ORDER : P.K. Lohra, J. Petitioner has preferred this misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for annulling order dated 09.11.2017, passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Cases), Barmer (for short, 'learned trial Court') in Session case No. 41/2012, whereby leaned trial Court has dismissed his application under Section 197 Cr.P.C. Besides the prayer for upsetting impugned order, petitioner has also prayed for quashment of entire proceedings of Sessions Case No. 41/2012. 2. Succinctly stated, the brief facts of the case are that a report was submitted by complainant Indira Devi against petitioner and three others alleging inter-alia that a forged patta was got prepared by one Megha Ram on the basis of spurious documents with the help of present petitioner, former Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Barmer, and others. On the basis of that report, FIR No. 80/11 was registered at Police Station Kotwali, District Bikaner for offence under Section 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B IPC and Section 3(1)(iv), 3(xv), 3(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Act. During investigation, it came to the fore that on the date of issuance of Patta petitioner was having additional charge of Executive Officer. After completion of investigation police filed charge-sheet against him and others for the aforesaid offences. An application was moved by the petitioner for his discharge before learned trial Court on the ground of initiating criminal proceedings against him without obtaining prior sanction for his prosecution. It was also pleaded by him that on the relevant date he was holding the additional charge of Executive Officer and had put his initials on the basis of report received from Junior Engineer after consulting other employees of the Municipal Board as such he should be given protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The learned trial Court by the order impugned rejected application of the petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that at the relevant time, petitioner was holding the post of Revenue Inspector and having additional charge of Executive Officer. The allegation against him is that he was made an instrument in getting issued the illegal Patta. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that as a public servant act of putting initials on relevant document was done or purportedly done bona fide by him in discharge of his official duty. The allegation against him is that he was made an instrument in getting issued the illegal Patta. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that as a public servant act of putting initials on relevant document was done or purportedly done bona fide by him in discharge of his official duty. Learned counsel further submits that before initiating criminal proceedings, no prosecution sanction was obtained from concerned authority and as such the proceedings initiated against him are liable to be dropped. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance on a decision rendered by coordinate Bench of this Court in Devi Dan v. State of Rajasthan (Criminal Misc. Petition No. 2177/2013, decided on 10.10.2014). 4. Learned Public Prosecutor as well as learned counsel for the complainant submit that the learned trial Court has not committed any error while dismissing the application filed by petitioner under Section 197 Cr.P.C. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned order and scanned the materials available on record. 6. The crucial issue which requires judicial scrutiny in the matter is availability of protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C. to the petitioner before taking cognizance for the charged offences. At the outset, it is made clear that status of the petitioner as public servant when alleged offences are committed is in dispute. In such a situation, Court is required to see the acts/omissions attributed to the public servant done by him while acting or purportedly to act in discharge of his official duty. Being prerequisite to attract protection under Section 197 Cr.P.C., I have made endeavour to examine the charge-sheet and other available material on record. 7. Upon scanning the charge-sheet and other documents it is crystal clear that petitioner on the crucial day was working as Revenue Inspector with Municipal Board, Barmer in substantive capacity. It is also borne out that due to administrative exigencies at the relevant point of time, petitioner was officiating as E.O. of the Municipal Board and entrusted all administrative and financial powers of E.O. Therefore, undeniably, petitioner has put his initials on the relevant papers while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty in absence of E.O., who was on leave. This being the situation, in my view, protection available under Section 197 Cr.P.C. is clearly attracted and petitioner's grievance in this behalf is legitimate which ought to have been considered by learned trial Court. 8. Supreme Court, in State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao [ (1993) 3 SCC 339 , considered the meaning of the "official act" and held: "6. Such being the nature of the provision the question is how should the expression, 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty', be understood? What does it mean? 'Official' according to dictionary means pertaining to an office. And official act or official duty means an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In S.B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, (1979) 4 SSC 177 it was held, The words 'any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty' employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, Nit is no part of an official duty to commit an offence, and never can be'. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is every offence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision." Use of the expression, 'official duty' implies that act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and that it should have been in discharge of his duty. The section does extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. The section does extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. In P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, (1967) 1 SCR 201 this Court after reviewing the authorities right from the days of Federal Court any Privy Council held: ".. It is therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duties so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is the quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected-with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable." It has been widened further by extending protection to even those acts or omissions which are done in purported exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office. Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must have been done by the public servant in course of his service and such act or omission must have been performed as part of duty which further must have been official in nature. The section has, thus, to be construed, strictly while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. The section has, thus, to be construed, strictly while determining its applicability to any act or omission in course of service. Its operation has to be limited to those duties which are discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission has been found to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his duty then it must be given liberal and wide construction, so far its official nature is concerned: For instance a public servant is entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section has to be construed narrowly and in restricted manner. But once it is established that act or omission was done by the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope of its being official should be construed so as to advance the objective of the section in favour of the public servant. Otherwise the entire purpose of affording protection to a public servant without sanction shall stand frustrated. For instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer commits an act in course of service but in discharge of his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be official was explained by this Court in Matajob Dubey v. H.C. Bhhari, AIR 1956 SC 44 thus: "The offence alleged to have been committed by the accused must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty...there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty the act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but a pretended or fanciful claim, that he did it in the course of the performance of his duty." (emphasis supplied) If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code cannot be disputed." 9. Similar controversy arose before the coordinate Bench of this Court in Devi Dan v. State of Rajasthan (Cr. Misc. Petition No. 2177/13, decided on 10.10.2014), and the Court while relying on its earlier decision of Ramswaroop Sharma v. State of Rajasthan [2007 (5) WLC (Raj.) 796], held: "The S.H.O. of a police station discharges his official duties while registering or failing to register a first information report. Non registration of the F.I.Rs. after receiving the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. from the Court was definitely an act/omission done by the S.H.O. concerned while discharging his official duties. Thus, the petitioner having been posted as the S.H.O. of P.S. Swaroopganj at the relevant time would be entitled to the protective umbrella of Section 197 Cr.P.C. Cognizance could have been taken against him for offences under Sections 166, 176, 186 & 188 IPC committed by him during the discharge of official duties, without obtaining prosecution sanction. Admittedly, in the case at hand, no prior prosecution sanction was taken before taking cognizance against the petitioner for the above offences vide order dated 25.10.2012. Resultantly, the misc. petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 25.10.2012 whereby the learned C.J.M., Sirohi took cognizance against the petitioner for the offences under Sections 166, 176, 186 and 187 I.P.C. is quashed." 10. As observed hereinabove, putting initials on relevant papers by the petitioner was an act done in discharge of his official duty or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty, sanction for prosecution under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was essential. There is nothing on record to show that competent authority has granted sanction for prosecution of the petitioner under Section 197 Cr.P.C. Thus, the impugned order and further proceedings pursuant thereto in Sessions Case No. 41/2012 cannot be sustained. Allowing proceedings to continue in the matter would be sheer abuse of the process of the Court and result in miscarriage of justice. 11. Consequently, this misc. petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 09.11.2017, passed by learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocity Cases), Barmer, in Sessions Case No. 41/2012, and the entire consequential criminal proceedings, pursuant thereto, pending before the learned trial Court, qua the petitioner are quashed and set aside.