JUDGMENT : C. Praveen Kumar, J. Pursuant to an office note with regard to maintainability of the writ petition before this Court, the matter is posted under the caption for orders of the Court. 2. In order to decide the issue of maintainability and the objection raised by the office, it would be useful to refer to the facts in issue. 3. The writ petitioner herein, who is a resident of Hyderabad, is said to be the Managing Director of M/s. Sasanka Infra Projects Private Limited. The 5th respondent namely Narmada Valley Development Authority, Katni, Madhya Pradesh, awarded the contract to the 4th respondent namely HES Infra Private Limited, having its registered office at Hyderabad, to execute Vijayaraghavghar Branch Canal from 0.00 to 57.170 KM and Pilongy Distributory from 0.00 KM to 7.93 KMs of Bargi Diversion Project on Turnkey basis. The said contract was sub-contracted to Sasanka Infra Projects Private Limited, of which the petitioner is a Managing Director, vide agreement dated 15.02.2013. Two years later, the 4th respondent is said to have terminated the sub-contract, through a letter dated 08.09.2015. The claim made by the petitioner with the 4th respondent came to be answered saying that the said amount would be paid after the amount is received from the 5th respondent. It is urged that to initiate action against the 4th respondent, the petitioner needs some documents from the office of respondents 2 and 3. Hence, he made an application under Right to Information Act, 2005 before the 2nd respondent i.e., Public Information Officer, O/o. the Executive Engineer, Katni, Madhya Pradesh State. On 25.05.2018, the 2nd respondent is said to have dismissed the application intimating the right of the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the 3rd respondent i.e., Appellate Information Officer, O/o. Executive Engineer, Katni, Madhya Pradesh State, which was also dismissed on 30.06.2018. Challenging the same, the present Writ Petition came to be filed before this Court. 4. An objection came to be raised by the office, which is as under : Please clarify, how the writ is entertain-able as the relief sought for pertains to other State i.e., (Madhya Pradesh). 5. An endorsement is made by the petitioner stating that the petitioner is a resident of Hyderabad and the appeal was rejected on pending proceedings before Hon’ble High Court of Hyderabad and the said order was received in Hyderabad by petitioner. 6. 5. An endorsement is made by the petitioner stating that the petitioner is a resident of Hyderabad and the appeal was rejected on pending proceedings before Hon’ble High Court of Hyderabad and the said order was received in Hyderabad by petitioner. 6. Not being satisfied with the explanation given, the Registry posted the present writ petition for orders of the Court. 7. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the order was communicated to the petitioner in Hyderabad; that he is a resident of Hyderabad and since the reason for rejecting his application by the Appellate Authority was due to pendency of the writ petition in this Court, pleads that this Court would get territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 8. It is to be noted here that the grievance of the petitioner is against respondents 1 to 3, having their offices in the State of Madhya Pradesh. As observed by me earlier, the present writ petition came to be filed challenging the order passed by the 3rd respondent rejecting his request to furnish certain documents, so as to enable the writ petitioner to file cases against the 4th respondent. It appears that the entire emphasis of the petitioner is on clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India basing on the purported cause of action. 9. In order to decide as to whether this Court would get jurisdiction, it would be useful to refer to clauses 1 and 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under: 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32. 10. (2) The power conferred on a High Court by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of Article 32. 10. The word cause of action is not defined either in the Constitution of India or in any other statutory enactment including the Code of Civil Procedure, but in Cooke v. Gill, 14 (1873) 8 SP 107 the word cause of action has been described as cause of action means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. 11. This provision came up for consideration before the Apex Court, in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and Others, (1994) 4 SCC 711 . In the said case the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) through its consultant Engineers India Limited (EIL) issued an advertisement in the newspaper inviting tenders for setting up of Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit in Gujarat, mentioning that the tenders containing offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi. After the final decision was taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi, the respondent NICCO moved the Calcutta High Court praying that ONGC be restrained from awarding the contract to any other party. It was pleaded in the petition that NICCO came to know of the tender from the publication in the Times of India within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The Apex Court while rejecting the plea of NICCO, that the Courts at Calcutta get jurisdiction on the ground that it has read the advertisement at Calcutta, submitted the offer from Calcutta; made representations from Calcutta and sent fax messages from Calcutta apart from receiving a reply thereto at Calcutta, held that they would not constitute facts forming integral part of cause of action. 