JUDGMENT : A.S. BOPANNA, J. 1. The petitioners are before this Court assailing the award dated 26.11.2009 passed by the Industrial Tribunal in I.D.No.199/2006. 2. The petitioners herein had raised a dispute in ID No.199/2006 seeking that the services be counted from their initial appointment i.e., on 12.05.1995 up to the date of their confirmation on 27.11.2003, 13.11.2003 and 04.04.2004 and to provide the benefit in that regard. 3. The respondents had filed their objection statement disputing the claim of the petitioners and had contended that the benefit of the continuity of services from 12.05.1995 up to the date of their confirmation/regular appointment would not be available to the petitioners since such service rendered by them is not regular service and in that view the petitioners cannot claim benefit under Clause 22(2) of the Truce Agreement. 4. The workmen had examined themselves as WW.1 and WW.2. They had relied on the documents at Exhs.W.1 to W.14. The witness on behalf of the Management was examined as MW.1 and the documents at Exhs.M1 to M16 were relied on. 5. The Industrial Tribunal after considering the rival contentions has arrived at the conclusion that the claim as put forth by the petitioners cannot be accepted and accordingly the reference is rejected. The petitioners claiming to be aggrieved are before this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners while assailing the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal would contend that appropriate consideration has not been made. Reference is made to the contention as put forth by the petitioners by relying upon the Truce Agreement. In that view, learned counsel would contend that the petitioners were brought on rolls as trainees on 30.05.1997 and had thereafter were brought on rolls as probationers and hence such service as rendered by the petitioners is to be reckoned for the purpose of continuity of service for grant of benefits. In that view, learned counsel would contend that the petitioners were brought on rolls as trainees on 30.05.1997 and had thereafter were brought on rolls as probationers and hence such service as rendered by the petitioners is to be reckoned for the purpose of continuity of service for grant of benefits. Learned counsel would also point out that the documents as available on record would be sufficient to indicate this aspect and therefore, the Tribunal in fact ought to have taken note of the muster roll as it was brought on record at the instance of the petitioners herein and even if the same was not marked, the said document would have to be relied on for the purpose of determining the length of service as rendered by the petitioners and such benefit ought to have been granted to the petitioners. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent would however seek to sustain the award passed by the Tribunal. It is pointed out that the Industrial Tribunal has referred to the oral evidence tendered by the parties as also the documents relied on and on analyzing the documents has arrived at the conclusion that the claim as put forth by the petitioners about the continuous service of 180 days or 240 days as required under the Truce Agreement has not been discharged by them. It is contended that in the circumstances where the Industrial Tribunal has referred to the evidence available and rendered a finding of fact, interference with such finding of fact by this Court in a writ petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India would not be justified. 8. In the light of the contentions, I have perused the petition papers including the award dated 26.11.2009 which is impugned herein. The Industrial Tribunal while taking note of the evidence available on record has kept in view the regulations under which the mode of selection is provided and in that light has referred to the requirement of continuous service of 240 days to be established by the petitioners to claim the benefit of the continuity of service from 30.05.1997 as claimed by them till they were regularly taken on record in the years 2002, 2003 and 2004 respectively. In that regard, it is no doubt true that the muster rolls which was summoned by the petitioners herein has not been marked in evidence. 9. In that regard, it is no doubt true that the muster rolls which was summoned by the petitioners herein has not been marked in evidence. 9. Be that as it may, what is necessary to be taken note is as to whether the Industrial Tribunal has referred to the other evidence which is available on record and in that circumstance to come to the conclusion with regard to the nature of the service that had been rendered prior to the petitioners coming on the rolls of the respondents and in that light if the evidence available on record is sufficient and the same has been taken note by the Industrial Tribunal. The position of law is well established that this Court would not sit in appeal over such finding as rendered inasmuch as the scope being limited is only to examine as to whether there is any perversity in the ultimate conclusion reached by the Tribunal and as to whether relevant material on record is ignored by the Tribunal. 10. While examining this aspect of the matter, a perusal of the consideration as made would indicate that the Industrial Tribunal has referred to the documents at Exhs.M4 to M9 wherein each of these petitioners were appointed in place of daily wage employees with regard to the nature of the service as rendered by them. In that regard, it is noticed from the said documents that the services rendered by the petitioners were only for the short periods which is referred to as training and that too in replacement of daily wage employees as and when the petitioners were required to perform their duties. Therefore, the Industrial Tribunal on referring to the said documents has also referred to the documents at Exhs.M13, 14 and 16 wherein the petitioners themselves had given an undertaking that their engagement is purely in the short time vacancies and the same could be discontinued without notice to which signatures subscribed by the petitioners was also taken note by the Industrial Tribunal. 11. Thus, on referring to the evidence available on record, the Industrial Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion that the petitioners herein cannot contend that they have worked continuously for 180 days or 240 days from the inception as claimed by them to take the benefit of the Truce Agreement. 11. Thus, on referring to the evidence available on record, the Industrial Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion that the petitioners herein cannot contend that they have worked continuously for 180 days or 240 days from the inception as claimed by them to take the benefit of the Truce Agreement. Therefore, in that circumstances, the Industrial Tribunal was of the opinion that the dispute as raised cannot be answered in favour of the petitioners herein. 12. In such circumstance, when the Industrial Tribunal has referred to the evidence and has arrived at its conclusion, I do not see reason to interfere with the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Accordingly, the petitions being devoid of merit stands disposed of.