JUDGMENT AND ORDER : J.B. Pardiwala, J. By this writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ-applicant, a Gram Panchayat, through its Sarpanch, has prayed for the following reliefs : "(a) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to admit and allow the present writ petition; (b) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue the writ of mandamus or writ in nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction quashing and setting aside the impugned notification dated 27.11.2014 passed by the Under Secretary, Revenue Department, State of Gujarat bearing no.GH/139/2014/PFR/102013/139/L.1, of including Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village in Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District and excluding Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village from Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District being violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993. (c) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, an interim relief may kindly be issued staying the implementation, operation and execution of the notification dated 27.11.2014 passed by the Under Secretary, Revenue Department, State of Gujarat bearing no.GH/139/2014/PFR/102013/139/L.1, in respect of Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village at Serial No.10. (d) Further, pending admission, hearing and final disposal of the petition, the Respondents and their servants and agents may be restrained from giving effect in the revenue record to the notification dated 27.11.2014 passed by the Under Secretary, Revenue Department, State of Gujarat bearing no.GH/139/2014/PFR/102013/139/L.1, in respect of Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village at Serial No.10. (e) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass such and further order as the nature and circumstances of the case may require." 2. The case put up by the writ-applicant, in his own words, as pleaded in his writ-application, is extracted hereunder : "1. The petitioner is a Gram Panchayat recognized under the section 3 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993. Therefore they are entitled for protection of their fundamental rights as enshrined under the Constitution of India and more particularly in Part-III of the Constitution of India, especially for their inhabitants. 2. The petitioner is a Gram Panchayat recognized under the section 3 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993. Therefore they are entitled for protection of their fundamental rights as enshrined under the Constitution of India and more particularly in Part-III of the Constitution of India, especially for their inhabitants. 2. The petitioner by preferring the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issuance of Writ of Mandamus or Writ in nature of mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, the petitioner begs to challenge the impugned notification dated 27.11.2014 bearing No. GHM/139/2014/PFR/102013/139/L.1 by the Under Secretary Revenue Department, State of Gujarat whereby the Village Chandrawati (Chandalaj) is excluded from the Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District and was included in Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District. 3.1 The Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village is part of Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District. After the Reconstitution of Siddhpur and Unjha Talukas of Patan District, Siddhpur Taluka came to be included into newly formed Patan District on 31.12.1999; Patan District was bifurcated from Mehsana District on 24/09/1997. Prior to this the village Chandrawati (Chandalaj) was part of Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District, but after the formation of Patan District and Siddhpur Taluka being 9 kms away from the Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village, then for ease and facility of entire population of Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village a representation was preferred before the Revenue Minister, Gujarat State for including the Village Chandrawati (Chandalaj) to newly formed Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District. The distance of Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District from Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village is about 13 kms, whereas the distance of Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District and Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village is about 9 kms, even Siddhpur Village and Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village is sharing a common boundary. Upon representation the inclusion to Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District was done accordingly. But now on 27.11.2014, a new notification was published whereby the Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village was again sent back to Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District under the political influence of the Local MLA of Unjha(Mehsana). 3.2 The petitioner is a Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Gram Panchayat and upon formation of Patan District on 24.09.1997; the Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village was included in Siddhpur Taluka, Patan District. The Siddhpur Taluka came to be included in Patan District after the bifurcation of Patan and Mehsana Districts. 3.2 The petitioner is a Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Gram Panchayat and upon formation of Patan District on 24.09.1997; the Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village was included in Siddhpur Taluka, Patan District. The Siddhpur Taluka came to be included in Patan District after the bifurcation of Patan and Mehsana Districts. Therefore soon after the bifurcation the State Government deemed it fit to include the Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village to Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District from Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District and the notification to that effect was published on 31.12.1999. 3.3 The petitioner states and submits that one Amratbhai Khodidas Patel challenged the said decision Dt. 31.12.1999 shifting village Chadrawati (Chandalaj) from Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District to Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District by way of Special Civil Application (SCA) No. 21 of 2000 before this Hon'ble High Court. This Hon'ble High Court was pleased to dismiss the SCA No. 21 of 2000 by Order Dt. 20/10/2000 with following observation: "6. Having perused the material on record and having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to the Court that since this Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the State Government in such matters, this Court is not to weigh the arguments for and against the impugned decision in golden scales. Even if the petitioners have shown some inconvenience here or there, the question, as posed by the Apex Court in the case of Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1996) AIR(Supreme Court) 11 (para 95), is whether the harm caused to the people is of such nature and magnitude that the Court should interfere. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as evident from the record, no such finding can be given. Hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs." 3.4 The petitioner states and submits that after publishing of notification dated 31.12.1999 the effect was given in the Revenue records of the Villagers as they were excluded form Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District and inclusion of Chandrawati (Chandaiaj) village to Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District. 3.5 It is respectfully submitted that all of a sudden on 27.11.2014 upon interference of respondent no. 3.5 It is respectfully submitted that all of a sudden on 27.11.2014 upon interference of respondent no. 7, who is a MLA of Unjha Constituency, for getting some political equations in his favour, again Chandrawati (Chandaiaj) village were excluded form Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District and included in Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District. 3.6 The petitioner states and submits that soon after getting the information about the notification dated 27.11.2014 the General Meeting of Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Gram Panchayat was held on 15.12.2014 and they unanimously decided to pursue the concerned authority and make a representation to the Revenue Authority for not effecting the notification dated 27.11.2014 and also for not including Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village to the Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District." Submissions on behalf of the Writ-Applicant : 3. Mr.Asim Pandya, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicant, submitted that the Notification issued by the Revenue Department dated 27th November 2014 could be termed as illegal, arbitrary, unjust, unreasonable, irrational, discriminatory, perverse, improper and erroneous in law. 4. Mr.Pandya would submit that the Notification dated 27th November 2014 is violative of Sections 7(2) and 9(2) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993. It is submitted that the impugned Notification is contrary to law and principle of reasonableness. 5. It is also submitted that the impugned Notification issued by the Revenue Department is contrary to the settled principles of law, justice, equity and good conscience. It is also submitted that the impugned Notification is erroneous in law as no opportunity was given to the writ-applicant or any of the residents to lodge their objections in that regard. 6. Mr.Pandya led much emphasis on grounds nos.4(f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l) and (m). It is also submitted that the impugned Notification is erroneous in law as no opportunity was given to the writ-applicant or any of the residents to lodge their objections in that regard. 6. Mr.Pandya led much emphasis on grounds nos.4(f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l) and (m). They are extracted hereunder : "(f) That the present case is an exceptional case because the inclusion to Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District was made on the request of the Respondent No.7 who has some political equations and motives in mind behind the inclusion of the Chandrawati village to the Unjha Taluka, though the opinion of the Collector, Patan District dated 23.08.2014 was against the inclusion of the village to Mehsana Mehsana District and that the General Meeting of Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Gram Panchayat has decided on 21.12.2010 by 6:3 majority votes agaisnt the inclusion of Chandrawati village in Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District, therefore, before excluding the Village from Patan District an opportunity of hearing must be afforded to the residents and Gram Panchayat, because ultimately, they would eb prejudicially affected. (g) MLAs are elected by the people for enacting laws for the benefit of people and as such they are not supposed to interfere with the administrative functions of the executive. The doctrine of separation of power clearly recognizes three separate wings of the government viz. legislature, executive and judiciary. Under this theory one wing is not expected to meddle in the working of the other. Thus, in the present case except the wish of the local MLA no other administrative or other relevant factors have gone in to the decision to exclude Chandravati village from Siddhpur Taluka and hence, the decision is unconstitutional. (h) That the impugned decision is going to affect the residents and the petitioners as there are serious civil consequences of the said decision, of which the residents are going to be vitally and adversely affected. The residents will have to travel about 13 kms if they are included in Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District for basic conveniences like Police Station, Mamlatdar Office, Prant Office, Sales Tax Office, Income Tax Office, Taluka Panchayat Office, Civil Courts, etc. Further the Regional Transport Office, Dy. The residents will have to travel about 13 kms if they are included in Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District for basic conveniences like Police Station, Mamlatdar Office, Prant Office, Sales Tax Office, Income Tax Office, Taluka Panchayat Office, Civil Courts, etc. Further the Regional Transport Office, Dy. Superintendent Office and Collector Office is about 35 kms away from Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village and District place Mehsana is about 35 kms, whereas basic Conveniences at Siddhpur Taluka is at 9 kms Distance and Patan District and Conveniences is about 21 kms only. Thus, the geographical proximity of the village Chandravati and convenience of the residents of the said village have been given complete copy. (i) That it is the fundamental right of the residents and citizen to decide in what area and locality they reside and live and the convenience of residents at large is required to be taken care of while taking such decision. The inclusion of an area covered under Gram Panchayat within another notified area certainly involves civil consequences, as they result into changes into Revenue and Panchayat Boundaries. (j) That the impugned decision is arbitrary and totally unreasonable because the Village Chandrawati (Chandalaj) is situated only about 9 kms away from the Siddhpur Taluka and even Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village and Siddhpur Village are sharing common boundaries. Whereas Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District is about 13 kms away from the Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village. Even the District centers would be at Patan which is only about 21 kms from Chandrwati (Chandalaj) Village, whereas the Distance of District Centers at Mehsana District is at 35 kms from Chandrawati (Chandalaj) Village. (k) That the impugned decision is with malafides because merely upont he indulgence of MLA of Unjha (District Mehsana) Constituency i.e., Respondent No.7, to work out some typical political equations in his favour, the Government had taken impugned decision. (l) That on perusal of factual aspects also, the impugned decision is not tenable and unreasonable because geographically also the Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village is attached to the boundary of Siddhpur Village and Siddhpur Taluka, which is a separate with effect from 14.11.1997. (l) That on perusal of factual aspects also, the impugned decision is not tenable and unreasonable because geographically also the Chandrawati (Chandalaj) village is attached to the boundary of Siddhpur Village and Siddhpur Taluka, which is a separate with effect from 14.11.1997. (m) That the last election of the Gram Panchayat was held in the year 2012 and the term of which will come to end on 2017, this shows that the impugned decision is with malafides because merely upon the interference of MLA i.e., Respondent No.7, to work out some typical political equations in his favour, the Government had taken the impugned decision." 7. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr.Pandya prays that there being merit in this writ-application, the same be allowed and the impugned Notification be quashed. 