JUDGMENT : Dipankar Datta, J. 1. Badal Biswas and his wife, Parul Biswas, along with their son, Basudeb Biswas (hereafter ‘the accused’ for short, wherever referred to collectively), faced trial before the relevant sessions judge for commission of offence punishable under sections 498A/304B/34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereafter ‘the IPC’ for short), alternatively under sections 302/34 of the IPC, following the death of Basudeb’s wife, Shila (hereafter ‘the victim’), in unnatural circumstances. Judgment was delivered by the sessions judge on September 9, 2015. It was held by him that Basudeb deserves the benefit of doubt and consequently, he was acquitted under section 235(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter ‘the Cr.P.C.’ for short). Insofar as Badal and Parul (hereafter ‘the parents-in-law’ for short, wherever referred to collectively) are concerned, they were held guilty of commission of offence punishable under sections 498A/302 of the IPC, and consequently sentenced on September 23, 2015. For the offence under section 498A of the IPC, the parents-in-law were sentenced to 2 (two) years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default to suffer 3 (three) months’ simple imprisonment, whereas for the graver offence under section 302 of the IPC, they were sentenced to imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default to suffer 6 (six) months’ simple imprisonment. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. Aggrieved thereby, Badal (hereafter ‘A-1’ for short) and Parul (hereafter ‘A-2’ for short) exercised their statutory right of appeal guaranteed by sub-section (2) of section 374 of the Cr.P.C. The appeal was heard by an Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court. Judgment, delivered on such appeal on January 25, 2017, revealed a difference of opinion between the learned judges comprising the Bench. The presiding judge of the Bench upheld the conviction of A-1 and A-2, while the conviction was upset by His Lordship’s companion judge. A reference was thus made under section 392 of the Cr.P.C. which having reached the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice, the appeal was laid before this Bench for delivering its opinion. 3. Mr. Das, learned advocate representing A-1 and A-2 and Ms. Chatterjee, learned advocate appearing for the respondent have been heard and the evidence, material for delivery of opinion, perused. 4. The victim suffered severe burn injuries on December 4, 2009. 3. Mr. Das, learned advocate representing A-1 and A-2 and Ms. Chatterjee, learned advocate appearing for the respondent have been heard and the evidence, material for delivery of opinion, perused. 4. The victim suffered severe burn injuries on December 4, 2009. She was admitted in the rural hospital at Jiaganj (hereafter ‘the rural hospital’ for short), but was later shifted to the Sub-divisional Hospital at Lalbagh (hereafter ‘the sub-divisional hospital’ for short). There, on December 5, 2009, a doctor (PW-20) in the presence of a staff nurse (PW-21) recorded the victim’s statement in the bed head ticket (Ext.9). The victim implicated the accused as the persons who set her on fire by pouring kerosene on her. Surprisingly, no First Information Report for commission of cognisable offence was registered till December 13, 2009, when the victim’s father (PW1) lodged a written complaint with Jiaganj Police Station giving rise to Jiaganj Police Station FIR No.193/2009 dated December 13, 2009 under sections 498A/326/307 of the IPC (Ext.1). It was, inter alia, alleged in the complaint that within a few months of the victim’s marriage with Basudeb dowry demands of the accused not having been met, they started torturing the victim and ultimately, she was set on fire. It was also alleged that after the victim was set on fire by the accused, Nibha Rani Biswas (PW–5) and Buro Biswas (not examined) had taken the victim to the rural hospital. Investigation of the FIR followed at the instance of a police officer (PW–24). He recorded the victim’s statement under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. at the sub-divisional hospital (Ext.15), without mentioning the exact time. It is revealed that the victim had exonerated Basudeb but implicated her parents-in-law. On December 13 itself, at about 19.00 hours, another doctor (PW–17), in the presence of another staff nurse (PW–19), recorded the victim’s statement (Ext.11). The statement, recorded in vernacular by PW17, bore the victim’s thumb impression as well as the signatures of PWs 17 and 19. Although it is not too clear as to which statement was recorded earlier, the accusation made by the victim recorded in Ext.11 was entirely consistent with Ext.15. Despite treatment at the sub-divisional hospital, the condition of the victim worsened and PW-1 and his relatives were advised to shift the victim to Kolkata. The advice was not heeded and the victim, unfortunately, passed away at the sub-divisional hospital on December 17, 2009. Despite treatment at the sub-divisional hospital, the condition of the victim worsened and PW-1 and his relatives were advised to shift the victim to Kolkata. The advice was not heeded and the victim, unfortunately, passed away at the sub-divisional hospital on December 17, 2009. 