JUDGMENT : AKHIL KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J. In the instant appeal, challenge has been made to the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 20-2-2008 passed by 3rd Additional Sessions Judge Shahdol in Sessions Trial No. 203/2006 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced under section 302 of Indian Penal Code to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000/-in default, to suffer further S. I. for 6 months. 2. The prosecution case is that deceased Aprajita was wife of appellant who got married with him in the year 2001. It is alleged that on account of occasional hot talks between the deceased and appellant over cooking food they started living separately from the other family members. On 17-12-2015 appellant asked Aprajita to go to the house of his elder brother Raghuwar Prasad to attend the sorrowful event, which she refused. On account of such refusal appellant strangulated her with a pillow, as a result of which she died. One Ramesh Prasad Mishra informed the police about the death of deceased which was recorded as merg intimation vide Exhibit P/14. The panchnama is said to have been prepared by the Naib Tahsildar. Dead body was sent for post-mortem. Dr. M. G. Rampuri (PW-1) has conducted the post-mortem and according to him he found tenderness over the right eye, right cheek, finger prints on both sides of the neck with tenderness on the back of the body of deceased. The cause of death was shown due to asphyxia. The post-mortem report is Exhibit P/2. After getting the information about the death of deceased, police has registered the offence under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and after investigation, charge-sheet was filed before the Court of JMFC who committed the case before the Sessions Judge, Damoh. 3. The trial Court, during the trial has framed charges for commission of offence under section 302 of Indian Penal Code against the accused person. He abjured the guilt. As many as 14 prosecution witnesses were examined by the prosecution. After completion of the trial, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant for commission of offence and sentenced him as mentioned above. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that trial Court has committed illegality in recording and convicting the appellant as the evidence was not marshaled properly. As many as 14 prosecution witnesses were examined by the prosecution. After completion of the trial, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant for commission of offence and sentenced him as mentioned above. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that trial Court has committed illegality in recording and convicting the appellant as the evidence was not marshaled properly. The post-mortem report initially did not disclose cause of death and later on the cause of death was shown due to asphyxia. The witnesses were recorded at a very late stage for which no reasonable explanation was given. The prosecution witnesses namely Smt. Kunti Devi (PW-11) mother of deceased, Vinaychand Mishra (PW-12) brother-in-law of deceased have not supported the prosecution case. It is further submitted that there is no direct evidence against the appellant for convicting the appellant and the trial Court was influenced to convict the appellant only on the basis of accused memorandum recorded under section 27 of the Evidence Act. Under such circumstances, he prays for setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant. 5. Learned counsel for the State supported the order of conviction and sentence and said that the conviction and sentence is proper. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the record, we find that the whole case is based on circumstantial evidence. The most important circumstance is that deceased was seen in the company of the accused prior to her death. There is no evidence that in between the incident someone else was there where deceased and her husband/accused were living together. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of Bodhraj Alias Bodha and others vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir reported in (2002) 8 SCC 45 held in para 31 as under :— “31. The last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible.” 7. It has come in the testimony of mother of deceased Smt. Kunti Devi (PW-11) in para 2 that 1-2 months prior to death of deceased, she started living separately from mother-in-law and brother-in-law (Devar). It has come in the testimony of mother of deceased Smt. Kunti Devi (PW-11) in para 2 that 1-2 months prior to death of deceased, she started living separately from mother-in-law and brother-in-law (Devar). In fact, this was suggested by the defence itself that both were living together separately from other family members. This fact was also asked to the accused during accused statement as question No. 36 that 1-2 months prior to the occurrence, the deceased was living with him separately from the other family member which was admitted by the appellant. Therefore, it is proved that deceased and accused were living together separately from the other family members. 