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2018 DIGILAW 625 (HP)

Ramesh Chand Batta v. State Of Himachal Pradesh

2018-04-12

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2018
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J —The petitioner has filed this petition claiming therein following effective relief:- 1. That the respondents may kindly be directed to pay compensation to the petitioner and other right holders for the land comprising in Khasra No. 128 old, new khasra No. 184 as per missal hakiyat istemal for the year 1986-87 for Tika Seri, Mauja, Jalari, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur (H.P) , with effect from due date with interest. 2. As per the pleaded case of the petitioner, the land on which he alongwith his brother and sisters claims to have proprietary rights as mortgagee was acquired by respondents-department vide notification dated 15.05.1970. Therefore, the moot question before the Court is whether the writ petition for the relief as claimed is maintainable before the Court. 3. It is more than settled that a discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution India need not be exercised if the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches and also in case he has an alternate remedy. 4. In Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation & another vs. Jabar Singh and others , (2007) 2 SCC 112, the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraphs supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches." 5. Likewise, in New Delhi Municipal Council vs. Pan Singh and others , (2007) 9 SCC 278 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and latches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See: Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy , (2004) 1 SCC 347 , U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh , (2006) 11 SCC 464 and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan , (2006) 4 SCC 322.) 17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See: Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India , (1994) 6 SCC 524 and M.R. Gupta v. Union of India , (1995) 5 SCC 628 .) 6. In Northern Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh and others , (2002) Supp3 SCR 534, the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered the question whether the writ petition filed after a period of 17 years for issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act could be entertained. The Hon''ble Court held that such petition must not be entertained and it was held that the writ petition must be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches itself. 7. In this case, there is absolutely no explanation on the part of the petitioner for the delay and latches of over more than 42 years in approaching the Court. That apart, as already observed above, the writ petition is otherwise not maintainable as the petitioner has failed to avail the remedies as were provided for under the Land Acquisition Act, more particularly, Section 30 thereof. 8. That apart, as already observed above, the writ petition is otherwise not maintainable as the petitioner has failed to avail the remedies as were provided for under the Land Acquisition Act, more particularly, Section 30 thereof. 8. It is more than settled that discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts and circumstances of the case and in accordance with law. 9. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought not to be entertained if alternative statutory remedies are available except in cases falling within the well defined exceptions as was set out by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in CIT v. Chhabil Dass Agarwa , (2014) 1 SCC 603 , which reads thus:- "15.Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes , (1964) AIR(Supreme Court) 1419, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa , (1983) 2 SCC 433 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation." 10. However, it needs to be clarified that there can be no doubt that an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but now it is well settled that where a statute provides efficacious and alternate remedy, the High Court will do well in not entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. 11. On misplaced considerations, statutory procedures cannot be allowed to be circumvented. 11. In addition to the above, it also needs to be observed that if the petitioner was really aggrieved he ought to have approached the Reference Court under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act that too within the stipulated period therein and having failed to do so, he cannot claim any equity before this Court that too after more than four decades, by filing the instant petition. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.