JUDGMENT : UJJAL BHUYAN, J. 1. Heard Mr. H.R.A. Choudhury, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A. Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A. Kalita, learned special counsel, Foreigners Tribunal (‘FT’). 2. By filing this petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks quashing of order dated 13.1.2016, passed by the Foreigners Tribunal, Barpeta 11th at Sorbhog in FT Case No. 88/2015 (Union of India v. Isiran Nessa), declaring the petitioner to be a foreigner who had illegally entered into India (Assam) from Bangladesh after 25.3.1971. 3. This court by order dated 22.4.2016 had issued notice while requisitioning the case record and passed an interim order to the effect that petitioner should be allowed to remain on bail subject to her appearance before the Superintendent of Police (Border), Barpeta and furnishing of adequate surety. 4. One Samad Hussain, APS, Addl. Superintendent of Police (Border), Barpeta has filed an affidavit on behalf of the Superintendent of Police (Border), Barpeta supporting the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. 5. Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have been considered. Also perused the materials on record, including the record requisitioned from the Tribunal. 6. Record discloses that Election Commission of India had ordered intensive revision of electoral rolls for the Sorbhog Assembly Constituency in the State of Assam with reference to 1.1.1997 as the qualifying date. In this connection, a house-to-house enumeration was carried out during the period from 16.1.1997 to 15.4.1997. Though the name of the petitioner was included in the draft electoral roll published on 24.9.1997, Electoral Registration Officer for the said constituency expressed doubts about the citizenship of the said person and got the matter verified by an on the spot local verification. On consideration of the report of such verification, Electoral Registration Officer recorded reasonable doubt that the petitioner was not a citizen of India. 7. Thereafter on completion of the due formalities, Superintendent of Police (Border), Barpeta made the reference before the Illegal Migrants (Determination) Tribunal, Barpeta under the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (TMDT Act’) suspecting the petitioner to be an illegal migrant. Be it stated that under section 3(1)(c) of the IMDT Act, an illegal migrant was defined as a foreigner who had unauthorizedly entered into India after 25.3.1971. The reference was registered as IMDT Case No. 2635/1997. 8. Be it stated that under section 3(1)(c) of the IMDT Act, an illegal migrant was defined as a foreigner who had unauthorizedly entered into India after 25.3.1971. The reference was registered as IMDT Case No. 2635/1997. 8. IMDT Act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665 with the further direction that references which were pending before the Tribunals constituted under the IMDT Act should be transferred to the Foreigners Tribunals constituted under the Foreigners Act, 1946 read with the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964. As a result, the related reference was transferred to the Foreigners Tribunal 2nd, Barpeta where, it was registered as FT (2nd) Case No. 957/11. However, after creation of additional Tribunals, the reference was assigned to the Foreigners Tribunal, Barpeta 11th at Sorbhog (Tribunal), where it was renumbered as FT Case No. 88/2015. 9. In her written statement filed before the Tribunal on 12.8.2011, petitioner stated that she was the daughter of Inser Ali, son of Jahur Ali. Father was a resident of Balarpet village within Abhayapuri Constituency and a citizen of India. After changing his residence, father became a resident of Bilmari village tinder Bijni Police Station. About 25 years ago, she had married Taleb Ali, son of Isar Ali of Nisuka village under Sorbhog Police Station. 10. This written statement of the petitioner was wholly inadequate to establish her identity as a citizen of India having regard to the mandate of section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, as explained by the Supreme Court in paragraph 26 of Sarbananda Sonowal (supra). Petitioner did not mention her date or year of birth and consequently, her age on the date of filing the written statement remained undisclosed. She also did not mention the name of her mother and paternal grandmother though these are material facts, not to speak of her brothers and sisters, if any. All that she stated was that she was the daughter of Inser Ali, son of Jahur Ali, who was a voter in 1966 and that about 25 years ago, i.e., around the year 1986, she had married Taleb Ali of Nisuka village. Therefore, from the written statement, what is discernible is that according to the petitioner, her father Inser Ali was a citizen of India and she being his daughter was a citizen of India. 