8. Dinesh Prasad Tiwari (PW-13) has stated that on 16-12-2005 he went to village Bhundi and on the same day, he went to the house of accused situated in village Tala and stayed there in the house of accused in the night, and in the morning of fateful day, he had conversation with the deceased. The deceased made request to take her with him to maternal home and he accepted it. After this he went to take bath in river where he received the information that Aprajita (deceased) is no more. When he returned from river he saw that dead body of Aprajita was lying in the varandah. He tried to enquire about the incident regarding her death but none has informed about cause of death. Though this witness has been declared hostile by the prosecution but Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgment has held that even testimony of hostile witnesses can be relied upon if some other material particulars are available on record and corroborate the same. It is important here that defence has not challenged the above facts narrated by Dinesh Prasad Tiwari (PW-13) in his cross-examination. 9. It is true that Smt. Kunti Devi (PW-11) mother of deceased and Vinay Chandra Mishra (PW-12) brother-in-law of deceased have turned hostile. Regarding evidentiary value of hostile witnesses Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Radha Mohan Singh vs. State of U. P., (2006) 2 SCC 450 has observed as under — “7. …… It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. Regarding evidentiary value of hostile witnesses Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Radha Mohan Singh vs. State of U. P., (2006) 2 SCC 450 has observed as under — “7. …… It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.” 10. Smt. Kunti Devi (PW-11) after declaring hostile has admitted on being asked leading questions on the point of harassment to deceased that her husband Ramesh Mishra (PW-14) has talked with her daughter (deceased). She has also admitted suggestion that when her husband had a talk with her daughter (deceased) and just 2-3 days after that talk, her son-in-law/accused informed that her daughter is no more. Vinay Chandra Mishra (PW-12) has also admitted that due to quarrel with the deceased, his brother-in-law/accused has gone to Bombay for work. This fact is also accepted by PW-2 in para 2 of his statement that her sister has informed Shobha Singh residing at Dhanpuri on phone to tell her parents that they should come to take her away. This fact has also been admitted by this witness that his father has talked to accused on phone and has also tried to explain but just after 2 days of this talk, information was received on mobile phone that Aprajita (sister of this witness) has died. 11. The case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence. There is no eye witness to the occurrence. Death of deceased Aprajita, wife of accused was caused in his house. Dr. M. G. Rampuri (PW-11) has conducted the post-mortem of deceased and as per his opinion, the cause of death was due to asphyxia and mode of death was throttling/strangulation. Dr. M. G. Rampuri (PW-11) has also stated in his testimony that there were ante-mortem injuries over the right eye and right cheek and an impression of finger on both side of deceased’s neck. He has also stated that second number vertebra on neck was dislocated. Postmortem report Ex.P/2 read with the Query Report Ex.P/3 corroborate that fact of unnatural death of Aprajita. 12. He has also stated that second number vertebra on neck was dislocated. Postmortem report Ex.P/2 read with the Query Report Ex.P/3 corroborate that fact of unnatural death of Aprajita. 12. The dead body was found in the house of accused. The place of incident is house of appellant/accused so burden lies on the accused to explain how unnatural death of his wife in the house has occurred. In this connection, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs. Thakur Singh, reported in (2014)12 SCC 211 has held as under :— “16. Way back in Shambhu Nath Mehra vs. State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 this Court dealt with the interpretation of section 106 of the Evidence Act and held that the section is not intended to shift the burden of proof (in respect of a crime) on the accused but to take care of a situation where a fact is known only to the accused and it is well-nigh impossible or extremely difficult for the prosecution to prove that fact. It was said : “11. This [section 101] lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not.” 17. In a specific instance in Trimukh Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 10 SCC 681 this Court held that when the wife is injured in the dwelling home where the husband ordinarily resides, and the husband offers no explanation for the injuries to his wife, then the circumstances would indicate that the husband is responsible for the injuries. It was said : (SCC p.694, para 22) “22. It was said : (SCC p.694, para 22) “22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime.” 18. Reliance was placed by this Court on Ganeshlal vs. State of Maharashtra, (1992) 3 SCC 106 in which case the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife inside his house. Since the death had occurred in his custody, it was held that the appellant was under an obligation to give an explanation for the cause of death in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation was held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant was a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife.” 13. In the present case, though the death of Aprajita caused in the house of the appellant where both were residing together but appellant even in his statement under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has denied the prosecution case without giving any explanation how his wife/deceased died. Even no question by way of suggestion has been asked to the family members of deceased i.e. father Ramesh Mishra (PW-14), mother Smt. Kunti Devi (PW-11), brother Vinay Chandra Mishra (PW-12) and Dinesh Prasad Tiwari (PW-13). Appellant when asked in accused statement with regard adverse circumstance about cause of death of deceased, he replied either having no knowledge or it is not true without any explanation. 