JUDGMENT DR. B.R. SARANGI, J. - This is an intra-Court appeal filed by the Insurance Company challenging the judgment dated 25.10.2000 passed by the learned Single Judge in Misc. Appeal No. 285 of 1996 confirming the award dated 15.01.1996 passed by the 2nd Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cuttack in Misc. Case No. 205 of 1994 directing to settle the claim as per the compromise in the Lok Adalat by paying an amount of Rs. 1.00 lakh, subject to verification of driving licence. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that on account of death of the deceased-Dhruba Charan Pal, who died in a vehicular accident, the claimant-respondents no.1 to 3 filed claim misc. case no. 205 of 1994 in the Court of Second M.A.C.T., Cuttack for grant of lump sum compensation to the tune of Rs.3,50,000/-. 3. The claimant-respondents no.1 to 3 alleged that on 15.10.1993, while the deceased was walking on the left side of the road, the offending vehicle (mini truck) bearing registration no. OR-02-A-4314 coming at high speed,negligently dashed against the deceased, as a result of which the deceased sustained serious head injuries and was shifted to S.C.B. Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack, but despite all possible treatment, the deceased died on the next date, i.e., on 16.10.1993. 4. The owner-respondent no.4 did not contest the case and was set ex-parte. On the other hand, the appellant- Insurance Company appeared and filed its written statement refuting all the allegations contained in the claim petition. The above claim misc. case no. 205 of 1994 was listed in the Lok Adalat. The appellant-Insurance Company agreed to settle the case for a sum of Rs.1.00 lakh towards full satisfaction subject to the condition that the claimants shall prove that the driver of the offending vehicle holds a valid driving licence and accordingly, claimants undertook that they will produce materials to show that the driver of the offending offence had valid and effective driving licence at the time of accident. 5. The appellant–Insurance Company enquired into the matter from the office of the R.T.O., Bhubaneswar wherefrom it transpired that the driver-Deba Kumar Tarai was not authorized to drive any transport vehicle. During the period of accident the driver had a driving licence to drive only light motor vehicle and he had no P.S.V. Badge. 6. 5. The appellant–Insurance Company enquired into the matter from the office of the R.T.O., Bhubaneswar wherefrom it transpired that the driver-Deba Kumar Tarai was not authorized to drive any transport vehicle. During the period of accident the driver had a driving licence to drive only light motor vehicle and he had no P.S.V. Badge. 6. The appellant-Insurance Company thereafter filed a petition before the tribunal to recall the conditional compromise on the ground that the driver had no valid and effective driving licence and also prayed for regular hearing of the case. But the tribunal rejected the prayer of the appellant and directed it to pay a sum of Rs. 1.00 lakh as per Lok Adalat compromise. 7. Being aggrieved by award dated 15.01.1996 passed by the 2nd M.A.C.T., Cuttack in Misc. Case No. 205 of 1994, the appellant preferred misc. appeal before this Court on the ground of ineffective driving licence. It was specifically pleaded by the appellant-Insurance Company that in order to drive a transport vehicle, the driver has to possess a transport endorsement specifically entitling him to drive such vehicle and in absence of such authorization, the driving licence becomes in-effective and the appellant is not liable. 8. The learned Single Judge, after hearing both the sides, held that it is for the Insurance Company to plead and prove that at the time of accident the particular vehicle was being used as a transport vehicle as per the decision reported in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., AIR 1999 S.C. 3181 . The learned Single Judge observed that a mini truck is also a light motor vehicle and a person having licnece to drive a light motor vehicle can drive such vehicle provided that at the relevant time the mini truck was not being used as a transport vehicle and accordingly dismissed Misc. Appeal No. 285 of 1996 by judgment dated 25.10.2000 confirming the award passed by the claims tribunal. Hence this intra-Court appeal. 9. Mr. M. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued with vehemence that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation in absence of valid and effective driving licence. Appeal No. 285 of 1996 by judgment dated 25.10.2000 confirming the award passed by the claims tribunal. Hence this intra-Court appeal. 9. Mr. M. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued with vehemence that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation in absence of valid and effective driving licence. It is contended that the claim was settled in Lok Adalat and when the petition to revoke the conditional compromise was rejected by the tribunal, it ought to have been held that there was no scope on the part of the appellant to take a positive plea relating to in-effectiveness of the driving licence in its written statement. It is further contended that whether the vehicle used as transport vehicle at the time of accident is a matter of evidence, which could have been elicited during crossexamination, had an opportunity been afforded to the appellant to enter into regular trial of the case by recalling the conditional compromise and, the same having not been done, the award passed by the claims tribunal and confirmed by the learned Single Judge cannot sustain in the eye of law and is liable to be quashed. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the award has been passed on the basis of the Lok Adalat compromise. May it be a conditional one, but subsequently, when the petition for recall of such award at the instance of the appellant was filed, the same having been rejected by the claims tribunal and consequentially the award so passed by the tribunal having been confirmed by the learned single Judge, the same should not be interfered with at this stage. 