JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. A.C. Sarma, the learned Senior counsel, assisted by Mr. G. Bhardwaj, the learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. K.K. Dey, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This appeal under section 96 of Civil Procedure Code (CPC for short) is directed against the judgment and decree dated 06.01.2009 passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 3, Kamrup (M), Guwahati in T.S. No. 235/2003, by which the suit of the appellant was dismissed. 3. The said suit was instituted by the appellant for declaration, realization of money, compensation and damages. As per the plaint, the case in brief is that the appellant is the owner of two storied RCC building situated at Rangia Town, which originally belonged to his father. In the year 1968, his father had let out the ground floor of the building to the respondents for Rangia Branch of the State Bank of India. In course of time, his father had constructed the first floor as per requirement of the bank and the premises was lease out by an Agreement dated 13.03.1995. The said lease was renewed from time to time and the agreement was to expire on 31.12.2003. From the Assam Tribune dated 30.09.2002, the appellant came to know that the respondents were going to shift their branch to another premise at MG Road, Rangia, w.e.f. 01.10.2002. It was stated that no notice of shifting was served on them. Seeking several relief’s including the prayer that the respondent had no right to vacate the suit premises, the appellant had filed T.S. No. 250/2002. A separate application for ad-interim injunction was filed, which was registered as Misc.(J) Case No.98/2002. It was projected that on 26.11.2002, when the appellant had visited the suit premises including the residential premises let out by his mother for the residence of respondent No.3, he was surprised to see that the respondents had shifted to another premises without any information and without delivering the keys. Hence, the appellant withdraw the said suit with liberty to file afresh. Hence, the appellant withdraw the said suit with liberty to file afresh. By the present suit, the appellant had prayed for declaration that he was entitled to realize monthly rent amounting to Rs.2,76,430/- in respect of the suit premises described in schedule of the plaint for the period from November, 2002 till expiry of the lease/tenancy agreement dated 04.05.2001, for realization of damages and compensation of Rs.6,69,053/-, being the value of the damages caused to the suit premises, for realization of electricity charges for February, 2003 of Rs.21,522.25 with further bill amount till expiry of the lease agreement dated 04.05.2001 with surcharge of Rs.2% per meter and for realization of interest at the rate of 10% P.A. with quarterly rests. 4. The respondent had contested the suit by filing their written statement. It was stated that there were several incidents of theft as well as snatching of money of bank’s customers and that the town had shifted towards the eastern side of the building after the railway track and therefore, the earlier premises had lost is importance. It was stated that the father of the appellant was aware of the process initiated for shifting of the branch, as such, by his letter dated 06.08.1986 and 30.11.1988, offered to construct building on his other plot of land and he had requested the respondents to give his first preference and he had also asked for tender on 09.09.1996. It was stated that as per lease agreement dated 04.05.2001, it was stipulated that the lessee was entitled to terminate the lease at any time on giving one calendar month’s prior notice and on expiry of the period of notice, the lease would cease to operate and that two notices dated 27.09.2002 were sent to the appellant and to his mother through messenger, the notices were refused and thereafter, the notices were issued by registered post and courier service. The registered notice to the mother of the appellant was received by one of her family member and the notice sent to the appellant was returned undelivered. It was stated that on 26.11.2002, the keys of the building was offered through J.C. Deka, one of their Branch staff, but the appellant had refused to accept the keys and the possession of the building and asked the said officer to lock the building. It was stated that on 26.11.2002, the keys of the building was offered through J.C. Deka, one of their Branch staff, but the appellant had refused to accept the keys and the possession of the building and asked the said officer to lock the building. It was submitted that the bank had shifted to the new premises on 01.10.2002 and that all the claims and allegations made in the plaint were denied. 5. On the basis of pleading of parties the following issues were framed for trial:- 1. Whether the defendants had shifted the bank from the tenanted premises for the plaintiff without giving any notice? 2. Whether the defendants have caused damages to the rented premises at the time of shifting their branch? 3. Whether the defendants have kept the keys after shifting their branch from the rented premises of the plaintiff? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the future rent, electricity charges and damages as claimed? 