14. The evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly shows that the death of deceased Aprajita is homicidal in nature. Even it is also corroborated by the medical evidence. There is neither any evidence regarding suicidal death, not any suggestion from the defence. Prosecution has established that the death of deceased is homicidal and is caused by asphyxia due to strangulation. 14. The evidence adduced by the prosecution clearly shows that the death of deceased Aprajita is homicidal in nature. Even it is also corroborated by the medical evidence. There is neither any evidence regarding suicidal death, not any suggestion from the defence. Prosecution has established that the death of deceased is homicidal and is caused by asphyxia due to strangulation. Accused has not discharged his burden to explain the cause of death of his wife and neither shown any evidence that some third person entered into the house and caused death of deceased Aprajita. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of Dnyaneshwar vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 445 in para 10 held as under :— “10. It has not been disputed before us that the deceased was murdered in her matrimonial home. It is not the case of the appellant that the offence was committed by somebody else. It is also not his cause that there was a possibility of an outsider to commit the said offence. One of the circumstances which is relevant is that when the couple was last seen in a premises to which an outsider may not have any access. It is for the husband to explain the ground for unnatural death of his wife.” 15. Learned amicus curiae for the appellant has argued that witnesses were recorded at a very late stage for which no reasonable explanation was given. Sub Inspector G. P. Dwivedi (PW-8) has deposed that at that point of time he was posted as Officer In-charge of the police station and after receiving Inquiry report under section 174 of Criminal Procedure Code merg intimation No. 35/2005, he registered the FIR on the information of Smt. Kunti Devi (PW-11) on 19-5-2006 for the offence punishable under sections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code. G. P. Dwivedi, SI (PW-8) has explained about delay in recording the statement of witnesses. He has given the reason that statement was recorded after the merg inquiry under section 174 of Cr.P.C was completed and FIR was lodged. Therefore, the proper explanation has been given by the investigating officer SI, G. P. Dwivedi (PW-8) in this regard. Under such circumstances, we do not find it fatal to prosecution. 16. He has given the reason that statement was recorded after the merg inquiry under section 174 of Cr.P.C was completed and FIR was lodged. Therefore, the proper explanation has been given by the investigating officer SI, G. P. Dwivedi (PW-8) in this regard. Under such circumstances, we do not find it fatal to prosecution. 16. The Apex Court in the case of Yogesh Singh vs. Mahabeer Singh and others reported in (2017) 11 SCC 195 held as under :— “34. The learned counsel for the respondents has further sought to attack the testimony of this prosecution witness on the ground of delay in recording of her statement by the Investigating Officer. In support of this submission, learned counsel has relied upon the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. vs. Ashok Dixit and anr., (2000) 3 SCC 70 ; Vijaybhai Bhanabhai Patel vs. Navnitbhai Patel and ors., (2004) 10 SCC 583 ; Jagjit Singh @ Jagga vs. State of Punjab, (2005) 3 SCC 689 ]. However, we find that none of these cases help the case of the respondents since Vijaybhai Bhanabhai Patel vs. Navnitbhai Patel and ors., (2004) 10 SCC 583 , does not pertain to the case of a child witness and in State of U.P. vs. Ashok Dixit and anr., (2000) 3 SCC 70 , and Jagjit Singh @ Jagga vs. State of Punjab (supra), delay in recording of evidence was not per se held to be fatal to the prosecution case but the testimony of the child witness in each case was found to be incredible on account of material contradictions and lack of independent corroboration. We find that this is not the case here. In this context, we may note that the Trial Court has observed that PW5 was cross-examined on practically every detail of the prosecution story and her statement corroborated every part thereof. Moreover, the delay in recording of the statement of PW5 was not unexplained. It was rightly observed by the learned Trial Judge that the delay was on account of the fact that the Investigating Officer wanted to assure himself of the veracity of her statement and hence, she was examined after she had time to recover from the shock of the incident and compose herself. Under these circumstances, any delay in examining this witness under section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code will not prejudice the prosecution.” 17. Under these circumstances, any delay in examining this witness under section 161 of Criminal Procedure Code will not prejudice the prosecution.” 