11. Though notice was issued to the respondents, in response to the same, respondent no. 1 has entered appearance, respondents no. 2 and 3 reported as dead, and notice as against respondent no.4 was served on affixture. But as it appears, respondent no.1 is the main contestant, who is the claimant, and the respondents no. 2 and 3 were children of respondent no.1, and respondent no.4 is the owner of the vehicle in question. 1 has entered appearance, respondents no. 2 and 3 reported as dead, and notice as against respondent no.4 was served on affixture. But as it appears, respondent no.1 is the main contestant, who is the claimant, and the respondents no. 2 and 3 were children of respondent no.1, and respondent no.4 is the owner of the vehicle in question. Since the award has already been passed and in the meantime more than 17 years have elapsed, the matter is finally disposed of at the stage of admission, as the correctness of the judgment passed by the tribunal and confirmed by the learned Single Judge, is under challenge in the present intra-Court appeal. 12. On the basis of the factual matrix delineated above, the undisputed facts are that the deceased Dhruba Charan Pal died in a vehicular accident on 16.10.1993 having sustained injury on 15.10.1993. The respondents no. 1 to 3 filed claim petition before the claims tribunal claiming compensation of Rs.3,50,000/-. But on a Lok Adalat compromise, the claimants have been awarded a sum of Rs.1.00 lakh towards full and final settlement of the claim subject to proof of driving licence of the driver of the offending vehicle. The appellant-Insurance Company filed a petition before the tribunal to recall the said conditional compromise on the ground that the driver had no valid and effective driving licence and claimed for regular hearing of the case. But the tribunal rejected the said petition and directed the appellant-Insurance Company to pay a sum of Rs. 1.00 lakh as per Lok Adalat compromise. The award of the claims tribunal has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 25.10.2000 in Misc. Appeal No. 205 of 1996. 13. The only question for determination is whether a driver having possessed a driving licence to drive ‘light motor vehicle’ can be construed to drive ‘transport vehicle’. In order to effectively answer the said question, definition of ‘light motor vehicle’ has to be given full effect to and it has to be read with Section 10(2)(d) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as amended by Act 54 of 1994, which makes it abundantly clear that ‘light motor vehicle’ is also a ‘transport vehicle’, gross vehicle weight or ‘unladen weight’ does not exceed 7500 Kg, as specified in the provision. Thus, a driver is issued a licence as per class of vehicle, i.e., light motor vehicle, transport vehicle or omnibus or another vehicle of other categories as per gross vehicle weight or unladen weight as specified in Section 2(21) of the Act. Provision of Section 3 of the Act requires that a person in order to drive a ‘transport vehicle’ must have authorization. Once a licence is issued to drive light motor vehicle, it would also mean specific authorization to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, gross vehicle weight or motor car, road roller, or tractor, unladen weight of which, as the case may be, does not exceed 7500 Kg. Insertion of ‘transport vehicle’ category in Section 10(2)(e) has no effect of obliterating the already defined category of transport vehicles of class of light motor vehicle. A distinction is made in Act if heavy goods vehicle, heavy passenger motor vehicle, medium goods vehicle and medium passenger motor vehicle in basis of ‘gross vehicle weight’ or ‘unladen weight’ for heavy passenger motor vehicle, heavy goods vehicle, weight, as the case may be, exceed 12000 Kg. This question has been considered by 3-Judge Bench of the apex Court in Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, AIR SCW 2017 SC 3668. 14. Otherwise also on perusal of the provisions of the Act, mainly Section 2(e) to (h), it is apparent that the use of language is very clear, meaning thereby, the words which cannot be read into an Act, unless clear reason for it is to be found within four corners of the Act itself. It is one of the principles of the statutory interpretation that may matter which should have been weighed, but has not been provided for in a statute, cannot be supplied by Courts as to do so will be legislation and not construction. Thus, it is apparent that plain and simple meaning has to be given to Section 10(2). When legislature has not amended the provisions, Court cannot rewrite definition of Section 2(21) of ‘light motor vehicle’ and Section 10(2)(d) and full effect has to be given to omission which has been made in provisions of Section 10(2)(e) to (h), by substituting ‘transport vehicle’ under Section 10(2)(e) and plain and literal interpretation of existing provisions and amended provisions it is not for Court to legislate by making insertion in Section 10(2)(e). What has not been provided in statute with a purpose cannot be supplied by Courts. Court has to construe a provision and not to act as a legislature. Therefore, the interpretation, as suggested by the insurer, would mean re-writing of provision, which is not permissible in law. 15. In view of the law laid down by the Court, as discussed above, this Court is of the considered opinion that if the driver of the offending vehicle has possessed driving licence of ‘light motor vehicle’, he having been driving the mini truck, may be considered to be a “transport vehicle”, but it does not exceed the gross vehicle weight or unladen weight of 7500 Kg, that itself means that the driver possessed a valid driving licence. 16. Apart from the above, if the parties have entered into a compromise with eyes wide open before the Lok Adalat and settled the dispute for all time to come by making a full and final award of Rs.1.00 lakh, as against the claim of Rs.3,50,000/-, and more particularly when the accident took place on 15.10.1993 consequence thereto the deceased succumbed to death on 16.10.1993, and in the meantime more than 25 years have elapsed, and as such the same has been confirmed by the learned Single Judge, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment and order itself so as to call for interference in this intra-Court appeal. 17. There is thus no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed. Appeal dismissed.