5. There were 3 (three) statements of the victim on record before the sessions judge, the first recorded in Ext. 9 on December 5, 2009 by PW–20 and the other two recorded on December 13, 2009 (Ext.11 by PW-17 and Ext.15 by PW–24). Ext. 15, being the victim’s statement recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C., does not appear to have weighed in the mind of the sessions judge. It was further noted that Ext.9 records the “history of assault” and such statement was not recorded after complying with the formalities, i.e., in the active voice of the victim, thereby not representing a verbatim reproduction of what the victim had said. Ext.11 was the statement of the victim, which the sessions judge found had been recorded by PW–17 upon complying with the formalities “making a note in verbatim according to the patient’s active voice”. The statement (Ext.11), sparing Basudeb and implicating A-1 and A-2, was relied on as credit-worthy by the sessions judge bearing in mind the evidence of PW–1 and the other witnesses [PWs 4, 13, 14 and 16 (relatives of the victim)]. The sessions judge was also of the opinion that the statement (Ext.11) did not suffer from any infirmity, like tutoring or that it was recorded at a time when the victim was not in a physical condition to speak. The claim of the defence that the victim’s physical condition had not been certified by PW–17 to be such that she could have given a statement, was not accepted by the sessions judge and Ext.11 was regarded as the dying declaration of the victim, which could be relied on in the proceedings before him. Conviction of A-1 and A-2, thus, followed. 6. The learned judge who ruled in favour of A-1 and A-2 and ordered setting aside of the conviction and the sentence found too many loopholes in the prosecution case to sustain the impugned judgment and order. His Lordship, inter alia, took note of PW-1 not supporting the FIR case, and disbelieved the dying declaration (Ext.11) of the victim. 6. The learned judge who ruled in favour of A-1 and A-2 and ordered setting aside of the conviction and the sentence found too many loopholes in the prosecution case to sustain the impugned judgment and order. His Lordship, inter alia, took note of PW-1 not supporting the FIR case, and disbelieved the dying declaration (Ext.11) of the victim. His Lordship was of the further view that the investigating officer (PW-24) was remiss in investigating the FIR in that he neither indicated whether the window through which A-1 and A-2 allegedly fled had iron grills or bamboo sticks fitted to it nor took measurement of such window. Had the particulars been shown in the sketch map (Ext.13) and if such measurement were taken, whether it was big enough for an old lady to escape could have been examined. The contradictions in the oral evidence of the prosecution witnesses coupled with the varying versions of the victim in the multiple dying declarations led His Lordship to hold that the prosecution had failed to drive home the guilt of A-1 and A-2. 7. The learned judge who upheld the conviction was, however, of the view that evidence is not read or appreciated by spotting the i’s that have not been dotted or the t’s that may not have been crossed. His Lordship found the dying declaration of the victim (Ext.11) to be believable and the evidence of the non-interested witnesses (PWs 17, 19, 20, 21 and 24) to be vital in coming to a conclusion regarding the guilt of A-1 and A-2. It was also opined that the discrepancies in the evidence were not so glaring to extend to A-1 and A-2 any benefit of doubt. 8. The difference of opinion between two learned judges comprising the Hon’ble Division Bench who had the occasion to appreciate, evaluate and analyse the evidence (oral and documentary) that were led at the trial having arisen, the situation as of necessity makes it imperative for this Bench to conduct a thorough scan of such evidence. It has also to be borne in mind that two learned judges having differed in their opinion based on the same set of evidence, an initial doubt is obviously created in regard to the worth of the prosecution case. It has also to be borne in mind that two learned judges having differed in their opinion based on the same set of evidence, an initial doubt is obviously created in regard to the worth of the prosecution case. For this reason, it is all the more necessary that while deciding a matter of the present nature more than the usual degree of care and caution is exercised. This Bench, therefore, has taken its time to peruse the evidence in some detail and proposes to record its own conclusions on its appreciation, evaluation and analysis of the evidence as under. 9. The victim’s version recorded in Ext.11, inter alia, reveals that A-1 and A-2 had poured kerosene on her, set her on fire and fled through a window in her room. Having been set on fire, the victim somehow managed to open the door and step out of the room. Her shouts attracted the neighbouring people who tried to douse the flame by pouring water. On the day of the incident, Basudeb was away from home for work. A-1 and A-2 having fled away, did not turn up at the hospital but Basudeb turned up each day and wept having seen the victim in such condition. 