5. To what relief/relief’s the parties are entitled to? 6. In respect of issue No.1, the learned trial court by referring to the evidence on record, had held that the appellant’s father was aware of the shifting of the Branch and vide Ext.B, the father of the appellant has specifically mentioned that his proposal was turned down by the bank. It was further held that as per clause-VIII (IV) of the lease agreement (Ext.D), the respondents were entitled to terminate the lease at any time on giving one calendar month’s notice in writing. The learned trial court had also held that the notice issued to the appellant (Ext.E) and to his mother (Ext.F) on 27.09.2002, though projected to not been served, it was held that the address of the said notice was the same address of the appellant. It was held that Ext.7 was received by the appellant and replied on 03.03.2003 (Ext.12), and it was held that the respondents had shifted from the tenanted premises by giving proper notice. Hence, issue No.1 was decided against the appellant. 7. In respect of issue No.2, by referring to the evidence on record, it was held that there was no signature of the bank’s officer in the valuation report. Hence, issue No.1 was decided against the appellant. 7. In respect of issue No.2, by referring to the evidence on record, it was held that there was no signature of the bank’s officer in the valuation report. The learned trial court had also referred to the admissions made in the cross-examination by the appellant (PW-1) on 27.02.2007 that he had sold portions of the suit premises in favour of Smt. Bidyabati Devi, Sri Gouri Shankar and Sri Jagannath Sinha. By referring to the certified copy of the Sale Deeds bearing No. 877/04 dated 03.11.2004, 977/04 dated 06.12.2004 and 335/05 dated 04.04.2005, the learned trial court had made a mention that though the said sale deeds were on record, but it could not be exhibited due to objection by the appellant on the ground that the same were not the original. By referring to the long cross-examination of the DW-1, it was held that the appellant could not prove that any damages were caused to the tenanted premises at the time of shifting of their Branch. Hence, issue No.2 was decided against the appellant. 8. In respect of issue No.3, it was held that the respondents had advertised the shifting of their Branch by a public notice dated 30.09.2002 (Ext.6) and it was held that the respondents did not intentionally keep the keys, but under compelling circumstances they kept the keys after shifting of their Branch and subsequently the keys were deposited before the court on 29.03.2004 and therefore, the issue No.3 was decided against the respondents. 9. In respect of issues No.4 & 5, it was held that Ext.27, Ext.28, Ext.29 and Ext.30 were not admissible, as those documents were neither filed with the plaint nor produced at the time of evidence and that the said documents were not proved by the concerned signatories. It was also held that there could not be any grievance on the ground that the building was constructed as per the specification of the bank. Moreover, it was held that during the pendency of the suit, the appellant had sold parts of the suits premises, but after that the appellant had not amended the plaint. Under the circumstances, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to any relief and the said issues No. 4 & 5 were decided against the appellant. As a result, the suit was dismissed. 10. Under the circumstances, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to any relief and the said issues No. 4 & 5 were decided against the appellant. As a result, the suit was dismissed. 10. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant has submitted that till the date of filing of the suit, the respondents had not handed over the keys to the appellant and their goods and articles as well as other belongings is still lying in the suit premises when surveyor/valuer has assessed the damages caused to the suit premises by the respondents. It is submitted that the valuer had inspected the suit premises on 02.11.2002 in the presence of the bank’s officer, namely, Mr. J.C. Deka, and that after the inspection was done, the said officer had again locked the suit premises and, as such, the respondents were in the control of the suit premises. Hence, the appellant was entitled to rent electricity charges as well as the damages as assessed by the valuer till the keys and possession of the suit premises was returned to the appellant. It is further submitted that as the owner of the suit premises, the appellant was entitled to compensation for the damages caused to the suit premises and notwithstanding of the suit premises was subsequently sold, the cause of action for recovery of the damages and compensation arose on the date 02.11.2002, an assessment of the damages was done because as on the said date, he was the owner of the suit premises and that the sale deed having not exhibited by the respondents, this Court should not be influenced by the subsequent transfer of portions of the suit premises to others and that the appellant continued to have a right to claim compensation for arrear rent and damages caused to the suit premises. By referring to the case of Rangammal Vs. Kuppuswami & Anr., (2011) 12 SCC 220 and the case of Food Corporation of India Vs. The Assam State Co-operative Marketing & Consumers Federation Ltd. & Ors., 1999 (1) GLT 1, it is submitted that the respondents had taken the plea of sale of the suit premises and therefore, if the respondents were taking up a plea for sale of the property, the burden of proof lies squarely on the respondents and without any pleadings, no amount of evidence produced by the parties can be considered. 