JUDGMENT : Ashok Kumar Gaur, J. SBCWP No. 8695/2017 The issue raised in the present writ petition is with regard to considering the cases of Ministerial Staff working in subordinate courts for appointment on the post of Junior Accountant against reservation provided under proviso (iii) of Rule 6 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Accounts Service Rules, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules of 1963"). 2. The Rajasthan Subordinate Accounts Service Rules, 1963 were amended on 23rd January, 1985 by virtue of an amendment by adding proviso (iii) after the existing proviso (ii) to Rule 6, as under:- "(iii) provided also further that 12-1/2% of the posts of Junior Accountants to be filled in by direct recruitment shall be reserved for being filled in from amongst the ministerial staff of all the departments of the Government holding a post in the cadre substantively, subject to their being found otherwise eligible for such recruitment under the rules. This reservation shall be carried forward only to the next succeeding year." 3. The petitioners are employees of various departments of Government of Rajasthan and are members of Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Staff Rules, 1999. 4. All the petitioners participated in Junior Accountant & Tehsil Revenue Accountant Competitive Examination, 2013 in pursuance of advertisement dated 18th September, 2013. The petitioners have submitted that by way of Corrigendum no.10/2014-2015, Rajasthan Public Service Commission published a tabular statement of the post of Junior Accountants and it was mentioned that 437 posts were horizontally reserved for the Ministerial Staff. 5. The RPSC issued another Corrigendum dated 16th April, 2015 and thereafter on 10th August, 2016 with regard to increase of number of posts and permission to candidates to edit their applications. 6. The RPSC conducted the written examination on 4th October, 2016 and the answer-key was uploaded on 6th October, 2016, and result was declared on 7th November, 2016. The petitioners have submitted that two times, revised results were declared and final revised result was declared on 16th May, 2017 and all the petitioners were declared 'pass' in the said examination and their names appeared in the reserve-list/waiting list. 7.
The petitioners have submitted that two times, revised results were declared and final revised result was declared on 16th May, 2017 and all the petitioners were declared 'pass' in the said examination and their names appeared in the reserve-list/waiting list. 7. The petitioners have submitted that after declaration of the final result, they came to know that the respondent-State Government and RPSC intended to include the Ministerial Employees working in different subordinate courts in State of Rajasthan to give them benefit of reservation under proviso (iii) to Rule 6 of the Rules of 1963. The petitioners sought information under the Right to Information Act and it was informed to them on 29th December, 2016 that only three categories of employees of Ministerial Service in State of Rajasthan, have been included and considered, namely, (i) Rajasthan Secretariat Ministerial Service Rules, 1970, (ii) Rajasthan Subordinate Officers Ministerial Services Rules, 1999 and (iii) Rajasthan Public Service Commission (Ministerial and Subordinate Service) Rules & Regulations, 1999. The petitioners have submitted that the respondent-State has specifically informed that since Public Undertaking/Board/Corporation/Electricity Board/Roadways Department had their own Service Rules and as such, their employees were included within Departments of the Government in the Ministerial Staff. 8. The petitioners have further submitted that other candidates again sought information under Right to Information Act and same position was reiterated by letter/information dated 10th march, 2017 by DoP (A-2) Dept. 9. The petitioners have submitted that on 15th May, 2017 when information was again sought, the respondent-State-DoP (A-2) informed one candidate Shri Gaurav that employees working in subordinate courts and appointed as per Rajasthan Subordinate Court Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1986 (hereinafter called as "the Rules of 1986") are also being included for the purpose of consideration of their cases against reservation provided of 12-1/2 % on the post of Junior Accountant as the Rules of 1986 have been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 10. The petitioners have submitted that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission also followed the same interpretation as given by the State Government by treating the Ministerial Staff of Courts as Department of the State Government and as such, the process of selection was sought to be completed by considering such category of employees working in subordinate courts. 11.