8. Mr.Pandya, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on the following decisions : (1) M.P.Oil Extraction and another v. State of M.P. and others, (1998) AIR(Supreme Court) 145; (2) Federation of Railway Officers Association and others v. Union of India, (2003) AIR(Supreme Court) 1344; (3) Union of India and another v. International Trading Co. and another, (2003) AIR(Supreme Court) 3983; (4) Mohanbhai Haribhai Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2001) 4 GLR 3141; (5) Patel Baldevbhai Ambalal and others v. State of Gujarat and others, (1998) 2 GLR 1604 . 9. On the other hand, this writ-application has been vehemently opposed by Ms.Nisha Thakore, the learned AGP appearing for the State respondent. 10. Ms.Thakore submitted that the writ-applicant has no locus standi to question the legality and validity of the Notification issued by the Revenue Department. It is submitted that it is within the discretion of the Government to take an appropriate decision as regards the inclusion and exclusion of a particular area from a particular village. 11. The learned AGP, while opposing this writ-application, has placed strong reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Hipavadi Village Panchayat v. State of Gujarat and others (Special Civil Application No.6357 of 2015 and allied matters, decided on 17th December 2015). 12. Ms.Thakore placed reliance on the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent no.3 : "6. 12. Ms.Thakore placed reliance on the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondent no.3 : "6. The challenge in this petition is the notification issued by the revenue Department dated 27/11/2014 under the provision of Section 7 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 (hereinafter referred as "the Code" for short) whereby the Government was pleased to exercise powers under Section 7 of the Code and was pleased to exclude the village name Chandravati (Chandalaj) from the Siddhpur Taluka of Patan District and includes the said village Unjha Taluka of Mehsana District. It is submitted that the Section 7 of the Code empowers the State Government to exercise such power and the same were exercised in the easiness of the administration and by considering the public at large would be facilitate and therefore the petition may not be entertained in the interest of public at large. 7. It is most humbly submitted that by taking impugned decision in this petition, the State Government has taken a decision not to divide the borders of the villages but the entire village was included into the Unjha Taluka and therefore there would be no any difficulty be arise as stated in the petition and business of the local people and local administration also be not affected as stated in this petition." 13. This writ-application has also been vehemently opposed by Mr.Archit P.Jani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.7. Mr.Jani submitted that the writ-applicant is not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for in this writ-application. According to Mr.Jani, the issue of impugned Notification is an administrative act and such administrative decisions should not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of its writ-jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, unless the decision arrived at by the State Government could be termed as unconstitutional or contrary to the provisions of any law. 14. Mr.Jani seeks to rely on the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of his client : "5. I say and submit that the impugned notification, cannot be challenged as there is no any infirmity or arbitrariness. That to be part of one village or another is a administrative subject where no legal or fundamental rights are violated. Therefore, the present petition under Article 226 is not maintainable. 6. I say and submit that the impugned notification, cannot be challenged as there is no any infirmity or arbitrariness. That to be part of one village or another is a administrative subject where no legal or fundamental rights are violated. Therefore, the present petition under Article 226 is not maintainable. 6. That being part of the Unjha Taluka, the rights of villagers are not affected in any manner. That the Government benefits and facilities or any scheme is not denied to the villagers of Chandrawati Village. 7. I say and submit that whatever rights, privileges and facilities which wee available to villagers and Gram Panchayat, when it was in Siddhapur Taluka continues to be available when this villages under Unjha Taluka. Therefore, no denial of any facilities, any privileges, rights of villagers or Gram Panchayat in any manner. 8. I say and submit that by bringing the Village in Unjha Taluka following additional benefits accrued to village people. (i) The distance to Unjha Taluka is less than from Siddhpur Taluka. (ii) All village People every day to Unjha for service, trade, commerce and job etc. (iii) Frequency of vehicles and connectivity is better from the Village to Unjha Taluka. (iv) The market area of Unjha has been notified by the State Government. (v) The members of the Co-operative Societies of the village have the right to vote in Unjha APMC in election. (vi) Unjha APMC is one of the biggest APMC in the country. (vii) The village people have greater and closer economic and trade ties with market of Unjha than with the market of Siddhpur. (viii) That the students go to Unjha every day as Schoold are situated at Unjha Taluka. (ix) That the adjoining villages are part of Unjha Taluka. 9. I say and submit that on 04.12.1997, Unjha Taluka came into existence. That Under Secretary Revenue Department on 04.12.1997 passed an order by virtue of which Unjha Taluka was demarcated from Siddhpur Taluka. That Chandalaj Village was also included in Unjha Taluka. 10. I say and submit that in 2003, the villagers of the Chandrawati Gram Panchayat passed resolution to exclude village from Siddhpur and include the village in Unjha Taluka. That the resolution was passed in 2003 by the Gram Panchayat stating that it was decided unanimously to include the village in Unjha Taluka. 11. 10. I say and submit that in 2003, the villagers of the Chandrawati Gram Panchayat passed resolution to exclude village from Siddhpur and include the village in Unjha Taluka. That the resolution was passed in 2003 by the Gram Panchayat stating that it was decided unanimously to include the village in Unjha Taluka. 11. I say and submit that the Gram Panchayat on 07.01.2010, addressed a letter to the Collector, Patan, stating that the village being included in Unjha Taluka. It is stated by the Gram Panchayat that the Co-operative Societies in the Village are members of the 'Dudhsagar Dairy' Mehsana. That the societies are voters in Unjha APMC. Rs.1 lac insurance is given by Unjha APMC that the nearby village being a Amudh, Vishol, Lindi etc. are part of the Unjha Taluka. That the villages connected with Unjha Taluka in every way. 12. I say and submit that on 18.02.2010, the villagers of Chandrawati Village addressed letter to the Collector, Mehsana. It is stated in the letter that the Village being excluded from Siddhpur and included in Unjha Taluka. 13. I say and submit that the notification has been issued by the revenue department in official gazette. It is submitted that the order has already been given assent of the Honorable Governor of Gujarat. That the order has been issued by order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. 14. I say and submit that even looking at the map, it would be explicit clear that Chandalaj village is only village which is being kept in Siddhpur Taluka whereas, nearby villages are part of Unjha Taluka. 15. I say and submit that the averments made by the petitioner are false and misleading as the deponent dos not have any political intent to include the Chandalaj Village in Unjha Taluka. 16. I say and submit that the village is part of Siddhpur Vidhansabha seat and it would continue to remain so. That the deponent has not ever contested any election of Taluka Panchayat or District Panchayat. Therefore, the inclusion of the Village in Unjha Taluka does not have any political motive by the deponent herein. 17. That introduction of one Village in other Taluka for revenue purpose. That bringing of one Village into another Taluka has no effect of violation of any constitutional or legal rights. 18. Therefore, the inclusion of the Village in Unjha Taluka does not have any political motive by the deponent herein. 17. That introduction of one Village in other Taluka for revenue purpose. That bringing of one Village into another Taluka has no effect of violation of any constitutional or legal rights. 18. That opinion of Collector is erroneous inasmuch as he was given emphasis on a point which does not required to be taken into consideration of inclusion of village into one Taluka or exclusion of some village from the particular Taluka. 19. That that there is neither any provision under Gujrat Panchayat Act nor in the Land Revenue Code or any statutory requirement under any law to seek opinion of Gram Panchayat for the Collector in this regard. 20. In fact, the Collector has gravely erred in seeking opinion from Gram Panchayat. There is no requirement to seek opinion under any law. 21. Alternatively, it is submitted that the views of Gram Panchayat are not binding to the Collector as also to the State Government. That the State Government has got powers to take decision for inclusion or exclusion of the Village from one Taluka to another Taluka." 15. Mr.Jani, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on the following decisions : (1) State of U.P. and others v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti and others, (1995) AIR(Supreme Court) 1512; (2) Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat, (2004) AIR(Gujarat) 243; (3) Paroya Group Gram Panchayat and others v. State of Gujarat and others, (2008) 2 GLR 1096 ; (4) Babubhai Jethabhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat and others, (2001) 3 GLH 718 ; (5) Amratbhai Kholidas Patel v. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No.21 of 2000, decided on 20th October 2000) ; (6) Gujarat Panchayat Parishad v. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No.7240 of 1997 and allied matters, decided on 24th April 1998) ; (7) Likhi Group Gram Panchayat v. State of Gujarat and others, (2000) 1 GLH 367 . 16. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr.Jani prays that there being no merit in this writ-application, the same be rejected. 17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the State Government committed any error in passing the impugned Notification. 18. 16. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr.Jani prays that there being no merit in this writ-application, the same be rejected. 17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the State Government committed any error in passing the impugned Notification. 18. Let me first look into the Notification, which came to be issued by the State Government dated 31st December 1999. The same reads thus : "ORDER REVENUE DEPARTMENT SACHIVALAYA, GANDI-UNAGAR DATED THE 3lst December. 1999 No.GHM-99-12l-M-PFR-1099-3998-L WHEREAS, under the Government Notification, Revenue Department, No.GHM/3081/M/PFR/1063-92658-L, dated 14th November, 1967, the Government of Gujarat had constituted SEDDHAPUR Taluka of' MEHSANA District; AND, WHEREAS, under Government Notification, Revenue Department, No. GHM-97-84-M-PFR--1097-L, dated the 24th September, 1997, the Government of Gujarat has constituted PATAN District; AND, WHEREAS under Government Notification, Revenue Department No. GHM-97-121-M-PFR-2097-2595-L, dated the 15th October, 1997, the Government of Gujarat has reconstituted UNJlHA and SIDHAPUR Talukas of PATAN District; AND, WHEREAS under the Government Notification, Revenue Department, No. GHM-99-40-M-PFR-1099-UO.75-L, dated the 23rd June, 1999, the Government of Gujarat has reconstituted PATAN ANDF MEHSANA District by excluding UNJHA Taluka from PATAN District and including UNJHA Taluka in MEHSANA District; AND WHEREAS under the Government Notification, Revenue Department, No.GHM-97-140-M-PFR-2297-2592-L, dated the 4th December, 1997, the Government of Gujarat has reconstituted SIDHPUR Taluka of PATAN District UNJHA Taluka of MESHANA District by excluding CHANDALAJ village from SIDHPUR Taluka and including the said village in UNJHA Taluka; AND WHEREAS, the Government of Gujarat has decided to reconstitute UNJHA Taluka of MEHSANA District and SIDDHAPUR Talukas of PATAN District by excluding CHANDLAJ Village from Unjha Taluka of MEHSANA District and including the aid vilalges in Siddhapur Taluka of Patan District; NOW, TEHREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 7 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bom. V of 1879), the Government of Gujarat hereby amends the Government Notification Revenue Department, No.GHM/3081/M/PFR/1063-92658-L, dated the 14th November, 1967, as follows, namely, In the said notification, in Schedule 1, in Appendix 119 annexed thereto, containing the entries of villages under Siddhapur Taluka, the following village shall be added at the end. "CHANDLAJ" By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. K.H. Pandya Under Secretary to Government" 19. "CHANDLAJ" By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. K.H. Pandya Under Secretary to Government" 19. Let me now look into the impugned Notification issued by the State Government dated 27th November 2014. The same reads thus : "REVENUE DEPARTMENT Notification SACHIVALAYA, GANDI-UNAGAR, 27th November, 2014 Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879. "CHANDLAJ" By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. K.H. Pandya Under Secretary to Government" 19. Let me now look into the impugned Notification issued by the State Government dated 27th November 2014. The same reads thus : "REVENUE DEPARTMENT Notification SACHIVALAYA, GANDI-UNAGAR, 27th November, 2014 Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879. No.GHM/139/2014/PFR/102013/139/L1, In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Bom.V of 1879), the Government of Gujarat hereby: (1) excludes the village Asodar which form part of the Tharad taluka of the Banaskantha District and includes the said village in the Lakhni taluka of Banaskantha District; (2) excludes the village Ma'kdala which form part of the Lakhni taluka of-the Banaskantha District and includes said villages in the Diyodar Taluka of Banaskantha District; (3) excludes the villages Bardipada (saja), Bandhpada, Dhuida, Khokhri, sajupada and villages of Bardipada Group Gram Panchayat which form part of the Vaghai Taluka of the Dang District and includes the said villages in the Subir Taluka of the Dang District; (4) excludes the villages Harpada, Chinchdhara, Gadhvihar, Hanvadpada (chi), Khadmal (G), Kamdiyavan, Kardiamba, Mahardra, Nlmpada, Sadadvihor, Thorpada, Vadiyavan, (villages of Harpada and Chinchali Group Gram panchayat), Vaidun, Vajtemru and Karanjdi which form part of the Subir taluka of the Dang District and includes the said villages in the Ahwa taluka of Dang District, (5) excludes the villages Borgavatha, Chikhli, Chirpada, Maharaichaud which form part of the Vaghai Taluka of the Dang District and includes the said villages in the Ahwa taluka of Dang District; (6) excludes the villages Harmadiya and (Petapara) Abhalvad which form part of the Kodinar taluka of the Girsomnath District and includes the said villages in the Girgadhda taluka of Girsomnath District; (7) excludes the villages Shana vankiya, Motimoli, Naliyeri Moli, Chorali Moli, Luharimoli, Kakidimoli, Nana samdhiyala, Mota Samdhiyala, Kandhi, Pankhan, Bandharda, Ambada, Bedia padapadar which form part of the Una taluka of the Girsomnath District and