JUDGMENT : 1. Today, the matter has come up on an interlocutory application No.159/2018 filed by learned counsel Shri Bohra representing the petitioner for early hearing of the petition. For the reasons mentioned in the application, the prayer for early hearing is allowed. The I.A. No.159/2018 is allowed and the matter is heard finally today itself. 2. By way of the instant misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioner Nasir Khan has approached this Court for challenging the order dated 28.10.2013 passed by appellate court being the learned Additional Sessions Judge, No.4, Jodhpur Metro, rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 29 of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2005”) and affirming the order dated 13.05.2013 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate No.6, Jodhpur in Criminal Misc. Case No.19/2012 whereby, the application submitted by the respondent under Section 12 of the Act of 2005 was allowed. 3. Facts in brief are that the petitioner was married to the respondent Smt. Rizwana in the year 2002 and a son named Rehan Khan was born from the wedlock. The petitioner is alleged to have maltreated his wife and son and finally, they were turned out of the family home in the year 2012. Thereupon, Smt. Rizwana filed the questioned application under Section 12 of the Act of 2005 in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate No.6, Jodhpur Metropolitan with various prayers including that of monetary relief. The said application was contested by the petitioner. Smt. Rizwana also moved an application for interim monetary relief under Section 23 of the Act of 2005 which was accepted by the trial court vide order dated 13.05.2013 and the petitioner was directed to make payment of a total sum of Rs.5,000/- (2,500/- each) by way of interim monthly maintenance to Smt. Rizwana and the child Rehan Khan from the date of filing of the application. The petitioner challenged the said order on numerous grounds by filing an appeal under Section 29 of the Act of 2005 which was transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge, No.4, Jodhpur Metro. The petitioner assailed the impugned order on merits before the appellate court. The petitioner challenged the said order on numerous grounds by filing an appeal under Section 29 of the Act of 2005 which was transferred to the court of Additional Sessions Judge, No.4, Jodhpur Metro. The petitioner assailed the impugned order on merits before the appellate court. However, the contentions raised by the petitioner for challenging the trial court’s order did not find favour with the appellate court and hence, the order dated 13.05.2013 passed by the trial court was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed by order dated 28.10.2013. Now, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of the instant petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for assailing the impugned orders as well as the proceedings sought to be taken against him in the court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate No.6, Jodhpur Metropolitan on the sole ground that the said court has no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings as the jurisdiction of extending the relief sought by the respondent vests only with the Family Court by virtue of Section 7 read with Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1984”). Though the ground of the Magistrate’s court lacking jurisdiction was not raised previously but as it goes to the root of the matter and is purely a legal ground, the petitioner is allowed to raise the same for the first time in this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 4. Learned counsel Shri Manoj Bohra relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Shabana Bano vs. Imran Khan, reported in AIR 2010 SC 305 and this Court’s Judgment in the case of Smt. Payal Agarwal vs. Kunal Agarwal (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.1094/2014) decided on 28.04.2014 and urged that now it has been settled beyond all manner of doubt that in whichever area, a Family Court has been established, a claim for maintenance under any law can be instituted and entertained only by such Family Court. He urged that in view of the non-obstante clause contained in Section 20, manifestly, the provisions of the Act of 1984 have an overriding effect over any other statute and consequently, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the respondent under the provisions of Act of 2005. He urged that in view of the non-obstante clause contained in Section 20, manifestly, the provisions of the Act of 1984 have an overriding effect over any other statute and consequently, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the respondent under the provisions of Act of 2005. He argued that as per Sections 8 and 20 of the Act of 1984, the Family Court has been exclusively vested with the jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding for maintenance. He buttressed that by virtue of Section 8 of the Act of 1984, jurisdiction of all other courts has been explicitly excluded for the matters covered by Section 7 of the Act and thus, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the respondent under the Act of 2005 and the same should have been either straight off transferred or, in the alternative, returned to the applicant for approaching the Family Court concerned. 5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by Shri Bohra and have perused the impugned orders and the precedents cited at bar. 6. The relevant provisions of law i.e. Sections 7, 8 and 20 of the Family Courts Act and Sections 2(i), 20, 26 and 27 of the Domestic Violence Act which are relevant and germane for deciding the controversy at hand are reproduced herein below for the sake of ready reference: Family Courts Act, 1984 “7. Jurisdiction.—(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall— (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district court or any subordinate civil court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a district court or, as the case may be, such subordinate civil court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation.—The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:— (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstance arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise— (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment." “8. Exclusion of jurisdiction and pending proceedings.—Where a Family Court has been established for any area,— (a) no district court or any subordinate civil court referred to in sub-section (1) of section 7 shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to that subsection; (b) no magistrate shall, in relation to such area, have or exercise any jurisdiction or powers under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); (c) every suit or proceeding of the nature referred to in the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 7 and every proceeding under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),— (i) which is pending immediately before the establishment of such Family Court before any district court or subordinate court referred to in that sub-section or, as the case may be, before any magistrate under the said Code; and (ii) which would have been required to be instituted or taken before such Family Court if, before the date on which such suit or proceeding was instituted or taken, this Act had come into force and such Family Court had been established, shall stand transferred to such Family Court on the date on which it is established.” “20. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act.” The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 “2(i) “Magistrate” means the Judicial Magistrate of the first class, or as the case may be, the Metropolitan Magistrate, exercising jurisdiction under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) in the area where the aggrieved person resides temporarily or otherwise or the respondent resides or the domestic violence is alleged to have taken place.” “20. Monetary reliefs.—(1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12,the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but not limited to,— (a) the loss of earnings; (b) the medical expenses; (c) the loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and (d) the maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children, if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force. (2) The monetary relief granted under this section shall be adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed. (3) The Magistrate shall have the power to order an appropriate lump sum payment or monthly payments of maintenance, as the nature and circumstances of the case may require. (4) The Magistrate shall send a copy of the order for monetary relief made under sub-section (1) to the parties to the application and to the in charge of the police station within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the respondent resides. (5) The respondent shall pay the monetary relief granted to the aggrieved person within the period specified in the order under sub-section (1). (6) Upon the failure on the part of the respondent to make payment in terms of the order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may direct the employer or a debtor of the respondent, to directly pay to the aggrieved person or to deposit with the court a portion of the wages or salaries or debt due to or accrued to the credit of the respondent, which amount may be adjusted towards the monetary relief payable by the respondent.” “26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19,20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any relief available under sections 18, 19,20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a civil court, family court or a criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act. (2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a civil or criminal court. (3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief.” “27. Jurisdiction.—(1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which— (a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or (b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or (c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act. (2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India.” 8. On a bare perusal of the Section 7 of the Act of 1984 which designates the reliefs which may be extended by the Family Court, it is apparent that it does not cater to the relief of (i) protection order, (ii) residence order, and (iii) return of stridhan articles made by the respondent in her application filed before the Magistrate. 9. Section 8 of the act of 1984 stipulates that where a Family Court is established in the area, no district court or any subordinate civil court referred to in Section 7(1) in relation to such area, shall have or exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any suit or proceedings in the nature referred to in the explanation to that sub-section. Section 7(2)(a) & (b) excludes the jurisdiction of a Magistrate from entertaining proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure in such area where a Family Court has been established. 10. Section 7(2)(a) & (b) excludes the jurisdiction of a Magistrate from entertaining proceedings under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure in such area where a Family Court has been established. 10. Section 20 of the Act of 1984 postulates that the provisions of this Act will have an overriding effect on anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. Manifestly, exclusion of jurisdiction as postulated in Sections 7 & 8 is clearly defined as that of a District Court or a Civil Court in relation to the proceedings referred to in Section 7(1) of the Act and that of a Magistrate in relation to proceedings under Chapter IX of Cr.P.C. For dealing with the issue raised by the petitioner, the prayers made by the respondent in her application need to be considered and evaluated so as to find out whether the Family Court has the power to extend these reliefs or not. The respondent made following prayers in her application: (i) Protection order under Section 18 of the Act of 2005, (ii) Residence order under Section 19 of the Act of 2005, (iii) Direction for return of her stridhan articles under Section 19(8) of the Act of 2005. (iv) Prayer for monetary relief under Section 20 of the Act of 2005. (v) Prayer for compensation under Section 22 of the Act of 2005. 