JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. These two revisional applications are taken up together, since both arise from the same proceeding and are thematically connected. 2. C.O. No. 721 of 2018 has been preferred against an order dated February 5, 2018, whereby the challenge taken out by the petitioner to the maintainability of a proceeding under Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1971 Act”) was turned down. 3. By virtue of C.O. No. 1034 of 2018, a subsequent order dated May 2, 2018, closing evidence and arguments in the same proceeding, on the prayer of the present petitioner for adjournment on the ground of pendency of C.O. No. 721 of 2018, has been challenged. 4. Since the second revisional application is consequent to the first, C.O. No. 721 of 2018 is taken up for adjudication prior to C.O. No. 1034 of 2018. 5. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner was in occupation of the disputed premises as a lessee from prior to September 16, 1958. On November 19, 1988, the opposite party issued a notice to the petitioner to vacate possession of the said premises immediately on the ground of sub-letting and change of user. 6. Subsequently, on May 2, 2017 a notice to quit was issued by the opposite party, thereby terminating the tenancy of the petitioner and asking the petitioner to quit, vacate and deliver up vacant and peaceful possession of 3327 sq. ft on the ground floor, southern side of flat no. 1, “National Garden”, 1B, Judges’ Court Road, Kolkata-700027, on or before expiry of May 31, 2017. 7. The short questions which fall for adjudication in the present revisions are: i. Does the two-Judge Division Bench judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Suhas H. Pophale vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and its Estate Officer - (2014) 4 SCC 657 , still hold the field or, being contrary to the judgment rendered in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and another vs. Punjab National Bank and others – (1990) 4 SCC 406 , rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court and the judgment of M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another – AIR 1981 SC 670 , rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, can be said to have binding effect? ii. ii. If Suhas H. Pophale (supra) is binding on this Court, whether the precedent laid down therein holds true only in the context of State Rent Control Acts or also the Transfer of Property Act, 1882? 8. The petitioner argues that since admittedly the petitioner came into possession of the disputed premises as a lessee under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the termination of such jural relationship in terms of Section 4 of the 1971 Act was de hors the law, vitiating the consequential proceeding under Section 5 of the 1971 Act. 9. It is argued that Suhas H. Pophale (supra) itself holds that the said judgment clarified and explained Ashoka Marketing (supra) and as such, Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was neither hit by the principle of per incuriam nor by the principle of sub silentio. 10. Placing reliance on several paragraphs of Suhas H. Pophale (supra), learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the said judgment followed Ashoka Marketing (supra) and M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company (supra) and only explained and clarified the full scope of operation of those judgments. The question as to the applicability of the 1971 Act prior to September 16, 1958, that is the date from which the Act originally came into force, was not considered in Ashoka Marketing (supra) at all. Suhas H. Pophale (supra) categorically laid down that two categories of occupants of the public corporations were excluded from the coverage of the 1971 Act. First, those who were in occupation since prior to September 16, 1958, when the Act became applicable, who were clearly outside the coverage of the Act. Secondly, those who came in occupation thereafter, but prior to the date of the premises concerned belonging to a government corporation or company, and were covered under a protective provision of the State Rent Act, who also got excluded. 11. In such view of the matter, learned counsel submits that Suhas H. Pophale (supra) still holds the field in this respect. 12. Learned counsel further cites a judgment reported at (2014) 16 SCC 321 [Band Box Private Limited vs. Estate Officer, Punjab and Sind Bank and another], which reiterated the proposition laid down in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) and reaffirmed that the precedent laid down in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was not contrary to either Ashoka Marketing (supra) or M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company (supra). 13. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner next cites a judgment reported at 2017 (6) Mh.L.J. 330 [Dr. Preeti Bhatt vs. Central Bank of India], which also held that Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was not per incuriam, since the same was not in conflict with the Constitution Bench decision in Ashoka Marketing (supra). 14. The next judgment cited by the petitioner was reported at 2015 SCC OnLine Cal 1327 [M/s Heilgers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another], wherein Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was referred to. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly cites two Single Bench judgments of this court, respectively reported at 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 17606 [M/s B.C. Shaw & Sons vs. The Union of India & Ors.] and at 2015 SCC OnLine Cal 7623 [Chong Hsin Wong vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors.]