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2018 DIGILAW 622 (CAL)

Chanchal Kumar Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal

2018-08-29

SHEKHAR B.SARAF

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the writ petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated December 27, 2017 passed by the District Inspector of Schools (S.E.), Jalpaiguri, wherein he has held that in the case of the petitioner, pensionary benefits cannot be recalculated on the basis of erroneously mentioned last drawn salary of the petitioner and therefore, revised pension payment order cannot be issued. 2. By an order dated April 8, 2011, a co ordinate bench of this Court had passed an order in favour of the petitioner directing the respondent authorities to refund the amount deducted from the overdrawn amount indicated in the pension payment order. This part of the order has been implemented by the State authorities. 3. The order also contained a direction on the concerned authority to recalculate the retiral dues of the petitioner by taking into consideration the last drawn salary of the petitioner and to issue a revised pension payment order, so that, the arrear dues as per such recalculation together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum could be paid to the petitioner. However, the process of recalculation of the revised pension payment order was not completed till the year 2016 and when the matter came up before the Assistant Director, Pension, Provident Fund and Group Insurance, West Bengal, the authorities directed the concerned District Inspector of Schools to consider the case of the petitioner in the light of the judgment passed in a similar case of State of West Bengal and ors. Vs. Amalendu Sekhar Bera & anr. (M.A.T. 98 of 2015 with C.A.N. 1659 of 2015 with C.A.N. 1821 of 2015) [Coram: Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay and Ishan Chandra Das, JJ.]. 4. On consideration of the same, the District Inspector of Schools passed the impugned order. The relevant portion of the Division Bench order in Amalendu Sekhar Bera (supra) is delineated below for the sake of clarity : “The respondent No.1/writ petitioner cannot receive excess pensionary benefits on account of the wrong fixation of last drawn salary. After detection of the error in fixation of pay of the respondent No.1/writ petitioner, the authorities concerned namely, the appellants/petitioners herein had rightly corrected the last drawn salary of the said respondent No.1/writ petitioner so that the respondent no.1/writ petitioner herein cannot receive any excess pensionary benefit in future. After detection of the error in fixation of pay of the respondent No.1/writ petitioner, the authorities concerned namely, the appellants/petitioners herein had rightly corrected the last drawn salary of the said respondent No.1/writ petitioner so that the respondent no.1/writ petitioner herein cannot receive any excess pensionary benefit in future. We do not find any error in the aforesaid act and/or decision of the appellants/petitioners herein. Therefore, we modify the impugned judgment and order under appeal passed by the learned Single Judge by permitting the appellants/petitioners herein to fix the last drawn salary of the respondent No.1/writ petitioner by deducting the excess amount which was earlier add with the last pay on account of the wrong fixation of the pay of the said respondent No.1/writ petitioner. Since the appellants/petitioners herein have already corrected the last drawn salary of the respondent No.1/writ petitioner by deducting the excess amount from the last pay of the said respondent No.1/writ petitioner and issued the revised Pension Payment Order on the basis of the corrected last pay, we are of the opinion that the said appellants/petitioners are not required to recalculate the retiral dues of the respondent No.1/writ petitioner on the basis of the erroneously mentioned last drawn salary of the said respondent No.1/writ petitioner and no further revised Pension Payment Order should also be issued as directed by the learned Single Judge.” 5. The principle laid down by the Division Bench in Amalendu Sekhar Bera & anr. (supra) is that no revision of the pension payment order can be made on the basis of erroneously mentioned last drawn salary. The Hon’ble Division Bench had reversed the order of the learned Single Judge directing the authorities to make such correction. 6. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the order passed in favour of the writ petitioner by a Coordinate Bench still stands and the same was accepted by the authorities. In fact, he submits that part of the order was complied with and accordingly, there is no reason for the authorities to take a contrary stand after a gap of seven years. He further submits that if the order of the Coordinate Bench was followed, he should have been paid in the year 2011-12 itself. 7. In fact, he submits that part of the order was complied with and accordingly, there is no reason for the authorities to take a contrary stand after a gap of seven years. He further submits that if the order of the Coordinate Bench was followed, he should have been paid in the year 2011-12 itself. 7. Counsel for the petitioner further submits that the Doctrine of Election and the Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate applies and State authorities having proceeded to comply with one part of the order of the Coordinate Bench cannot at this stage play hot and cold and refuse to recalculate the retiral dues of the petitioner by taking into consideration the last drawn salary as had been directed by the Coordinate Bench. 