11. Clause (f) of the Explanation to Section 7(1)(b) of the Act of 1984 deals with a proceeding or suit for maintenance. Section 7(2) of the Act of 1984 confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Family Court to entertain proceedings under Chapter IX of Code of Criminal Procedure. If the plain language of the various clauses mentioned under the Explanation to Section 7(1)(b) is seen, manifestly, the same refer to suits or proceedings between spouses to a marriage for maintenance or in relation to legitimacy of any person or for guardianship or custody of a minor or a property dispute between such spouses. 12. The Act of 2005 is a subsequent legislation and has been enacted with the objective of creating a substantive and better equipped forum for extending provide expeditious relief to women/victims of domestic violence of any kind occurring with the family or for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 12. The Act of 2005 is a subsequent legislation and has been enacted with the objective of creating a substantive and better equipped forum for extending provide expeditious relief to women/victims of domestic violence of any kind occurring with the family or for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Manifestly, upon an overview of the provisions of the Act of 2005, it is clear that it does not restrict the relief sought for by a woman only against her husband or any other matrimonial relative for that matter. The aggrieved person, can seek relief from even her parents or any person with whom she might have lived in a domestic relationship in a shared household whether owned or tenanted. Furthermore, the application under the Act of 2005 can only be entertained if there is an allegation of domestic violence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act. On the other hand, the suit or proceedings for maintenance referred to under Section 7(f) of the Family Courts Act do not require that the applicant should have been subjected to domestic violence. Apparently, the scope of inquiry and relief under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act is totally different from the scope of inquiry and relief provided under the Family Courts Act. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 expressly confers jurisdiction upon a Magistrate to pass the following orders: “(i) Protection orders. (ii) Residence orders. (iii) Monetary relief. (iv) Custody orders. (v) Compensation orders.” 13. Manifestly, the Family Court has not been conferred the power to grant relief of (i) right to live in shared household, (ii) protection order (iii) residence order and the monetary reliefs of the kind defined in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section 1 of Section 20 of the Act of 2005. The Family Courts Act also does not provide for the relief of compensation which the Magistrate is empowered to grant under Section 20(2) of the Act. 14. Section 20(1)(d) of the Act of 2005 makes it clear that the maintenance granted under this provision will be in addition to an order of maintenance which may be passed under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. 14. Section 20(1)(d) of the Act of 2005 makes it clear that the maintenance granted under this provision will be in addition to an order of maintenance which may be passed under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 15. Section 26 of the Act of 2005 makes it abundantly clear that the aggrieved person can claim reliefs available under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act by filing application before the Magistrate and identical relief may also be sought in a Family Court, civil court or a criminal court. Manifestly thus, the Act of 2005, which is a subsequent legislation enacted with specially designed measures aimed at providing expeditious relief to women and children affected by domestic violence, gives a choice to the aggrieved person who may, as per her/ his desire and convenience, invoke jurisdiction of a Magistrate to seek relief available under the provisions of Sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the Act. Thus, as per Section 26(1) of the Act of 2005, choice of forum has been left at the discretion of the aggrieved person. 16. Section 27 of the Act of 2005 specifically confers jurisdiction upon a court of the Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate concerned to exercise powers within the local limits where, the person aggrieved or the respondent resides or the cause of action has arisen and authorises such court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under the Act. Any order made under the Act of 2005 has been made enforceable throughout India. Thus, the powers conferred upon a Magistrate by the Act of 2005 are for wider and comprehensive than those conferred upon a Family Court by the Act of 1984. 17. Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act provides for an appeal against the order passed by the Magistrate and thus, an additional safeguard is provided in this Act to the aggrieved person if an adverse order is passed against her by the Magistrate. The Domestic Violence Act further provides that the breach of a protection order or an interim protection order under this Act shall be an offence punishable under Section 31 of the Act and confers jurisdiction of trial upon the very same Magistrate who had passed the order of protection. 