11. 11. Per-contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the appellant did not give any notice to the respondents before assessment of damages through his valuer. It is further submitted that the appellant had not given any notice to the respondents to participate in the valuation process, as such, the ex-parte valuation was tailor made to suits the requirement of the appellant and having not given the respondents to any notice to prepare such damages, the respondent could not be saddled with any liability. It is further submitted that Sri J.C. Deka, who had gone with the keys to the suit premises, had gone at the request of the appellant. However, it was not the pleaded case of the appellant that the said staff of the bank was authorized to participate in the process of valuation and moreover, in the absence of his signature in the measurement books of the valuer, there was no admission or any acknowledgment by the respondent bank about any damages, which the appellant contends to have happened at the time when the respondents had shifted their Branch. Therefore, it is submitted that in the absence of any pleading in the plaint regarding the damages to the suit premises, no decree could have been passed in the suit and the suit was rightly dismissed. It is further submitted that the photographs which are marked as Ext.25 and Ext.26 series, was exhibited by the valuer (PW-2). In the paragraph 8 of his evidence-on-affidavit, the said PW-2 had admitted that due to loss of the negative somewhere in his office, he was not in a position to submit them before the court. Hence, the photographs, being merely secondary evidence, in the absence of proof about the loss of negatives, the secondary evidence in form of the photographs (Ext.25 and Ext.26 series) were not admissible and, as such, it is submitted that the claim of the appellant was not proved in accordance with law. 12. It is further submitted that the appellant had not led any evidence of the nature of damages and he had merely marked the valuation report as Ext.10 and that neither the appellant (PW-1), not the valuer (PW-2) had given any evidence about the nature of damages. 12. It is further submitted that the appellant had not led any evidence of the nature of damages and he had merely marked the valuation report as Ext.10 and that neither the appellant (PW-1), not the valuer (PW-2) had given any evidence about the nature of damages. It is submitted that the appellant’s witnesses (PW-1) and (PW-2) had merely stated that the assessment of damages was given in the valuation report and the damages were assessed at Rs.6,56,585/-. Moreover, the appellant had not led any evidence to show that the property was sold to three persons at a price which was lower than the estimated market value because of the damages to the property, therefore, it is submitted that it must be deemed that there was no loss of damages to the property. 13. On appreciating the materials on record and upon hearing the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents, the only point of determination in this case is – Whether the judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit is sustainable on facts and in law? 14. On a perusal of learned trial court’s record including the various documents exhibited by the appellant, it is seen that the report of the valuer (PW-2), being Ext.10 is dated 03.12.2002. After the said date, a letter dated 03.03.2003 (Ext.12) was issued by the appellant and thereafter a notice dated 29.03.2003 (Ext.15) was issued, and both the letters do not contain any demand for compensation/damages. Rather, by letter dated 29.03.2003 (Ext.15), the appellant expressed his surprise for illegally stopping the payment of monthly rent since the month of November, 2002 and, as such, he had demanded payment of the rent for the month of November, 2002 till date, failing which the respondents were informed that he would be compelled to file necessary suit and cases against the bank for eviction and for realization of arrear rent with interest accrued thereon. Moreover, it is seen that in paragraph 28 of the written statement, the specific plea of the respondents was that the ground floor was constructed in the year 1968 and the first floor was constructed between the year 1985-88 and as normal wear and tear was taking place, the respondents by their letter dated 14.03.1991 (Ext.Q) and letter dated 18.06.1992 (Ext.R), had requested the landlord to carry out repairs, but instead of taking steps for repairing the building at proper time, the appellant had now dragged the matter to court for illegal gain. The correctness of the said statement has not been denied in the evidence of the PWs. In the cross-examination, on 19.03.2008, the DW-1 had denied the suggestion that the building was damaged due to use and occupation. Apart from the said suggestion, in the 2 (two) days of voluminous cross-examination of DW-1, no suggestion was even given to the said witness that any damage was caused to the suit premises at the time of shifting of the Branch. From the