. In both the said decisions, Suhas H. Pophale (supra) did not find favour, not only on facts but on a consideration of the pre-existing judgments in Ashoka Marketing (supra) and M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Company (supra). However, it was submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that both the said judgments overlooked the effect of Band Box (supra), which further strengthened the ratio laid down in Suhas H. Pophale (supra), and as such, could not be said to lay down a precedent in context. 16. This apart, learned counsel for the petitioner urged a secondary point as to the appointment of the Estate Officer himself being de hors the mandate of the 1971 Act. It is argued that, despite such discrepancy in appointment being pointed out, the opposite party did not produce any document to show the proper appointment of the Estate Officer within the contemplation of the 1971 Act and the Estate Officer refused to adjudicate such issue, which was basic and hit the root of the Estate Officer’s jurisdiction, but proceeded with the hearing of the matter nonetheless. 17. It is thus submitted that C.O. No. 721 of 2018 ought to be allowed on the above grounds, setting aside the impugned order and holding that the proceeding under Section 5 of the 1971 Act was not maintainable and ought to be dropped/quashed. 18. 17. It is thus submitted that C.O. No. 721 of 2018 ought to be allowed on the above grounds, setting aside the impugned order and holding that the proceeding under Section 5 of the 1971 Act was not maintainable and ought to be dropped/quashed. 18. In C.O. No. 1034 of 2018, the petitioner argues that the Estate Officer acted without jurisdiction in hastily concluding the hearing and reserving the matter for final order without providing the petitioner further chance of cross-examination of the witness of the present opposite party and/or to argue on merits. Such a modus operandi, despite pendency of C.O. No. 721 of 2018, was an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction and occasioned miscarriage of justice according to the petitioner. Hence, it is argued that the order impugned in the said revisional application also ought to be set aside. 19. Learned counsel for the opposite party criticizes the arguments of the petitioner on the premise that Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was delivered primarily on the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, which does not specifically exempt ‘public premises’, as defined in Section 2(e)(2)(ii) of the 1971 Act, from the sweep of the 1971 Act. However, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1997 Act”) specifically excludes such premises. As such, it is argued, Suhas H. Pophale (supra), which relates to applicability of the 1971 Act vis-à-vis the State Rent Control Acts, is not applicable to the present lis. 20. Learned counsel for the opposite party refers to an unreported order dated March 17, 2015 passed by a two-Judge Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 35859 of 2014 [Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Vita Pvt. Ltd. and another], where it was observed that Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was contrary to Ashoka Marketing (supra) and as such, referred the matter for decision of a three-Judge Bench. It is submitted with reference to the said order that the binding effect of the ratio laid down in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) is under cloud and as such ought not to be followed. 21. It is submitted with reference to the said order that the binding effect of the ratio laid down in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) is under cloud and as such ought not to be followed. 21. Learned counsel for the opposite party relies on the decisions of Ashoka Marketing (supra), M/s Jain Ink (supra) as well as the following judgments: I. (1989) 2 SCC 754 [Union of India and another vs. Raghubir Singh (dead) by LRS], wherein a Constitution Bench decided inter alia that a Division Bench is bound by an earlier decision of another Division Bench of equal or more Judges and that, on disagreement or doubt, the later Division Bench might refer the matter to a larger Bench. II. In (2006) 1 CHN 513 [Jaharlal Saha & Ors. vs. Pradip Saha & Ors.], it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the decision of a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court cannot be relied upon as precedent in view of a contrary decision by a Bench of three-Judges of the Supreme Court. A Bench of two Judges, it was held, is bound to follow the decision of a Bench of three Judges and cannot even refer the matter directly to a five-Judge Bench, questioning the propriety of the decision. III. (1976) 4 SCC 52 [The State of U.P. vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi was next cited, wherein it was held inter alia that even in cases where a High Court finds any conflict between the views expressed by larger and smaller benches of the Supreme Court, it cannot disregard or skirt the views expressed by the larger benches and the proper course for the High Court in such a case would be to try to find out and follow the opinion expressed by larger benches of the Supreme Court in preference of those expressed by smaller benches of the Supreme Court which practice, hardened as it had into a rule of law, was followed by the Supreme Court itself. IV. IV. (2011) 13 SCC 446 [Banatwala and company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another] held that the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, with respect to fixation of standard rent for premises and requiring the landlord not to cut off or withhold essential supply or service and to restore the same when necessary, were not in conflict with or repugnant to any of the provisions of the 1971 Act. It was further held that the provisions of the 1971 Act shall govern the relationship between the public undertakings covered under