JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. J. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mrs. Rita Das Mazumdar, learned Amicus Curiae. 2. The issue involved in the present case is with regard to whether the last drawn wages of the workman would have to be paid under section 17(B) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to the 1947 Act), after the dispute between the parties which was earlier pending in the High Court had been remanded back to the Industrial Tribunal. 3. The petitioner’s case in brief is that due to the numerous unauthorized absence of the workman, a domestic enquiry had been initiated against the workman, where in it was proved that the workman had been unauthorizedly absent on many occasions. Accordingly, the workman was removed from service vide Order dated 31.03.1998. 4. The petitioner (Management) thereafter filed an application, registered as Misc. Case No. 4/1998, under Section 33(2)(b) of the 1947 Act, for approval of the Order dated 31.03.1998, before the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Silchar. The Industrial Tribunal, Silchar thereafter passed an Award dated 11.08.2000, dismissing the application and prayer of the petitioner for approval of its Award dated 31.03.1998. The Industrial Tribunal also directed the petitioner to reinstate the workman within 1 (one) month from the date of the order with all back wages, after deducting his salary for 81½ days for unauthorized absence. 5. The petitioner being aggrieved by the Award dated 11.08.2000, passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, in Misc. Case No. 4/1998, filed WP(C) No. 7016/2000. The ground of challenge taken by the petitioner against the Award dated 11.08.2000 was that the Industrial Tribunal had exceeded the parameters of its jurisdiction under Section 33 (2) (b) of the 1947 Act, inasmuch as, it should have only gone into the question of whether the domestic enquiry had been done by following due procedure. Instead the learned Industrial Tribunal went into the merits of the case by going into the surrounding circumstances and reasons for issuing the penalty of removal vide the Order dated 31.03.1998. 6. This Court, vide its Judgment & Order dated 06.01.2009, disposed of WP(C) No. 7016/2000, by holding that the approval refused by the learned Industrial Tribunal in respect of the Order dated 11.08.2000 was not tenable. 6. This Court, vide its Judgment & Order dated 06.01.2009, disposed of WP(C) No. 7016/2000, by holding that the approval refused by the learned Industrial Tribunal in respect of the Order dated 11.08.2000 was not tenable. Accordingly, the matter was remanded back to the learned Tribunal for a fresh consideration in the light of observations made in the Judgment & Order dated 06.01.2009. Paragraph 7 to 10 of the Judgment & Order dated 06.01.2009 is reproduced follows:- “7. Before proceeding to examine the respective contentions advanced on behalf of the rival parties the Court may set out the parameters of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act as laid down in paragraph 12 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Lalla Ram (supra):- ‘12. The position emerges from the above quoted decisions of this Court may be stated thus : In the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is confined to the enquiry as to (i) whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules/Standing Orders and principles of natural justice has been held (ii) whether a prima facie case for dismissal based on legal evidence adduced before the domestic tribunal is made out; (iii) whether the employer had come to a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dismissal did not amount to unfair labour practice and was not intended to victimize the employee regard being had to the position settled by the decision of this Court in Bangal Bhatdee Coal Co. v. Ram Prabesh Singh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. V. Ram Prabesh Singh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd v. Ram Naresh Kumar, Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, Workmen of Messrs. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. V. Management and Eastern Electric & Trading Co. v. Ram Prabesh Singh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. V. Ram Prabesh Singh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd v. Ram Naresh Kumar, Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, Workmen of Messrs. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. V. Management and Eastern Electric & Trading Co. v. Baidev Lal that though generally speaking the award of punishment for misconduct under the Standing Orders is a matter for the management to decide and the Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe yet an inference of mala fides may in certain cases be drawn from the imposition of unduly harsh, severe, unconscionable or shockingly disproportionate punishment; (iv) whether the employer has simultaneously or within such reasonably short time as to form part of the same transaction applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him. If these conditions are satisfied, the Industrial Tribunal would grant the approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal. If however, the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the labour authority will have to find out on its own assessment of the evidence adduced before it whether there was justification for dismissal and if it so finds it will grant approval of the order of dismissal which would also relate back to the date when the order was passed provided the employer had paid or offered to pay wages for one month to the employee and the employer had within the time indicated above applied to the authority before which the main industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him.’ 8. In the present case it is not in dispute that the only area which will require scrutiny of the Court is whether the refusal of the learned Tribunal to grant approval could be covered by the parameters of jurisdiction laid down in clause (iii) of para 12 of the judgment in Lalla Ram (supra), namely, whether the claim of the employer that the punishment of dismissal, as proposed, is bona fide or is an expression of an unfair labour practice which the industrial adjudicator is duty bound to prevent. 