10. The petitioners have submitted that the Rajasthan Public Service Commission also followed the same interpretation as given by the State Government by treating the Ministerial Staff of Courts as Department of the State Government and as such, the process of selection was sought to be completed by considering such category of employees working in subordinate courts. 11. The petitioners have submitted that they approached the respondents by filing representation but after issuance of order dated 15th May, 2017, respondents were bent upon to proceed in their own way. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by such illegal action have filed the present writ petition. 12. The State has filed separate reply in the instant writ petition. Mr. Rajendra Prasad, learned AAG has submitted that reply as filed in S.B. Civil Review Petition No.373/2017 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10594/2017 (Gajanand Saini v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) may be considered as the stand of the State Government. [This Court had decided S.B.Civil Writ Petition Nos. 11308/2017 and other connected writ petitions by a common order dated 1st November, 2017 allowing writ petitions of the employees working in the Ministerial cadre in subordinate courts by common order dated 1st November, 2017. The review petitions No.373/2017, 374/2017, 375/2017, 376/2017, 377/2017, 378/2017, 384/2017 have been preferred by the applicants-candidates like present petitioners in the instant writ petition, which are decided separately along with this writ petition.] 13. The respondent-State has submitted in its reply that the Ministerial Staff of Subordinate Courts are governed by Rajasthan Subordinate Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1986, which was formulated by the Government while exercising its power conferred by the proviso to Article 309 and it goes to show that Ministerial employees of the subordinate courts, as a matter of fact, are the employees of the State Government for considering their cases under proviso (iii) to Rule 6 of the Rules of 1963. It has been mentioned that administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Court, falls under item No.11-A of concurrent list under Schedule-VII of the Constitution of India and organization of courts is to be taken care by the State Government and accordingly, the State Government had formulated the rules for the Ministerial Staff of Subordinate Courts for regulating their service conditions. 14.
14. The State has submitted that after consultation between different departments, the Finance Department had also informed that those employees, who are governed under the Rules framed by the Governor by exercising its power under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, will also be considered as employee of the Department of State and as such, the State has taken a conscious decision to include such employees working in different courts in Ministerial Staff. 15. The respondent-State has also taken a stand that Rajasthan Subordinate Ministerial Staff Service Rules, 1999 only talk about the covered categories of employees. However, for other classes of employees, various service rules were framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India governing the services of Secretariat clerks, RPSC clerks and judicial clerks. 16. The State has raised an objection as to why petitioners are feeling aggrieved only against inclusion of employees working in ministerial staff in different courts and they do have any objection against inclusion of other categories of Ministerial employees working in Secretariat and Rajasthan Public Service Commission. 17. The respondents have stated that provisions relating to State judiciary are contained in Chapter-V & VI of part 6 of the Constitution of India. Article 229 of the Constitution of India provides with regard to the officers and servants of the High Court, Article 233 deals with appointment of District Judges and Article 234 deals with appointment in cases of Members of other judicial services. It has been submitted that while in case of officers and staff of the High Court, the Rules are to be framed by Hon'ble Chief Justice, whereas, in case of subordinate Courts, the legislative power is vested with the State Legislature and rule making power is with the Governor. In so far as other employees of the subordinate courts are concerned, the Constitution leaves it upon the Legislature/Governor and as such, the employees of ministerial service in the Courts do hold a judicial post and are civil servants. The State has submitted that control of High Court upon subordinate courts contemplated by Article 235 may extend to such employees for maintenance of independence of judiciary but control does change the character of relation of master and servant/employer and employee between the State Government and the employees. 18. Mr.
The State has submitted that control of High Court upon subordinate courts contemplated by Article 235 may extend to such employees for maintenance of independence of judiciary but control does change the character of relation of master and servant/employer and employee between the State Government and the employees. 18. Mr. R.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner has submitted that bare perusal of proviso (iii) to Rule 6 of the Rules of 1963 makes it clear that such reservation is to be given and filled in from amongst the ministerial staff of all the departments of the Government holding a post in the cadre substantively. Mr. Singh submitted that Courts cannot be department of the Government and as such, the inclusion of ministerial staff working in the courts is contrary to the proviso (iii) of Rule 6 of the Rules of 1963. 19. Mr. Singh has submitted that the State Government cannot have any control over the courts or their employees and by taking such interpretation, the intention of the State is to make inroads into the functioning and control of courts, which is permissible under the Scheme of the Constitution. 20. Mr. Singh has submitted that the State Government had consistently taken the stand that employees working in different courts are to be included as per proviso (iii) to Rule 6 of the Rules of 1963 and change of the stand by the State Government by informing to the candidates by letter dated 15th May, 2017 is wholly unjustified and in a way State has taken 'U' turn and same cannot be permitted in law. 21. Mr. Singh has submitted that as per doctrine of "contemporanea exposito" it enjoins upon the State to exposit contemporary legal position consistently and capriciously. 22. Mr. Singh has submitted that interpretation and position expounded by RPSC and State that all courts of the State are functioning as departments of the State Government, is incomprehensible and conspicuously illegal. 23. Mr.