8. Mr. Basu Mallick, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities submits that the order of the Co-ordinate Bench dated April 8, 2011 has directed the concerned authority to recalculate the retiral dues of the writ petitioner and as such the recalculation has to be on the basis of the ‘correct last drawn salary’ and not simpliciter the ‘last drawn salary’. He submits that after the Division Bench judgment in Amalendu Sekhar Bera and Anr. (supra), the authorities cannot calculate the revised pension payment order taking into consideration the erroneously ‘last drawn salary’. It is his submission that for calculation of the revised pension payment order it is the correct salary that has to be taken into account. 9. I have heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the materials on record. 10. The arguments of the counsel on behalf of the petitioner with regard to the fact that once the state authorities have acted on one portion of the order and therefore, they cannot renegade from acting upon the second part of the order is based on the principles of the Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate. It is to be noted that the phrase “Approbate and Reprobate” is apparently borrowed from the Scotch Law, where it is used to express the principle accepted in the Doctrine of Election – namely, that no party can accept and reject the same instrument. Our Supreme Court has time and again examined the principles relating to the Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate. 11. In State of Punjab and Others vs. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu reported in 2014 (15) SCC 144 [Coram: Dr. Our Supreme Court has time and again examined the principles relating to the Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate. 11. In State of Punjab and Others vs. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu reported in 2014 (15) SCC 144 [Coram: Dr. B.S. Chauhan and M. Yusuf Eqbal, JJ.], held that a person may be precluded, by way of his actions or conduct, or silence, when it is a duty to speak from asserting a right which she would have otherwise had. The relevant paragraphs are provided below: “22. The doctrine of “approbate and reprobate” is only a species of estoppel, it implies only to the conduct of parties. As in the case of estoppel it cannot operate against the provisions of a statute. (Vide CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar [CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar, AIR 1965 SC 1216 ].) 23. It is settled proposition of law that once an order has been passed, it is complied with, accepted by the other party and derived the benefit out of it, he cannot challenge it on any ground. (Vide Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 ].) In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683 ] this Court has observed as under: (SCC pp. 687-88, para 10) “10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that ‘a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage’.” 24. This Court in Babu Ram v. Indra Pal Singh [Babu Ram v. Indra Pal Singh, (1998) 6 SCC 358 ] and P.R.Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti [P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, (1998) 6 SCC 507 ], has observed that: (P.R. Deshpande case [P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti, (1998) 6 SCC 507 ] , SCC p. 511, para 8) “8. The doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel—the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel—the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel) which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.” 25. The Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corpn. v. Diamond and Gem Development Corpn. Ltd. [Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corpn. v. Diamond and Gem Development Corpn. Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 : (2013) 3 SCC (Civ) 153] , made an observation that a party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”, “fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience. 26. It is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel, the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one among the species of estoppel in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he would have otherwise had.” 12. The Supreme Court in Shyam Telelink Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in 2010 (10) SCC 165 [Coram: Markandey Katju and T.S. Thakur, JJ.] had also examined the principles relating to Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate and had held that a person cannot accept and reject the same instrument. The relevant paragraphs are delineated below: “23. The maxim qui approbat non-reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate) is firmly embodied in English common law and often applied by courts in this country. The relevant paragraphs are delineated below: “23. The maxim qui approbat non-reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate) is firmly embodied in English common law and often applied by courts in this country. It is akin to the doctrine of benefits and burdens which at its most basic level provides that a person taking advantage under an instrument which both grants a benefit and imposes a burden cannot take the former without complying with the latter. A person cannot approbate and reprobate or accept and reject the same instrument. 