JUDGMENT : The present challenge has been preferred by a third party objector in an eviction decree. 2. The petitioner took out an application under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure asserting the petitioner’s independent tenancy right under the decree-holder/opposite party no. 1. Apparently an eviction decree was obtained by the opposite party no. 1 against the present opposite party no. 2 on the ground of sub-letting to the present petitioner. The said decree was passed ex parte, the opposite party no. 2 having not filed his written statement nor contested the proceeding. 3. It further appears that two suits had been filed previously. One was filed by the present petitioner asserting the petitioner's tenancy rights in respect of the suit property and also seeking permanent injunction restraining the opposite party no. 1 from dispossessing the petitioner from the suit property. In such suit, initially an injunction was granted in respect of the suit property in favour of the present petitioner, which was subsequently vacated. The said suit was ultimately dismissed for default. 4. On the other hand, the present opposite party no. 1 also instituted a suit in respect of the self-same property, wherein the opposite party had claimed declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit property and permanent injunction restraining the present petitioner from taking electricity in the scheduled property, on the allegation that the petitioner was in illegal occupation of the suit premises. Such suit is still pending, as per the submissions of the parties. 5. In such factual context, upon the opposite party no. 1 having obtained an eviction decree against the opposite party no. 2, the present petitioner came up with an application under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101 of the Code asserting that the petitioner was an independent tenant under the landlord in respect of the suit property. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the petitioner is aggrieved only against the partial deemed refusal of the injunction application filed by the petitioner in connection with the said proceeding under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101 of the Code, whereby the petitioner’s prayer for injunction restraining the opposite party no. 1 from changing the nature and character of the suit property was not granted. 1 from changing the nature and character of the suit property was not granted. The other portion of the injunction prayed for by the petitioner, being not to encumber the suit property in favour of third parties and/or create any third party interest, was granted by the impugned order itself. Naturally, the petitioner is not aggrieved by the second portion of the impugned order, as indicated above. 7. As such, the scope of the present revision is restricted to the deemed refusal of injunction restraining the opposite party no. 1 from changing the nature and character of the suit property in any manner. 8. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that despite having produced rent receipts showing payment of zero rent (which, according to the petitioner, was due to the nature of the premises being a charitable dispensary) and despite production of other documents showing the petitioner’s possession in respect of the suit property, the court below refused a part of the injunction prayed for without assigning any reason therefor while granting the other. 9. The impugned order, as such, is contradictory since only a part of the injunction prayed for by the petitioner was granted thereby, upon being satisfied with the prima facie case and other legal yardsticks governing injunction matters. 10. It is further argued on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner, along with other documents, produced a photocopy of a surrender letter dated August 18, 1989, whereby the present opposite party no. 2, Abir Chand Sethia, an alleged tenant, had already surrendered the suit property in favour of the erstwhile landlord, Smt. Jyotirmoyee Devi, from whom the vendor, opposite party no. 1, claims to derive title. In view of such surrender as far back as in 1989, the said Abir Chand Sethia could not have continued as a tenant in respect of the suit property, let alone subletting the property to the present petitioner. 11. As such, it is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that the entire basis of the ex parte eviction decree obtained by opposite party no. 1 against Abir Chand Sethia was based on fraud, collusion and upon untrue allegations. 11. As such, it is pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that the entire basis of the ex parte eviction decree obtained by opposite party no. 1 against Abir Chand Sethia was based on fraud, collusion and upon untrue allegations. On the date on which such decree was passed, Abir Chand Sethia himself was not a tenant in respect of the suit property; as such, there was no question of the petitioner being a sub-tenant under Abir Chand. Hence, it is argued, there was sufficient prima facie case in favour of the petitioner, for which the court below ought to have granted the interim prayer for injunction as made by the petitioner. 12. In controverting such submissions, learned senior advocate appearing for the decree-holder/opposite party no. 1 submits that the petitioner had suppressed material facts in obtaining the ex parte ad interim injunction. As such, it is submitted, the portion of the impugned order, whereby injunction was granted partially, is also under challenge in an appeal before the District Court, at the behest of opposite party no. 1. In such appeal, an order of stay of operation of the present impugned order also granted. 13. It was suppressed by the petitioner, it is alleged, that the injunction obtained by the petitioner in his previous suit was vacated subsequently on merits. If such factum was brought to the notice of the court below, it might very well be that the court below would have refused to grant the injunction. Not only that, the said suit was dismissed for default, which precludes the present petitioner from taking out the subsequent application under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101 of the Code, which is on the same footing as a subsequent suit. 14. This apart, it is submitted, the petitioner categorically admitted in his previous suit, that no rent receipt was issued to the petitioner till November, 2012, despite the petitioner having paid rent. However, in a mutually exclusive stand now taken, the petitioner not only alleged that rent receipts were granted upon payment of zero rent for the suit premises, the petitioner also went so far as to produce rent receipts inter alia of the year 2001. 15. Such contrary stands taken by the petitioner, according to learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 15. Such contrary stands taken by the petitioner, according to learned senior counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 1, belies the case of the petitioner and amounts to suppression of materials fact, disentitling the petitioner from getting any sort of injunction whatsoever. 