21. Mr. Singh has submitted that as per doctrine of "contemporanea exposito" it enjoins upon the State to exposit contemporary legal position consistently and capriciously. 22. Mr. Singh has submitted that interpretation and position expounded by RPSC and State that all courts of the State are functioning as departments of the State Government, is incomprehensible and conspicuously illegal. 23. Mr. Singh has submitted that as per Rules of Business framed by the Governor by invoking Clause (2) & (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, recruitment rules for all services can be made by Department of Personnel (A-2) and even the Rajasthan Subordinate Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1986 have been made by Department of Personnel (A-2) and as such, the various correspondence entered between the Department of Personnel and Finance, in no way can confer power and no role can be given to the Department of Finance, which ultimately prevailed over Department of Personnel to have such interpretation of inclusion of court employees. 24. Mr. Singh has submitted that the scheme of the Rajasthan Subordinate Court Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1986 completely excludes any control of the State Government and High Court alone has the pervasive control over the staff working in different courts. The counsel has submitted that the appointing authority as per Rules of 1986 for the ministerial employees, is District & Sessions Judge or any other authority to make appointment to the Staff by delegation of power of District & Sessions Judge with the approval of the High Court. 25. The Counsel submitted that "the ministerial establishment" as per definition given in Rule 3(g) "Ministerial Establishment" means the ministerial staff of the Courts subordinate to the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan. The counsel has submitted that the Rules of 1986 have complete and comprehensive procedure regulating the service conditions and from the first stage of appointment till superannuation of employee or termination of service of such employee, the High Court alone has the control and State Government cannot have any say in such matters. 26. Mr. Singh has submitted that various persons had filed writ petition before this Court for seeking a direction for providing them reservation in the category of ministerial employees in pursuance of same recruitment and this Court dismissed S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.16720/2016 (Vinay Mohan Kiradoo v. RPSC & Ors.) along with other connected writ petitions vide order dated 10th February, 2017.
Mr. Singh has submitted that various persons had filed writ petition before this Court for seeking a direction for providing them reservation in the category of ministerial employees in pursuance of same recruitment and this Court dismissed S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.16720/2016 (Vinay Mohan Kiradoo v. RPSC & Ors.) along with other connected writ petitions vide order dated 10th February, 2017. The Court took a view that person working in office of District & Sessions Judge, Bikaner on the post of LDC was member of the Rules of 1999 and as such, this Court has already taken a view with regard to status of such employees of various courts. Mr. Singh submitted that in view of controversy decided by this Court on 10th February, 2017, the respondents could have included such candidates for the purpose of reservation. 27. Mr.Singh has placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in Laxmikant Dhal & Ors. v. State of Orissa & ors., reported in 1988 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 504 and in Renu & Ors. v. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi & Anr., reported in (2014) 14 SCC 50 as well as judgment of Division Bench of this Court passed in Poonamn Chand v. The District Judge, Jodhpur & Ors., reported in 1979 WLN 596 . 28. Mr.Rajendra Prasad, learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that by inclusion of ministerial staff of subordinate courts for considering their case for appointment as Junior Accountant against quota of 12-1/2%, no interference is made in the independence of judiciary and the State Government has taken the decision considering the such employee eligible only for the purpose of giving them benefit of reservation of 12-1/2 % meant for ministerial staff of the different departments of the Government. 29. Mr. Prasad has submitted that under the Rules of 1986, the control of the subordinate staff of courts may be with the High Court or with the Appointing Authority but for the purpose of inclusion of such employees, the nature of control is to be seen and same is relevant criterion for considering them eligible. 30. Mr. Prasad has submitted that it is the legislature power, which is exercised by the Governor under proviso to 309 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that since administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts is at serial no.