nature of answer which has come up in the cross-examination on 19.03.2008 as referred above, the stand of the appellant was not about the damages due to shifting but it was for use and occupation of the premises, which was not the pleaded case. 15. Under aforesaid circumstances, if the decision of the learned trial court on issue No. 1 is revisited, it is seen that the learned trial court has referred to the letters/notices issued vide Ext. E, F, G, H and I. From the same, it appears that although the appellant is trying to prove that the notice at Ext. E and F were not properly addressed, the learned trial court had correctly appreciated that on receipt of respondent’s letter dated 27.12.2002 (Ext.7 and Ext.N), he had given a reply dated 03.03.2003 (Ext.12), from which it is proved that the notice referred above were served on the appellant. The respondents had examined DW-2, who was the messenger, who had carried Ext. E and F for delivering to the appellant, but his evidence could not be demolished during cross-examination. The respondents had examined DW-2, who was the messenger, who had carried Ext. E and F for delivering to the appellant, but his evidence could not be demolished during cross-examination. On a perusal of the evidence, it is seen that the deceased father of the plaintiff vide Ext.B, did have the knowledge of his proposal being turned down for constructing and letting out his other property to the respondent bank for the shifting of Rangia Branch of the respondents. Therefore, this Court of the considered opinion that through his predecessor- in-interest, the appellant did have knowledge about the shifting of the respondent bank from the tenanted premises. Thus, this Court does not find any infirmity with the finding of the learned trial court on issue No.1. 16. In respect of issue No. 2, it is seen that the learned trial court had disbelieved the photograph (Ext.25 to Ext.26 series) on the ground that the PW-1 had not made any whisper about taking of the said photographs by PW-2. Similarly, the learned trial court disbelieved the evidence of PW-3, who was the tenant of the appellant as the said witness had admitted in his evidence that he had filed the evidence as per the direction of the appellant. Moreover, the PW-4, who was the brother-in-law of the appellant had also not given any statement that any photograph was taken by the valuer. As per the valuation report, although the valuer has released the bill towards photo charges, but those photographs are not found to be enclosed with the valuation report. Therefore, those photographs were not exhibited by the PW-1. Hence, as PW-2 was not a witness to the shifting of the respondent bank, the photographs taken by him cannot be treated as an evidence to prove that the damages reflected in those photographs was caused at the time of shifting of the respondents’ Branch. As already stated earlier, the photographs are merely a secondary evidence and in the absence of satisfactory proof of the loss of the negative, the ingredients for introducing secondary evidence as prescribed under Section 63 and Section 65 of the Evidence Act, 1872 having not been proved, those photographs (Ext.25 & 26 Series) are found to be inadmissible in evidence. As already stated earlier, the photographs are merely a secondary evidence and in the absence of satisfactory proof of the loss of the negative, the ingredients for introducing secondary evidence as prescribed under Section 63 and Section 65 of the Evidence Act, 1872 having not been proved, those photographs (Ext.25 & 26 Series) are found to be inadmissible in evidence. Merely because some photographs have been exhibited, in the absence of its admissibility, the secondary evidence in form of the photographs cannot be held to be admissible evidence. It is an admitted fact that the PW-2 had deposed to the effect that the negatives were lost somewhere in his office and he was no in a position to submit them in the court, which means that the said negative was only lost/misplaced in his office and not irretrievably lost. Moreover, having narrated in Ext.10 i.e. the Valuation Report that he has charged a sum of Rs.900/- to the appellant for the photographs, if the appellant has allowed to the said photographs and its negatives to be retained by the PW-2, the appellant has done so in his own risk and in the absence of the introduction of the photographs in the evidence of the appellant (PW-1), the valuer (PW-2) could not have led a better evidence than the appellant himself, as the appellant was the plaintiff. Moreover, in the process of valuation, the PW-2 i.e. the valuer did not take a signature of the purported staff of the Rangia Branch, the onus was on the appellant to prove various components of damages but there is no evidence to that effect. The appellant, in his evidence, did not state the nature of damages or the amount required to rectify those alleged damages. The appellant’s witnesses, viz., the appellant (PW-1) and the valuer (PW-2), have merely referred to the valuation report (Ext.10) without marking any of its contents. It is a well settled law that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not amount to prove of its contents. As the contents of the valuation report (Ext.10) has not been proved, although for different reasons, but this Court does not find any infirmity with the fining recorded by the learned trial court on issue No.2. 