9. 9. A reading of the relevant part of the order of the learned Tribunal would indicate that the only ground on which approval was considered appropriate to be withheld is the conduct attribute to the management in overlooking the persistent and continuous absence of the respondent workman from duties as also the fact that the absence of the workman, though admitted, was claimed to be on account of unavoidable reasons. Though in clause (iii) of para 12 of the judgment in Lalla Ram (supra) a limited power has been given to the Industrial Court under Section 33(2)(b) to scrutinize the adequacy of the punishment such scrutiny has necessarily to be confined to the question as to whether the punishment if found to be excessive can also be said to be actuated by mala fides. The scrutiny of the quantum of the punishment imposed is not to be made from the standpoint of the adequacy of the punishment but from the perspective of mala fide intention, if any, in imposing the punishment. This is because excessive punishment can in certain cases be actuated by reasons of mala fide. However, whether mala fide was present or not is a question of fact has to be established by the evidence on record or at least it must be capable of being inferred from the surrounding circumstances as proved by the evidence and materials adduced. In the present case there is nothing on record to suggest that the punishment proposed to be imposed on the respondent workman is actuated by any malafide intention. No material is available on record from which an inference of malafide can be legitimately drawn. Merely because the punishment is considered to be harsh or disproportionate the same cannot be said to be actuated by a malafide intention. What is relevant to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act is not the harshness of punishment proposed but whether the punishment proposed being harsh bas been actuated by a malafide intent. In the present case even if the learned Industrial Tribunal was to come to a finding that the punishment imposed was excessive or harsh, in the absence of further facts, the necessary inference that the punishment imposed was actuated by a malafide intendment could not have been drawn by the learned Tribunal below. In the present case even if the learned Industrial Tribunal was to come to a finding that the punishment imposed was excessive or harsh, in the absence of further facts, the necessary inference that the punishment imposed was actuated by a malafide intendment could not have been drawn by the learned Tribunal below. As already held mere harshness of the punishment imposed will not be sufficient to clothe the Industrial Court with necessary jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act to refuse approval sought for by the management. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the Court is of the view that the approval refused by the learned Industrial Tribunal by the order dated 11.08.2000 impugned in the present case is not tenable. As power has been vested in the industrial Courts under the statue to approve or refuse approval of the decision of the management to impose a punishment there is no option for this Court but to remand the matter to the learned Tribunal below for a fresh consideration in the light of the observations contained herein. The learned Tribunal below shall now finalise the matter as expeditiously as possible and in any case within a period of two moths from the date of receipt of this order or a certified copy thereof.” 7. The petitioner’s counsel submits that the petitioner gave the last drawn wages to the respondent No. 2 during the pendency of WP(C) No. 7016/2000, as per Section 17 (B) of the 1947 Act. However, the payment of wages to the respondent No. 2 was stopped by the petitioner w.e.f., the month of March, 2009, as Misc. Case No. 4/1998 was remanded by this Court to the learned Industrial Tribunal, Silchar on 06.01.2009 for a fresh decision, i.e., as there were no proceedings pending in the High Court. 8. The petitioner’s counsel submits that in view of the stoppage of wages to the respondent Nos. 2, the respondent No. 2 filed an application under Section 33(A) of the 1947 Act before the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, praying for payment of wages. 8. The petitioner’s counsel submits that in view of the stoppage of wages to the respondent Nos. 2, the respondent No. 2 filed an application under Section 33(A) of the 1947 Act before the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, praying for payment of wages. Though the petitioner submitted a written objection to the application submitted by the respondent No. 2, the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, gave the following Order dated 29.06.2010, wherein it directed that the workman was entitled to receive all his wages, including back wages till approval of the decision taken by the petitioner in the Domestic Enquiry was approved, the operative portion of which is as follows:- “On perusal of the judgment and order dated 06.01.2009 it is clear that Hon’ble High Court has been pleased to remand the matter back for fresh consideration as to the approval of the action taken by the Management against the workman, which goes to show that the action of the Management has not yet been given final shape by the Industrial Tribunal and as such in view of the provisions of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act the condition of service of the workman cannot be altered. During the pendency of the proceedings of the industrial disputes, therefore, the employer is not authorized to discontinue the payment of wages/salaries to the workman, in other words, the workman is entitled to receive his back wages alongwith the wages till the date of final disposal of the matter regarding approval of the action against the workman taken by the Management.” 