includes the said villages in the Girgadhda taluka of Girsomnath District; (8) excludes the village Vagosan which inrm part of the Sankheswar taluka of the Patan District and includes the said village in the Harij taluka of Patan District; (9) excludes the village Amarpura which form part of the Santalpur taluka of the Patan District and includes the said village in the Sami taluka of Patan District; (10) excludes the village Chandrawati (Chandalaj) which form part of the Sidhhpur taluka of the Patan District and includes the said village in the Unja taluka of Mehsana District; (11) excludes the villages Run, Devavanta and Petli which form part of the Vaso taluka of the Kheda District and includes the said villages in the Sojitra taluka of Anand District; (12) excludes the village Ramol which form part of the Vaso taluka of the Kheda District and includes the said village in the Petlad taluka of Anand District; (13) excludes the village Munai which form part of the ldar taluka of the Sabarkantha District and includes the said village in the Bhlioda taluka of Arvalli District; (14) excluded the village Hadala (Bhal), Dholi, Jasapar Vakhatpar which form part of the Limdi taluka of the Surendranagar District and includes the said village in the Dhandhuka taluka of Ahmedabad District; (15) excludes the village Rangpur which form part of the Chuda taluka of the Surendranagar District and includes the said village in the Dhandhuka taluka of Ahmedabad District; (16) excludes the village Nagnesh which form part of the Chuda taluka of the Surendranagar District and includes the said village in the Ranpur taluka of Botad District; (17) excludes the village Vanavad, Verad and Krushnagadh which form part of the Jamjodhpur taluka of the Jamnagar District and includes the said villages in the Bhanvad taluka of Devbhumi Dwarka District; (18) excludes the village Gajdi which form part of the Jodiya taluka of the Jamnagar District and includes the said village in the Tankara taluka ol Morbi District; (19) excludes the villages Kherva which form part of the Rajkot taluka of the Raikot District and includes the said village in the Vankaner taluka of Morbi District; (20) excludes the villages Bedl and Hadala'which form part of the Rajkot taluka of the Raikot District and includes the said village in the Tankara taluka of Morbi District; (21) excludes the village Dharampur which form part of the Ranavav taluka of the Porbandar District and includes the said village in the Porbandar taluka of Porbandar District; (22) excludes the village Gota which form part of the Vadali taluka of the Sabarkantha District and includes the said village in the Khedbrahma taluka of Sabarkantha District; (23) excludes the village Vada Talav which form part of the Jetpur-pavi taluka of the Chhota udaipur District and includes the Said village in the Bodeli taluka of Chhota udaipur District; (24) excludes the village Nadasa which form part of the Jotana taluka of the Mehsana District and includes the said village in the Mehsana taluka of Mehsana District; ' By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat Sd/- Harish K. Prajapati Under Secretary to Government" 20. Let me now look into few relevant provisions of law. Section 9 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961, reads as under : "Section 9 - Declaration of Nagar and Gram (1) After making such inquiries as may be prescribed, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare any local area, comprising a revenue village, or group of revenue villages or hamlets forming part of a revenue village, or such other administrative unit or part thereof - (a) to be a nagar, if the population of such local area does not exceed 10, 000; (b) to be a gram, if the population of such local area does not exceed 10, 000; Provided that if in the case of a local area, which is eligible for being declared as a nagar under clause (a), the State Government, having regard to the geography, extent of urban development and such other factors in relation to that area as may be prescribed and after consulting the local authority if any, constituted for such local area is of the opinion that the local area should be declared to be a gram, the State Government may by a like notification declare the local area to be a gram; Provided further that if in the case of a local area, which is eligible for being declared as a gram under clause (b), the State Government having regard to the geography, extent of urban development and such other factors in relation to that area as may be prescribed and after consulting the local authority, if any, constituted for such local area is of the opinion that the local area should be declared to be a nagar the State Government may by a like notification declare the local area to be a nagar (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) and section 4 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 (Guj.) 34 of 1964) if the State Government having regard to the geography, extent of urban development and such other factors in relation to a municipal borough as may be prescribed, and after consulting, is of the opinion that the area comprised in the municipal borough be declared to be a gram or nagar, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare the area comprised in the municipal borough and specified in the notification to be a gram or nagar. (2) After consultation with the Taluka Panchayat, the district panchayat and the nagar or gram panchayat concerned (if already constituted) the State Government may, by like notification at any time- (a) include within, or exclude from, any nagar or gram any local area or otherwise alter the limits of any nagar or gram; (b) declare that any local area shall cease to be a nagar or gram; or (c) having regard to clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (8), declare the whole area comprised in a gram or the part thereof to be a nagar of two or more grams or the whole area comprised in a nagar to be a gram or split up the area comprised in the nagar into a nagar and a gram or into two or more grams;] and thereupon the local area shall be so included or excluded, or the limits of the nagar or gram so altered or the local area shall cease to be a nagar or gram, as the case may be, the area declared to be a nagar or gram shall be a nagar, or gram as the case may be." 21. Sections 2.4, 7, 254 and 256 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 are extracted hereunder : Section 2.4 - Competent Authority means such Government Officer, panchayat or authority as the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint to perform the functions of a competent authority under such provisions of this Act and in respect of such panchayats as may be specified in the said notifications. Section 7 - Recommendation specifications of village :- (1) After making such inquiries as may be prescribed, the competent authority may recommend any local area comprising a revenue village, or a group or revenue villages, or hamlets forming part of a revenue village, for being specified a village under clause (g) of article 243 of the Constitution if the population of such local area does not exceed fifteen thousand. (2) After consultation with the taluka panchayat, the district panchayat and village panchayat concerned (if already constituted), the competent authority may at any time recommend inclusion within or exclusion from any villages any local area or otherwise alternation of limits of any village, or recommend cesser of any local area to be a village, to the Governor for exercise of his powers under clause (g) of article 243 of the Constitution." 22. Articles 243 and 243(A) of the Constitution of India are extracted hereunder : Section 254 - Consequences of alteration of limits of village 254 (1) When by a notification under clause (g) of Article 243 of the Constitution, the limits of a village is altered so as to - (a) Include any area therein, or (b) exclude any area there from, the State Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time in force, by order published in the Official Gazette, provide for all or any of the following matters namely :- i. in a case falling under clause (a), the increase in the number of the members of the village panchayat by election of additional members, ii. in a case falling under clause (b), the removal of the members of the village panchayat, who in the opinion of the State Government represent the area excluded from the village: Provided that where the area so excluded had been included in any other village, the members so removed shall be additional members of the panchayat of such village, iii. the term of additional members and the manner of filling casual vacancies; iv. allocation of any officer or servant of the panchayat affected by the alteration of the limits. (2) The panchayat, if any, constituted for the village and functioning immediately before the alteration of the limits shall, subject to the addition or exclusion of members under sub-section (1), continue to function until the expiry of its duration under this Act and on such expiry it shall be reconstituted in the manner provided in this Act. (2) The panchayat, if any, constituted for the village and functioning immediately before the alteration of the limits shall, subject to the addition or exclusion of members under sub-section (1), continue to function until the expiry of its duration under this Act and on such expiry it shall be reconstituted in the manner provided in this Act. (3) If an altering the limit of any village, the area excluded there from is included in any other village, then- (a) such portion of the village fund, debts obligations and other property of the village from which the area is so excluded shall be transferred to and shall vest in, the panchayat of the village in which the area is excluded as the State Government may b order in writing direct; (b) the rights and liabilities of the panchayat in respect of any contracts, agreements and other matters and things, arising in or relating to the area so excluded shall vest in the panchayat of the village in which the area is so included. (c) any notice, Tax fee, cess, order, licence, permission, rule or bye-law issued, imposed, granted or made in respect of the area so excluded shall be deemed to have been issued, imposed, granted or made in respect of the panchayat in which the area is so included and shall continue in force until it is superseded under the provisions of the law applicable thereto; (d) all proceedings relating to the area excluded from the village and pending before the panchayat on the date of such exclusion shall be transferred to and disposed off by the panchayat of the village in which the area is included. Section 256 - Effect of area ceasing to be village On any area ceasing to be a village by virtue of any notification under clause (g) of article 243 of the Constitution of India, (a) the panchayat shall be dissolved and all members of the panchayat shall vacate office as from the date of the notification; (b) the unexpected balance of the fund of the panchayat and the property (including arrears of rates, taxes and fees) vesting in the panchayat shall vest in the State Government to be utilized for the benefit of the inhabitants of the areas as the State Government thinks fit." 23. Let me now look into few decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court. 24. Let me now look into few decisions of the Supreme Court as well as this Court. 24. In Gujarat Panchayat Parishad v. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No.7240 of 1997 and allied matters, decided on 24th April 1998), a Division Bench of this Court considered the very same issue, which I am called upon to look into. I may quote the relevant observations thus : "9. Article 243(a) of the Constitution defines 'district' as meaning a District in a State. Clause (d) of that Article defines 'Panchayat' as "an institution of self-government constituted under Article 243-B, for the rural areas. As per clause (e), "Panchayat area" means "the territorial area of a Panchayat". According to clause (g), 'village' means "a village specified by the Governor by public notification to be a village". Article 243-B deals with constitution of Panchayats. It states that there should be constituted in every State, Panchayats at the village, intermediate and district levels. The said constitution of the Panchayat must be in relation to the Panchayat area. That area is to be at village level, intermediate level, i.e. Taluka level, and District level. What should be the village is to be decided by the Governor or the State Government by Notification in the Gazette. As per the constitutional provision, the Panchayat area so constituted should be an institution of self-government. That institution of self-government should not be interfered with. By reconstitution of the Panchayat area, if any portion of that area falls outside the jurisdiction of an institution of self-government, that will violate the Constitutional mandate. If no part of the Panchayat area, on reconstitution or reorganization, falls outside the institution of self-government, such reconstitution or reorganisation cannot be faulted. Petitioners have no case that on reorganization of the Districts, portion of the area, which was taken out of one District and attached to another District, is taken out of an institution of selfgovernment. By reorganisation of Districts, some portion of the area, comprised in one District Panchayat, becomes attached to another District Panchayat. The area, which thus becomes attached to the new District Panchayat, will continue to be under an institution of self-government, which exists in relation to the new District. In other words, by the reorganisation of the District and Talukas, no area will go out of an institution of self-government. The area, which thus becomes attached to the new District Panchayat, will continue to be under an institution of self-government, which exists in relation to the new District. In other words, by the reorganisation of the District and Talukas, no area will go out of an institution of self-government. It continues to be in a Panchayat, as envisaged by that term in the Constitution. 10. The Bombay Land Revenue Code authorises Government to reorganise Districts and Talukas. Section 7 of the Code allows the State Government to form Districts by a duly published order. This power of the State Government to reconstitute Districts and Talukas cannot be disputed. As per the Constitution, the Panchayat, at the District level or the Taluka level, must be a self-government in the rural area. The aspect which is to be looked into is whether the reconstituted District or Taluka is a self-governing one or not. If the area so reconstituted is a self-governing one, then the action of the Government cannot be challenged. The District, as per Article 243(a) means a District in a State, the boundaries of which can be changed by the State Government. So also, the boundaries of Taluka, which is the intermediate level, have also to be specified by the State Government. After the amendment of the Constitution by the Seventy Third Amendment, Gujarat Panchayats Act, Act 18 of 1993, was enacted. That defines 'panchayat' to mean "a village panchayat, taluka panchayat or district panchayat". 