11. Therefore, from the written statement, what is discernible is that according to the petitioner, her father Inser Ali was a citizen of India and she being his daughter was a citizen of India. 11. Let us now examine whether petitioner could prove the above fact in issue by adducing cogent, reliable and admissible evidence. 12. Petitioner deposed before the Tribunal as her witness No. 1 on 20.2.2012. She disclosed her age as 50 years and described herself as daughter of Md. Inser Ali and wife of Md. Taleb Ali. If petitioner was 50 years of age in 2012, it would mean that she was bom sometime in the year 1962. 13. Be that as it may, according to the testimony of the petitioner, she was bom and brought up at village Balarpet under Abhayapuri Police Station in the district of Bongaigaon. Her father Md. Inser Ali was residing at Bilmari village in the district of Chirang along with her mother Kamela. She admitted that though her name appeared in the voters list of 1989, she was marked as a doubtful (D) voter in 2005. She further stated that her father Inser Ali was still alive and was residing at village Bilmari under Bijni Police Station. 14. One Kabejuddin deposed as a witness in favour of the petitioner on 27.7.2015. He stated that petitioner was his younger sister. She was bom at village Panbari under Bijni Police Station in the district of Chirang and was residing at village Nisuka with her husband Taleb. He further stated that mother Kamela was still alive but father Inser Ali passed away 7 years ago. 15. Firstly, petitioner had neither stated in her written statement nor in her evidence that she had an elder brother by the name of Kabejuddin which makes his sudden appearance and deposition suspect. Be that as it may, from the evidence of Kabejuddin, it appears that petitioner was born at village Panbari under Bijni Police Station in the present district of Chirang whereas, according to the petitioner, she was bom and brought up at village Balarpet under Abhayapuri Police Station in the district of Bongaigaon. According to Kabejuddin, father Inser Ali had expired 7 years ago, i.e., in 2008 but, as per testimony of the petitioner, father Inser Ali was still alive. Thus, we find serious material contradictions at the thresh hold of the evidence. 16. According to Kabejuddin, father Inser Ali had expired 7 years ago, i.e., in 2008 but, as per testimony of the petitioner, father Inser Ali was still alive. Thus, we find serious material contradictions at the thresh hold of the evidence. 16. Mother Kamela Bibi deposed before the Tribunal as a witness of the petitioner. She supported the narration of the petitioner by saying that petitioner was bom and brought up at village Balarpet under Abhayapuri Police Station. However, to make matters worse, Inser Ali appeared before the Tribunal on 6.1.2014 and testified on behalf of the petitioner. He stated that petitioner was his daughter and she was bom at village-Balarpet under Abhayapuri Police Station. His name along with his wife was included in the voters list of 1966 and thereafter in 1997, 2010 and 2011. 17. Question is, when according to the son Kabejuddin, father Inser Ali had expired in 2008, it is not understood as to how the father Inser Ali could appear in person before the Tribunal to testify on 6.1.2014. On the face of such irreconcilable material discrepancies, the writ petition can be dismissed. However, we have still decided to examine the documents filed by the petitioner before the Tribunal to ensure that all aspects of the matter are duly considered by the court. 18. Petitioner filed as many as eight documents, which were marked as Exts.-A to G. We will take up Exts.-A to D first. Ext.-A is a translated copy of electoral roll for the year 1966 in respect of Abhayapuri Constituency. Here, the three voters were, viz, Monser Ali, son of Sahar Munshi, aged 32 years; Amiran Nessa, daughter of Sahar Munshi, aged 22 years; and Indar Ali, son of Sahar Munshi, aged 21 years. They were shown as residents of village Balarpet under North Salmara Police Station in the erstwhile district of Goalpara (in the present district of Bongaigaon). Likewise, Ext.-D is a translated copy of electoral roll of Abhayapuri Constituency for the year 1970. Here the two voters are Monser Ali, son of Sahar Munshi, aged 36 years; and Amiran Nessa, daughter of Sahar Munshi, aged 26 years and that name of Indar Ali is conspicuous by his absence. Exts.-A and D are translated copies of electoral rolls of 1966 and 1970. Question for consideration is whether a translated copy of electoral roll can be construed as an admissible piece of evidence? Exts.