30. Mr. Prasad has submitted that it is the legislature power, which is exercised by the Governor under proviso to 309 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that since administration of justice; constitution and organization of all courts is at serial no. 11-A in List III of concurrent list of Schedule-VII, in the Constitution of India, the power of the State is there to legislate. The power to create courts vests with the State Government. 31. Mr. Rajendra Prasad has submitted that under Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the control over district and court subordinate thereto vest in the High Court, however, the power exercised by the State Government to include such employees does encroach upon such power of the High Court. Mr. Prasad has submitted that employee-employer relationship of the staff in subordinate courts is created by virtue of rules made by the governor under proviso to Article 309 and such employees holds a civil post and as such, without interfering in independence of judiciary in any manner, such employees are being sought to be included for the purpose of considering their cases under the reservation provided for Ministerial Staff for giving appointment on the post of Junior Accountants. 32. Mr. Prasad has further submitted that in General Financial Rules and Procedures, Part-I in Appendix-8, List of Heads of Departments, includes District & Sessions Judges at serial No.179. He has further submitted that under CCA Rules, 1958, in Schedule-A (Rule 15), the post of District Judge is at serial no.102. Accordingly, District Judge is Head of Department for exercising his powers to control the staff. 33. Mr. Prasad has submitted that as far as reference of order passed in the case of Vinay Mohan Kiradoo v. RPSC & Ors. (supra) is concerned, the controversy was altogether different and it was case relating to change of category of employees and such candidate wanted to edit their online application for considering their cases. The Court had come to the conclusion that on three different occasions, the facility was afforded to the candidates to edit their online application and yet the petitioners in those cases failed to avail the facility on different occasions, to edit their online applications and as such, claim of the those petitioners was found tenable. 34. Mr. Prasad placed reliance on the judgment in the case B.S.Yadav & ors.
34. Mr. Prasad placed reliance on the judgment in the case B.S.Yadav & ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 561 and submitted that where power to pass a law relating to service conditions of staff of subordinate court is conferred, such power cannot be said to be violative of the control vested in the High Court over the State Judiciary. He further submits that the power so exercised by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution in framing the rules of subordinate staff, partakes the characteristics of the legislative power executive power. The such power being legislative in nature, cannot be said to be making any inroads in the independence of the judiciary. 35. Mr. Shobhit Tiwari, Mr. Ajay Gupta and M. Faisal Baig, learned counsel for the private respondents have adopted the arguments of learned Additional Advocate General and have submitted that the inclusion of Ministerial Staff of Subordinate Courts is valid and no fault can be found with such decision of the State Government. I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material placed on record. 36. The first contention of Mr. Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the ministerial staff of subordinate courts cannot be treated as staff of Department of Government, the Court finds that proviso (iii) added to Rule 6 of the Rules of 1963 clearly provides that 12-1/2 % post of Junior Accountant will be filled by direct recruitment and they will be reserved for being filled from amongst the ministerial staff of all the departments of Government holding a post in cadre substantively. The inclusion of ministerial staff of courts cannot be construed by treating such employees as government servant. The interpretation given by the State Government, as the Rules of 1986 have been framed by virtue of power conferred by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, it has kept in mind the power being exercised while framing the Rules for subordinate staff, the Court does find such interpretation to be illegal or arbitrary. 37.