'District' has been defined in that Act as "a district constituted from time to time under the Land Revenue Code". Likewise, 'taluka' has been defined as one "constituted from time to time under the Land Revenue Code". "Village Panchayat" is defined as one "constituted under the Act". From this definition, it is clear that the Taluka Panchayat or District Panchayat should be in relation to the Taluka or District as constituted by the Government from time to time. It is in relation to such areas the Taluka Panchayat or the District Panchayat can exist as an institution of self-government. The decision in State of U.P. and others v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti and others, (1995) AIR(Supreme Court) 1512, is the authority for the proposition that the State Government have the power to change the boundaries of the District and Talukas. 11. The decision in State of U.P. and others v. Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti and others, (1995) AIR(Supreme Court) 1512, is the authority for the proposition that the State Government have the power to change the boundaries of the District and Talukas. 11. Learned counsel representing the petitioners submitted that while reorganising the Districts and Talukas, Government should have afforded an opportunity of being heard in the matter to the persons affected thereby. In the instant case, there was no such consultation with the Panchayats or persons affected. On this ground, it is said that the order passed by the Government is unsustainable. 12. Section 9(2) of the Panchayats Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1939, provided for consultation with Taluka Panchayat, District Panchayat and the Nagar or Gram Panchayat before deciding on the question as to whether a local area shall be included or excluded to any Nagar or Gram. Such provision has been specifically excluded when Act 18 was enacted in 1993. The exclusion of this provision shows that the Legislature wanted to exclude the provision for consultation. In other words, Legislature specifically excluded the application of principles of natural justice in the case of reorganisation or delimitation of Panchayats of other local self-government. Looking into this legislative history, it can safely be taken that Legislature expressly excluded the application of rule of natural justice. In such a situation, this Court cannot read into the provision of Section 7 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code principles of natural justice (vide Dr.Rash Lal Yadav v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1994 7 JT 62 ). 13. In the case of reorganisation of Daskroi Taluka and Ahmedabad City Taluka, when villages affected thereby were consulted, majority of the villages agreed for reorganisation. Their views were considered by the Government and a Notification issued. This shows that even though the requirement of consultation was not provided in the Act, it was, in fact, carried out. It is settled law that 'consultation' does not mean 'concurrence' or 'consent'. So, on the facts and circumstances of these cases, the action resorted to by the Government cannot be faulted as one carried out in violation of the principles of natural justice. 14. As a result of reconstitution or reorganisation of Districts and Talukas, the area of the Panchayat underwent alteration. So, on the facts and circumstances of these cases, the action resorted to by the Government cannot be faulted as one carried out in violation of the principles of natural justice. 14. As a result of reconstitution or reorganisation of Districts and Talukas, the area of the Panchayat underwent alteration. Certain areas were deleted from the jurisdiction of one Panchayat and attached to another. This has resulted in some constituencies of the existing Panchayat being detached from it. Such detachment of the constituency from one Panchayat is taken by the petitioners as a delimitation of the constituencies, coming within the purview of Section 16(3) of the Panchayats Act. Such delimitation, it is argued, can be done only by the State Election Commission and that too, at any time not later than two months from the date of the expiry of the duration of the Panchayat. The term of office of the existing Panchayat is to expire by May, 2000 A.D. So, at no point of time earlier to March, 2000 could there be delimitation. Since the reorganisation was done in 1997, the action of the Government is unsustainable. We are not in a position to agree with this contention. Government decision was to redefine the Panchayat area. That power of the Government, as stated earlier, cannot be challenged on the ground that it will result in change of the limits of the constituencies. Change of the constituencies will be a natural consequence of the reorganisation of the Panchayat area. The reorganization of the Panchayat area under no circumstance can be termed as delimitation of the territorial constituencies of the Panchayat. When the area of the Panchayat is redetermined or reorganised, the consequences that should follow are those that are contained in Section 264 of the Panchayat Act. The consequences of alterations of the limits of the District or Taluka are provided in that section. 15. The provision contained in Section 264 should have precedence to all other provisions contained in the Panchayats Act because of the non obstante clause contained in that Section. The power of the State Government under that Section is notwithstanding anything contained in the Panchayats Act or any other law for the time being in force. 15. The provision contained in Section 264 should have precedence to all other provisions contained in the Panchayats Act because of the non obstante clause contained in that Section. The power of the State Government under that Section is notwithstanding anything contained in the Panchayats Act or any other law for the time being in force. As a result of this non obstante clause, when Government issues Notifications, as contemplated by that Section, the correctness or otherwise of that is not to be decided on the basis of the other provisions contained in the Panchayat Act. The fiction enacted in the non obstante clause should operate within its legitimate field with full vigour and it must be taken to its logical conclusion. So, the order to be passed under Section 264 of the Act can provide for consequences of the alteration of the limits of the Panchayats. In the instant case, no such order has been issued by the Government till date, in relation to the District Panchayat and Taluka Panchayat, which were affected by the reorganisation of the Districts and Panchayats. 16. Another argument advanced by learned counsel representing the petitioners is that by the reorganisation of Districts and Talukas, the President and other office bearers of the erstwhile District Panchayat and Taluka Panchayat will lose their office. As per Section 67 of the Panchayats Act, the term of office of President and Vice President of a Taluka Panchayat is to be coextensive with the duration of the Panchayat. On reorganization, when the President loses his office, it goes against the provision of the Act and in that view also, it is argued, the reorganisation is against the provisions of the Panchayat Act. This argument appears to be quite attractive, but, on closer scrutiny, we do not find any merit in it. Elected members of the Panchayat are to select President, Vice President and Chairmen of different Committees. By such election, a person so elected is not getting any constitutional right to hold the post; nor has he got any fundamental right to continue in that post. He gets that right only by virtue of the statutory provisions contained in the Panchayats Act. Notwithstanding those provisions in the Panchayats Act, Section 264 has its play. By such election, a person so elected is not getting any constitutional right to hold the post; nor has he got any fundamental right to continue in that post. He gets that right only by virtue of the statutory provisions contained in the Panchayats Act. Notwithstanding those provisions in the Panchayats Act, Section 264 has its play. If circumstances falling under Section 264 arise, then they cannot be challenged or attacked on the ground of the other provisions contained in the Panchayats Act are violated in view of the non obstante clause in Section 264. So, when a District Panchayat or Taluka Panchayat is reconstituted or when delimitation of the territories falling within them takes place, office bearers cannot contend that their statutory right to continue in office during the duration of the erstwhile Panchayat is violated." 25. In Amratbhai Kholidas Patel v. State of Gujarat (Special Civil Application No.21 of 2000, decided on 20th October 2000), a learned Single Judge of this Court held as under : "3. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid notification on the grounds which can broadly be classified into legal contentions and contentions based on facts. The legal contentions have already been examined and rejected in the judgment delivered today in Special Civil Application No.10459 of 1999. Hence, only the contentions based on facts are dealt with in this judgment. 4. The gravamen of the challenge is that the impugned notification is arbitrary, because the distance between Chandalaj and Siddhpur is only 9 kms. whereas the distance between Chandalaj and Unjha is 11 kms. and that village Chandalaj has more commercial and social relations with Unjha. 5. In the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the State government, it is pointed out that there is not much substantial geographical distance between Chandalaj and Unjha (9 Kms) on the one hand as compared to the distance between Chandalaj and Siddhpur (11 kms.) on the other hand. It is further submitted that the people in village Chandalaj can continue to have business relations with both Unjha and Siddhpur and that no inconvenience will be caused to the village people. 6. It is further submitted that the people in village Chandalaj can continue to have business relations with both Unjha and Siddhpur and that no inconvenience will be caused to the village people. 6. Having perused the material on record and having heard the learned counsel for the parties, it appears to the Court that since this Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the State Government in such matters, this Court is not to weigh the arguments for and against the impugned decision in golden scales. Even if the petitioners have shown some inconvenience here or there, the question, as posed by the Apex Court in the case of Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1996) AIR(Supreme Court) 11 (para 95), is whether the harm caused to the people is of such nature and magnitude that the Court should interfere. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as evident from the record, no such finding can be given. Hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs." 26. In Likhi Group Gram Panchayat v. State of Gujarat and others, (2000) 1 GLH 367 , a Division Bench of this Court held as under : "4. A bear look to the Notification at Annexure-C makes it clear that the local area shown in column 6 of the schedule attached to the Notification is divided from the area shown in column 4 of the Schedule and after the division, the new panchayats named in column no.7 having the local area as shown in column no.8 of the said schedule are formed. Accordingly as per the said Notification Likhi Group Gram Panchayat has lost its originality completely and in fact three new gram panchayats have come into existence viz. Likhi Group Gram Panchayat, Bhadardi Gram Panchayat and Khandhol Gram Panchayat and even the area is also mentioned which comprises of new gram Panchayats. Therefore, in our opinion there is complete splitting the areas comprising the original Likhi Group Gram Panchayat and three different gram panchayats have come into existence. Likhi Group Gram Panchayat, Bhadardi Gram Panchayat and Khandhol Gram Panchayat and even the area is also mentioned which comprises of new gram Panchayats. Therefore, in our opinion there is complete splitting the areas comprising the original Likhi Group Gram Panchayat and three different gram panchayats have come into existence. The effect of such division has been provided under section 310 of the said Act and as per the said provision, Panchayat constituted in respect of such local area stand dissolved and all the members of the Panchayat vacate office and therefore, in the instant case when the original Likhi Group Gram Panchayat has already been split into three new gram panchayats, the natural consequential effect of the same would be to appoint an Administrator as envisaged by section 310 of the Act. The submission of the learned advocate for the appellant with reference to section 298 of the said Act has absolutely no force at all. So far as section 298 of the said Act is concerned, it applies when some area of a particular gram Panchayat or nagar panchayat as the case may be is altered either by exclusion or inclusion from the said gram Panchayat or nagar Panchayat and in that case the provisions of Section 298 of the said Act are required to be followed and in such a case there would not be any question of appointment of an Administrator. Said provision will apply when area of an existing gram panchayat is altered and is included in another existing gram panchayat because there will be inclusion and exclusion from the area of gram panchayats. In such a situation the natural consequences provided under section 298 will follow. However, this is not the case here. The instant case is not covered by section 298 of the said Act as pointed above. Here the original Likhi Group Gram Panchayat is split and 3 separate new gram panchayats have come into existence with the area prescribed in the said Notification and therefore, as per section 310 of the said Act appointment of an Administrator has been made. This is absolutely in consonance with the provisions of the said Act and argument of the learned advocate for the appellant has no merit. The same is required to be rejected. 5. It was further submitted by Mrs. This is absolutely in consonance with the provisions of the said Act and argument of the learned advocate for the appellant has no merit. The same is required to be rejected. 5. It was further submitted by Mrs. Mehta for the appellants that the original Notification suffers from the vice of malafide because once the Development Commissioner had initially not approved the proposal subsequently, without any basis or valid reasons within a short time, he could not have approved the division and formation of new panchayats. So far as the allegation about malafide is concerned, averments had been made in para 8 of the original SCA. Said para 8 reads as under: "The petitioners say that the action of dividing the Likhi Group Group Panchayat into 3 Panchayat is also malafide in law, inasmuch as the Sarpanch and the members of the Gram Panchayat who are looking after the interest of the villagers, who were completely uprooted because of the Guhi dam and because they were helped by the Sarpanch and members of Likhi Group Gram Panchayat in getting their legitimate right from the Government the impugned action is taken with a view to remove them by illegal methods and by circumventing the provisions of law. The petitioners therefore, say that the Notification Annexure-C to the petition and subsequent order Annexure-D to the petition is illegal, ultravires and bad in law." Reading the aforesaid averments made in para 8 of the petition it can hardly be said that there is any basis for such assertion or allegation about malafide action. There is hardly any pleading about malafides in the said para. The Development Commissioner has also filed affidavit in reply which is at page 32 of the compilation wherein he has pointed out that the Notification in question was issued for safeguarding the interest of the people and the said decision was taken in good faith and in public interest. It has been pointed out in the affidavit in reply that in view of distance problem which has occurred due to the water of the dam, the bifurcation become imminent and he has also annexed a sketch along with his reply to substantiate his plea of bonafide exercise of power. As stated above, nothing has been shown as to how the aforesaid decision is in any way malafide or against the interest of public. 