17. Learned amicus curiae for the appellant has also argued that there are contradictions and omissions in the statement of prosecution witnesses which cannot be relied upon and prosecution has utterly failed to prove the guilt of the appellant on such testimony of the prosecution witnesses. It is true that there are some contradictions and omissions in the statement of prosecution witnesses, who are near relatives of the deceased but those contradictions are not vital in nature and do not stuck to the base of prosecution case hence, such contradictions and omissions are not fatal to the prosecution. In this regard, the Apex Court in the case of Yogesh Singh (supra) in para 37 has held as under :— “37. Another reason for which the High Court disbelieved the prosecution story is the improvement made by PW2 in the story of beheading of the deceased. We find it difficult to agree with this conclusion of the High Court in the light of the judgment of this Court in Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525 , wherein it was observed : “It is indeed necessary to note that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain some exaggeration or embellishment – sometimes there could even be a deliberate attempt to offer embellishment and sometimes in their over anxiety they may give a slightly exaggerated account. The Court can sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Total repulsion of the evidence is unnecessary. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness. If this element is satisfied, it ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to accept the stated evidence though not however in the absence of the same.” 18. Learned amicus curiae for the appellant has argued that at the time of death of Aprajita the appellant was not in the house in which deceased Aprajita died, in fact, he was in his agricultural field. To some extent, appellant has taken plea of alibi. Regarding plea of alibi, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jayantibhai Bhenkarbhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 8 SCC 165 in para 19 held as under :— “19. To some extent, appellant has taken plea of alibi. Regarding plea of alibi, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jayantibhai Bhenkarbhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 8 SCC 165 in para 19 held as under :— “19. The plea of alibi flows from section 11 and is demonstrated by illustration (a). Sarkar on Evidence (Fifteenth Edition, p. 258) states the word ‘alibi’ is of Latin origin and means “elsewhere”. It is a convenient term used for the defence taken by an accused that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is highly improbable that he would have participated in the crime. Alibi is not an exception (a special or general) envisaged in the Indian Penal Code or any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognized in section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. The burden of proving commission of offence by the accused so as to fasten the liability of guilty on him remains on the prosecution and would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused had adopted the defence of alibi. The plead of alibi taken by the accused needs to be considered only when the burden which lies on the prosecution has been discharged satisfactorily.” So this fact that at the time of incident, appellant was in his agricultural field and it was rather impossible to commit the crime, at home by him is not established. In this regard, neither appellant has given any evidence to establish plea of alibi nor demonstrated through prosecution evidence. Hence, plea of alibi is also not sustainable. 19. It has come in the statement of deceased Aprajita’s father Ramesh Mishra (PW-14), brother Vinay Chandra Mishra (PW-12) that there was quarrel between the deceased and her husband/present appellant and that too was on the question of good food. Even this fact was suggested on behalf of appellant in the cross-examination of deceased’s father Ramesh Mishra (PW-14) and the same was admitted by him. Even this fact was suggested on behalf of appellant in the cross-examination of deceased’s father Ramesh Mishra (PW-14) and the same was admitted by him. On appreciation of evidence of Ramesh Mishra (PW-14), Vinay Chandra Mishra (PW-12) and Smt. Kunti Devi (PW-11), it appears that 2-3 days prior to death of deceased, some altercations/quarrel were held between the deceased and appellant and to ease out the same, father of deceased Ramesh Mishra (PW-14) has talked to appellant and his brother of appellant Kanhaiya Mishra. So this also depict that there was no good relations between the deceased and appellant. 20. In the case of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has followed the same principle held in the case of Shivaji Saheb Rao Bobde vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 that it is a primary principle-(1) that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilt. (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 21. Having considered the totality of the facts of the present case and the principles of law as above, we are left with no doubt that in the present case the prosecution has established beyond all reasonable doubt that it is the accused/appellant alone and nobody who had committed the offence. Hence, we are of the view that the conviction of the accused/appellant and the sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court is justified and needs no interference. 22. Hence, we are of the view that the conviction of the accused/appellant and the sentence imposed upon him by the learned trial Court is justified and needs no interference. 22. We therefore, in view of the above, do not find any merit in the instant appeal, hence, we dismiss the appeal and confirm the conviction of the appellant under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and the sentence of life imprisonment with fine imposed upon him by the trial Court. Appeal dismissed. Appeal dismissed.