-A and D are translated copies of electoral rolls of 1966 and 1970. Question for consideration is whether a translated copy of electoral roll can be construed as an admissible piece of evidence? Further question is whether translated copy can be considered as a certified copy and, thus, an admissible piece of evidence. 19. Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition has defined certified copy to mean a copy of a document or record signed and certified as a true copy by the officer to whose custody the original is entrusted. Section 61 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (‘Evidence Act’) deals with proof of contents of documents. Contents of documents may be proved either by primary evidence or by secondary evidence. While primary evidence is explained in section 62; section 63 deals with secondary evidence. As per section 63, secondary evidence means and includes certified copies, copies made from the original by mechanical process ensuring accuracy of the copy and copies compared with the original; copies made from or compared with the original, etc. 20. Section 65 deals with cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given. It says that secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition or contents of a document in the cases mentioned therein from clauses (a) to (g). As per clause (e) thereof, secondary evidence may be given when the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74. 21. Section 74 explains as to what are public documents and section 76 deals with certified copies of public documents. As per section 76, every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees, therefore, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title and shall be sealed whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal. Such copy so certified shall be called certified copies. 22. Such copy so certified shall be called certified copies. 22. On a careful and conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Evidence Act together with the definition of certified copy, we are of the unhesitant view that a translated copy such as, Exts.-A and D cannot be construed as certified copies and, therefore, cannot be treated as secondary evidence. This position is further strengthened if we look at Exts.-A and D because there is no certification by the competent authority certifying that the extracts are true copies from the original. We may also observe that though certified copies are admissible as secondary evidence, it would be so only if those are issued by the competent authority. Admission of photostat copies, even if attested by Notary Public, is improper and inadmissible in evidence under section 63 of the Evidence Act. That apart, certified copies of documents (not to speak of photostat copies) not coming within the ambit of clause (a) or (e) of section 65 would not be admissible in evidence. That apart, as a general principle, secondary evidence is not admissible until non-production of primary evidence is satisfactorily accounted for. In addition, we may also refer to section 66 of the Evidence Act, as per which, secondary evidence of the contents of documents shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence had previously given to the party in whose possession or power the document is such notice to produce it as is prescribed by law. In other words, a party desirous of adducing secondary evidence must not only satisfactorily explain non-production of primary evidence but also must give previous notice to the party who is in possession of the primary evidence and if despite such notice, the primary evidence is not produced before the Tribunal by the custodian of the primary evidence, in such a situation, Tribunal may invoke its power under order 4 of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 to issue summons to the custodian of the primary evidence and not as a matter of course. 23. Therefore, having regard to the discussions made above, there cannot be any iota of doubt that Exts.-A and D are inadmissible in evidence. Even then, we may make a brief note that the name which appeared in Exts.-A and D was Monser Ali, son of Sahar Munshi. 23. Therefore, having regard to the discussions made above, there cannot be any iota of doubt that Exts.-A and D are inadmissible in evidence. Even then, we may make a brief note that the name which appeared in Exts.-A and D was Monser Ali, son of Sahar Munshi. On the other hand, in Exts.-B and C, which are photostat copies of voters list extracts of 1997 and 2011, the name which appeared was Insar Ali, son of late Sahar (in Ext.-B) and Insar Ali, son of Sahar Uddin (Ext.-C), respectively. Insar Ali was shown as resident of Ballimari village under Bijni Police Station. 