12. In State of Rajasthan and Others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and another, (1985) 3 SCC 217 which was referred to by the Honble Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (2 supra), the Special officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur at the instance of the improvement Trust, Jaipur issued a notice intimating that the State Government proposed to acquire a large part of the lands situated on the outskirts of Jaipur for public purpose, namely; implementation of a development scheme. The said notice was served on the owners of the land at their Calcutta office. After holding enquiry, a final notification was issued for acquisition of the land. The attempt of the land owners to seek exemption under the provisions of Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 went in vain. Thereupon the land owners filed a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta. The ex parte ad interim relief granted by the Calcutta High Court was questioned before the Supreme Court. Setting aside the interim order of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that mere service of notice under Section 52 (2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory, unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. It was further held that the entire cause of action, culminating in acquisition of the land under Section 52 (1) of the said Act, arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e., within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court of the Jaipur Bench. 13. Alchemist Ltd. And another v. State Bank of Sikkim and Others, (2007) 11 SCC 335 was a case where the appellant company was having its registered and corporate office at Chandigarh. Respondent No.1 was the State Bank of Sikkim and respondent No.2 was the State of Sikkim, was desirous of disinvesting 49% of its equity capital in the first respondent bank, to a strategic partner with transfer of management in the first respondent bank, issued an advertisement in Economic Times and invited offers for strategic partnership. It was stipulated in the advertisement that the offers made by the parties would be subject to scrutiny by the Board of Directors of the first respondent bank with the right reserved by the Board of Directors to accept or reject the offer without assigning any reason. The appellant submitted its formal proposal for the strategic business partnership vide its offer dated 03.02.2004. After short-listing the offers, the Board of Directors in its meeting held negotiations with the appellant. The Chairman and the Managing Director of the first respondent bank visited Chandigarh for further negotiations. On being asked, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs. The appellant submitted its formal proposal for the strategic business partnership vide its offer dated 03.02.2004. After short-listing the offers, the Board of Directors in its meeting held negotiations with the appellant. The Chairman and the Managing Director of the first respondent bank visited Chandigarh for further negotiations. On being asked, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs. 4.50 crores to show its bona fides with the State Bank of India, Chandigarh. Respondent No.1 bank informed the appellant company that its proposal was accepted in principle subject to consideration and approval of the Government of Sikkim. However, the appellant received a communication at Chandigarh on 23.02.2006 by which the first respondent bank informed the appellant company that the Government of Sikkim has not approved the proposal submitted by the appellant and sought to withdraw the communication, dated 20.02.2004. Thereupon the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging the letter-cum-order dated 23.02.2006. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the Writ Petition on the sole ground that it did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition, as no cause of action has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, without entering into the merits of the case, the High Court has dismissed the Writ Petition granting liberty to the appellant to seek appropriate remedy before an appropriate Court. The said decision was challenged by the appellant in a civil appeal before the Supreme Court, wherein it has advanced the following submissions in support of its plea that the Punjab and Haryana High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the Writ Petition on merits. (i) The Appellant-Company has its Registered and corporate office at Chandigarh; (ii) The Appellant-Company carries on business at Chandigarh; (iii) The offer of the Appellant-Company was accepted on February 20, 2004 and the acceptance was communicated to it at Chandigarh; (iv) Part performance of the contract took place at Chandigarh inasmuch as Rs. 4.50 crores had been deposited by the Appellant-Company in a fixed deposit at Chandigarh as per the request of the first respondent; (v) The Chairman and Managing Director of the first respondent visited Chandigarh to ascertain the bona fides of the Appellant-Company; (vi) Negotiations were held between the parties in the third week of March, 2005 at Chandigarh; (vii) Letter of revocation dated February 23, 2006 was received by the Appellant-Company at Chandigarh. Consequences of the revocation ensued at Chandigarh by which the Appellant-Company is aggrieved. 14. After exhaustive reference to the case law on cause of action, the Supreme Court held as under : From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding, whether facts averred by the petitioner- appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a part of cause of action, nothing less than that. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the Appellant company, in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore was not wrong in dismissing the petition. 15. In C.B.I., Anti-corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Narayan Diwakar, (1999) 4 SCC 656 the Apex Court was dealing with a case, where A, who was posted in Arunachal Pradesh moved the High Court of Guwahati for quashing of FIR filed against him by the CBI, on receiving a wireless message through Chief Secretary of the State asking him to appear before CBI Inspector in Bombay. An objection was raised by the department, that the High Court of Guwahati had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. But the same turned down. However, the Honble Supreme Court, upheld the objection stating that the Guwahati High Court could not have entertained the petition. 16. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 the question of territorial jurisdiction came up for consideration before the Apex Court. In the said case, A filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat claiming benefit of the Passport Scheme under the EXIM policy. Passport was issued by Chennai Office and entries in the Passport were made by authorities at Chennai. In the said case, A filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Gujarat claiming benefit of the Passport Scheme under the EXIM policy. Passport was issued by Chennai Office and entries in the Passport were made by authorities at Chennai. But none of the respondents were stationed within the State of Gujarat. It was, therefore, contended that Gujarat High Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The contention, however, was negatived and the petition was allowed. The respondents approached the Apex Court, wherein it was held that the Gujarath High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and set aside the order of the High Court. 17. In National Textile Corporation v. Haribox Swalram and Others, (2004) 9 SCC 786 the Apex Court dealt with a situation, where the textile mills were situated in Bombay and the supply of cloth was to be made by them, ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. After a detailed discussion, a learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench has reversed the finding on the ground that concluded contract had come into existence which can be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing and consequently the question of revocation of the contract, at its Calcutta address, would constitute a cause of action. The Apex Court did not agree with the view expressed by the Division Bench, since it was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had initiated any action under Section 11 of the Act, by issuing any notice to the writ petitioner for cancellation of the contract. It was held that mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta, is not an integral part of the cause of action and, therefore, held that the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. However, on merits the Apex Court agreed with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. 18. However, on merits the Apex Court agreed with the view taken by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. 18. In Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India and Another, (2006) 6 SCC 207 answering a similar question, the Apex Court observed that from a plain reading of Clause(2) of Article 226, it is manifestly clear that the High Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose, if the cause of action in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territory. In para 7 the Apex Court observed as under:- 7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Courts jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof. 19. In Rajendran Chingaravelu vs. R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax and Others, (2010) 1 SCC 457 the Apex Court while considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, particularly in relation to cause of action in maintaining a writ petition, held as under : 9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the appellant could not maintain the writ petition before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have jurisdiction. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that State will have jurisdiction. 20. From the judgments referred to above, it is clear that even if part of cause of action or a fraction of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the High Court, the writ petition can be maintained before the said Court. 21. Keeping in view the law laid down in the judgments referred to above, it is to be noted as to whether there was any part of cause of action, within the jurisdiction of this Court. 22. A reading of the averments in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and the documents filed would show that the petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by the 3rd respondent in Madhya Pradesh, rejecting the request of the petitioner to furnish him with certain documents so as to enable him to file cases against the 4th respondent. 23. The law laid down by the Apex Court, in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (2 supra), squarely apply to the facts on hand. It was also a case where Calcutta High Court entertained the writ petition on the ground that the advertisement was read in Calcutta, which was circulated in Calcutta, made representations from Calcutta, sent fax message from Calcutta and received a reply there to at Calcutta. The same came to be rejected by the Apex Court holding that they would not constitute facts forming part of cause of action. Therefore, mere communication of the order to the place of residence of the petitioner, does not by itself give any cause of action or confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain a writ petition. 24. The same came to be rejected by the Apex Court holding that they would not constitute facts forming part of cause of action. Therefore, mere communication of the order to the place of residence of the petitioner, does not by itself give any cause of action or confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain a writ petition. 24. Therefore, serving a copy of the order at Hyderabad and the person against whom he intends to initiate action is a resident of Hyderabad, would not constitute facts forming integral part of cause of action, when the grievance was against the order passed by the third respondent. 25. For the aforesaid reasons, the objection raised by the office is sustained.