The interpretation given by the State Government, as the Rules of 1986 have been framed by virtue of power conferred by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, it has kept in mind the power being exercised while framing the Rules for subordinate staff, the Court does find such interpretation to be illegal or arbitrary. 37. This Court is of the opinion that the State has interpreted that the ministerial staff working in Secretariat as per Rajasthan Secretariat Ministerial Service Rules, 1970, the persons are working in different subordinate offices as per Rajasthan Subordinate Offices Ministerial Service Rules, 1999 and persons working in Public Service Commission as per Rajasthan Public Service Commission (Ministerial & Subordinate Services) Rules, 1999, such employees are required to be considered against the quota reserved of direct recruitment of 12-1/2 % for the post of Junior Accountant. 38. The persons working in Public Service Commission or in Secretariat as per Rules of 1970 and 1999 respectively, may be departments of the Government in strict sense, however, looking to their nature of job and their service conditions being governed, by virtue of enactment of their service rules as per power given under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the State has taken the correct interpretation by including the employees of ministerial staff working in different courts. 39. The submission of Mr. Singh that by providing such kind of reservation in appointment, the State Government wants to have control over the courts and they intend to make inroads into the functioning and control of the courts, this Court is of the opinion that this apprehension of the petitioners is wholly unfounded. The action of respondents by providing an opportunity of appointment by way of earmarking 12-1/2% post of Junior Accountant for Ministerial Staff of Subordinate Courts, cannot in any way can be termed as intrusion or interference in independence of the judiciary or the control of judiciary is being taken away by the State Government. 40.
The action of respondents by providing an opportunity of appointment by way of earmarking 12-1/2% post of Junior Accountant for Ministerial Staff of Subordinate Courts, cannot in any way can be termed as intrusion or interference in independence of the judiciary or the control of judiciary is being taken away by the State Government. 40. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that a consistent view which was taken by the State has been changed by inclusion of Ministerial Staff of Subordinate Courts, this Court finds that the State Government has taken a definite stand before this Court and has further made it clear by their letter dated 15th May, 2017 that persons working in Ministerial Staff in Subordinate Courts as per Rules of 1986 are required to be considered as Ministerial Staff. The State Government-Employer in its wisdom has considered all the aspects by even taking opinion from different departments like Department of Personnel, Department of Finance etc., it cannot be said that stand of the Government is shifting like sand. 41. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Department of Personnel (A-2) is the only competent Authority, which can prescribe the service conditions, suffice it to say that the State Government has considered all aspect of the matter and if interpretation of Rules has been made by Department of Personnel, it cannot be said that any other Department/Authority except Department of Personnel (A-2), can issue the impugned order or give such direction. 42. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as per Scheme of Rules of 1986, entire control over the staff of Subordinate Courts is of the High Court or of the Appointing Authority, the Court finds that as far as recruitment and other service conditions of the employees working in courts are concerned, the State has made any interference in the functioning of such employees except providing the procedure of recruitment etc. as per Rules of 1986. Rule 32 of the Rules of 1986 gives power to the State Government to prescribe scale of pay to the persons appointed to the various posts in the cadre and scale of the pay is to be sanctioned by the Government from time to time. The other conditions of service like pay during probation, increment during probation are governed as per Rule 36 of Rules of 1986.
The other conditions of service like pay during probation, increment during probation are governed as per Rule 36 of Rules of 1986. The pay, allowance, pension, leave and other service conditions of the staff is regulated by different rules made by the State Government and there are as many as ten specific Rules of the State Government, which have been enumerated in Rule 36 and made applicable to such staff and further, the service condition can be regulated as per Rule 36(11) by any other Rules made by an Appropriate Authority under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. 43. The Court finds that the contention of the petitioners that the State Government while exercising the power of including such staff, will also create imbalance of power as envisaged by the Constitution, is without any basis. The Court is of the opinion that such apprehension of the petitioners is wholly unfounded and contrary to the provisions contained in the Constitution as well as in various service rules. 44. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that this Court has already taken a view in the case of Vinay Mohan Kiradoo v. RPSC & Ors. (supra), the Court finds that the earlier writ petition decided by this Court was in respect of different context as the candidates were permitted to change their category and as such, it cannot be said that this Court has already taken a view on the same issue and respondents were under obligation to follow the law by permitting such ministerial staff of courts to be included for the purpose of reservation in the recruitment quota for the post of Junior Accountant. 45. The reliance placed on by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Poonam Chand v. The District Judge, Jodhpur & Ors. (supra), the Court finds that the Division Bench had considered the objection raised in that case with regard to availability of an alternative remedy for challenging the reversion order as it was termed to be "a service matter" as contained in Section 2(f) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunals), Act, 1976 and objection of the respondents in that case was that in view of the alternative remedy of appeal, the writ jurisdiction could have been invoked under Article 226.