18. The Domestic Violence Act further provides that the breach of a protection order or an interim protection order under this Act shall be an offence punishable under Section 31 of the Act and confers jurisdiction of trial upon the very same Magistrate who had passed the order of protection. 18. The Domestic Violence Act confers wider powers upon a Magistrate and the reliefs extendable thereunder are of more comprehensive and its area of operation covers an entirely different spectrum than what is provided under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. Hence, if, a victim of Domestic Violence is deprived of the right to approach a competent Magistrate under the provisions of the Act of 2005 and is compelled to approach the Family Court, the relief sought for by such person would be fettered within the confines of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act which does not fully cater to the reliefs specified under Sections 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Act of 2005. Furthermore, as has been observed above, Section 26(1) of the Domestic Violence Act gives a choice of forum to the aggrieved party and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate empowered under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act cannot be ousted by virtue of Sections 8 & 20 of the Family Courts Act when the relief is sought under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. 19. The act of 2005 is a subsequent substantive legislation enacted for providing various kinds of reliefs to the persons afflicted by domestic violence. If at all, intention of the legislation had been to confer jurisdiction of granting various reliefs, enumerated in the Act of 2005 upon the Family Court then a specific provision could have been introduced to this effect in the Act of 2005 itself. However, as noticed above, even under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act of 1984, the exclusion of jurisdiction has been confined to that of a District Court or a Civil Court from entertaining civil suits or like proceedings or of a Magistrate in entertaining proceedings under Chapter IX of the Cr.P.C. The enactment of 2005 was enacted with a clear concept of conferring powers upon a Magistrate to decide all the matters covered by the various provisions of the Act. 20. 20. That apart, the Family Courts Act, 1984 is a procedural law whereas The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a substantive law providing special and more comprehensive reliefs and the orders passed therein are enforceable throughout the country as per Section 27(2) of the Act of 2005. Thus, the provisions of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 would hold field whenever a controversy arises regarding its application vis-a-vis any other provision like Family Courts Act, etc. 21. The learned Single Bench of this Court, while deciding the case of Smt. Payal Agarwal, (referred to supra) relied upon by Shri Bohra, did not consider the import of Sections 26 and 27 of the Domestic Violence Act. 22. In view of the discussion made herein above, this Court has to consider whether Payal Agarwal’s Judgment lays down the correct position of law on the aspect of jurisdiction inter-se between the Family Courts and the Magistrate in reference to the Act of 1984 and the Act of 2005. 23. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. & Anr. vs M/S. Synthetics And Chemicals Ltd. & Anr., reported in (1991)4 SCC 139 , considered in detail, the concept of sub-silentio/per incuriam and held that if an earlier judgment even passed by a Larger Bench does not take account of a specific provision of law and decides the issue in ignorance thereof then, such a ratio has to be termed as per incuriam and would not have force of law. Hon’ble the Supreme Court held as under: “38. The dispute is about levy of purchase tax on industrial alcohol. The High Court held that the State legislature was competent to enact a law imposing purchase tax on it in exercise of power under Entry 54 of List II. But it struck down the levy as it would disturb price structure regulated by Central Government. It was held that control of alcohol industry having been taken over by the Parliament, for purpose of regulation and development the State stood denuded of its taxing power under Entry 54 of List II to the extent the field of price fixation was covered by the price control order issued by the government. It was held that control of alcohol industry having been taken over by the Parliament, for purpose of regulation and development the State stood denuded of its taxing power under Entry 54 of List II to the extent the field of price fixation was covered by the price control order issued by the government. And the purchase price being component of price fixation which squarely fell within the power of Central Government the imposition of purchase tax amounted to intrusion into the forbidden area of price fixation by Central Government. Support for this was drawn, principally, from the two Constitution Bench decisions in India Cement Ltd v. State of Tamil Nadu and Synthetic and Chemicals v. State of U.P.. The first was relied for the principle that even a taxing legislation by the State could be invalid to the extent it trenched on Central legislation on the same subject. And the latter for the conclusion that, however, sales tax cannot be charged on industrial alcohol in the present case, because under the Ethyl Alcohol (Price Control) Orders sales tax cannot be charged by the State on industrial alcohol. Reliance on India Cement Ltd. was under complete misapprehension. The State in that case attempted to levy case on royalty. It was held to be invalid. To save it the State attempted to justify it as a tax in exercise of power under Entry 50 of List II. The submission was negative as the legislative power of State under Entry 50 of List II was subject to any limitation imposed by the Parliament by law relating to mineral development. The bench held that in view of the Parliamentary legislation under Entry 54 of List I and the declaration made under Section 2 and provisions of Section 9 of the Act the State legislation was