10. The English translation of the statement (Ext.11) revealed that A-1 and A-2 with “common intention” set the victim on fire. At the outset, user of the expression “common intention” in the 2nd line of the 2nd paragraph of the statement (Ext.11) appeared to this Bench to be inapt and was sufficient to create a doubt. The meaning of “common intention” in Bengali is ‘somo uddeshya’. Sensing that these words may not have been spoken to by the victim, who was a village lady, her version as recorded by the doctor (PW-17) in Bengali was read. Having read the original version and the translated version, a serious discrepancy was noted in respect of user of the expression ‘common intention’. What the victim did say was that A-1 and A-2, in consultation with each other (‘paramorsho kore’, in Bengali), had set her on fire. The expression “common intention” has a definite connotation under the IPC and, therefore, the translator would have been well advised to avoid such expression in the translated version of the contents in Ext.11. 11. What the victim did say was that A-1 and A-2, in consultation with each other (‘paramorsho kore’, in Bengali), had set her on fire. The expression “common intention” has a definite connotation under the IPC and, therefore, the translator would have been well advised to avoid such expression in the translated version of the contents in Ext.11. 11. Be that as it may, the turn of events may now be noticed with the conclusions that can be drawn from the circumstances which surfaced. 12. The exact time of the victim being set on fire by A-1 and A-2 is not available from Ext.11. It, however, appears from the injury reports (Ext.s 16 and 16/1) prepared at the rural hospital that the victim was admitted at 10.00 hours with severe burns (80%). Ext. 16/1 also records that she was brought by Niva (PW-5) and Baby Halder (PW-16), who happened to be the victim’s neighbour and cousin, respectively. It further appears from the bed head ticket generated at the sub-divisional hospital (Ext.9) that the victim was admitted around 11.35 hours. The victim was brought by her father (PW-1) and had suffered serious burn injuries (90%). The FIR reveals PW-1 having received a phone call at or about 09.00 hours of the fateful day that the victim had been set on fire by the accused. This part of the version of PW-1 has not been contradicted and it stands to reason that the victim was set on fire at least prior to 09.00 hours. 13. The victim’s father (PW-1), in the written complaint giving rise to the FIR, also alleged that the accused had set the victim on fire “with a view to kill her” and that the victim was taken to the rural hospital by the neighbours, namely, Niva and Buro. PW-1’s version that police had been informed earlier finds corroboration from Ext.16. It (Ext.16) bears a writing that the “police of Jiaganj PS is informed” and that the victim was referred to “Lalbagh SD hospital”. Why the police of Jiaganj Police Station did not immediately register an FIR is a mystery but that by itself would not be sufficient to hold that elements of criminal liability were absent from the very beginning. Contra-contention that was raised on behalf of A-1 and A-2 by Mr. Why the police of Jiaganj Police Station did not immediately register an FIR is a mystery but that by itself would not be sufficient to hold that elements of criminal liability were absent from the very beginning. Contra-contention that was raised on behalf of A-1 and A-2 by Mr. Das that the police had been informed for the first time on December 13, 2009, therefore, cannot be accepted. The laxity of the officers attached to Jiaganj PS to register a case suo motu calls for condemnation, but cannot be regarded as a factor to come to the aid of A-1 and A-2. 14. Baby (PW-16) deposed that Niva (PW-5) having brought the victim to the house of Baby at about 09.30 hours in a van, Niva told Baby that there was quarrel between the victim and her in-laws in the night in which the victim received burn injuries; that, the victim told Baby that A-2 set the victim on fire; that Niva could not say what actually happened in the house but she (Niva) put off the fire and brought the victim at Baby’s house. Baby had thereafter taken the victim to the rural hospital, whereafter she was shifted to the sub-divisional hospital. In cross-examination the only circumstance of relevance that surfaced was that the victim never told her (Baby) that Basudeb used to assault her (the victim) but she shared that there were hot altercations between them on several occasions. 15. Niva (PW-5), in course of trial, did not support the prosecution case of taking the victim to the rural hospital. Having deposed of not being aware of the place where the victim got burnt, she was declared hostile by the prosecution. She denied having stated before the investigating officer (PW24) that on the date of the incident she rushed to the place of occurrence, and that having heard the hue and cry and found the victim burning, she tried to save her or that she shifted her to the rural hospital. 16. The versions of Niva (PW-5) and Baby (PW-16) are not consistent; in fact, they are contradictory. Thus, the question is who between the two should be believed. 17. The testimony of Baby (PW-16) cannot be discarded only because she happens to be the cousin of the victim. 16. The versions of Niva (PW-5) and Baby (PW-16) are not consistent; in fact, they are contradictory. Thus, the question is who between the two should be believed. 17. The testimony of Baby (PW-16) cannot be discarded only because she happens to be the cousin of the victim. Baby’s version that Niva (PW-5) doused the flame on the person of the victim, brought the victim to Baby’s house whereafter she took her to the rural hospital cannot be disbelieved either, having regard to what has been recorded in Ext.16/1 regarding the identity of the persons who had brought the victim at the hospital. Ext.16/1 clearly mentions Niva and Baby having brought the victim at the hospital. 