the Act and their occupants to the extent they provided for eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises, recovery of arrears of rent or damages for such unauthorized occupation and other incidental mattes specified under the Act. On the other hand, the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 shall govern the relationship between the said undertakings and their occupants to the extent the said Act covers the other aspects of the relationship between the landlord and tenants, not covered under the 1971 Act. V. In AIR 1977 SC 265 [Sarwan Singh and another vs. Shri Kasturi Lal], it was held inter alia that when two or more laws operate in the same field and each contains a non-obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law, such conflict has to be decided in reference to the object and purpose of the laws under consideration. Apart from whether laws operated for a specific and special purpose, it is the later enactment prevailing over the earlier which was also to be taken into account. 22. In view of the aforementioned decisions, the opposite party argues that Suhas H. Pophale (supra) is no longer a binding precedent and ought not to be followed in the present case. 23. As to the objection regarding the Estate Officer having jurisdiction, it is argued by the opposite party that the proceeding is already at the final hearing stage and as such, the question can be decided at trial. 24. As to the order impugned in C.O. No. 1034 of 2018, it is submitted by the opposite party that the fate of the said revision would be consequent on the decision of C.O. No. 721 of 2018. 25. Upon considering the submissions of both sides, this Court is of the following opinion: 26. 24. As to the order impugned in C.O. No. 1034 of 2018, it is submitted by the opposite party that the fate of the said revision would be consequent on the decision of C.O. No. 721 of 2018. 25. Upon considering the submissions of both sides, this Court is of the following opinion: 26. Ashoka Marketing (supra) as well as M/s Jain Ink (supra) were both rendered by Benches of the Supreme Court superior in numerical strength to that of the two Judge Division Bench deciding Suhas H. Pophale (supra) . In the event Suhas H. Pophale (supra) had not considered or held contrary to the previous two judgments, a question might have arisen as to Suhas H. Pophale (supra) being hit by the principle of sub silentio and/or per incuriam. However, Suhas H. Pophale (supra), throughout the judgment, refers to the previous two judgments as well as other previous judgments holding the field and the two Judge Bench deciding Suhas H. Pophale (supra) was of the specific opinion that the proposition dealt with in Suhas H. Pophale (supra) had not been considered or decided in either Ashoka Marketing (supra) or M/s Jain Ink (supra). In fact, Suhas H. Pophale (supra) professes to follow the previous judgments and only decided on a chink left untouched by the previous judgments. 27. In view of the said view having specifically been taken by the Supreme Court (albeit by a two-Judge Bench) in Suhas H. Pophale (supra), this Court has no authority to question such observation of the Supreme Court and consequentially the binding effect of Suhas H. Pophale (supra). 28. The subsequent reference of Suhas H. Pophale (supra) to a larger Bench, by another two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, does not lessen the binding effect of Suhas H. Pophale (supra), more so since the order, by which such reference was made, does not discuss on merits the proposition in question or lay down any proposition upon a detailed consideration of the same but merely refers Suhas H. Pophale (supra) to a larger bench. In such view of the matter, the first question falling for consideration herein, has to be held in the affirmative. In such view of the matter, the first question falling for consideration herein, has to be held in the affirmative. Suhas H. Pophale (supra) still holds the field and has binding effect on this Court, being self-evidently in consonance with Ashoka Marketing (supra) as well as M/s Jain Ink (supra) and only clarifying and explaining the gaps left by the said previous judgments. 29. The question which next falls for consideration is whether the principle of Suhas H. Pophale (supra) can be held to be true in the context of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which governs the present lis, having been rendered in the context of the operation of Rent Control Acts vis-à-vis the 1971 Act. 30. In this context, certain differences in the Rent Control Act in question, that is the 1997 Act and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 have to be taken note of. 31. First, under the 1997 Act, tenancy of the occupant is terminated only upon a decree for eviction being passed on a ground specified in Section 6 of the said Act, whereas under the Transfer of Property Act, a notice to quit either under Section 106 or under Section 111 (on any of the grounds of forfeiture being mentioned) would suffice to terminate the lis. While the 1997 Act provides statutory protection to a tenant even after termination of the contractual relationship between the parties, the Transfer of Property Act withdraws such protection upon a quit notice being issued and only provides for the subsequent procedure for eviction and other incidents of lis. 32. Secondly, the 1997 Act is special statute governing the relationship, eviction and other instances of tenants and landlords. The Transfer of Property Act, on the other hand, is on a broader perspective and takes under its sway not merely leases but all other previous inter vivos transfers relating to immovable property. 