6. As stated above, nothing has been shown as to how the aforesaid decision is in any way malafide or against the interest of public. 6. It was next argued by Mrs. Mehta that once the Development Commissioner had turned down the proposal for such division/bifurcation, he was required to follow the procedure of fresh consultation with Gram Panchayat, Taluka Panchayat as well as with the District Panchayat and as no such consultation had taken place the Notification should be quashed. The Resolution passed by the Taluka Panchayat and District Panchayat regarding the proposal for bifurcation is annexed at page 36 of the SCA. This Resolution would show that there was no malafide on the part of the Development Commissioner in issuing the Notification in question. It may be stated that consultation required had already taken place earlier. Therefore, after considering all the materials on record, if ultimately the Development Commissioner has issued a Notification it cannot be said that within such a short period further consultation was required to be made. So far as the question of consultation is concerned as laid down in the decision reported in the case of Kalubhai Kesrisingh Mahida vs. State of Gujarat & ors, (1965) GLR 451, that such procedure is directory and not mandatory. In this decision it has been further observed as under: "..a duty to consult the Panchayat before passing an order under the section, it does not follow that every departure from that duty will taint the whole proceeding with a fatal blemish and render it void and ineffective. We find nothing in section 9 or the Act which would lead us to the conclusion that if the Government omits to consult the Panchayat concerned while taking action under sub-section (2) of section 9, the right of the Panchayat or any person would be adversely affected. There is also nothing in the Act to show that even after consultation he sense indicated by the Panchayat concerned would be binding to the Government." It has also been observed in the said judgment that the subsection 2 of section 9 is directory and not mandatory. Above referred to reported decision was also subsequently followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in the case of Naroda Nagar Panchayat vs State of Gujarat & ors, (1977) GLR 814. Above referred to reported decision was also subsequently followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in the case of Naroda Nagar Panchayat vs State of Gujarat & ors, (1977) GLR 814. wherein it has been observed that the word 'consultation' cannot be equated with "consent" or "concurrence" In the instant case aforesaid procedure of consultation had already taken place and and therefore, it cannot be said that the Notification issued by the Development Commissioner was in any way illegal, arbitrary or malafide." 27. In Babubhai Jethabhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat and others, (2001) 3 GLH 718 , a Division Bench of this Court considered the very same issue with regard to shifting of a village from one Taluka to another. The Division Bench held as under : "10. This Court in so many reported/unreported decisions has interpreted provisions of section 7 of the Code. In the case of Patel Baldevbhai Ambalal Vs. State of Gujarat, (1998) 1 GLH 932 and in the case of Gujarat Panchayat Parishad Vs. State, Special Civil Application No. 7240 of 1997 decided on 24.4.1998 by the Division Bench of this Court (Coram: K.Sreedharan, CJ & A.R. Dave, J.), this Court in terms held that before exercise of powers under section 7 of the Code, the Government is not bound to issue notice to the concerned Gram Panchayat and a general notice to the residents of the concerned villages. In substance, the contention that before exercising powers under section 7 of the Code for reconstitution of talukas, the Government is required to follow the principles of natural justice has been negatived by this Court. Learned Counsel Mr.Patel for the appellants, however, invited our attention to the decision of the apex Court in the case of Baldevsingh Vs. State of H.P., (1987) AIR(Supreme Court) 1239 and in the case of State of U.P.and ors. Vs. Pradan Sangh Kshetra Samiti and ors., (1995) AIR(Supreme Court) 1512. IN para 4 of the said judgment, the apex Court observed as under: "Citizens of India have a right to decide what should be the nature of their society, in which they live-agrarian, semi-urban or urban. Admittedly, the way of life varies, depending upon where one lives. Inclusion of an area covered by a Gram Panchayat within a notified area would certainly involve civil consequences. Admittedly, the way of life varies, depending upon where one lives. Inclusion of an area covered by a Gram Panchayat within a notified area would certainly involve civil consequences. In such circumstances, it is necessary that people who will be affected by the change should be given an opportunity of being heard, otherwise they would be visited with serious consequences like loss of office in Gram Panchayats, an imposition of way of life, higher incidence of tax and the like. " The Apex Court made the said observations considering the facts of the case, namely that four villages inhabited by agriculturists and having a rural set up and forming part of gram panchayats under the relevant statute were sought to be constituted as notified areas under section 256 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act and in this background, the apex Court held that before the notified area was constituted, the people of the four villages should have been afforded an opportunity of being heard and the decision should have been taken after considering the views of the residents. As far as the present case is concerned, the nature of society in which the concerned villagers are shifted does not change. Only their administration is changed from one taluka panchayat to another taluka panchayat. 11. The Division Bench in the case of Gujarat Panchayat Parishad, in fact, considered the judgment of the apex Court rendered in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Pradan Sangh Kshetriya Samiti, (1995) AIR(Supreme Court) 1512 and rejected the contention about applicability of principles of natural justice by giving reasons as under: "(i) The institution of self government should not be interfered with. By reconstitution of the panchayat area, if any portion of that area falls outside the jurisdiction of an institution of self-government, that will violate the constitutional mandate. If no part of the panchayat area, on reconstitution or reorganisation, falls outside the institution of self government, such reconstitution or reorganisation cannot be faulted. The area which thus becomes attached to the new District Panchayat/Taluka Panchayat will continue to be under an institution of self Government. (ii) The Bombay Land Revenue Code authorises Government to reorganise Districts and Talukas. The boundaries of the taluka have to be specified by the State Government and can be changed by the State Government. The area which thus becomes attached to the new District Panchayat/Taluka Panchayat will continue to be under an institution of self Government. (ii) The Bombay Land Revenue Code authorises Government to reorganise Districts and Talukas. The boundaries of the taluka have to be specified by the State Government and can be changed by the State Government. After the amendment of Constitution by Seventy Third Amendment, Gujarat Panchayats Act No.18 of 1993 was enacted. That defines 'Panchayat' to mean 'a village panchayat, taluka panchayat or district panchayat'. Similarly, 'district' has been defined in that Act as a 'district constituted from time to time under the Land Revenue Code'. 'Similarly, 'taluka' has been defined as one 'constituted from time to time under the Land Revenue Code.' 'Village Panchayat' is defined as one 'Constituted under the Act. It is clear that the Taluka Panchayat or District Panchayat should be in relation to the Taluka or District as constituted by the Government from time to time under the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Thus, in the case of State of U.P. Vs. Pradhan Sangh Kshetriya Samiti, (1995) AIR(Supreme Court) 1512, it is held that the State Government has power to change the boundaries of the Districts and Talukas. (iii) Section 9(2) of the Panchayats Act, as it stood prior to the amendment of 1993, provided for consultation with Taluka Panchayat, District Panchayat and the Nagar or Gram Panchayat before deciding on the question as to whether a local area shall be included or excluded to any Nagar or Gram. Such provisions have been specifically excluded when Act No.18 was enacted in 1993. The exclusion of this provision shows that the Legislature wanted to exclude the provision for consultation. In other words, Legislature specifically excluded the application of principles of natural justice in the case of reorganisation or delimitation of Panchayats of other local self government. Looking into this legislative history, it can safely be taken that the Legislature expressly excluded the application of rule of natural justice. In such a situation, this Court cannot read into the provisions of section 7 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code principles of natural justice (vide Dr.Rash Lal Yadav. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 1994 7 JT 62 )." 12. Suffice it to say that we are in total agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench in the judgment rendered in Gujarat Panchayat Parishad. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 1994 7 JT 62 )." 12. Suffice it to say that we are in total agreement with the view taken by the Division Bench in the judgment rendered in Gujarat Panchayat Parishad. In our view, the learned single judge was perfectly justified in following the decision of this Court rendered in the said case which has also considered the decision of the apex Court in Pradhan Sangh's case. True, the apex Court in Pradhan Sangh's case, observed that reasonable opportunity for placing objections and hearing ought to have been given to the village people when the change in area/local boundaries results in civil consequences. It may be stated that it was not disputed before the apex Court that the action of bringing more villages than one village under one gram panchayat did involve civil consequences. The learned Counsel in the instant case has not produced sufficient material on record to show as to how the impugned decision, namely shifting village Kahoda from Sidhpur taluka and placing it in Unjha taluka and abolishing Bhildi and again making 53 villages as part of original Deesa taluka would involve civil consequences. It was pointed out that the representatives of taluka panchayat would lose their right to represent taluka. In our opinion, the said contention has no merit and is required to be rejected." 28. In Paroya Group Gram Panchayat and others v. State of Gujarat and others, (2008) 2 GLR 1096 , a learned Single Judge of this Court considered the challenge to the policy decision of the State Government to bifurcate a Gram Panchayat. While rejecting the writ-application, the learned Judge observed as under : "14. A Full Bench of this Court in Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat & Ors. had occasion to deal exhaustively, with the requirement of consultation as envisaged in Section 7(2) of the Act. After dealing with the points referred to it for decision, it has been held in paragraphs 9 and 14 as under: "9.... A Full Bench of this Court in Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat & Ors. had occasion to deal exhaustively, with the requirement of consultation as envisaged in Section 7(2) of the Act. After dealing with the points referred to it for decision, it has been held in paragraphs 9 and 14 as under: "9.... when the statute requires an authority to consult before taking action, the consultation should not be a mere formality, but must be genuine and meaningful, then only the object of incorporation of this clause in the statute by the makers of law would be fulfilled, particularly in the case before us the consultation would enable the authority to understand and evaluate the implications of the proposed stage on a section of society which is likely to be affected. The authority would know their point of view which would assist it in evaluating or judging the situation and take decision in the best interest of the society.......... 14. After the consultation, once it culminates into a decision considering the pros and cons of the matter, the exercise comes to an end and chapter is closed. If it is proposed to make a fresh decision, in our opinion, it would be a new chapter and fresh exercise of consultation would be necessary. It will have to be examined whether there is change in circumstance or not and if so, what are the changes and for that reason, what is the view point of the Panchayat - the affected party. This requirement of law has to be, thus, saluted as if it is altogether a new proposal for decision on aspect of bifurcation." Summing upon its conclusions, the Full Bench answered the points referred for its determination as under: "16. In view of the above discussion, the points for our determination are answered as under : (i) The term 'Consultation' has to be taken as an effective and meaningful and genuine consultation and not a formality. (ii) There is no conflict between the ratio laid down in the case of Nathabhai and Likhi Group of Gram Panchayat. The conclusions are based on fact of each case, but, there is no conflict in the ratio. (iii) If proposal has culminated into a decision, fresh exercise of consultation would be necessary before taking a fresh decision. (ii) There is no conflict between the ratio laid down in the case of Nathabhai and Likhi Group of Gram Panchayat. The conclusions are based on fact of each case, but, there is no conflict in the ratio. (iii) If proposal has culminated into a decision, fresh exercise of consultation would be necessary before taking a fresh decision. We may reiterate that the consultation is not mandatory and every departure therefrom may not render it void or ineffective, but, the provisions of law has to be saluted in its spirit and exercise of consultation should be undertaken." 15. In paragraph 13.1 of the judgment, the Full Bench has held that though the requirement of consultation is not mandatory but is directory, the same cannot be given a total go-bye. What emerges from a cumulative reading of the judgment of the Full Bench is that though the provisions of Section 7(2) of the Act are not mandatory, but the consultation envisaged therein has to be effective, meaningful and genuine consultation and not a mere formality. Further, if a proposal has culminated into a decision, a fresh exercise of consultation would be necessary before taking a fresh decision. Applying the ratio of the judgment of the Full Bench to the facts and circumstances obtaining in the present case, it is to be seen whether there has been effective, meaningful and genuine consultation with the Taluka Panchayat, District Panchayat and the concerned Gram Panchayat, before issuing the impugned Notification dated 4.10.2007. 