18. Goutam Halder (PW-7), husband of Baby (PW-16) deposed that at about 11.00 hours of the day of the incident, A-2 had put fire on the victim aftersprinkling kerosene and subsequently the victim’s neighbour Niva (PW-5) took the victim to hospital. PW-7 was a witness to the seizure of the marriage invitation card of the victim. He had met the victim in the hospital and she was able to converse with him. Although the time as mentioned by Goutam (PW-7) does not match with the official records as well as the circumstances that have emerged, his version that Niva had taken the victim to the hospital was never dislodged by the defence in course of cross-examination. It is, therefore, clear that Niva did take the victim to the hospital. 19. More importantly, as noticed above, it is borne out by the official record (Ext.16/1) that Niva (PW-5) along with Baby (PW-16) had taken the victim to the rural hospital. It was one of the first two documents generated after the alleged incident. Niva herself stated that she had arrived at the Court premises to depose along with the accused persons who were all known to her as co-villagers. Having regard to the version of Niva, a clear attempt on her part is discernible to save the accused. Ext.16/1 had been written by Dr. A. Haldar, Block Medical Officer of Health. The said doctor did not depose at the trial. Ext.16/1 was, however, admitted into evidence without any objection from the side of the defence. Little did Niva realise that her name transpires in Ext.16/1. The injury reports (Ext.s 16 and 16/1) were proved by the investigating officer (PW-24). A. Haldar, Block Medical Officer of Health. The said doctor did not depose at the trial. Ext.16/1 was, however, admitted into evidence without any objection from the side of the defence. Little did Niva realise that her name transpires in Ext.16/1. The injury reports (Ext.s 16 and 16/1) were proved by the investigating officer (PW-24). The defence did not make any attempt to establish that the name of Niva was wrongly entered in Ext. 16/1. Recording of the name of Niva in Ext.16/1 as one of two who brought the victim to the hospital belies her version in Court. The conclusion is irresistible that Niva (PW-5) was won over. Her evidence does not inspire confidence and cannot be relied on to acquit A-1 and A-2. 20. Baby (PW-16) also deposed having been told by the victim that her mother-in-law (A-2) set her ablaze. There is no cross-examination by the defence suggesting that the victim did not tell Baby that the mother-in-law did so. This version of Baby in her examination-in-chief is, thus, uncontroverted. 21. Weighing the evidence of Baby (PW-16) in the light of the aforesaid surrounding circumstances, this Bench holds it to be trustworthy. 22. It would now be appropriate to focus on the place of occurrence and the conduct of A-1 and A-2. 23. The evidence on record is clear as crystal that the victim suffered burn injury in her room in the matrimonial home. According to Ext.11, Basudeb was not at home when the victim was set on fire by A-1 and A-2 and they fled through the window. 24. As has been noted above, Ext.11 reveals the victim’s version that after A-1 and A-2 fled through the window of the room, she somehow managed to open the door, stepped out and shouted for help. Although not described clearly, the sketch map of the place of occurrence (Ext.13) drawn by the investigating officer (PW-24) suggests two windows in the room of the victim. The room was marked ‘A’. The two windows, though not separately marked with any alphabet, are shown on the two walls of the room with ‘x’ marks. PW-24 in course of investigation had engaged Koushik Karmakar (PW-8), a photographer, to click photographs of the victim’s room (place of occurrence). The photographs (Ext.5) were admitted into evidence without objection. The room was marked ‘A’. The two windows, though not separately marked with any alphabet, are shown on the two walls of the room with ‘x’ marks. PW-24 in course of investigation had engaged Koushik Karmakar (PW-8), a photographer, to click photographs of the victim’s room (place of occurrence). The photographs (Ext.5) were admitted into evidence without objection. Two of the three photographs clicked by the photographer clearly indicate the existence of a window by the side of a cot on the wall. One of the photographs clearly shows the existence of window of such size, which would make it reasonably possible for a human being to pass through it provided no obstruction is created by grill or iron rods. Since the window was closed when the photographs were taken, whether it is fitted with grills or anything else cannot be seen. However, considering the fact that the place of occurrence was part of a village house where windows are seldom fitted with grills or iron rods and they are mostly obstruction-free windows, it can well be presumed that the windows in the victim’s room were not fitted with grills or iron rods and were obstruction-free. In any event, no worthy effort was made from the side of the defence to prove that there was either no window in the victim’s room or that, even if such a window did exist, no one could have fled through such window. The version of the victim that A-1 and A-2 fled through the window, recorded in Ext.11, finds corroboration from the statement of Madhabi Halder (PW-18), elder sister of the victim. Although the version in course of examination-in-chief that A-2 fled through a window was objected to by the defence, there was no attempt made in course of cross-examination of Madhabi to discredit her. In fact, even no suggestion was given to her in course of cross-examination that A-2 did not flee through the window or could not have done so. 25. It would further appear from the seizure list (Ext.2) that the investigating officer (PW-24) on December 13, 2009 had seized from the place of occurrence a black coloured old plastic jerrycan (Mat. Ext.1). It smelt of kerosene. The seizure list was also admitted into evidence without objection. 