33. Thirdly, the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act are no better from the viewpoint of the lessee than those of Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act. While the latter provision contemplates determination of jural relationship “for any reason whatsoever”, termination of a monthly tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act envisages only a fifteen days’ notice and does not even speak of any reason whatsoever for termination. While the latter provision contemplates determination of jural relationship “for any reason whatsoever”, termination of a monthly tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act envisages only a fifteen days’ notice and does not even speak of any reason whatsoever for termination. As such, the position of the Transfer of Property Act lessee is worst than an occupier under the 1971 Act on that score. 34. Hence, the Transfer of Property Act cannot be said to provide any special protection to the occupier vis-à-vis the 1971 Act, akin to that provided by the 1997 Act or for that matter any other State Rent Control Act. 35. Moreover, a combined reading of Section 3(a)(iii) of the 1997 Act, which exempts premises owned by the Government undertakings or enterprises from the operation of the said Act, and the definition of “public premises” for the purpose of the 1971 Act, which includes such premises within the fold of the said Act, point unerringly to the conclusion that there is no conflict between the 1997 Act and the 1971 Act. The 1971 Act is thus a special statute governing the public premises, which are under discussion at present, thereby automatically excluding the applicability of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to such premises. 36. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the Estate Officer could not be said to have acted without jurisdiction in taking up the proceeding under Section 5 of the 1971 Act for adjudication upon holding the same to be maintainable. 37. That apart, in the present case, the notice to quit dated May 2, 2017 sufficiently satisfied the pre-requisite envisaged under Section 2(g) of the 1971 Act as well as Section 111, alternatively Section 106, of the Transfer of Property Act insofar as determination of the previous jural relationship between the parties was concerned. Hence, the Estate Officer had jurisdiction, in any event, to entertain and decide the proceeding under Section 5 of the 1971 Act, since the petitioner had already been rendered to be in ‘unauthorized occupation’ as contemplated under Sections 2(g) and 4 of the 1971 Act by the notice to quit. 38. As regards the Estate Officer having been duly appointed in terms of Section 3 of the 1971 Act, undoubtedly such issue has to be decided by the Estate Officer before passing any final order of eviction under Section 5 of the 1971 Act. 38. As regards the Estate Officer having been duly appointed in terms of Section 3 of the 1971 Act, undoubtedly such issue has to be decided by the Estate Officer before passing any final order of eviction under Section 5 of the 1971 Act. However, since the proceeding has already reached the final hearing stage, it would be counter-productive to set the clock back by directing such issue to be decided before proceeding further with the hearing of the main matter. Of course, the parties will be at liberty to adduce evidence on such score and to be heard on merits on the said issue as well as the other issues, which would sufficiently meet the ends of justice. The issue has to be kept open for being decided by the Estate Officer along with other issues. 39. In view of the maintainability point being decided against the petitioner, who was the respondent before the Estate Officer, the question of violation of natural justice, in the Estate Officer having relied upon judgments not cited by parties and on which the parties were not given any opportunity to argue, becomes merely academic and need not to be gone into. 40. Accordingly, C.O. No. 721 of 2018 is dismissed, thereby affirming the order impugned therein, whereby the Estate Officer turned down the maintainability point raised by the present petitioner. It is hereby held that the proceeding under Section 5 of the 1971 Act, which is going on before the Estate Officer, is maintainable and has to be decided on merits by the Estate Officer. There will be no order as to costs. 41. As regards C.O. No. 1034 of 2018, although filing of C.O. No. 721 of 2018 itself did not operate as stay of the proceedings before the Estate Officer, in all fairness it would be proper if the Estate Officer waited for a decision on the said other revisional application before hastily closing arguments and fixing the matter for passing orders, since the maintainability of the proceeding itself was sub judice before this court. 42. Accordingly, C.O. No. 1034 of 2018 is allowed, thereby setting aside the order impugned therein and permitting the parties to complete the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of all their witnesses and thereafter to argue the matter on merits. 42. Accordingly, C.O. No. 1034 of 2018 is allowed, thereby setting aside the order impugned therein and permitting the parties to complete the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of all their witnesses and thereafter to argue the matter on merits. The Estate Officer, after giving full opportunity to both sides to complete their evidence and arguments, will finally decide the matter in accordance with law, in terms of the orders passed in C.O. No. 721 of 2018 and the instant revisional application. 43. The Estate Officer is directed to dispose of proceeding No. EO/522/0917 pending before him, as expeditiously as possible without granting unnecessary adjournments to either side, preferably within four months from the date of communication of this order to the Estate Officer. 44. There will be no order as to costs. 45. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance of requisite formalities.