24. In Ambu Nair v. Kelu Nair [(1932-33) 60 IA 266 : AIR 1933 PC 167 ] the doctrine was explained thus: (IA p. 271) “Having thus, almost in terms, offered to be redeemed under the usufructuary mortgage in order to get payment of the other mortgage debt, the appellant, Their Lordships think, cannot now turn round and say that redemption under the usufructuary mortgage had been barred nearly seventeen years before he so obtained payment. It is a well-accepted principle that a party cannot both approbate and reprobate. He cannot, to use the words of Honyman, J. in Smith v. Baker [1873 LR 8 CP 350] LR at p. 357: ‘… at the same time blow hot and cold. He cannot say at one time that the transaction is valid, and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and at another time say it is void for the purpose of securing some further advantage.’ ” 25. The view taken in the above decision has been reiterated by this Court in City Montessori School v. State of U.P. [ (2009) 14 SCC 253 ] To the same effect is the decision of this Court in New Bihar Biri Leaves Co. v. State of Bihar [ (1981) 1 SCC 537 ] where this Court said: (New Bihar case [ (1981) 1 SCC 537 ], SCC p. 558, para 48) “48. It is a fundamental principle of general application that if a person of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of the terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other terms of the same contract which might be disadvantageous to him. The maxim is qui approbat non reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate). This principle, though originally borrowed from Scots law, is now firmly embodied in English common law. According to it, a party to an instrument or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or transaction and reject the rest. That is to say, no party can accept and reject the same instrument or transaction (per Scrutton, L.J., Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd. [(1921) 2 KB 608 : 1921 All ER Rep 215 (CA)] ; …).” 26. The decision of this Court in R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [ (1992) 4 SCC 683 : AIR 1993 SC 352 ] brings in the doctrine of election in support of the very same conclusion in the following words: (SCC pp. 687-88, para 10) “10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that: ‘… A person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage.’ (See Verschures Creameries Ltd. v. Hull and Netherlands Steamship Co. Ltd.[(1921) 2 KB 608 : 1921 All ER Rep 215 (CA)] KB at p. 612, Scrutton, L.J.) According to Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 16: “1508. Examples of the common law principle of election.—After taking an advantage under an order (for example for the payment of costs) a party may be precluded from saying that it is invalid and asking to set it aside.' ” 27. In America estoppel by acceptance of benefits is one of the recognised situations that would prevent a party from taking up inconsistent positions qua a contract or transaction under which it has benefited. American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol. 28, pp. 677-80 discusses “estoppel by acceptance of benefits” in the following passage: “Estoppel by the acceptance of benefits.—Estoppel is frequently based upon the acceptance and retention, by one having knowledge or notice of the facts, of benefits from a transaction, contract, instrument, regulation which he might have rejected or contested. American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol. 28, pp. 677-80 discusses “estoppel by acceptance of benefits” in the following passage: “Estoppel by the acceptance of benefits.—Estoppel is frequently based upon the acceptance and retention, by one having knowledge or notice of the facts, of benefits from a transaction, contract, instrument, regulation which he might have rejected or contested. This doctrine is obviously a branch of the rule against assuming inconsistent positions. As a general principle, one who knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance. This rule has to be applied to do equity and must not be applied in such a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience.” 13. On a thorough study of these above noted judgments, the principles that emerges is that a person cannot at the same time accept and reject an instrument. Such acceptance has to be judged by his conduct and actions. If the person has chosen to accept a particular instrument and/or order, he cannot at a latter point agitate against the same instrument and/or order. Carrying the analogy further, if a person acts on a part of an order passed by a Court, he cannot choose to ignore and/or reject the other part of the order unless the same has been challenged by him under the process established in law. In the present case, the authorities accepted the order passed on April 8, 2011 and proceeded to carry out the first point of the order that is of refunding the overdrawn amount. With regard to the second part of the order for recalculation of the pension payment order steps were taken by the authorities to comply with the same. It is only after five years that the Assistant Director, Pension, Provident Fund and Group Insurance objected to the order and directed the authorities below to act in consonance with another order passed by the Calcutta High Court. The very fact that the respondent authorities did not file any appeal against the order dated April 8, 2011 lends credence to the fact that they had accepted the order and had in fact complied with part of the same. Apropos, having accepted the same, it did not lie in their mouth at a latter date to not comply with another part of the order. 14. Apropos, having accepted the same, it did not lie in their mouth at a latter date to not comply with another part of the order. 