9. The present writ petition has challenged the Order dated 29.06.2010, passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Silchar on the ground that the petitioner is not liable to pay any wages to the respondent No. 2, after the dispute between the parties had been remanded by the High Court to the Tribunal. The petitioner’s counsel also submits that the respondent No. 2’s application under Section 33 (A) of the 1947 Act is not maintainable, inasmuch as, the respondent No. 2 had been removed from service vide the domestic enquiry and as per the provisio to Section 33(2)(b), one month wages had been paid to the respondent No. 2. The application under 33(2)(b) had also been made for approval of the Order dated 31.03.1998, in pursuance to the domestic enquiry, conducted by the petitioner. 10. The application under 33(2)(b) had also been made for approval of the Order dated 31.03.1998, in pursuance to the domestic enquiry, conducted by the petitioner. 10. The petitioner’s counsel in support of his submissions has relied upon the Judgment of the Kerela High Court in K. Jayaraman Vs. Quilon Gas Service & Anr., reported in 1995 (70) FLR 1028 and the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nagar Panchayat Vs. Sunil Kumar Rawat & Anr., reported in 2000 ILLG 821 MP. 11. The petitioner’s counsel also submits that ultimately on 31.05.2011, the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar has given approval to the Order dated 31.03.1998, removing the respondent No. 2 from service. 12. Ms. Rita Das Mazumdar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, on the other hand, submits that though the respondent No. 2 had been removed from service, vide Order dated 31.03.1998 in pursuance to domestic enquiry, unless the same was given approval by the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33 (2)(b) of the 1947 Act, the respondent No. 2 had to be considered to be continuing as a workman. Accordingly, the respondent No. 2 was to be paid his wages till approval by the Industrial Tribunal was given to the Order dated 31.03.1998. 13. Mrs. Rita Das Mazumdar, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits that as per the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors, reported in 2002 2 SCC 244 , the Apex Court has held that till the authority gives its approval as per Section 33 (2)(b), it cannot be said that the employee was removed from service. She has also relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of G.K. Sengupta vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. & Anr reported in 1994 4 BOMCR 230 . 14. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 15. Section 17(B), 33(2)(b) and 33(A) of the 1947 Act are reproduced below:- “17B. She has also relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of G.K. Sengupta vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. & Anr reported in 1994 4 BOMCR 230 . 14. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 15. Section 17(B), 33(2)(b) and 33(A) of the 1947 Act are reproduced below:- “17B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts Where in any case, a Labor Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such court: PROVIDED that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be.] 33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute 149[or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman]- (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: PROVIDED that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. 33A. 33A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc, changed during pendency of proceedings Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings102[before a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, Labor Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing 152[in the prescribed manner- (a) to such conciliation officer or Board, and the conciliation officer or Board shall take such complaint into account in mediating in, and promoting the settlement of, such industrial dispute; and (b) to such arbitrator, Labor Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint, the arbitrator, Labor Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit his or its award to the appropriate government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.]” 16. In the case of K. Jayaraman vs. Quilon Gas Service and Anr, reported in 1995 (70) FLR 1028, the Kerela High Court has held that for invoking Section 17-B of the 1947 Act, the following conditions should be satisfied:- “(1) there must be an award by the Labour Court or the Tribunal directing reinstatement of the workman: (2) the award should have been challenged in a proceeding pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court”. The Kerela High Court also stated that for denying the benefit of Section 17(B), it must be established that the workman was employed in some establishment during the pendency of the proceedings before the High Court or the Supreme Court and during that period he was receiving adequate remuneration. 