ORDER : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This habeas corpus petition has been filed by the petitioner Kanta Devi praying for quashment of order dated 27.09.2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Sikar for preventive detention of her husband, Om Prakash @ Jeevan Ram son of Boduram, by caste Jat resident of Baral, Police Station Ranoli, District Sikar as also order dated 15/16th November, 2017 passed by the Joint Secretary to the Government, Department of Home (Disaster Management), Jaipur under Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 2006 (for short ‘the Act’), confirming the aforementioned order of preventive detention of Om Prakash @ Jeevan Ram for a period of one year up to 27.09.2018. 2. The District Magistrate, Sikar passed the order of preventive detention of petitioner’s husband on 27.09.2017, information of which was given to him by Superintendent of Central Jail, Bikaner where he was lodged with its forwarding letter dated 14.10.2017 conveying about meeting of the Advisory Board. Said order was initially approved by the State Government on 06.10.2017. Thereafter, meeting was scheduled to be held on 24.10.2017 at 4.30 P.M. in the Conference Room in the premises of this Court at Jaipur which the petitioner’s husband was informed that he could also join through video conference and produce any material he wanted to do. On receiving recommendation of Advisory Board, the Government issued order dated 15/16th November, 2017 confirming the order of preventive detention of petitioner’s husband on the basis of report of the Advisory Board. 3. Mr. Vijay Poonia, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that impugned order of preventive detention dated 27.09.2017 passed by the District Magistrate, Sikar has been confirmed by the State Government without due application of mind. The District Magistrate, while passing the aforesaid order, has acted in an arbitrary manner, which is reflected from sequence of the proceedings mentioned in the order itself that he received letter/request from the Superintendent of Police, Sikar on 27.09.2017 and it is on that very day that the order of preventive detention of petitioner’s husband was passed by the District Magistrate, Sikar. District Magistrate has, thus, acted in an unprecedented haste in passing the impugned order. Voluminous record of 300 pages could not have been examined by the District Magistrate, Sikar on the same day. This clearly shows that there was no application of mind. District Magistrate has, thus, acted in an unprecedented haste in passing the impugned order. Voluminous record of 300 pages could not have been examined by the District Magistrate, Sikar on the same day. This clearly shows that there was no application of mind. He has signed on the dotted lines and it was not possible for him to pass 10 pages order of preventive detention on the same day, after making proper application of mind. This proves that the District Magistrate, Sikar acted in a pre-determined and biased manner. It is argued that fundamental right of life and personal liberty of a citizen guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India should not be violated in a slipshod manner. There was no material with the District Magistrate, Sikar to conclude that mere involvement of the petitioner’s husband in some crimes, most of which were ordinary crimes, would have the effect of disturbing public order and tempo of the society. This was an ordinary law and order problem and could be tackled under the ordinary laws. 4. It is argued that in view of provisions of Section 11 of the Act, the case of petitioner’s husband was required to be placed before the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks from the date he was detained but, eventually and admittedly case of petitioner’s husband was placed before the Advisory Board belatedly on 24.10.2017, much after expiry of mandatory period of three weeks. Safeguards provided under Sections 9, 11 and 12 of the Act, which were mandatory to be followed, have thus been violated, therefore, impugned order of preventive detention of petitioner’s husband is liable to be set aside. It is argued that petitioner’s husband was already in judicial custody when the impugned order was passed. It is settled position of law that preventive detention order can be passed for detaining a person, who is out of reach of the law, but in the present case when the petitioner’s husband was already in jail, there was no need for passing such an order. Order of preventive detention of petitioner’s husband is therefore liable to be set aside as the same has been passed without due application of mind. 5. Order of preventive detention of petitioner’s husband is therefore liable to be set aside as the same has been passed without due application of mind. 5. It is argued that the petitioner’s husband is neither a “dangerous person” in the meaning of Section 2 (c) of the Act, nor a “habitual” offender in the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. He has not been convicted even in a single case. Besides, last criminal case was registered against petitioner’s husband on 04.01.2016 and almost 20 months had gone from that date when impugned order of preventive detention was passed on 27.09.2017. Therefore, pre-requisite conditions of habitual offender as per Section 2(g) of the Act that acts or omissions were committed repeatedly, persistently and frequently having a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts or omission is not satisfied. The order of preventive detention has been passed in a mechanical manner only on the premise that total 17 criminal cases were registered against husband of the petitioner whereas in 5 of them, he had already been acquitted. There was no material with the District Magistrate, Sikar and for that matter, with the State Government to arrive at the subjective satisfaction about imperative need of detaining petitioner’s husband and to conclude that if he was left free, he might misuse the liberty and create a breach of peace in the society thereby putting life and liberty of the people to peril. 