The Division Bench found that control over district courts and court subordinate thereto is vested in the High Court and therefore, the High Court alone was competent to deal with the appeals or representations, which were submitted by the persons in the Ministerial Establishment of the Civil Courts Subordinate to the High Court and the provisions of Rajasthan Civil Services (Service Matters Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1976 could have no application to the employees who were in the ministerial establishment of the Civil Courts subordinate to the High Court and held that no appeal could lay before the Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal. 46. The Division Bench further considered the scope of Article 235 of the Constitution and found that the expression "district courts and court subordinate thereto" in Article 235 must be construed to include the Presiding Officers of the said courts as well as the subordinate staff attached to those courts and the High Court is the sole custodian of the control over the subordinate judiciary, including the staff employed in service in courts subordinate to the High Court. In the humble opinion of the court, the said judgment is in respect of the scope of Article 235 and availability of alternative remedy of filing appeal by the members of Ministerial Staff of Subordinate Courts. The present controversy is in respect of treating ministerial staff of courts for the purpose of considering their cases for appointment and as such, the said judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners does apply to the present facts of the case and also does involve the legal issue, which requires consideration in the instant case. 47. In the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of in Laxmikant Dhal & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court has considered that persons who were appointed to the ministerial post in establishment of a District Judge, the State Administrative Tribunal could have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. The Apex Court held that if such jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal set up under the Administrative Tribunals Act, control conferred on the High Court under 235 of the Constitution, would be affected. 48. In the humble opinion of the Court, the said judgment does deal with the issue raised in the instant writ petition and is of no assistance to the present petitioners. 49.
48. In the humble opinion of the Court, the said judgment does deal with the issue raised in the instant writ petition and is of no assistance to the present petitioners. 49. The judgment rendered in the case of Renu & Ors. v. District & Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi & Anr. (supra) considers the scope of Article 235. The relevant para of the said judgment is quoted as hereunder:- "23. Article 235 of the Constitution provides for power of the High Court to exercise complete administrative control over the Subordinate Courts. This control, undoubtedly, extends to all functionaries attached to the Subordinate Courts including the ministerial staff and servants in the establishment of the Subordinate Courts. If the administrative control cannot be exercised over the administrative and ministerial staff, i.e. if the High Court would be denuded of its powers of control over the other administrative functionaries and ministerial staff of the District Court and Subordinate Courts other than Judicial Officers, then the purpose of superintendence provided therein would stand frustrated and such an interpretation would be wholly destructive to the harmonious, efficient and effective working of the Subordinate Courts. The Courts are institutions or organism where all the limbs complete the whole system of Courts and when the Constitutional provision is of such wide amplitude to cover both the Courts and persons belonging to the Judicial Office, there would be no reason to exclude the other limbs of the Courts, namely, administrative functionaries and ministerial staff of its establishment from the scope of control. Such control is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation. (Vide: The State of West Bengal & Anr. v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447 ; Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa High Court & Anr., AIR 1974 SC 710 ; Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 1999 SCC 3734; Subedar Singh & Ors. v. District Judge, Mirzapur & Anr., AIR 2001 SC 201 ; High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 1029 ; and Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Madras v. R. Perachi & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 232 )" 50.
v. District Judge, Mirzapur & Anr., AIR 2001 SC 201 ; High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 1029 ; and Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Madras v. R. Perachi & Ors., AIR 2012 SC 232 )" 50. In the humble opinion of the Court, the scope of Article 235 has been explained by the Apex Court and power of High Court to exercise complete administrative control over the subordinate courts has been explained. The said judgment is with respect to the controversy raised and as such, there is no assistance to the petitioners. 51. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondents in the case of B.S. Yadav & ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (supra) deals with the legislative power of the Governor and it lays down that it is the High Court, the executive, which possesses control over the State judiciary, but it is important to bear in mind that the Constitution which has taken the greatest care to preserve the independence of the judiciary, did regard the power of the State legislature to pass laws regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of judicial officers, as an infringement of that independence. The mere power to pass such a law, is held to be violative of the control vested in the High Court over the State Judiciary. The relevant paras of the said judgment is quoted as hereunder:- "41. Who has the power to pass such a law? Obviously the High Court because, there is no power in the High Court to pass a law, though rules made by the High Court in the exercise of power conferred upon it in that behalf may have the force of law. There is a distinction between the power to pass a law and the power to make rules, which by law, have the force of law. Besides, "law" which the second part of Article 235 speaks of, is law made by the legislature because, if it were so, there was no purpose in saying that the High Court's power of control will be construed as taking away certain rights of certain persons under a law regulating their conditions of service. It could have been possibly intended to be provided that the High Court's power of control will be subject to the conditions of service prescribed by it.