14. Apart from the fact that the state authorities are clearly hit by the Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate, I am of the view that the State Authorities are also prevented from re-agitating the issue relating to the manner in which recalculation has to be carried out, as the issue has been settled and reached a finality. The Supreme Court in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2011) 8 SCC 161 [Coram: Dr. Dalveer Bhandari and H.L. Dattu, JJ.] discussed the entire issue of finality of judgment in paragraphs 103 to 142. The principle on which the ‘Doctrine of Finality’ is based has been delineated in paragraphs 103 and 142 that are provided below:- “103. The maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium says that it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation after a long hierarchy of appeals. At some stage, it is necessary to put a quietus. It is rare that in an adversarial system, despite the Judges of the highest court doing their best, one or more parties may remain unsatisfied with the most correct decision. Opening door for a further appeal could be opening a floodgate which will cause more wrongs in the society at large at the cost of rights. 104. It should be presumed that every proceeding has gone through infiltration several times before the decision of the Apex Court. In the instant case, even after final judgment of this Court, the review petition was also dismissed. Thereafter, even the curative petition has also been dismissed in this case. The controversy between the parties must come to an end at some stage and the judgment of this Court must be permitted to acquire finality. It would hardly be proper to permit the parties to file application after application endlessly. In a country governed by the rule of law, finality of the judgment is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment. Permitting the parties to reopen the concluded judgments of this Court by filing repeated interlocutory applications is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far-reaching adverse impact on the administration of justice. ……….. ………….. 142. Permitting the parties to reopen the concluded judgments of this Court by filing repeated interlocutory applications is clearly an abuse of the process of law and would have far-reaching adverse impact on the administration of justice. ……….. ………….. 142. The applicants certainly cannot be provided an entry by back-door method; and permit the unsuccessful litigants to reagitate and reargue their cases. The applicants have filed these applications merely to avoid compliance with the order of the Court. The applicants have been successful in the endeavour and have not permitted the judgment delivered on 13-2-1996 to acquire finality till date. It is strange that other respondents did not implement that final order of this Court without there being any order or direction of this Court. These applications being devoid of any merit deserve to be dismissed with heavy costs.” 15. Subsequently, in Union of India and Others Vs. Major S. P. Sharma and Others [Coram: Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. Chelameswar and M.Y. Eqbal, JJ.] reported in (2014) 6 SCC 351 the Supreme Court once again elucidated the principles in paragraphs 75 to 90 with regard to the Doctrine of Finality. M.Y. Eqbal, J. observed in paragraphs 80 to 82 as follows: “80. In M. Nagabhushana V. State of Karnataka this Court held that the doctrine of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality in litigation. The main object of the doctrine is to promote a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse of process of the court on the issues which have become final between the parties. The doctrine is based on two age-old principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the court that it is for one and the same cause. 81. Thus, the principle of finality of litigation is based on a sound firm principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end to litigation. 81. Thus, the principle of finality of litigation is based on a sound firm principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end to litigation. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such anarcy. 82. In a country governed by the rule of law, the finality of a judgment is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment and it is not permissible for the parties to reopen the concluded judgments of the court as it would not only tantamount to merely an abuse of the process of the court but would have far-reaching adverse effect on the administration of justice. It would also nullify the doctrine of stare decisis, a well-established valuable principle of precedent which cannot be departed from unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The judgments of the court and particularly of the Apex Court of a country cannot and should not be unsettled lightly.” 16. I would go amiss if I do no not consider the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of this High Court wherein Sanjib Banerjee, J. authoring the judgment on behalf of himself and the Hon’ble the Chief Justice had examined the issue with regard to the Doctrine of Finality and pronounced the principles thereto in Indu Bhusan Jana Vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 2009 Cal 24 ; (2009) 1 CHN 27 [Coram: Surinder Singh Nijjar, C.J. and Sanjib Banerjee, J.]