6. Learned counsel argued that the copy of notification dated 10.08.2017 issued under Section 3(2) of the Act purportedly empowering the District Magistrate, Sikar to exercise powers under Section 3(1) of the Act has not been supplied to the petitioner’s husband, in the absence of which he was deprived of the right to make effective representation there against before the Advisory Board and the State Government. There was no material with the State Government on the basis of which it arrived at the satisfaction that circumstances were prevailing or likely to prevail in District Sikar to justify authorization in favour of District Magistrate, Sikar. Learned counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay Vs. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, 1951 AIR 157; Ahmedhussain Shaikhhussain (C) Vs. Commissioner of Police, 1989 AIR 2274 and judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in Salman Khan Vs. Learned counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in The State of Bombay Vs. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, 1951 AIR 157; Ahmedhussain Shaikhhussain (C) Vs. Commissioner of Police, 1989 AIR 2274 and judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in Salman Khan Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (D.B. Habeas Corpus No. 161/2016 decided on 27.01.2017). 7. Mr. B.N. Sandu, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State opposed the habeas corpus petition and argued that the petitioner’s husband had been involving himself in criminal activities regularly for last several years and there was enough material with the District Magistrate, Sikar to arrive at the satisfaction that for maintenance of public order, it was necessary to make an order directing that he should be detained. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that the State Government also had enough material to arrive at the satisfaction that circumstances were prevailing or likely to prevail within the local limits of District Sikar where it had become necessary to direct by order in writing to the District Magistrate to exercise powers provided under Section 3(1) of the Act. It is only after arriving at such satisfaction that notification dated 10.08.2017 has been issued. Learned Additional Advocate General produced before the Court original record showing that there was sufficient material to arrive at satisfaction that circumstances were prevailing or likely to prevail to justify authorisation of the District Magistrate, Sikar in terms of Section 3(2) of the Act to exercise powers under Section 3(1) of the Act. 8. It is argued that the Superintendent of Central Jail, Bikaner informed the petitioner’s husband vide letter dated 28.09.2017 about his detention order passed by District Magistrate, Sikar. District Magistrate submitted report to the State Government within time limit as it was sent to the Joint Secretary, Home Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur vide letter dated 28.09.2017. The petitioner’s husband was also communicated grounds of detention within three days, i.e. on 28.09.2017. The State Government has followed every single provision of the PASA Act. Advisory Board had also confirmed the order of preventive detention vide its letter dated 25.10.2017 and thereafter vide letter dated 03.11.2017. State of Rajasthan vide letters dated 15/16.11.2017 has confirmed the order of preventive detention. The State Government has followed every single provision of the PASA Act. Advisory Board had also confirmed the order of preventive detention vide its letter dated 25.10.2017 and thereafter vide letter dated 03.11.2017. State of Rajasthan vide letters dated 15/16.11.2017 has confirmed the order of preventive detention. Learned Additional Advocate General has produced for perusal of the Court original record of the case and also referred to letter of Private Secretary to the Chairman of the Advisory Board dated 12.10.2017, conveying that meeting of the Advisory Board had been fixed on 24.10.2017. It is, therefore, clear that matter was placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of passing of detention order. Even if therefore meeting of the Advisory Board was convened on 24.10.2017, i.e. beyond three weeks, that would not be a reason to hold that the matter was not placed before the Advisory Board within the requisite period of three weeks. 9. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that the government was cognizant of the fact that order of preventive detention was passed by the District Magistrate, Sikar, as he was aware of the nature of the case in which petitioner’s husband was detained in jail and it was apprehended that he might be soon released on bail. And husband of the petitioner had actually been granted bail and if had he not been detained by passing of preventive detention order, he would have come out of jail in pursuance of bail order and then become a menace for the society. Petitioner’s husband Om Prakash @ Jeevan Ram is a history sheeter of the area and his history sheet in category A was opened by order of Superintendent of Police, Sikar. Learned Additional Advocate General referred to Criminal Case No. 47/2006 registered for offence under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 302, 435, 303, 324 IPC and Section 4/25 of Arms Act, in which Rajendra @ Raju Thehat and husband of the petitioner Om Prakash @ Jeevan Ram were accused and were lodged in the jail. Mukesh Kumar, Constable was given summons for being served on the witness Ashok Kumar. Mukesh Kumar, Constable was given summons for being served on the witness Ashok Kumar. Family members of Ashok Kumar told Mukesh Kumar that while Ashok Kumar was coming to depose before the Court, aforesaid Rajendra @ Raju Thehat and Om Prakash @ Jeevan Ram sent 4-5 persons, who abducted Ashok Kumar and threatened him of dire consequence if he gave evidence in the matter. Even though, S.H.O., Police Station Khandela gave full assurance of protection to aforesaid witness but when he appeared before the Court on the next date on 15.02.2017, he turned hostile. It is argued that Surendra Kumar Shekhawat, Superintendent, Central Jail, Bikaner in his report dated 24.07.2014 mentioned about quarrel between two groups of the criminals inside jail premises where prisoner, Jai Prakash @ JP opened fire at gangster Balveer @ Banuda as a result of which he died and thereafter his companions Anandpal Singh, Nemichand @ Nemla, Bhawani Singh Rajput, Manoj Choudhary, Vikram Singh Rajput had beaten Jai Prakash and Ram Pal to death. Petitioner’s husband Om Prakash @ Jeevan Ram and Jagdish @ JP were also made accused in that case which was registered for offence under Sections 302, 307, 147, 148, 149, 120B IPC and Section 3/25 Arms Act. Learned Additional Advocate General, in support of his arguments, relied upon judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in Subhash Chandra Kandara Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, 2017 (3) RLW 2247 (Raj.). 10. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully perused the material on record as also original record of the case produced before us. 11. So far as non-supply of copy of notification dated 10.08.2017 issued under Section 3(2) of the Act authorising District Magistrate, Sikar to exercise powers under Section 3(1) of the Act is concerned, we do not find any substance in the argument that petitioner’s husband thereby was deprived of the right to make effective representation before the Advisory Board. The petitioner, of course, on that basis can raise an argument about absence of requisite and relevant material before the State Government to arrive at the satisfaction as to the necessity of authorising District Magistrate, Sikar for exercising the powers under Section 3(1) of the Act. The petitioner, of course, on that basis can raise an argument about absence of requisite and relevant material before the State Government to arrive at the satisfaction as to the necessity of authorising District Magistrate, Sikar for exercising the powers under Section 3(1) of the Act. Perusal of the original record, which has been produced before us, indicates that the District Magistrate, Sikar vide his letter dated 23.06.2017 forwarded proposal to the State Government giving reference of the gang war prevalent in his district and adverse effect it had on the public order and tempo of the society. He mentioned therein that this has become regular feature of these criminals to indulge in the offences of murder, loot, dacoity, illicit liquor, rape, abduction and arms act. Many people have lost their lives in the gang war that had been taking place in District Sikar. Activities of these persons cannot be controlled in the ordinary process by subjecting them to ordinary laws because in most of the cases, these people secured acquittal on the basis of compromise or otherwise delayed the trial of the case by threatening the witnesses and preventing them from coming to the Court. Reference in particular was given to activities of half a dozen accused against whom large number of cases were registered against them very regularly. On the basis of proposal received from the District Magistrate, Sikar, the matter was examined in the Government at various stages and was eventually approved by the competent authority, i.e. Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur as also the Hon’ble Home Minister of the State. On perusal of the original note sheets and the original record, we are satisfied that the Government had the requisite material to arrive at the satisfaction that circumstances were prevailing or likely to prevail in the local limits of District Sikar where it had become necessary for the District Magistrate to exercise the powers under Section 3(1) of the Act and therefore, we repel the argument to the contrary. We are also not inclined to countenance the argument that by mere non-supply of copy of said notification, petitioner’s husband was deprived of the right to make effective representation before the Advisory Board. Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ahmedhussain Shaikhhussain (supra) and The State of bombay Vs. We are also not inclined to countenance the argument that by mere non-supply of copy of said notification, petitioner’s husband was deprived of the right to make effective representation before the Advisory Board. Judgment of the Supreme Court in Ahmedhussain Shaikhhussain (supra) and The State of bombay Vs. Atma Ram Sridhar (supra) relied by learned counsel for the petitioner being distinguishable on the facts of the present case, do not afford any help to the petitioner. 