24. We have already noticed the evidence of Kabejuddin, as per which, Insar Ali had expired in 2008. If Insar Ali had expired in 2008, it is not understood as to how his name appeared in the voters list of 2011. That apart, in Exts.-A and D, i.e., voters lists of 1966 and 1970, the voter was Monser Ali, son of Sahar Munshi whereas, in 1997 and 2011, the voter was Insar Ali, son of late Sahar and Sahar Uddin. That apart, Monser Ali was a resident of village-Balarpet under North Salmara Police Station whereas, Insar Ali was a resident of village-Ballimari under Bijni Police Station. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that Monser Ali who appeared in Exts.-A and D was the same person as Insar Ali of Exts.-B and C. 25. Therefore, if we exclude the inadmissible evidence what is evident is that presence of Insar Ali is traceable only to 1997 and not before that. 26. Insar Ali had sworn an affidavit on 16.1.2013, which was marked as Ext.-6, stating that his actual name was Insar Ali, son of Sahar Ali, but in 1966 voters list, his name was wrongly recorded as Indar Ali, son of Sahar Munshi. Insar Ali, son of Sahar Ali and Indar Ali, son of Sahar Munshi was one and the same person. Firstly, according to Kabejuddin, Insar Ali had expired in 2008;, therefore, it belies all comprehension as to how Insar Ali could swear an affidavit on 16.1.2013 explaining discrepancies in his name. That apart, this affidavit cannot be treated as a valid piece of evidence. Firstly, according to Kabejuddin, Insar Ali had expired in 2008;, therefore, it belies all comprehension as to how Insar Ali could swear an affidavit on 16.1.2013 explaining discrepancies in his name. That apart, this affidavit cannot be treated as a valid piece of evidence. Sections 1 and 3 of the Evidence Act, read with order 19, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 would make it abundantly clear that affidavit by a proceedee explaining discrepancies in name and age of self, father, etc., is not evidence. In Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan, (1988) 3 SCC 366 : AIR 1988 SC 1381 , Supreme Court has clarified the position by declaring that affidavit filed by a party suo motu and not under direction of court cannot be termed as evidence. Affidavit is not included as evidence unless law specifically permits. Therefore, Ext.-G is not an admissible evidence. 27. That brings us to Exts.-E and F, which are two certificates dated 3.5.2011, issued by the same authority, i.e., Gaonburah of Ballimari Revenue Village certifying that Isiron Nessa was the daughter of Insher Ali; that she had married Taleb Ali and that Kamela Bibi was the wife of Insar Ali. These two documents cannot be accepted as a valid piece of evidence because the author of the certificate did not testify before the Tribunal to prove his certificates as well the contents thereof, including the truthfulness of the same. That apart, contents of Ext.-E contradict the version of the petitioner herself. According to the petitioner, she was bom at village — Balarpet under North Salmara Police Station sometime in the year 1962; after almost 50 years, the Gaonburah of Ballimari Revenue Village certified that she was the daughter of Insher Ali of his village. That apart, even if we accept the contents of the certificate at its face value, it only leads us to Insar Ali whose presence in India is traceable only up-to 1997 and not beyond that. 28. Net result of the above discussion is that narration presented by the petitioner suffers from multiple material contradictions and omissions rendering the same wholly improbable. 28. Net result of the above discussion is that narration presented by the petitioner suffers from multiple material contradictions and omissions rendering the same wholly improbable. That apart, there is no cogent, reliable and admissible evidence to prove that petitioner was bom to Indian parents relatable to a period prior to 25.3.1971 which is the cut-off date for identification of foreigners in the State of Assam as per section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, as amended, and, therefore, she was a citizen of India. Thus, she had failed to discharge her burden under section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. Resultahtly, we do not find any good ground to entertain the writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed. 29. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated. 30. Registry to send down the LCR and inform the concerned Foreigners Tribunal, Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent of Police (Border) for necessary follow-up steps. 31. A copy of this order be furnished to learned standing counsel, Election Commission of India and State Co-ordinator, NRC.