overridden to that extent. No such restriction or limitation is placed under Entry 54 of List II except that the exercise of power has been made subject to the provisions of Entry 92 of List I. 39. But the problem has arisen due to the conclusion in the case of Synthetic and Chemicals. The question was if the State legislature could levy vend fee or excise duty on industrial alcohol. But the problem has arisen due to the conclusion in the case of Synthetic and Chemicals. The question was if the State legislature could levy vend fee or excise duty on industrial alcohol. The bench answered the question in the negative as industrial alcohol being unfit for human consumption the State legislation was incompetent to levy any duty of excise either under Entry 51 or Entry 8 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. While doing so the bench recorded the conclusion extracted earlier. It was not preceded by any discussion. No reason or rationale could be found in the order. This gives rise to an important question if the conclusion is law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution or it is per incuriam and is liable to be ignored. 40. Incuria literally means carelessness. In practice per incuriam appears to mean per ignoratium. English courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. The quotable in law is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority. (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.{(1944) 1KB 718 : (1944) 2 All ER 293}). Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey{ (1962) 2 SCR 558 : AIR 1962 SC 83 } this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed when conflicting decisions are placed before a bench extracted a passage from Halsburys Laws of England incorporating one of the exceptions when the decision of an appellate court is not binding. 41. Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law? Here again the English courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. "A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind." (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn,, p. 153). It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. "A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind." (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn,, p. 153). In Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd.{(1941) 1KB 675,677 } the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gumam Kaur. { (1989) 1 SCC 101 } The bench held that, precedents subsilentio and without argument are of no moment. The Courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perperated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decedendi. In Shama Rao v. State of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1680 it was observed, ’it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein’. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent.” Evidently, while deciding the case of Smt. Payal Agarwal, the learned Single Bench of this Court was not apprised of the specific provisions of the Act of 2005 viz. Sections 26, 27, 29 and 31 and hence, the said judgment has to be termed to be subsilentio and it does not lay down the correct position of law. Sections 26, 27, 29 and 31 and hence, the said judgment has to be termed to be subsilentio and it does not lay down the correct position of law. It can without any doubt be concluded that despite establishment of a Family Court, the Magistrate competent to exercise jurisdiction over the area concerned, is empowered and has jurisdiction to entertain applications to extend all kinds of relief provided under the Domestic Violence Act except an application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Seen differently and if for argument’s sake, the plea putforth by Shri Bohra that the prayer for maintenance can only be entertained by the Family Court is accepted then, it would lead to an unjust multiplicity of proceedings because in that case, the aggrieved person would have to file a separate application for maintenance which would have to be presented before the Family Court and another one for the reliefs of residence order, protection order, etc, which would have to be filed before the Magistrate as per the Act of 2005. As the legislature has consciously given the choice of forum to the aggrieved person under the Act of 2005, it is such person who would be the best Judge to decide where the application should be moved. Thus, this Court is of firm opinion that a victim of domestic violence cannot be compelled to invoke the jurisdiction of Family Court for seeking the reliefs provided by the Act of 2005. So far as the Supreme Court Judgment in the case of Shabana Bano (supra) is concerned, in that case, the proceedings which were filed before the Magistrate were under Section 125 Cr.P.C. and hence, the Supreme Court held that such proceedings would only be maintainable before the Family court. Manifestly, the language of Section 8(b) of the Family Court specifically excludes the jurisdiction of a Magistrate from entertaining the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in an area where Family Court has been constituted and thus, the said Supreme Court Judgment would have no application to the issues of facts and law involved in the case at hand. Manifestly, the language of Section 8(b) of the Family Court specifically excludes the jurisdiction of a Magistrate from entertaining the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in an area where Family Court has been constituted and thus, the said Supreme Court Judgment would have no application to the issues of facts and law involved in the case at hand. In view of the discussion made herein above and finding no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order dated 28.10.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, No.4, Jodhpur Metro, I am not inclined to interfere therein in exercise of inherent power conferred upon this Court by Section 482 Cr.P.C. Hence, the instant misc. petition is dismissed as being devoid of merit.