25. It would further appear from the seizure list (Ext.2) that the investigating officer (PW-24) on December 13, 2009 had seized from the place of occurrence a black coloured old plastic jerrycan (Mat. Ext.1). It smelt of kerosene. The seizure list was also admitted into evidence without objection. How and in what circumstances Mat Ext.1, smelling of kerosene, could find its way into the room of the victim is not explained by the defence. This is another circumstance that cannot be brushed aside. 26. Next, in course of examination under section 313, Cr.P.C., A-1 and A-2 denied their presence at the place of occurrence. They had also not been to the sub-divisional hospital to inquire about the victim’s health. In fact, it appears from the materials in the lower court records that the application for anticipatory bail of A-1 was rejected by the Bench presided over by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of this Court as late as on August 18, 2010. The date of surrender of A-2 is almost a couple of months after the incident. The question that would obviously arise in the circumstances is, where A-1 and A-2 were at the material point of time, and also months after the incident. A1 and A-2 having set up an alibi that they were not present in their residence when the victim caught fire (assuming that she was not set on fire by A-1 and A-2), it was for them to prove where they were at the time of occurrence. Neither they nor any other witness deposed of absence of A-1 and A-2 at the place of occurrence. In terms of section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereafter ‘the Evidence Act’ for short), the respective location of A-1 and A-2 was within their special knowledge. A-1 and A-2 having specifically set up a plea of absence at the place of occurrence which, if proved, could have absolved them from criminal liability, the burden of proof certainly lay upon them which they failed to discharge. 27. The victim’s brother-in-law (PW-4), aunt (PW-13), uncle (PW-14) and cousin (PW-16) were given common suggestions, which would indicate the trend of the defence version that they being relatives of the victim were interested witnesses and, thus, deposing falsely to extract conviction of the accused. 27. The victim’s brother-in-law (PW-4), aunt (PW-13), uncle (PW-14) and cousin (PW-16) were given common suggestions, which would indicate the trend of the defence version that they being relatives of the victim were interested witnesses and, thus, deposing falsely to extract conviction of the accused. Even if the evidence of these witnesses to the extent of implicating the accused are discarded from consideration, the evidence of the victim herself lying on the death bed, recorded by the doctor (PW-17) in the presence of the staff nurse (PW-19) is the sheet anchor of the prosecution case. Whenever death of an individual is caused due to severe burn injuries, it is difficult to opine whether the death is suicidal, accidental or homicidal. It has not been the defence version that because of an accident the victim caught fire. It was also not the defence case that the victim attempted to commit suicide and suffered burn injuries as a result thereof. What remains is the possibility of a homicidal death. The question is, whether the evidence was sufficient for returning a finding in that regard. A dying person would not lie, is the common perception. Judged from that angle, there is no reason to disbelieve whatever has been recorded in Ext.11. The cross-examination of the doctor (PW-17) and the staff nurse (PW-19) does not reveal the defence putting its relevant and essential case to PW-17 and PW-19 that because of the incident of burn injuries suffered by her, the victim was not in a position to speak or that there was no voluntary disclosure of the facts preceding such burn injuries. Merely because the relatives of the victim had access to her while she was admitted at the sub-divisional hospital, does not lend credence to the argument that they must have tutored the victim to implicate A-1 and A-2. If indeed the victim was tutored, it begs the question as to why Basudeb was spared by her. 28. It is now a well-settled principle of law that a judgment of conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone, subject of course to the satisfaction of the Court that the same was true and voluntary. For the purpose of ascertaining truth or voluntariness of the dying declaration, the Court may look to the other circumstances. 29. For the purpose of ascertaining truth or voluntariness of the dying declaration, the Court may look to the other circumstances. 29. A-1 and A-2 did not offer any explanation as to how the victim caught fire in the privacy of their residence. It was contended that they were entitled to maintain silence. Although such silence may not be sufficient to conclusively hold that they are guilty of commission of the offence of the murder of the victim, but the legal position that the same could be considered to be a circumstance against them is not in dispute. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohd. Omar : (2000) 8 SCC 382 and Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharshtra : (2006) 10 SCC 681 . 30. In the former decision, the Court held as follows: “31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof on the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing therefore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in relation to the facts of the case.” 31. The observations extracted above were quoted with approval in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan (supra). Relevant passages from the said decision read as under: “12. In the case in hand there is no eyewitness of the occurrence and the case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence. The normal principle in a case based on circumstantial evidence is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; that those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; that the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with their innocence. 13. The demand for dowry or money from the parents of the bride has shown a phenomenal increase in the last few years. Cases are frequently coming before the courts, where the husband or in-laws have gone to the extent of killing the bride if the demand is not met. These crimes are generally committed in complete secrecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in court as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonise a neighbourhood family. No member of the family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come forward to depose against another family member. The neighbours, whose evidence may be of some assistance, are generally reluctant to depose in court as they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonise a neighbourhood family. The parents or other family members of the bride being away from the scene of commission of crime are not in a position to give direct evidence which may inculpate the real accused except regarding the demand of money or dowry and harassment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean that a crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should go unpunished. 14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. …. The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 15. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. ***** 21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. *****” 32. A-1 and A-2 not having explained how the victim caught fire in the privacy of their residence, where they were at the time of the incident and even thereafter, and why they had not been to the sub-divisional hospital to enquire about their daughter-in-law’s heath which would have been the normal reaction in the circumstances, assuming that they were in no way to be blamed for any criminal act leading to her death, are strong circumstances appearing in the evidence pointing that they are responsible for commission of the crime. 33. It is now time to reflect upon the circumstances that seem to be favourable to A-1 and A-2. 34. 33. It is now time to reflect upon the circumstances that seem to be favourable to A-1 and A-2. 34. It is indeed true that the version of the victim’s father (PW-1) in cross-examination completely demolishes the allegation of torture inflicted upon the victim by the accused, as levelled in the FIR. This mitigating circumstance would tend to tilt the scales a bit in favour of A-1 and A-2. 35. Attention of this Bench has been drawn by Mr. Das to the deposition of Bidyut Biswas (PW-3). According to this witness, on the date of the incident at about 10.30 hours he heard a hue and cry and rushed to the place of occurrence to find the victim burning. He admits having doused/extinguished the fire on the victim and shifted the victim to the hospital. His name is not recorded in Ext. 16/1 as one of those who brought the victim to the hospital. He was a witness to the seizure of Mat Ext.1. It was only upon his statement that he did not hear anything as to why or how the victim “got died in that fire” that he was declared hostile. He denied the suggestion of the prosecution that the victim while being on her way to the hospital told him that the accused had “put fire on her person by spraying kerosene”. 36. Sanat Sarkar (PW-11) was also a neighbour of the appellants and the victim. He could not say why the victim “preferred to die in that way”. In cross-examination, he was not declared hostile and in cross-examination he deposed that he knew nothing about any incident which took place between the spouses before the death of the victim since the victim never shared any story of torture with him during her lifetime. 37. This being the evidence, for and against the prosecution case, the evidence has to be weighed and not counted as statutorily recognised in section 134 of the Evidence Act. Law is well-settled that a conviction could be maintained even on the evidence of a single witness if his evidence has a ring of truth and is found to be cogent, credible, consistent and inspires confidence. The emphasis has to be on the quality of evidence, which ultimately counts, and not the quantity or plurality of witnesses. Law is well-settled that a conviction could be maintained even on the evidence of a single witness if his evidence has a ring of truth and is found to be cogent, credible, consistent and inspires confidence. The emphasis has to be on the quality of evidence, which ultimately counts, and not the quantity or plurality of witnesses. It is also settled law that evidence of interested partisan witnesses has to be carefully assessed and cannot be discarded mechanically. The conclusion that would follow must necessarily be the only possible conclusion admitting of no other possibility. 