16. The undisputed facts of the case are that on 27-3-2006 and 31-3-2006 the petitioner-Gram Panchayat passed Resolution No.5 and Resolution No.4 respectively, to the effect that village Rodhra should be bifurcated from Paroya Group Gram Panchayat for geographical and administrative reasons, especially for the reason that river Gosambi was passing between villages Paroya and Rodhra, making travel and transportation to and fro difficult, for the people of the area. Acting upon the above two Resolutions, the Taluka Panchayat and the District Panchayat, after making necessary inquiries, submitted the requisite proposal to the State Government for bifurcation of the petitioner-Gram Panchayat, which ultimately culminated in the issuance of Notification dated 4-10-2007. 17. Acting upon the above two Resolutions, the Taluka Panchayat and the District Panchayat, after making necessary inquiries, submitted the requisite proposal to the State Government for bifurcation of the petitioner-Gram Panchayat, which ultimately culminated in the issuance of Notification dated 4-10-2007. 17. The first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that the impugned Notification has been issued as a political gimmick in order to woo the rich and influential persons of the area before the impending elections to the Legislative Assembly, cannot be accepted, for the reason that initially the proposal for bifurcation emanated from the petitioner-Gram Panchayat itself, by way of Resolutions dated 27-3-2006 and 31-3-2006 respectively. The elections to the Legislative Assembly took place only in December 2007 and, therefore, there is no connection or nexus between the two. Even otherwise, the allegations of political malafide are not supported by any material on record and, therefore, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is merely stated to be rejected. Moreover, after the earlier Resolutions dated 27-3-2006 and 31-3-2006, there is no change in circumstances till the passing of the subsequent Resolution dated 16-8-2007 whereby it is stated that for the time being, consent for bifurcation has been withheld. 18. Regarding the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that there has been no consultation before passing the impugned Notification, it is evident that the subsequent Resolution No.4(1) dated 16-8-2007, whereby the majority has resolved that, for the time being consent for bifurcation of the petitioner-Gram Panchayat is being withheld, is clearly an after thought since it has been passed by the newly-formed body. The record reveals that pursuant to the earlier Resolutions dated 27-3-2006 and 31-3-2006, the Taluka Panchayat and the District Panchayat have passed Resolutions dated 4-9-2006 and 27-10-2006 respectively consenting to the bifurcation of the petitioner Gram Panchayat and it is only after following the necessary procedure, as envisaged in the Statute and after conducting the necessary inquiry that the proposal for bifurcation of the petitioner-Gram Panchayat was sent to the State Government, resulting in the issuance of Notification dated 4-10-2007. A perusal of the documents on record reveals that there has been effective, meaningful and genuine consultation, as held to be necessary by the Full Bench in Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat & Ors.. A perusal of the documents on record reveals that there has been effective, meaningful and genuine consultation, as held to be necessary by the Full Bench in Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat & Ors.. The record discloses that the procedure envisaged in Section 7 of the Act has been meticulously followed by the respondents and the requirement of effective and meaningful consultation, in terms of Section 7(2) of the Act, has been fulfilled before issuing the impugned Notification. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there has been no effective and meaningful consultation cannot, therefore, be accepted. 19. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding violation of the principles of natural justice are also without substance. It is relevant to notice the fact that the Resolution for bifurcation was sent by the petitioner-Gram Panchayat as far back as on 27-3-2006 and 31-3-2006 and, acting upon the same, the proposal for bifurcation has been processed at the levels of the Taluka Panchayat and District Panchayat. The earlier Resolutions of the petitioner-Gram Panchayat are based on the representations of the people at large, who were facing difficulties due to the geographical conditions prevailing in the area and due to lack of proper transportation facilities. In the light of this position, it cannot be said that the people at large were not given an opportunity of being heard. Further, it is relevant to notice that the provisions of Section 7(2) of the Act do not contemplate an individual opportunity of hearing. What is contemplated is only 'consultation', which has effectively taken place, as is evident from the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the documents on the record. The Statute does not contemplate, a personal hearing to all the objectors who may file representation. Even otherwise, the Gram Panchayat has itself by the earlier resolutions consented to the bifurcation and merely because by a subsequent Resolution dated 16-8-2007, the majority has withheld the consent for bifurcation, for the time being, does not indicate that there is any change of circumstances, necessitating abandoning of the proposal for bifurcation. Even otherwise, the Gram Panchayat has itself by the earlier resolutions consented to the bifurcation and merely because by a subsequent Resolution dated 16-8-2007, the majority has withheld the consent for bifurcation, for the time being, does not indicate that there is any change of circumstances, necessitating abandoning of the proposal for bifurcation. A perusal of the Resolution dated 16-8-2007 whereby, the petitioner-Gram Panchayat, by majority has withheld the consent to the proposal of bifurcation, for the time being, makes it clear that the earlier stand of the petitioner-Gram Panchayat has been changed by the new governing body, ostensibly with the purpose of allowing the elected representatives to complete their term. There is no objection, in principle, to the proposal of bifurcation. The Resolution dated 16-8-2007 does not contain a single reason why the bifurcation should not take place, giving rise to the inescapable conclusion that the withholding of the consent for bifurcation, for the time being as stated therein, is merely to protect the personal interests of the elected body and allow it to complete its term in office. 20. It is evident from a perusal of the communication dated 3-8-2007, annexed as Annexure "B" to the petition that the State Government has written to the respondent No.2 to consult the newly elected Gram Panchayat and ask them to pass a Resolution regarding their views on the bifurcation of the Gram Panchayat. In this view of the matter, it cannot be denied that there has been fresh consultation, after the formation of the new governing body. The Resolution No.4/1 dated 16-8-2007 has been passed by the petitioner-Gram Panchayat subsequent to the letter dated 3-8-2007. The requirement of fresh consultation, as held by the Full Bench in Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat & Ors. has, therefore been fulfilled. 21. There is sufficient material on record to show that while issuing the Notification for the bifurcation of the petitioner-Gram Panchayat, the State Government has taken into consideration all relevant factors, such as the geographical location, revenue, population and other related factors and the decision to bifurcate the Gram Panchayat has been taken in the interest of the public at large. This decision is in the nature of a policy decision of the State Government. This decision is in the nature of a policy decision of the State Government. As held in Federation of Railway Officers Association and others v. Union of India, the scope of judicial review in matters affecting policy and requiring technical expertise is limited; "Judicial review of a policy evolved by the Government is limited. When policy according to which or the purpose for which discretion is to be exercised is clearly expressed in the statute, it cannot be said to be an unrestricted discretion. On matters affecting policy and requiring technical expertise the court would leave the matter for decision of those who are qualified to address the issues. Unless the policy or action is inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws or arbitrary or irrational or abuse of power, the court will not interfere in such matters." 22. In the case in hand, the policy decision to bifurcate the petitioner-Gram Panchayat by issuing the impugned Notification has been arrived at after taking into consideration all relevant factors and ground realities, and does not violate any legal or constitutional provisions. There is no material on record to show that the decision is arbitrary, irrational or perverse. This Court, therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India will not interfere with such a policy decision, especially when it meets with the requirements of law. 23. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners to the effect that the revenue and population of village Rodhra is lesser than that of the other villages comprising Paroya Gram Panchayat and that the newly formed Gram Panchayat will find it difficult to run its administration, is also not worthy of acceptance. It is not in dispute that the newly-formed Gram Panchayat will be given various grants and exemptions in order to run its administration. Such matters of a financial and administrative nature are to be looked into by the competent authorities in this regard and it is not for this Court, or for the petitioners to decide how, and in what manner, the financial and administrative matters of the Gram Panchayat are to be handled. There is nothing on record to show that the decision to bifurcate the petitionerGram Panchayat has not been taken in the larger public interest. There is nothing on record to show that the decision to bifurcate the petitionerGram Panchayat has not been taken in the larger public interest. In fact, the subsequent resolution of the petitioner Gram Panchayat, stating that the consent for bifurcation of the said Gram Panchayat is being withheld for the time being, gives rise to the inescapable conclusion that the same has been passed to serve the personal interest of the office bearers and not for concerns of the public at large. 24. Last, but not the least, it is relevant to notice that 'consultation' is not the same as 'concurrence', as has been clarified by the Full Bench in para 13.1 of Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat & Ors. ; "The affected party must have an opportunity to express its opinion and view on the proposed decision. The term is used as a consultation, and it cannot be, by any stretch of imagination, taken as concurrence or consent, and therefore, after consultation a decision may be taken by the Government." In the present case, the decision has been taken by issuing the impugned Notification after due consultation, which is not diluted by the temporary withholding of consent for bifurcation, by the petitioner-Gram Panchayat. 25. In view of the principles of law laid down by the Full Bench in Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat & Ors., and in the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove, and in the ultimate analysis, I am of the considered opinion that the Notification dated 4-10-2007, whereby the petitioner-Gram Panchayat has been bifurcated, suffers from no legal infirmity. Consequently, the orders dated 20-10-2007 and 22-10-2007 whereby an Administrator has been appointed for the newly-formed Gram Panchayat are also legal and valid." 29. In Pruthvisinh Amarsinh Chauhan v. K.D.Rawat, (2004) AIR(Gujarat) 243, a Full Bench of this Court held as under : "9. The reference order culminates into three material questions, as narrated above. The question that would be required to be dealt with, first, would be what meaning can be attributed to term 'Consultation'. In this regard, the decision in the case of Union of India Vs. Sakalchand S. Sheth and Another, (1977) AIR(Supreme Court) 2328 and Baldevsingh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1977 AIR(Supreme Court) 1239, followed by observations in the case of Bhalod Gram Panchayat Vs. State of Gujarat, (1986) 1 GLR 247 would be relevant. In this regard, the decision in the case of Union of India Vs. Sakalchand S. Sheth and Another, (1977) AIR(Supreme Court) 2328 and Baldevsingh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1977 AIR(Supreme Court) 1239, followed by observations in the case of Bhalod Gram Panchayat Vs. State of Gujarat, (1986) 1 GLR 247 would be relevant. The Apex Court has observed in the case of Sakalchand that, "the term 'Consultation' means full and effective and not formal or unproductive consultation". The term used is consultation and not concurrence or consent which are not synonyms to each other, and operate differently. For an important that the consultation has to be meaningful and not formal. In the case of Nathabhai, this Court observed that, "for making consultation effective and clear, the Government ought to have disclosed a new material to the Panchayats and ascertained its view thereon, and thereafter held that as no result has been pointed out for not doing so, and because it does not point out that if the action of the Government is regarded invalid, it would be prejudicial to the public interest. The action of the Government was arbitrary and liable to be declared as invalid". We are also of the view that when the statute requires an Authority to consult before taking action, the consultation should not be a mere formality, but must be genuine and meaningful, then only the object of incorporation of this cause in the statute by the makers of law would be fulfilled, particularly in the case before us the consultation would enable the authority to understand and evaluate the implications of the proposed stage on a section of Society which is likely to be affected. The authority would know their point of view which would assist it in evaluating or judging the situation and take decision in the best interest of the society. 10. The next point that is required to be considered by us is whether there is any conflict between the ratio decidendi emerging from Nathabhai's case and from the case of Likhi Group of Gram Panchayat. 10.1 We have given a close scrutiny to both the cases. In the case of Nathabhai, the Division Bench, after referring to Kalubhai Vs. 10. The next point that is required to be considered by us is whether there is any conflict between the ratio decidendi emerging from Nathabhai's case and from the case of Likhi Group of Gram Panchayat. 10.1 We have given a close scrutiny to both the cases. In the case of Nathabhai, the Division Bench, after referring to Kalubhai Vs. State of Gujarat, (1965) GLR 451, observed that in the said decision Section 9 Subsection (2) of the Old Act is pari-materia with Section 7 Subsection (2) of the New Act is directory and not mandatory. The Division Bench held that Section does not prescribe what consequences would follow if prior consultation is not made before taking an action under the said Section. The Division Bench, ultimately, held and observed "....it appears that the provision is directory and although it does not indicate a duty to consult Panchayat before passing an order under the Section, but, it does not follow that every departure from that duty will taint the whole proceedings with a fatal blemish and render it void and ineffective". 