17. In the case of Dena Bank vs. Kiritikumar T. Patel, reported in 1999 2 SCC 106 , the Apex Court has held at paragraph 23 as follows:- “23. 17. In the case of Dena Bank vs. Kiritikumar T. Patel, reported in 1999 2 SCC 106 , the Apex Court has held at paragraph 23 as follows:- “23. As regards the powers of the High Court and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution, it may be stated that Section 17-B, by conferring a right on the workman to be paid the amount of full wages last drawn by him during the pendency of the proceedings involving challenge to the award of the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal in the High Court or the Supreme Court or the Supreme Court which amount is not refundable or recoverable in the event of the award being set aside, does not in any way preclude the High Court or the Supreme Court to pass an order directing payment of a higher amount to the workman if such higher amount is considered necessary in the interest of justice. Such a direction would be dehors on the provisions contained in Section 17-B and while giving the direction, the court may also give directions regarding refund or recovery of the excess amount in the event of the award being set aside. But we are unable to agree with the view of the Bombay High Court in Elpro International Ltd, that in exercise of the power under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution, an order can be passed denying the workman the benefit granted under Section 17-B. The conferment of such a right under Section 17-B cannot be regarded as a restriction on the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution”. 18. The Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court Nagar, while referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Dena Bank (Supra) has in the case of Panchayat Vs. Sunil Kumar Rawat & Anr., reported in (2000) ILLJ 821 MP has held that – “Therefore, their Lordships have interpreted Section 17B to mean that the amount which is paid to the incumbent, is to the extent of the last pay drawn by him. It is also observed by the Apex Court that Section 17B cannot be interpreted to cause a burden on the employer more than what it ordained. It is also observed by the Apex Court that Section 17B cannot be interpreted to cause a burden on the employer more than what it ordained. The Apex Court was conscious of the financial liability which may arise on account of the petition being dismissed. It is very difficult for the employer to recover the entire amount paid by the employer. Therefore, the expression 'full wages last drawn' must be given restricted meaning and it cannot be given extended meaning that means that whenever the petition is filed by the Management challenging the award of the Tribunal then it enables the High Court or the Supreme Court to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceedings, full wages last drawn by him. The expression 'pendency of such proceedings' shall commence when the petition is filed before the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. It cannot 'be interpreted to mean that the employer is under an obligation to pay the entire amount as an interim measure right from the date of the award. The expression 'during the period of pendency of such proceedings' only signifies that the High Court or the Supreme Court will have a jurisdiction to award the wages last drawn by the labour as a maintenance or other allowances admissible to him from the date of pendency of the proceedings. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court will only arise from the date of pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court and prior to that, the Court cannot grant a maintenance, i.e. from the date of the award. Therefore, the observation made in the case of State of M.P. v. Jaswant Singh, (supra) by the Gwalior Bench of this Court is wide off mark and does not lay down the correct position. Therefore, Section 17B means that the High Court will have a right to award a maintenance to the workman in the event of not being reinstated by the employer, wages last drawn by him including maintenance allowance admissible to him from the date of pendency of such proceedings before the High Court or Apex Court and not from the date of award.” 19. The issue, to be decided by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. The issue, to be decided by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors (Supra) is reproduced below:- “If the approval is not granted under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, whether the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed or from the date of non-approval of the order of dismissal and whether failure to make application under Section 33(2)(b) would not render the order of dismissal inoperative”. Paragraph 3 of the Judgment, passed in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma & Ors (Supra) states as follows:- “The two Benches consisting of three learned Judges in (1) Strawboard Mfg. Co. v. Govind and (2) Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. V. S.N. Modak have taken the view that if the approval is not granted under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short “the Act”), the order of dismissal becomes ineffective from the date it was passed and, therefore, the employee becomes entitled to wages from the date of dismissal to the date of disapproval of the application. Another Bench of three learned Judges in Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. V. Suresh Chand has expressed the contrary view that non- approval of the order of dismissal or failure to make application under Section 33(2)(b) would not render the order of dismissal inoperative, failure to apply for approval under Section 33(2)(b) would only render the employer liable to punishment under Section 31 of the Act and the remedy of the employee is either by way of a complaint under Section 33-A or by way of a reference under Section 10(1)(d) of the Act. It may be stated here itself that there was no reference in this decision to the two earlier decisions aforementioned”. 