12. So far as contention that matter of the petitioner’s husband was not placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of his detention on 27.09.2017 is concerned, this issue has already been set at rest by this Court in Rajesh Sharma @ Raju Pandit through Rakehs Sharma V. State of Rajasthan, 2017 (4) WLC (Raj.) 709, because after the District Magistrate, Sikar in the present case had forwarded the matter to the Advisory Board and Private Secretary to the Chairman to the Advisory Board vide letter dated 12.10.2017 conveyed to the District Magistrate, Sikar and the State Government that meeting of the Board shall be convened on 24.10.2017. What would be the meaning of connotation, “place before” in this context has been deliberated upon and decided by the Supreme Court in Raisuddin Alias Babu Tamchi Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, (1983) 4 SCC 537 . Therein also, analogous provision contained in Section 10 of the National Security Act, 1980, which cast a duty on the appropriate Government to place before the Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention, the relevant papers pertaining to the detention was interpreted. Similar argument was made before the Supreme Court that there has been violation of provisions of Section 10 of the National Security Act, 1980 because the Advisory Board has not considered the case of the petitioner therein within three weeks from the date of detention. Repelling that argument, the Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment held as under: “5. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Under the section, a duty is cast on the appropriate Government to "place before" the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 within three weeks from the date of detention, the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Under the section, a duty is cast on the appropriate Government to "place before" the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 within three weeks from the date of detention, the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order. The petitioner's counsel wanted us to interpret the words "place before the Advisory Board" as meaning "get considered by the Advisory Board". We are wholly unable to accede to this argument. Under the terms of the section, the duty cast on the appropriate Government is to forward to the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 within three weeks from the date of detention, the papers pertaining to the detention of the detenu consisting of the grounds on which the order has been made, the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, etc. It is to be remembered that the Advisory Board is not an entity subordinate to the Government. It is a wholly independent body consisting of persons who are or have been or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High Court. It is entirely for the Advisory Board to regulate its Schedule of holding meetings and conducting its business in accordance with the procedure laid down Under Section 11 of the Act which has specified a time limit of seven weeks from the date of detention for the submission of the Board's report to the appropriate Government. It is, therefore, wholly wrong to interpret the words "place before" as meaning anything more than forward to or submit before the Advisory Board the relevant papers relating to the detention of the detenu. In the present case, the Advisory Board has disposed of the Petitioner's case well within the period of seven weeks specified in sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act. This contention of the petitioner is also, therefore, devoid of substance.” 13. As per the provisions of Section 12(1) of the PASA Act, the Advisory Board has to give its report to the State Government within 50 days from the date of detention of the detenue. In the present case, husband of the petitioner was detained on 27.09.2017 and meeting of the Advisory Board was convened on 24.10.2017 and its report was sent to State Government, i.e. well within 50 days. In the present case, husband of the petitioner was detained on 27.09.2017 and meeting of the Advisory Board was convened on 24.10.2017 and its report was sent to State Government, i.e. well within 50 days. Section 11 and 12 of the PASA Act were thus fully complied with. Argument of the petitioner in this respect is, therefore, rejected. 14. Cited judgment of this Court in the case of Salman Khan (supra) is also distinguishable on the facts of the present case because in that case proposal was sent by Superintendent of Police, Bikaner to District Magistrate, Bikaner on 21.09.2015 and order of detention was passed by District Magistrate after one year on 15.09.2016. It was held by this Court that the finding of the District Magistrate, Bikaner to treat the petitioner detenue therein as “dangerous person” so as to take action under the Act was not in consonance with law. Additionally, this Court in the aforesaid case observed that most of the cases registered against the petitioner therein were relating to the offences of Indian Penal Code and Arms Act and in none of the cases, the petitioner was held guilty after trial and therefore, the recommendation of the Advisory Board to confirm the preventive detention order was not in consonance with law. This Court in the aforesaid case held so because none of the cases registered against the petitioner therein was related to the offence of drugs, immoral trafficking, property grabbing and most of the cases were related to the offence of personal dispute. The aforesaid findings were recorded by Coordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur on the facts of that case. We, on the basis of the arguments advanced and record that has been produced before us, are not inclined to hold that in view of nature of cases registered against husband of the petitioner that he cannot be treated as dangerous person. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment passed by this Court and cited by learned Additional Advocate General in Subhash Chandra Kandara (supra) in which case the accused had only 14 cases registered against him in which he had already been enlarged on bail, but he was found to misuse the liberty of bail. In this connection, we may refer to the judgment passed by this Court and cited by learned Additional Advocate General in Subhash Chandra Kandara (supra) in which case the accused had only 14 cases registered against him in which he had already been enlarged on bail, but he was found to misuse the liberty of bail. It was held that merely on the basis of registration of number of cases, a person cannot be termed as dangerous person but at the same time it is duty of the State to assess case of each of the accused and reach on the conclusion that whether criminal activity of the offender adversely affects the public order or not. If it finds that it is not possible to control the activities of that person as per ordinary laws, the State would be justified in invoking power of preventive detention under the special law. In the present case also, we find that the competent authority has arrived at the satisfaction that petitioner’s husband had become menace to the society and his activities could not be tackled in ordinary laws and in order to prevent him from acting in the manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order, it had become necessary to make an order of his preventive detention. 15. We are also not inclined to accept the argument that for a person to be habitual offender within Section 2(g) of the Act, he ought to have been convicted in some of the offences. Husband of the petitioner, as has been argued at the Bar, has been acquitted in five cases out of total 17 cases registered against him, but these acquittals have been brought about as a result of either compromise or witnesses turning hostile which as per learned Additional Advocate General, happened due to fear of the petitioner’s husband. For being habitual offender in the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act, a person should have committed several acts or omissions, repeatedly, persistently and frequently, having a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts or omission, but shall not include isolated, individual and dissimilar acts or omissions. For being habitual offender in the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act, a person should have committed several acts or omissions, repeatedly, persistently and frequently, having a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts or omission, but shall not include isolated, individual and dissimilar acts or omissions. In the present case, no new case has been registered against petitioner’s husband for last about 19 months primarily because he remained in jail, but the cases were being regularly registered against him since 2004 till the last one, which was registered on 04.01.2016 for offence under Sections 458, 504, 336, 120B IPC and Section 27 Arms Act. He has also been shown as accused in the offence of murder in the year 2014; one case of murder was registered in the year 2006, two cases of abduction; three cases of attempt to murder, and cases of dacoity and criminal tresspass, extortion and offences pertaining to causing hurt or grievous hurt and offence of Arms Act have also been registered against petitioner’s husband. Invocation of Section 3(1) of the Act by the District Magistrate in the present was fully justified because when the petitioner was already in jail, he succeeded in securing an order of bail in the case in which he was detained. 16. The Supreme Court in Subramanian Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Another, (2012) 4 SCC 699 was dealing with a case wherein order of preventive detention was passed under the provisions of T.N. Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 on the ground that the detenue was habitual offender, who acted in a manner prejudicial to maintenance of public order. Apart from incident of the year 2011 on the basis of which detention order was passed, two incidents which took place within a span of six months in 2010 and one incident of 2008 involving detenue were highlighted in the grounds of detention coupled with definite indication about impact thereof also precisely stated in the grounds. All incidents mentioned in the grounds substantiated subjective satisfaction of detaining authority as to how acts of the detenue were prejudicial to public order and in that context, it was held by the Supreme Court that past incidents cannot be regarded as stale. 17. The Supreme Court in G. Reddeiah Vs. All incidents mentioned in the grounds substantiated subjective satisfaction of detaining authority as to how acts of the detenue were prejudicial to public order and in that context, it was held by the Supreme Court that past incidents cannot be regarded as stale. 