10.2 Making observations on factual aspect of the case, the Division Bench in Para.9 of the judgment observed, thus : "In the case, on basis of the material which was before the Government and the representation made by the Bavala Nagar Panchayat, the Government had on 24-12-1990, taken a decision not to accept the proposal for bifurcation of Bavala Nagar Panchayat. If it had been a case of mere consideration of the material which was already there and in respect of which the concerned Panchayat was already consulted earlier, then it could have been said that it was not necessary to consult it again. But it is an admitted position that fresh material was placed before the Government after 24-12-1990. For making consultation effective and real the Government ought to have disclosed the new material to the Panchayat and ascertained its view thereon. No reason has been pointed out for not doing that. It is also not pointed out that if the action of the Government is regarded as invalid, it would be prejudicial to public interest. Therefore, the impugned action of the Government will have to be regarded as arbitrary and thus liable to be declared as invalid". No reason has been pointed out for not doing that. It is also not pointed out that if the action of the Government is regarded as invalid, it would be prejudicial to public interest. Therefore, the impugned action of the Government will have to be regarded as arbitrary and thus liable to be declared as invalid". 10.3 Thus, according to the Division Bench, in the case of Nathabhai as the decision of the Government founded on fresh material was without consultation and therefore, although the requirement of consultation was not mandatory, the decision was held to be invalid. No reason was indicated by Government for not undertaking the exercise of consultation. The ratio decidendi therefore is that requirement of consultation is not mandatory and is directory. However, the consultation has to be effective and real, and for making it effective and real, the new material considered by Government ought to have been disclosed to the Panchayat and ascertained its view. 11. In the case of Likhi Group Gram Panchayat also the Division Bench held that requirement of Section 9(2) of the Old Act is not mandatory. What is required is the consultation and not consent or concurrence. Before that Bench, it was also argued that the Development Commissioner has turned down the proposal for division/bifurcation and thereafter, without consultation of the Gram Panchayat or Taluka Panchayat, a different view was taken to bifurcate the Panchayat. The Division Bench observed that looking at the resolution, it was clear that there was no mala fide on part of the Development Commissioner in issuing the Notification. Earlier there was consultation and this different view was taken within a short time and therefore, the Division Bench observed that if ultimately the Development Commissioner has issued Notification within such a short period, it cannot be said that within such a short period further consultation was required. The Division Bench relied on Kalubhai's case that a duty to consult Panchayat before passing an order under Section does not necessarily mean that every departure from their duty will take the whole proceedings with a fatal damage and render it void and ineffective. Thus, the Division Bench, in the facts of that case found that there was no much lapse of time and non-consultation did not affect the decision. 12. Thus, the Division Bench, in the facts of that case found that there was no much lapse of time and non-consultation did not affect the decision. 12. What emerges from these two judgments therefore is that in case of Nathabhai, the Division Bench found that as the decision was taken on fresh material, earlier consultation would not be effective or real. Whereas in the case of Likhi Group of Gram Panchayat there was no fresh material, there was no change in circumstance and the time lag was so narrow that the Division Bench, probably, felt in the facts of the case that fresh consultation was not required. Both the decisions concurred on the aspect that requirement of consultation is not mandatory, but, is directory. The decision taken in both the cases in respect of further consultation were based on facts of those cases and in our opinion, as such, there is no conflict between the ratio laid down in the two decisions. 13. The third point that requires consideration by virtue of the reference is whether the Government can issue Notification without again consulting the Panchayat as per the requirement of Section 7(2) of the New Act. 13.1 As discussed above, though the requirement of consultation is not mandatory and is directory, in our opinion, it cannot be given a total go-bye to it. Since the Legislature in its wisdom has incorporated this provision, it has to be given its due importance. It is true that in other case non-compliance would not vitiate the decision, valid reasons therefore have to be indicated. The object behind the enactment has to be saluted. The affected party must have an opportunity to express its opinion and view on he proposed decision. The term is used as a consultation and it cannot be, by any stretch of imagination, taken as concurrence or consent and therefore, after consultation a decision may be taken by the Government. 14. After the consultation, once it culminates into a decision considering the pros and cons of the matter, the exercise comes to an end and chapter is closed. If it is proposed to make a fresh decision, in our opinion, it would be a new chapter and fresh exercise of consultation would be necessary. 14. After the consultation, once it culminates into a decision considering the pros and cons of the matter, the exercise comes to an end and chapter is closed. If it is proposed to make a fresh decision, in our opinion, it would be a new chapter and fresh exercise of consultation would be necessary. It will have to be examined whether there is change in circumstance or not and if so, what are the changes and for that reason, what is the view point of the Panchayat - the affected party. This requirement of law has to be, thus, saluted as if it is altogether a new proposal for decision on aspect of bifurcation. 15. If after undertaking an exercise a final decision one way or the other is not taken, probably fresh exercise may not be undertaken once again. If there is a lapse of time resulting into change into factual scenario, the Government or the Authority can legitimately be expected to undertake a fresh exercise of consultation. 16. In view of the above discussion, the points for our determination are answered as under : (i) The term 'Consultation' has to be taken as an effective and meaningful and genuine consultation and not a formality. (ii) There is no conflict between the ratio laid down in the case of Nathabhai and Likhi Group Gram Panchayat. The conclusions are based on fact of each case, but, there is no conflict in the ratio. (iii) If proposal has culminated into a decision, fresh exercise of consultation would be necessary before taking a fresh decision. We may reiterate that the consultation is not mandatory and every departure therefrom may not render it void or ineffective, but, the provisions of law has to be saluted in its spirit and exercise of consultation should be undertaken. 17. The Reference stands disposed of accordingly. 18. I, while agreeing with the ultimate conclusion and supporting reasons, highlighted and heralded, by my learned brother, Justice Dave, respectfully, propose to add the following grounds and propositions for more effective, better and efficient, understanding, proposition and exposition as well as interpretation of the provisions of subsection 2 of Section 7 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 ("Act"). 19. 18. I, while agreeing with the ultimate conclusion and supporting reasons, highlighted and heralded, by my learned brother, Justice Dave, respectfully, propose to add the following grounds and propositions for more effective, better and efficient, understanding, proposition and exposition as well as interpretation of the provisions of subsection 2 of Section 7 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 ("Act"). 19. By virtue of Section 2 of Constitutional (73rd) Amendment Act, 1992, which came into effect, from 24-04-1993, and the resultant inclusion of Chapter IX under the heading of "the Panchayats", "a village" means a village specified by the Governor, by a public notification to be a village for the purpose of this part and includes a group of villages so specified and "Panchayat" means an instrument, by whatever name called, as the Government constituted under Article 243-B, for the rural areas. A Constitutional Mechanism of Gram Sabha, Panchayats, including a provision of a bar to interfere by the Courts in electoral matters of Panchayats play significant role in highlighting the purposive, useful, real and meaningful interpretation of expression, "Consultation" employed in Section 7 (2) of the Act corresponding to the provision of Section 9 (2) of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1961 ("old Act".) 20. The Division Bench decisions rendered in Kalubhai Kesri Singh Mahida Vs. State of Gujarat, (1965) GLR 451 and Nathubhai M. Patel Vs. State of Gujarat, (1993) 2 GLR 992 , were prior to the aforesaid amendments in the Constitution relating to the composition and administration of the Panchayats. While upholding the nature of the provisions contained in sub-section 2 of Section 9 of the old Act corresponding to sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the new Act as 'directory' and not 'mandatory', it has been, succinctly, held that the scheme of the provisions in the context of the particular provisions under consideration and the intended benefit of the provision, as well as, the material danger by its contravention out to be seen and not only the actual words used in the statute. The proposition laid down for sublime and significant use of expression "consultation", at the time of reconstitution of a village and administration of Panchayat under the Act, has been materially signified and reinforced by the inclusion of Chapter IX in the Constitution of India. The proposition laid down for sublime and significant use of expression "consultation", at the time of reconstitution of a village and administration of Panchayat under the Act, has been materially signified and reinforced by the inclusion of Chapter IX in the Constitution of India. Needless to reiterate that the Court is required to determine and decide, appreciate and check the merits of each case, having regard to the subject-matter in the backdrop of the factual premise and profile, and the resultant impact and effect, in the event of failure or departure, as it "ipso-facto" may not constitute invalidity of the action. It may, also, be remembered that the legislature must have provided, for good reasons, that before effecting reconstitution of a village or a change in the administrative set-up for a Panchayat, the concerned Panchayat ought to be consulted and departure from non-compliance in the light of constitutional status to Panchayat Raj Institute, ought to be viewed, very seriously and, therefore, by now, the said provision has to be taken almost like a mandatory prescription though the expression employed in Section 7 (2) of the Act is "may". 21. As a grass-root institution, the Panchayat administration concept and philosophy has deep old roots all along in the ancient days. The growth of Panchayat, as an institution in villages and towns, as a system of governance, is phenomenal and remarkable, notwithstanding that during the times of kingdoms, autocracies, feudal Rajas and Maharajas, this institution has played an important and effective role in creating democratic public opinion. Those were the days when Panchayats, as effective instrument, as a popular democratic public opinion, as to morality had impelled King Ram to banish wife, Sita, on suspicion, whereas these days, worst, criminals, escape moral obligations to quit till the crime is established beyond doubt. It was an information technology leading to effective public opinion, which gave various authority to behave elderly through consensus building. Human rights are implicitly preserved, observed and subserved in revolutionary evolution of the institution of the Panchayat. Fragmentations and factionalism, fanaticism and fundamentalism should remain miles away from the administration of self-government like institution of Panchayats for the better welfare of society and higher interest of the common man and the concept of better governance. The object of Panchayat Raj inheres, 'dil-bandi' and not 'dal-bandi'. Once upon a time, villages were very happy in their splendid isolation. Fragmentations and factionalism, fanaticism and fundamentalism should remain miles away from the administration of self-government like institution of Panchayats for the better welfare of society and higher interest of the common man and the concept of better governance. The object of Panchayat Raj inheres, 'dil-bandi' and not 'dal-bandi'. Once upon a time, villages were very happy in their splendid isolation. Today, isolation is neither splendid nor desirable for the growth of Gram Republic philosophy and effective participation in development and governance. 22. Unfortunately, the glowing scenario of the expression, "Panchayat" underwent a sea change after independence. Dynamics of "Village Panchayat" needs no emphasis in a democratic and republic set-up of governance. The creation of Panchayat should not be oriented only to ensure the realisation of revenues and power. It should not be compromised with the various forces from political parties to penetrate the peace and tranquility, objectivity and morality. The institution of Panchayat has to be taken as an instrument of transformation of socio-economic life and liberty. It is, rightly, said that for such institutions, elections are not the democracy. Panchayats are meant for pious and progressive governance and not mere drum-beating. Empty democracy is retrogressive and disillusionary. It was rightly, observed in Balwant Rai Mehta Report (1978) on Panchayats that at times political parties hierarchies and a State were clashing in contradictions, which were contrary to the policy and planning for the Panchayati Raj institutions and vice-versa importance of achieving success of revivalist Panchayati system in the party demanded parochial environments without their ability and commitment to oversee and closely supervise the re-establishment of clear, composed and clean democratic and developed institutions village upwards. Ashok Mehta Report, 1978 was even more illustrating on Panchyati Raj failure. It said the Panchayati Raj story of ups and downs in three phases: one, the phase of ascendancy (1959-65) ; two, stagnation (1965-69) and decline (1969-77). The Committee, also, highlighted and repeated the Balwant Rai team's observation and made observations and suggestions. 23. The Panchayati Raj, like democracy at national and State level, has both, an end and means. This is in essence even of an integrated democratic polity. It is essential for decentralisation, better development. More importantly, for the creations of an integral structure of self-governing institutions from village upwards to national level, Panchayati Raj is to be the foundations of swaraj. 