It could have been possibly intended to be provided that the High Court's power of control will be subject to the conditions of service prescribed by it. The clear meaning, therefore, of the second part of Article 235 is that the power of control vested in the High Court by the first part will deprive a judicial officer or the rights conferred upon him by a law made by the legislation regulating him conditions of service. 42. Article 235 does confer upon the High Courts the power to make rules relating to conditions of service of judicial officers attached to district courts and the courts subordinate thereto. Whenever, it was intended to confer on any authority the power to make any special provisions or rules, including rules relating to conditions of service, the Constitution has stated so in express terms. See, for example Articles 15(4), 16(4), 77(3), 87(2), 118, 145(1), 146(1), and 2(148)(5), 166(3), 176(2), 187(3), 208, 225, 227(2) and (3), 229(1) and (2), 234, 237 and 283(1) and (2). Out of this fasciculus of Articles, the provisions contained in Articles 225, 227(2) and (3) and 229(1) and (2) bear relevance on the question, because these Articles confer power on the High Court to frame rules for certain specific purposes. Article 229(2) which is directly in point provides in express terms that subject to the provisions of any law made by the legislature of the State, the conditions of service of officers and servants of a High Court shall be such as may be prescribed by the rules made by the Chief Justice or by some other Judge or Officer of the Court authorised by the Chief Justice to make rules for the purposes. With this particular provision before them, the framers of the Constitution would have failed to incorporate a similar provision in Article 235 if it was intended that the High Courts shall have the power to make rules regulating the conditions of service of judicial officers attached to district courts and courts subordinate thereto. 43. Having seen that the Constitution does confer upon the High Court the power to make rules regulating the conditions of service of judicial officers of the district courts and the courts subordinate thereto, we must proceed to consider: who, then, possesses that power, Article 309 furnishes the answer.
43. Having seen that the Constitution does confer upon the High Court the power to make rules regulating the conditions of service of judicial officers of the district courts and the courts subordinate thereto, we must proceed to consider: who, then, possesses that power, Article 309 furnishes the answer. It provides that Acts of the appropriate legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State. Article 248(3), read with Entry 41 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, confers upon the State legislatures the power to pass laws with respect to "State public services" which must include the judicial services of the State. The power of control vested in the High Court by Article 235 is thus expressly, by the terms of that Article itself, made subject to the law which the State legislature may pass for regulating the recruitment and service conditions of judicial officers of the State. The power to pass such a law was evidently considered by the Constitution makers as an encroachment on the "control jurisdiction" of the High Courts under the first part of Article 235. The control over the district courts and subordinate courts is vested in the High Court in order to safeguard the independence of the judiciary. It is the High Court, the executive, which possesses control over the State judiciary. But, what is important to bear in mind is that the Constitution which has taken the greatest care to preserve the independence of the judiciary did regard the power of the State legislature to pass laws regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of judicial officers as an infringement of that independence. The mere power to pass such a law is violative of the control vested in the High Court over the State Judiciary. 44. It is in this context that the proviso to Article 309 assumes relevance and importance. The State legislature has the power to pass laws regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of judicial officers of the State. But it was necessary to make a suitable provision enabling the exercise of that power until the passing of the law by the legislature on that subject. The Constitution furnishes by its provisions ample evidence that it abhors a vacuum.
