JUDGMENT Shree Chandrashekhar, J. – With consent of the learned counsel for the parties both the writ petitions have been heard together and are disposed of by a common order. 2. Issue raised by the petitioner(s) is, whether the competent authority can order initiation of a departmental proceeding about 10 years after knowledge of the alleged misconduct? 3. Petitioner in W.P.(S) No.4903 of 2017 namely, Anand Prakash Singh was posted on the post of Superintendent of Mines at Open Cast Mines (OCP Mines), Giridih Project under the respondent-M/s C.C.L and he has superannuated from service on 31.12.2016. The petitioner in W.P.(S) No.4948 of 2017 namely, Narendra Pal Singh was functioning as Project Officer at the said Giridih Project at the relevant time and he is still serving under the respondent-M/s C.C.L. 4. Challenge by the writ petitioner(s) is to the memorandum of charges both dated 26.12.2016 and order dated 05.07.2017 by which an inquiring officer has been appointed. 5. Briefly stated, on an allegation of abuse of their official position by signing false monthly attendance sheet for the period between October, 2006 to August, 2007, which reflected name and attendance of ex-servicemen who in fact did not perform duty at Giridih Project during the relevant period, a First Information Report was lodged vide RC 9(A)/2007D for the offences u/s 120-B, 420, 468, 471 and 477 A IPC and u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Allegation in the First Information Report is of criminal conspiracy, cheating, forgery for the purpose of cheating, using as genuine a forged document, falsification of accounts and criminal misconduct against the accused petitioner(s). After investigation final report was submitted on 26.12.2008 finding prima facie case against the accused persons but for the offence u/s 477 A IPC. On 26.12.2016 a memorandum along with article of charge was served to both the petitioner(s). The charge framed against both the petitioner(s) is identically worded. Statement of article of charge framed against the petitioner in W.P.(S) No.4903 of 2017 reads as under: ARTICLE I "Shri Anand Prakash Singh, Superintendent of Mines {presently posted as Sr. On 26.12.2016 a memorandum along with article of charge was served to both the petitioner(s). The charge framed against both the petitioner(s) is identically worded. Statement of article of charge framed against the petitioner in W.P.(S) No.4903 of 2017 reads as under: ARTICLE I "Shri Anand Prakash Singh, Superintendent of Mines {presently posted as Sr. Manager (M)}, Hazaribagh Area} while posted and functioning as colliery Manager, Beniadih Project, Giridih, B&K Area, CCL during the year 2006-07 committed gross irregularities in matters of deployments of ex-servicemen security guards by the Security Agency engaged at Beniadih Project for providing security service inasmuch as he accepted false and fabricated documents showing that the security personnel to the extent of 90% is deployed from Ex-serviceman category and remaining 10% from civilian category as per the agreement of work with M/s Ex-Army Industrial Protection & Escort services, Dhanbad resulted in loss of Rs.2408558.00 to the Company. Hence the charge. The above advertent acts of omissions and commissions on the part of said Shri Anand Prakash Singh besides being amounting to non-fulfillment of duties and obligations as contained under Rules 4.1(i), 4.1(ii), 4.2, 4.3 and 4.6 of the Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (amended up to April, 2000) also tantamount to misconduct under clauses 5.1, 5.5, 5.9 & 5.26 of the said Rules." 6. Similar charge has been framed against the petitioner-Narendra Pal Singh. 7. After the reply of the petitioner(s) was found not satisfactory, by an order dated 05.07.2017 an inquiring officer was appointed to enquire into the charge framed against the petitioner(s). 8. Contending that delay of about 10 years in initiation of the departmental proceeding against the petitioner(s) would cause serious prejudice to them, Mr. Pandey Neeraj Rai, the learned counsel for the petitioner(s) submits that without disclosing a reason for delay in initiation of the departmental proceeding the respondent-M/s C.C.L cannot be permitted to proceed against the petitioner(s) on the basis of memorandum dated 26.12.2016. The learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has referred to the decisions in " State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bani Singh and Another , (1990) Supp1 SCC 738" and " M.V. Bijlani Vrs. Union of India and Others , (2006) 5 SCC 88 " , to fortify his contention. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner(s) has referred to the decisions in " State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bani Singh and Another , (1990) Supp1 SCC 738" and " M.V. Bijlani Vrs. Union of India and Others , (2006) 5 SCC 88 " , to fortify his contention. 9. Raising a contention that initiation of departmental proceeding does not amount to infringement of any of the rights of the petitioner(s), the learned counsel for the respondent-M/s C.C.L refers to a decision in " Anant R. Kulkarni Vrs. Y.P. Education Society and Others , (2013) 6 SCC 515 " to submit that at the threshold the tribunal/court would not interfere with the charge-memo or initiation of the departmental proceeding. 10. Normally, the writ Court would not entertain challenge to charge-memo/charge-sheet unless it is found patently illegal or without jurisdiction. It is not the case pleaded by the petitioner(s) that the authority who has issued the charge-memo is not the competent authority, and merely on a plea that the charge-memo has been issued about 10 years after C.B.I lodged a criminal case, thus the respondent-M/s C.C.L had knowledge of the alleged misconduct committed by the petitioner(s), the charge-memo, in my opinion, cannot be termed as patently illegal. In M.V. Bijlani case, the question of prejudice to the delinquent employee during the departmental proceeding was tested after he had suffered penalty in the departmental proceeding. In the said case, the Supreme Court has observed that at the relevant time the delinquent admittedly was not having possession of any document and the departmental proceeding which was initiated 5 years after handing over charge by the delinquent employee which took about 7 years for completion, has prejudiced the delinquent employee in the departmental proceeding. Issue in "Bani Singh case" was entirely different. The employee had approached the tribunal with a prayer for grant of promotion from the date his juniors were promoted and for expunging adverse entry in his A.C.R. While adjudicating the aforesaid prayers in the application u/s 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 it was noticed that on account of punishment in the departmental proceeding initiated against the employee about 12 years after the alleged misconduct, the tribunal had quashed the departmental proceeding, and order of the Administrative Tribunal was upheld by the Supreme Court. 11. As noticed above, the charge against the petitioner(s) is serious. 11. As noticed above, the charge against the petitioner(s) is serious. Whether on account of initiation of the departmental proceeding about 10 years after the competent authority granted sanction for prosecution would cause prejudice to the petitioner(s) or not, would be an issue which can be decided only at the end of the departmental proceeding. After considering the whole conspectus of the judgments on the subject, including the judgments in Bani Singh and M.V. Bijlani, the Supreme Court in Anant R. Kulkarni has held that the question of delay can be examined by the tribunal/court in the facts of individual case; the Supreme Court has held as under: "14. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question must be carefully examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of the charges involved therein. The court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the court must weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come to the conclusion which is just and proper considering the circumstances involved. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts, and balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration that the said proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. 12. The petitioners are facing a grave charge of misconduct in the departmental proceeding and they are also facing trial on criminal charges for offences u/s 120-B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC and u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 12. The petitioners are facing a grave charge of misconduct in the departmental proceeding and they are also facing trial on criminal charges for offences u/s 120-B, 420, 468, 471 of IPC and u/s 13(2) r/w 13(1) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Now merely by pleading that delay in initiation of departmental proceeding would cause serious prejudice to them, in my opinion, the petitioners cannot maintain the writ petition and accordingly both the writ petitions are dismissed.