20. In the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (Supra), the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has held at paragraph 14 as follows:- “14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightaway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33A would be meaningless and futile. It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33A would be meaningless and futile. The said Section has a definite purpose to serve, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted.” 21. In the case of G.K. Sengupta vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. & Anr (Supra), the Bombay High Court has held as follows:- “There is no dispute in regard to the well-settled legal position that if approval is not granted the order of dismissal or discharge shall not be operative and the employee concerned shall be deemed to be in service.” 22. A perusal of para 14 of the Judgment of the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (Supra) shows that the order of dismissal of an employee brings to an end the relationship of an employer and an employee, but that order remains incomplete as it is subject to approval of the authority under Section 33(2)(b). The Apex Court has also held that if approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employer, as it would be deemed that the order of dismissal had never been passed. The question now is with regard to whether, if approval is given by the authority, whether the approval would relate back to the order dated 31.03.1998, by which the petitioner was removed from service in pursuance to the domestic enquiry. 23. The question now is with regard to whether, if approval is given by the authority, whether the approval would relate back to the order dated 31.03.1998, by which the petitioner was removed from service in pursuance to the domestic enquiry. 23. With regard to the answer to the above issue, this Court in para 7 of the Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2009, passed in W.P(C) No. 7016/2000 had relied upon para 12 of the Judgment of the Apex Court in Lalla Ram v. D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd., reported in 1978 3 SCC 1 , wherein, the Apex Court has held that “in the proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) of the 1947 Act, if the Industrial Tribunal finds that the domestic enquiry satisfies the 4 conditions laid down by the Apex Court in Lalla Ram (Supra) in para 12, the Industrial Tribunal would grant approval of the dismissal, which would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal.” Thus, though the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (Supra) has not stated that the approval of dismissal of an employee by the authority would relate back to the date from which the employer had ordered the dismissal of the employee, it has held that if approval of the dismissal of an employee is not given, it will be deemed that the order of dismissal had never been passed and the consequences of the same would be that the employee is deemed to have continued in service, entitling him to all benefits available. The natural corollary of the above is that if approval for the dismissal is given by the authority, the same would relate back to the date of dismissal of the employee by the employer. 24. In the present case, the dismissal of the respondent No. 2 having been accorded approval by the Industrial Tribunal on 31.05.2011, the same would relate back to the date of the dismissal of the employee by the employer, i.e., on 31.03.1998. Further, the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (Supra) has held that Section 33A of the 1947 Act would be a ground available to a dismissed employee after approval of the same has been granted by the authority. Further, the Apex Court in Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. (Supra) has held that Section 33A of the 1947 Act would be a ground available to a dismissed employee after approval of the same has been granted by the authority. In the present case, the Industrial Tribunal has issued the impugned order dated 29.06.2010, directing that the respondent No. 2 was entitled to receive all his wages, including back wages vide order dated 29.06.2010. However, the approval of the dismissal order dated 31.03.1998 was given by the authority on 31.05.2011, i.e., subsequent to the impugned order dated 29.06.2010. This Court accordingly holds that the last drawn wages of the workman need not be paid to the workman under Section 17B of the 1947 Act, after the dispute between the parties pending in the High Court had been remanded back to the Industrial Tribunal. 25. In view of the reasons stated above, this Court holds that the petitioner was not required to pay the last drawn wages of the workman under Section 17B of the Industrial Dispute, 1947, after the dispute between the parties had been remanded back to the Industrial Tribunal by the High Court. Accordingly, this Court finds that the order dated 29.06.2010, passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Silchar, under Section 33A is bad in law and is accordingly set aside. Writ petition is accordingly allowed. Send back the LCRs. 26. In view of the assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae, her fee of Rs. 7,500/- shall be paid by the Assam State Legal Services Authority.