16. It is further argued on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that it is now well settled that an illegal sub-tenant is not entitled to be heard in an eviction decree passed against such tenant. 17. In such view of the matter, it is argued, the petitioner does not even have the right to maintain the present proceeding under Order XXI Rules 99 and 101 of the Code. 18. It is further argued that injunction should have been refused to the petitioner, apart from other reasons, merely in view of the mala fide conduct of the petitioner. 19. It is submitted that the petitioner not only took a contrary stand in the previous and present proceedings, but suppressed material facts having germane bearing on the proceeding, not coming with clean hands, which is a prerequisite of grant of injunction. 20. In this context, learned senior advocate appearing for the opposite party no. 1 cites a judgment report at (2008) 11 SCC 1 (Mandali Ranganna and others Vs. T. Ramachandra and others). 21. Placing particular reliance on paragraph nos. 21 and 22 of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, learned senior advocate argues that, apart from prima facie case, balance of convenience and inconvenience and irreparable injury, the conduct of the petitioner is vital for grant of injunction. The conduct of the petitioner was a determinant in finding out whether the petitioner came with clean hands to justify injunction. 22. Learned senior advocate appearing for the opposite party no. 1 next cites a judgment reported at 2004 (7) SCC 166 (S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar and Other). 23. Placing particular reliance on paragraph- 13 of the said judgment, it is argued that suppression of material facts disentitles a plaintiff/petitioner from getting an injunction in respect of the suit property. 24. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that the trial court was justified in refusing injunction partially; the court below ought not to have granted injunction even in respect of third party interest, as done. 25. 24. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, it is submitted on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that the trial court was justified in refusing injunction partially; the court below ought not to have granted injunction even in respect of third party interest, as done. 25. A perusal of the materials on record reveals that apparently the present petitioner took a contrary stand relating to issuance of rent receipts in the previous suit and the present suit. Even taking the worst case against the petitioner, it could probably be argued at best that the petitioner has failed to establish any independent tenancy right in respect of the suit property, at this stage. 26. However, the purported surrender letter dated August 18, 1989, produced by the petitioner in the court below, should then be given equal weightage as the contradictory stands taken by him. Such surrender letter would obviate any chance of Abir Chand Sethia having continued as a tenant after August 18, 1989, which would prima facie invalidate the eviction decree obtained by the opposite party no.1 against opposite party no. 2, since the opposite party no. 2 did not sustain his tenancy in respect of the suit premises and could not be arrayed as the only defendant in the suit. 27. In view of Abir Chand Sethia’s tenancy being clouded, there could not arise any question of non-impleadment of the petitioner in the capacity of sub-tenant, legal or illegal. If that be so, in view of the admitted possession of the petitioner, the petitioner ought to have been a necessary party to the eviction suit, which, in any event, would invalidate the eviction decree. 28. As such, it could not be brushed aside that the petitioner had made out a prima facie case even irrespective of an independent tenancy right of the purported rent receipts produced in the executing court, to justify injunction. 29. It is further seen that the executing court, in the impugned order, did not grant injunction in respect of change of nature and character, whereas injunction was granted in respect of creation of third party interest, without any ration to justify such discrimination between the two prayers. Since no reason was attributed for taking such a discrepant view in respect of the two reliefs, the impugned order ought to have been set aside on such score alone. 30. Since no reason was attributed for taking such a discrepant view in respect of the two reliefs, the impugned order ought to have been set aside on such score alone. 30. However, it is submitted by learned senior advocate appearing for the opposite party no. 1 that a construction has been raised substantially on the suit property and the same is on the verge of completion. Although such stand is controverted by learned counsel for the petitioner, it is undisputed that the initial existing structure, where the petitioner used to run a dispensary, has now been demolished and construction up to a certain level has already come up on the suit property. 31. Restraining the opposite party no. 1 from making further construction would not enure, in any event, to the benefit of the petitioner, since even if the petitioner expects, or succeeds in establishing, any right in respect of the suit property, such right could be given only in the newly constructed building on the locale. As such, it would not be to the benefit of either party to stop further construction. However, the relief of the petitioner might lie in the other portion of his prayer, that is, restraint in creating third party interest. However, since such portion of the prayer was already granted by the impugned order, albeit the stay subsequently granted by an appellate forum, it would be entirely beyond the scope of the present revisional application to go into the question of creation of third party interest. Since the present revision is directed and restricted only against the deemed refusal of injunction to change the nature and character of the suit property, this Court does not deem it prudent to go into the other part of the prayer, as to creation of third party interest, which in any event, is open for challenge by the parties in an appropriate proceeding. 32. In such view of the matter, C. O. No. 2584 of 2018 is dismissed on contest in the light of the observations made above. 33. 32. In such view of the matter, C. O. No. 2584 of 2018 is dismissed on contest in the light of the observations made above. 33. It is made clear that this Court has not gone into the merits of the contentions of the parties in so far as the suit is concerned, and it will be open to the courts below and for any other forum to entertain all arguments and adjudication relating to the rights and contentions of the parties, since the present discussion was only restricted to a prima facie case on the ad interim injunction as refused by the court below. 34. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 35. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.