17. It is a well settled law that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not amount to prove of its contents. As the contents of the valuation report (Ext.10) has not been proved, although for different reasons, but this Court does not find any infirmity with the fining recorded by the learned trial court on issue No.2. 17. In respect of issue No.3, it is seen that by a public notice dated 30.09.2002 (Ext.6), the respondent had issued an advertisement in the newspaper about the shifting of their premises. By notice dated 29.03.2003 (Ext.15), the appellant had demanded rent which was not being paid since November, 2002, but did not come forward to receive the keys. The respondents had led evidence by proving Ext. E, F, G, H and I about issuance of notice to shift the premises and to take keys, which was also proved by DW-2, but the appellant did not receive the keys and therefore, the appellant had to deposit the keys before the learned trial court on 29.03.2004. It is seen that from newspaper advertisement dated 30.09.2002 (Ext.6), and after filing and withdrawing T.S. No. 250/2002, when the appellant came to know about shifting of the respondents’ Branch which was also known when the appellant, his valuer when the valuer visited the suit premises on 26.11.2002 for doing valuation of the suit premises, the appellant allowed the staff of the bank to take back the keys. Under the circumstances, there is no infirmity in the finding recorded by the learned court below that the keys were not kept intentionally by the respondents. The appellant had an opportunity to take over the keys of the suit premises on 26.11.2002, but he avoided to do so. Thus, under no circumstances, the appellant can be held to be entitled to any rent after 01.10.2002. 18. In respect of issues No. 4 and 5, it is seen that the lease agreement (Ext.D) contained clause VIII (IV) which entitled the respondent to terminate the lease at any time on giving one calendar month’s notice. As referred hereinbefore, the respondent had proved that notices were issued vide Ext. 18. In respect of issues No. 4 and 5, it is seen that the lease agreement (Ext.D) contained clause VIII (IV) which entitled the respondent to terminate the lease at any time on giving one calendar month’s notice. As referred hereinbefore, the respondent had proved that notices were issued vide Ext. E, F, G, H and I and that the father of the appellant was aware of the initiation of process of shifting of the branch and the shifting of the branch was advertised in the newspaper and that the branch was shifted w.e.f. 01.10.2002, under the circumstances, from the notice dated 27.09.2002, the appellant have received rent for one month as provided in clause VIII(IV) of the agreement (Ext.D). The learned trial court had rightly refused any relief. Moreover, as already indicated earlier, the appellant did not lead any evidence to show that because of any damages to its property, he did not get the proper market value of the said property while it was sold to the three persons named above during the pendency of the suit. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant had relied on the case of Rangammal (supra) and the case of Food Corporation of India (supra). The ratio laid down in the said cases is not found to be applicable because the PW-1 is found to have admitted about the said sale in his cross examination, as such, despite the sale having not been proved, the PW-1 is found to have admitted such sale. 19. Moreover, the appeal is also found to be not sustainable on defect of non- joinder of necessary parties. It is seen that in the plaint, there are three defendants, viz., (1) The State Bank of India, (2) Assistant General Manager (Region-I), Regional Office, Bhangagarh, Guwahati-5, (3) The Branch Manager, SBI Rangia Branch. In the decree, the name of the judgment debtor is shown to be the said three defendants. However, in this present appeal, there are only two respondents, viz., (1) The State Bank of India, (2) The Branch Manager, SBI Rangia Branch. But the name of the party arrayed as defendant No.2 has been dropped out. As such, the decree of the dismissal of the suit had attained finality in so far as the defendant No.2 is concerned. However, in this present appeal, there are only two respondents, viz., (1) The State Bank of India, (2) The Branch Manager, SBI Rangia Branch. But the name of the party arrayed as defendant No.2 has been dropped out. As such, the decree of the dismissal of the suit had attained finality in so far as the defendant No.2 is concerned. Hence, the present appeal is also held to be not maintainable for non- joinder of defendant No.2 as a necessary party, as the decree is not found divisible or severable against the said defendant No.2. 20. As a result of the discussion above, the point of determination as formulated above is answered in the negative and against the appellant by holding that the impugned judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit is sustainable on facts and in law. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed and the impugned judgment and decree dated 06.01.2009 passed by the learned Civil Judge No. 3, Kamrup (M), Guwahati in T.S. No. 235/2003 is affirmed. 21. Let a decree be drawn up accordingly. 22. Let the LCR be returned back.