17. The Supreme Court in G. Reddeiah Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Another, (2012) 2 SCC 389 was dealing with a case where preventive detention order was passed under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Preventive Detention Act, 1986 as the detenue therein was found involved in felling, transporting, smuggling of red sanders trees and committing theft of forest wealth for as many as eight times within a year thus, causing irreprarable loss to national wealth. It was held that If the Government/detaining authority is able to satisfy the court that a person either by himself or in association with other members of a gang habitually commits or attempts or abets such commission of offence punishable under IPC, he can be detained in terms of the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Forest Act and Forest Rules subject to satisfying Section 3 of 1986 Andhra Pradesh Preventive Detention Act and such satisfaction should either be reflected in detention order or in affidavit justifying detention order. Grounds of detention therein clearly indicated that the detenue was habitually indulging and was mastermind behind various illegal activities resulting in destruction of forest wealth and that detaining authority was unable to control him by invoking provisions of ordinary criminal law. The detention order was held valid by the Supreme Court. 18. The Supreme Court in Vijay Narain Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Others, (1984) 3 SCC 14 , while dealing with a case arising out of Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 and dealing with argument as to who would be anti-social element, held that a person habitually committing acts prejudicial to public order would be for the purpose of said Act an anti-social element. Observations made by their Lordships in para 31 are under: “31. It is seen from section 12 of the Act that it makes provision for the detention of an antisocial element. If a person is not an anti-social element, he cannot be detained under the Act. Observations made by their Lordships in para 31 are under: “31. It is seen from section 12 of the Act that it makes provision for the detention of an antisocial element. If a person is not an anti-social element, he cannot be detained under the Act. The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under section 12 of the Act is an antisocial element as defined in section 2 (d) of the Act. Sub-clauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of section 2 (d) of the Act which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be omitted from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses which need to be examined closely are sub-clauses (i) and (iv) of section 2 (d). Under sub-clause (i) of section 2 (d) of the Act, a person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Indian Penal Code is considered to be an anti-social element. Under sub-clause (iv) of section 2 (d) of the Act, a person who has been habitually’ passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both these sub-clauses, the word ‘habitually’ is used. The expression ‘habitually’ means ‘repeatedly’ or ‘persistently’. It implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts. Repeated, persistent and similar, but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. If connotes frequent commission of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in each of the said sub-clauses or an aggregate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use of the word ‘habitually’ separately in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iv) of section 2 (d) and not in sub-clauses (iii) and (v) of section 2 (d). This appears to be clear from the use of the word ‘habitually’ separately in subclause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iv) of section 2 (d) and not in sub-clauses (iii) and (v) of section 2 (d). If the State Legislature had intended that a commission of two or more acts or omissions referred to in any of the sub clauses (i) to (v) of section 2 (d) was sufficient to make a person an ‘anti-social element’, the definition would have run as ‘Anti-social element’ means “a person who habitually is.....” As section 2 (d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub-clause (iii) or sub-clause (v) of section 2 (d) a single act or omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person concerned as an ‘anti-social element’, in the case of sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind referred to in sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as an ‘anti-social element’. Commission of an act or omission referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) and of another act or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-clauses would not be sufficient to treat a person as an ‘anti-social element’. A single act or omission falling under sub-clause (i) and a single act or omission falling under sub-clause (iv) of section 2 (d) cannot, therefore, be characterised is a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them. Because the idea of ‘habit’ involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omissions in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them they cannot be treated as habitual ones.” 19. The Supreme Court in D.M. Nagaraja Vs. The Supreme Court in D.M. Nagaraja Vs. Government of Karnataka & Others, (2011) 10 SCC 215 , while dealing with an order of preventive detention passed under the provisions of Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985, held that if the detaining authority has arrived at subjective satisfaction that because of detenue’s habituality in committing crimes and violating public order and being not amenable and controllable by normal procedure, it was necessary to detain him under the provisions of the Act of 1985 and passed preventive detention order, such order is not open to interference on the ground that action could be taken against him under ordinary laws. 20. In view of above discussion of facts and the law, we do not find any infirmity in the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the competent authority in passing the impugned order of preventive detention. 21. In view of above, there is no merit in this habeas corpus petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.