24. This is in essence even of an integrated democratic polity. It is essential for decentralisation, better development. More importantly, for the creations of an integral structure of self-governing institutions from village upwards to national level, Panchayati Raj is to be the foundations of swaraj. 24. It is in this context necessary to emphasise that there should be no intrusion or intervention of the rights and duties, custom and culture, composition and character of the institution of Panchayati Raj. It is in this context, it is, rightly, said that the consensus is going to be the integral cultural system of the governance and if Consensus Raj and Panchayati Raj made for each other, so much the better. The political hierarchies and the State leadership cannot underscore and underestimate the significance and the content of the Panchayati Raj by not following statutory provisions, even whether it is directory, more so in the text and context of inclusion of Chapter IX of the Panchyati set up and mechanism in the Constitution of India in 1993 and it is in this context and environment though Section 7 (3) speaks of "consultation" and not "consent" or "concurrence". The direct adherence and observance of the expression, "consultation" employed by the legislature in its wisdom and magnified and reinforced by the inclusion of Chapter IX in the Constitution of India should, always, be insisted and ought to be the hallmark of the growth and development of the concept of Panchayat which is in the higher public interest. 25. There is a dynamic reform in approach to governance and dealing increasingly with the provision for consultation with civil society in relation to legislative, public policy and developmental activities in a democratic set up. While this development may have led to enhanced understanding of consultation, as a mode of involving larger sections of society or the people of the territorial units, in decision-making, the term "consultation" constituted, has to be used interchangeably with, for example, "participation" and "involvement" understandably in the context of informal or non-formal dialogue. This practice risks of obscuring a clear understanding of the expectation that can be had of consultation as a function of forming public opinion or public decision-making. 26. This practice risks of obscuring a clear understanding of the expectation that can be had of consultation as a function of forming public opinion or public decision-making. 26. Consultation with the people or the representative organisations and individual citizens in relation to any public better or public policy initiatives can summarily be highlighted as being a commitment on the part of the government or a governmental agency to actively listen to and take into consideration the views of the individual or representative organisation on a given set of legislative or public policy reformative proposals. Indisputably, process of consultation is a mode of involvement that brings with it no guarantee that the view-point of an individual citizens or representative organisations, shall be reflected in actions or documents arising from given public consultation, let alone be translated into actions. 27. There is a considerable philosophical and conceptual body of literature available to facilitate the development of a single coherent definition of "consultation" as "a mechanism for involving rural folks or people or citizens in decision-making, including in relation to public policy development". Let it be mentioned that in a period spanning over 30 years, Arnstain (1969), Hart (1992), John (1996), Franklin (1997), Treseder (1997) and Lendonz (2001) are among those who have forwarded the definition of consultation and moreover to have constituted these definitions schematically in relation to other modes on involvement. Roger Hart's adaptation of Armstein's ladder of participation is worth mentioning because it was the model chosen for presentation in national development strategically approach. 28. As this philosophical and conceptual aspect of the word, "consultation" illustrates clearly not only the meaning of consultation, but the regard and esteem in which it is held that it can be a focus for divergent opinions and views. 29. The consultation, therefore, has to be understood as a mechanism for collecting views, selecting opinions, eliciting information that can inform about development of a policy to a public policy maker at the state and national level. The views of the people of village in getting them participated in the process of decision-making and influencing decisionmaking process is not of a notion, but is a vision and has to be understood with missionary zeal in a democratic governance. The concept of consultation in a democratic set up also augments culture and concept of a federalism. The views of the people of village in getting them participated in the process of decision-making and influencing decisionmaking process is not of a notion, but is a vision and has to be understood with missionary zeal in a democratic governance. The concept of consultation in a democratic set up also augments culture and concept of a federalism. Consultation provides an involvement of obtaining important advice, ideas and divergent opinions from various kinds of people regarding the formation, evaluation, monitoring. Failure to consult or departure from the statutory mechanism of consultation, even if it be directory, has to be taken very seriously, as departure of such process entails evil and civil consequences directly or indirectly, knowingly or unknowingly, deliberately or otherwise, for, effective, efficient and meaningful governance and autonomy of selfgovernment at the bottom of the pyramid will result into degeneration, de-composition and disintegration of the process of democratic values, rule of law and fundamental principles of natural justice as opposed to the evolution of the humanistic and logistic rights. The Reference is, in the result, answered accordingly." 30. Thus, what is discernible from the above discussed caselaw is that before maintaining a writ-application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner needs to point out, or rather, convince the court that any of his fundamental rights or any other legal rights have been infringed. 31. In the present case, the petition has been filed by the petitioner in his capacity as the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, and if that be so, and if his case is that the petition is filed in the representative capacity, i.e. on behalf of the villagers, then he needs to point out to the court that the fundamental rights or any other legal rights of the villagers have been infringed by the impugned Notification. The petitioner needs to point out that the impugned Notification involved civil consequences. 32. The above referred decisions make it very clear that the administrative decisions of the present type should not be disturbed by the court in exercise of its extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The nature of society, in which the concerned villagers are shifted, does not change. Only their administration is changed from one taluka panchayat to another taluka panchayat. 33. The nature of society, in which the concerned villagers are shifted, does not change. Only their administration is changed from one taluka panchayat to another taluka panchayat. 33. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr.Pandya, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicant, is not of any assistance because the observations made by the Supreme Court in Pradhan Sangh Kshettra Samiti were considering the facts of the case, namely that four villages inhabited by the agriculturists and having a rural setup and forming part of the gram panchayat under the relevant statutes were sought to be constituted as the notified areas under Section 256 of the Himachal Pradesh Municipal Act, and in this background, the Supreme Court held that before the notified area was constituted, the people of the four villages should have been afforded an opportunity of being heard. Having regard to the peculiar facts of the case, the Supreme Court observed that the inclusion of an area covered by a gram panchayat within a notified area would involve civil consequences. 34. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 AllER 935, Lord Diplock enunciated three grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review, viz. (i) illegality, (ii) irrationality, and (iii) procedural impropriety. While opining that "further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds" he added that principle of "proportionality" may be a possible ground for judicial review for adoption in future. Explaining the said three grounds, Lord Diplock said: "By "illegality" he means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decisionmaking power and must give effect to it, and whether he has or has not, is a justiciable question; by "irrationality" he means "Wednesbury unreasonableness". Explaining the said three grounds, Lord Diplock said: "By "illegality" he means that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decisionmaking power and must give effect to it, and whether he has or has not, is a justiciable question; by "irrationality" he means "Wednesbury unreasonableness". It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided, could have arrived at it; and by "procedural impropriety" he means not only failure to observe the basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness, but also failure to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which the tribunal's jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice." 35. The principle of "Wednesbury unreasonableness" or irrationality, classified by Lord Diplock as one of the grounds, for intervention in judicial review, was lucidly summarised by Lord Greene M.R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223, as follows: ".....the court is entitled to investigate the action of the local authority with a view of seeing whether it has taken into account matters which it ought not to take into account, or conversely, has refused to take into account or neglected to take into account matters which it ought to take into account. Once that question is answered in favour of the local authority, it may still be possible to say that the local authority, nevertheless, have come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it. In such a case, again, I think the court can interfere." 36. In State of U.P. and Anr. v. Johri Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 714 , this Court has observed thus: "The scope and extent of power of the judicial review of the High Court contained in Article 226 of the Constitution of India would vary from case to case, the nature of the order, the relevant statute as also the other relevant factors including the nature of power exercised by the public authorities, namely, whether the power is statutory, quasijudicial or administrative. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power of judicial review is not intended to assume a supervisory role or don the robes of the omnipresent. The power is not intended either to review governance under the rule of law or do the courts step into the areas exclusively reserved by the suprema lex to the other organs of the State. Decisions and actions which do not have adjudicative disposition may not strictly fall for consideration before a judicial review court." 37. In Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. (VI) v. Union of India and Anr., (2006) 2 SCC 1 , wherein a proclamation issued under Article 356 was under challenge, Arijit Pasayat, J. observed thus: "A person entrusted with discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his attention to matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules he may truly be said to be acting unreasonably. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. It is an unwritten rule of law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to be subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote." 38. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardised formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognised, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the Court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision. 39. The following passage from Professor Bernard Schwartz's book Administrative Law (Third Edition) aptly echo's our thoughts on the scope of judicial review: "Reviewing courts, the cases are now insisting, may not simply renounce their responsibility by mumbling an indiscriminate litany of deference to expertise. Due deference to the agency does not mean abdication of the duty of judicial review and rubber-stamping of agency action: [W]e must accord the agency considerable, but not too much deference; it is entitled to exercise its discretion, but only so far and no further." 40. Quoting Judge Leventhal from Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F. 2d 841 (D.C.Cir. 1970), he further says : "......the reviewing court must intervene if it "becomes aware...... that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making..." 41. Tested on the touchstone of the above principles, I am of the view that I should not interfere with the administrative decision taken by the State Government and I should not disturb the Notification which has been challenged in the present petition. 42. Let me reiterate what has been pointed out to me by Mr.Jani, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.7. 43. It is pointed out that the following benefits would enure to the villagers after the impugned Notification : (1) The geographical distance from Chandrawati village to enter the limits of the Unjha Taluka is less than the Siddhpur Taluka. (2) The villagers of Chandrawati village travel more often to Unjha Taluka than Siddhpur Taluka due to their service, trade, commerce, etc. (3) The conveyance facility is better from the Chandrawati village to Unjha Taluka than Siddhpur Taluka. (2) The villagers of Chandrawati village travel more often to Unjha Taluka than Siddhpur Taluka due to their service, trade, commerce, etc. (3) The conveyance facility is better from the Chandrawati village to Unjha Taluka than Siddhpur Taluka. (4) The State Government has also notified the market area of Unjha Taluka. Moreover, the Agriculture Produce Market Committee of Unjha is one of the biggest Market Committees in the country. (5) The Cooperative Societies of the Chandrawati village are associated with the APMC - Unjha. The members of the Cooperative Societies of the village have the right to cast their votes in the election of APMC - Unjha. (6) The villagers of Chandrawati village have close economic and trade ties with the market at Unjha than Siddhpur. (7) As the schools located in Unjha Taluka are more than the Siddhpur Taluka, the students would have to commute to Unjha Taluka every day. (8) The villages situated adjoining to the Chandrawati village are the part of the Unjha Taluka. 44. In the overall view of the matter, I have reached to the conclusion that no case is made out to interfere with the impugned Notification. 45. In the result, this application fails and is hereby rejected. Rule discharged. Ad-interim order earlier granted stands vacated forthwith. 46. After the judgment is pronounced, the learned counsel appearing for the writ-applicants, made a request that the interim order earlier granted may be continued for some time. 47. In view of what has been stated in the judgment, the request is declined.