38. In a tradition and custom bound Indian society, a conservative woman would be loath to disclose before her father the discords that she may have developed in her marital life. Merely because the father (PW-1) did not allege that the victim was subjected to torture or harassment in her matrimonial home, and on the contrary had deposed that she did not have any grievance against her in-laws, is not sufficient to prove absence of torture or harassment. The said circumstance has to be weighed with the other evidence on record, mainly the evidence of the cousin (PW-16) in cross-examination that the victim had hot altercations on several occasions and denial of the suggestion that the accused never inflicted any sort of torture upon the victim. 39. The law relating to dying declarations and the extent to which the same may be relied upon has been laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in its decision in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra : (2002) 6 SCC 710 . The Bench was constituted to resolve the so-called conflict noticed in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh : (1999) 7 SCC 695 and Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat : (1999) 9 SCC 562 . The Bench laid down the law in paragraph 3, reading as follows: “3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” Also, considering other decisions of the Supreme Court, the Bench held the decision in Paparambaka Rosamma (supra) to have not been correctly decided and the law laid down in Koli Chunilal Savji (supra) was affirmed. 40. There is evidence on record (Ext.s 14 and 14/1) that requests were made to the Sub-divisional Officer, Lalbagh Sub-Division and the Superintendent of the sub-divisional hospital by the investigating officer (PW-24) and the Officer-in-Charge, Jiaganj Police Station, respectively, for recording of the dying declaration of the victim. The doctor (PW-17) who recorded the statement of the victim in her voice mentioned that such exercise had been undertaken upon a request of the sub-divisional officer. The cloud sought to be created on behalf of A-1 and A-2 in regard to the necessity for recording multiple dying declarations, thus, stands dispelled. 41. Mr. Das emphatically argued that the victim was not kept in seclusion and her relatives had access to her, and she was tutored by such relatives to implicate her in-laws. 42. The cloud sought to be created on behalf of A-1 and A-2 in regard to the necessity for recording multiple dying declarations, thus, stands dispelled. 41. Mr. Das emphatically argued that the victim was not kept in seclusion and her relatives had access to her, and she was tutored by such relatives to implicate her in-laws. 42. Whether the victim could have been tutored has to be ascertained from the facts and circumstances of the case. Merely because the victim’s relatives had access to her, is by itself no reason to hold that the victim gave a tutored statement. Having regard to the circumstances appearing in the evidence, this Bench has no hesitation to hold that the version of the victim recorded in Ext.11 is not tutored. 43. In view of the dictum in paragraph 3 of the decision in Laxman (supra), this Bench further has no doubt in its mind that the circumstances under which the statement of the victim was recorded were not such that Ext.11 ought to be discarded as unreliable. The doctor and the nurse (PWs 17 and 19 respectively) would not have been witness to recording of the dying declaration of the victim, if she were not in a position to speak. PW-15 was the doctor who conducted post mortem on the cadaver of the victim and prepared the examination report (Ext.8). The condition of the trachea was not mentioned therein. Absolutely no attempt was made on the part of the defence to extract any evidence from PW-15 about the condition of the trachea, which would have thrown light on the physical condition of the victim as to whether she was at all in a position to speak or not after suffering the burn injuries in question. That apart, no suggestion was given to PW-17 that what he recorded was a tutored version. The dying declaration of the victim recorded by PW-17 is, thus, otherwise substantiated by reliable evidence. Minor discrepancies, i.e., the victim did not say in the initial statement (Ext.9) that A-2 escaped through the window or that she stated that Basudeb was also guilty, do not create any dent in the prosecution case. It has to be remembered that PW-17 was the fittest person to comment on the physical condition of the victim and also that neither PW-17 nor PW19 had any axe to grind against A-1 and A-2. It has to be remembered that PW-17 was the fittest person to comment on the physical condition of the victim and also that neither PW-17 nor PW19 had any axe to grind against A-1 and A-2. In the absence of circumstances showing anything to the contrary, the version of PW-17 should be believed. Also, there is no justification to hold that the victim left the mortal world with a lie in her mouth. Taking an overall view of the matter, more particularly the confidence that Ext.11 inspires, the conclusion seems to be inescapable that the prosecution was successful in establishing the charge under section 302 against A-1 and A-2. 44. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shaikh Bakshu v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 11 SCC 269 was relied upon by Mr. Das to urge that the dying declaration (Ext.11) not having been read over and explained to the victim, the same could not have been acted upon. Paragraph 8 of the cited decision reveals that the trial court and the High Court concluded that even though it was not stated in the dying declaration that the contents were read over and explained to the deceased, it has to be presumed that it was read over and explained. This view of the High Court was held by the Supreme Court to be clearly unacceptable. 45. This Bench is not inclined to the view that mere omission to record in the dying declaration (Ext.11) that the contents were read over and explained to the victim would render such dying declaration vulnerable. No suggestion was given to PWs 17 and 19 that the victim’s left thumb impression was obtained on Ext.11 without she being in a position to know the contents of what had been recorded. 46. For the reasons discussed in paragraph 8 of the decision in Shaikh Bakshu (supra), the Court considered the dying declaration to be unreliable. The circumstances discussed above being completely different, the said decision has no application here. 47. The other decisions cited by Mr. Das on admissibility of a dying declaration and the evidentiary value thereof, viz. 46. For the reasons discussed in paragraph 8 of the decision in Shaikh Bakshu (supra), the Court considered the dying declaration to be unreliable. The circumstances discussed above being completely different, the said decision has no application here. 47. The other decisions cited by Mr. Das on admissibility of a dying declaration and the evidentiary value thereof, viz. P. Mani v. State of Tamilnadu : AIR 2006 SC 1319 , Kanti Lal v. State of Rajasthan : AIR 2009 SC 2703 , Shudhakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh : AIR 2012 SC 3265 , and Ramakant Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh : (2015) 8 SCC 299 as well as the decision on admissibility of the evidence of a hostile witness, viz. Raja v. State of Karnataka : AIR 2016 SC 4930 , have been duly considered. The law laid down therein does not admit of any doubt but having regard to the conclusions reached by this Bench on the basis of its reasoning as above, such cited decisions do not come to the aid of A-1 and A-2. 48. A point of flawed investigation has been urged and reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in : Mahavir Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh : (2016) 10 SCC 220 . Indeed, a faulty investigation could prove fatal for the prosecution case; nevertheless, despite the faults and/or omissions on the part of the police to properly, effectively and meaningfully investigate the FIR as referred to by Mr. Das, there has been no difficulty in separating the grain from the chaff and in dredging the truth from the pandemonium of statements. It is, however, true that the FIR was belatedly registered but it is not the law that on such ground only a conviction has to be overruled. Ext.16 is the first document revealing intimation being given to the police immediately after the victim was brought to the rural hospital. The plea of false implication sought to be raised by Mr. Das does not, therefore, stand judicial scrutiny. 49. The final contention of Mr. Das may now be considered. Ext.16 is the first document revealing intimation being given to the police immediately after the victim was brought to the rural hospital. The plea of false implication sought to be raised by Mr. Das does not, therefore, stand judicial scrutiny. 49. The final contention of Mr. Das may now be considered. According to him, there is absolutely no evidence of cruelty that A-1 and A-2 had inflicted on the victim or that there was any demand for dowry and, therefore, the conviction under section 498A of the IPC cannot be sustained in view of the law laid down in the decision in Hazarilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh : (2009) 13 SCC 783 . There is evidence in the record that the in-laws of the victim used to quarrel with her over the issue of domestic household work and that their relationship were anything but cordial. A married woman set on fire within a short period of her marriage in her matrimonial home by her in-laws is sufficient to draw a conclusion in regard to the offence punishable under section 498A of the IPC. This is not a case within the category of “could have been”, but a case falling within the category of “has been”, as explained in the said decision. The contention is, therefore, untenable. 50. This Bench is of the view that a ghastly crime of this nature ought not to go unpunished. To quote Hon’ble V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. (as His Lordship then was), “law must keep its promise to justice”; therefore, it would be justice to the victim if those found guilty are suitably punished for not abiding by and respecting the law. 51. The conviction recorded by the sessions judge is upheld and the appeal preferred by A-1 and A-2 against such conviction is ordered to stand dismissed.