. The Principles of Doctrine of Finality have been succinctly captured in the paragraphs delineated below: “11. Upon an order attaining finality, it matters little as to whether it was erroneous. A party aggrieved by an order has to work out his remedies within the legal framework. If an issue or the entire lis is concluded upon a finding being rendered and such finding remains unchallenged, it is no longer open to the party to undo the effect thereof at any subsequent stage or collaterally unless it is demonstrated that the finding was obtained by fraud or the Court lacked jurisdiction to pass the order. The hierarchy in the judiciary exists to afford litigants to climb up the ladder in pursuit of justice and to right a wrong committed at a lower level. The hierarchy in the judiciary exists to afford litigants to climb up the ladder in pursuit of justice and to right a wrong committed at a lower level. But if a litigant accepts an order, he does it to his prejudice and binds himself thereby. 12. The principle of finality or res judicata is a matter of public policy and is one of the pillars on which a judicial system is founded. Once a judgment becomes conclusive, the matters in issue covered thereby cannot be reopened unless fraud or mistake or lack of jurisdiction is cited to challenge it directly at a later stage. The principle is rooted to the rationale that the issues decided may not be reopened, and has little to do with the merit of the decision. If it were to be otherwise, no dispute can be resolved or concluded. The principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata apply equally to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. A decision pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction is binding between the parties unless it is modified or reversed, by adopting a procedure prescribed by law. It is in the interest of the public at large that finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over in the assessment of the same matter in issue. Even in case of a judgment passed incuriam which is unchallenged, the efficacy and binding nature of the operative order is conclusive inter parties. The principle applies both to an order from which an appeal lies and no appeal is preferred and to an order from which no appeal is provided.” 17. On an analysis of the above judgment on the Doctrine of Finality one concludes that the above Doctrine is based on two age-old principles, namely, interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium which means that it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and the other principle is nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae quod sit pro una et eadem causa meaning thereby that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the court that it is for one and the same cause. It is clear that once an order attains its finality, that is, it is not challenged in appeal or by way of any procedure established in law, it matters little whether such order was erroneous and bad in law. This order inter se the parties becomes final and is not open to challenge by either of the parties on a subsequent occasion. The only exceptions to the Doctrine of Finality are that the finding of the earlier order was obtained by fraud or the court lacked jurisdiction to pass the order. 18. The authorities cannot now rely on a judgment of the Division Bench passed after four years, in another matter, to overrule the judgment passed by the co-ordinate Bench. The above view of mine is strengthened by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court with regard to the Doctrine of Finality inter se the parties. It is not in dispute that subsequent to passing of the order dated April 8, 2011 the State authorities did not prefer an appeal against the said order. In fact, they proceeded to act on the same and refunded the amount of Rs.28,338/- that had been illegally deducted by the authorities. In fact, they also paid the interest @ 8% per annum as directed by the court. With regard to the second direction of recalculation of the retiral dues taking into consideration the last drawn salary, an order was passed by the D. I. of Schools (S. E.), Jalpaiguri directing the school authorities to submit the pension paper. It is only in the year 2016 that the Assistant Director of Pension, Provident Fund and Group Insurance, Government of West Bengal raised an objection stating that the revised pensionary benefits cannot be calculated on the basis of the ‘last pay drawn’ erroneously at higher slab in light of the judgment of the Division Bench as indicated above. This change of stance that has now been taken by the respondent authorities in the case of the petitioner is no longer legally tenable as the same is diametrically opposite to the principles of the Doctrine of Finality. In the present case, none of the exceptions to the Doctrine of Finality, that is, fraud or error of jurisdiction come into play in any manner whatsoever. 19. In the present case, none of the exceptions to the Doctrine of Finality, that is, fraud or error of jurisdiction come into play in any manner whatsoever. 19. In view of the same, I set aside the Official Memorandum dated December 27, 2017 passed by the District Inspector of Schools (S. E.), Jalpaiguri and direct the District Inspector of Schools to act in terms of the order dated April 8, 2011. It is made clear that the retiral dues of the petitioner shall be calculated by taking into consideration the ‘last drawn salary’, that is, Rs.9425/-and to issue the revised pension payment order within a period of six weeks from date. The respondent authorities are directed to make payment of the arrear pension amounts within a period of ten weeks from date and to pay the pension as per the revised calculation keeping in mind the ‘last drawn salary’, that is, Rs.9425/. 20. The writ petition being W. P. No. 4398 (W) of 2018 is, accordingly, allowed and disposed of. 21. There will be no order as to costs. 22. Urgent certified copy of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.