But it was necessary to make a suitable provision enabling the exercise of that power until the passing of the law by the legislature on that subject. The Constitution furnishes by its provisions ample evidence that it abhors a vacuum. It has therefore made provisions to deal with situations which arise on account of the ultimate repository of a power exercising that power. The proviso to Article 309 provides, in so far as material, that until the State legislature passes a law on the particular subject, it shall be competent to the Governor of the State to make rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service of the judicial officers of the State. The Governor thus steps in when the legislature does act. The power exercised by the Governor under the proviso is thus a power which the legislature is competent to exercise but has in fact yet exercised. It partakes of the characteristics of the legislative, executive, power. It is legislative power." 52. This Court at Principal Seat, Jodhpur in the case of Jitendra Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2018(1) WLC (Raj.) 138 has considered the scope of Rule 6(iii) of the Rules of 1963 for considering the cases of Lower Division and Upper Division Clerk in Panchayati Raj Department for 12.5% reservation as available for ministerial staff in other departments and as such, the Court has found that such clerks fall within the definition of Ministerial Staff given under Rule 258(c)(i)(ii) of Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Rules, 1996 and in Rule 7(19) of Rajasthan Service Rules, and such employees have been held to be the employees of the State. 53. Further, this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7239/2017 (Surendra Kumar Vyas & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) and other connected writ petitions, decided on 18.12.2017 has held that the persons working on the post of Commercial Assistant-I (UDC) and Commercial Assistant-II (LDC) in the Jodhpur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. are entitled for consideration of their cases against 12.5% posts reserved for Ministerial Employees for the post of Junior Accountant in pursuance of advertisement dated 18.09.2013. The relevant para of the said judgment are quoted as hereunder:- "34.
The relevant para of the said judgment are quoted as hereunder:- "34. Though, it is true that the separate corporation has been formed making it a separate legal entity but for seeing the implication the Sub-Rule (iii) of Rule 6 of the Rules of 1963, this Court has to determine as to whether the Nigam will come within the purview of Department of Government of Rajasthan for the purpose of such reservation and the answer to it is that in the broader definition of Department of State of Rajasthan shall include the employees of Nigam as they for the all practical purposes are discharging public duties as the employees of any of the Department of State Government. 35. The Sub Rule (iii) of Rule 6 of the Rules of 1963 while mentioning the term Department of Government, cannot be construed strictly only upon the technically declared employee of the Department of the Government of Rajasthan and has to include all the limbs of State of Rajasthan, who practically are discharging the same functions whether it is in the reformative area, productive area and distributive area or any other administrative functions which are in the present case being discharged by the Nigam." 54. This Court is of the opinion that action of the State-respondents and RPSC cannot be termed as illegal in any manner and the inclusion of Ministerial Staff working in Subordinate Courts for the purpose of appointment as per proviso (iii) to Rule 6 of the Rajasthan Subordinate Accounts Service Rules, 1963 is a valid decision. 55. Accordingly, the writ petition has no force and the same is dismissed. Writ Review Nos. 373/2017, 374/2017, 375/2017, 376/2017, 377/2017, 378/2017, 384/2017 56. The applicants have preferred review petitions seeking a review of the order dated 01st November, 2017 passed by this Court. 57. Mr. Jai Raj Tantia, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the respondents had apprised this Court with respect to the stand of the State, which kept on shifting and as such, this Court passed the order on the basis of statement made by the counsel for the State and RPSC. 58.
57. Mr. Jai Raj Tantia, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the respondents had apprised this Court with respect to the stand of the State, which kept on shifting and as such, this Court passed the order on the basis of statement made by the counsel for the State and RPSC. 58. This Court on being informed about decision of the State Government and RPSC, held petitioners entitled for consideration of their cases for appointment on the post of Junior Accountant in terms of advertisement dated 18.09.2013 and they were held to be eligible to be considered against 12.5% quota of direct recruitment. 59. The Court is of the opinion that the order which was passed on 1st November, 2017 does require any interference and it need be reviewed. 60. This Court has further examined the issue of eligibility of Ministerial Staff working in Subordinate Courts for the purpose of reservation of 12.5% quota as per Rule 1963 independently and writ petition filed by the candidates challenging such action of the State to consider them eligible, has been dismissed by separate reasoned order. 61. The present review petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.