JUDGMENT : DR. A.K. RATH, J. Plaintiffs are the appellants against a reversing judgment in a suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession, permanent injunction and damages of Rs.1,050/-. 2. The case of the plaintiffs was that the suit land originally belonged to Raja Dharanidhar Indra Deo of Bonai. The plaintiffs were in possession of the suit schedule land since 1955. They had constructed three shop rooms over the same. They had their cycle repairing shop in one of the shop rooms. They leased out other two rooms. The shop rooms had been unauthorisedly demolished on 18.09.1979 by the staff at the instance of the defendant. They sustained a loss of Rs.1,050/-. In the year 1967, the criminal proceeding was initiated against them, but they were acquitted. It was further pleaded that they had perfected title by way of adverse possession. With this factual scenario, they instituted the suit seeking the relief mentioned supra. 3. The defendant filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendant was that the suit land belonged to the Orissa State Transport Corporation of Rourkela. Defendant is in possession of the suit land since long. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court struck four issues. Parties led evidence, both oral and documentary, to substantiate their cases. Learned trial court came to hold that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land. The draft R.O.R. revealed that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land. The plaintiffs had acquired title by way of adverse possession. Held so, it decreed the suit. Felt aggrieved, the defendant filed T.A. No. 5/1 of 1983-82 in the court of the learned Additional District Judge, Rourkela. The same is allowed. Hence, this second appeal has been instituted. 5. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law:-“Whether the appellants have acquired title in respect of the suit property by way of adverse possession ?” 6. Heard Mr. Surya Narayan Satpathy, learned advocate along with Ms. Sunita Satpathy, learned advocate for the appellants. None appears for the respondent. 7. Mr. S.N. Satpathy, learned advocate for the appellants argues with vehemence that the suit land originally belonged to Raja Dharanidhar Indra Deo of Bonai. The plaintiffs were in possession of the suit schedule land since 1955. They had constructed three shop rooms. Sunita Satpathy, learned advocate for the appellants. None appears for the respondent. 7. Mr. S.N. Satpathy, learned advocate for the appellants argues with vehemence that the suit land originally belonged to Raja Dharanidhar Indra Deo of Bonai. The plaintiffs were in possession of the suit schedule land since 1955. They had constructed three shop rooms. They had cycle repairing in one shop room and leased out the other two shop rooms. The plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land peacefully, continuously and with the hostile animus to the defendant for more than thirty years and as such, perfected title by way of adverse possession. He further submits that the settlement R.O.R. had been published in the name of the plaintiffs. They used to pay tax. He further submits that the defendant had no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit schedule land. There is no evidence on record that the suit schedule land had been transferred to the defendant. The defendant has no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit property. 8. Adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. In Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Govt. of India and others, (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the apex Court observed as under :- "In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nec vi, nec clam, nec precario", that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. The court further observed that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession.” (emphasis laid) 9. The date of entry into the suit land by the plaintiffs has not been mentioned. Mere possession of the suit land for long time is not suffice to hold that the plaintiffs have perfected title by way of adverse possession, unless the classical requirements of adverse possession nec vi, nec clam, nec precario are pleaded and proved. On a threadbare analysis of evidence on record as well as pleadings, the learned appellate court negatived the plea of adverse possession. There is no perversity or illegality in the findings of the courts below. The entry in the M.S. ROR neither creates nor extinguishes title. In view of the same, reliance placed on the R.O.R. is totally misplaced. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly. 10. As a sequel of the above discussion, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.