JUDGMENT : P. DIWAKER, J. 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 16.6.2011 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir Champa (CG) in S.T. No.90/2010 convicting the accused/appellant under Sections 376 (2) (g) & 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the IPC') and sentencing each of them to undergo RI for 10 years with fine of Rs.2,000/- and RI for life with fine of Rs.2,000/- respectively. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that deceased prosecutrix, aged about 14 years, was residing with her aunt Narbada Bai (PW-1) in village Bhagodih. On 23.3.2010 at about 9 in the morning she had gone to the field to graze the cattle and returned from there at about 12.30 in the afternoon. She again left the house for the field leaving dung in the house and when she did not return till 2 pm, her aunt went in search of her. Said Narmada Bai while searching her reached at Bahra Well where he found sitting accused/appellant Ajay Suryavanshi, however, she did not find the deceased there and therefore she returned home. After some time she again went to the field in search of the deceased prosecutrix along with her daughter Ganga where he saw the deceased prosecutrix lying in a dead condition near the bund. Bllood was coming out from her private part and a kerchief was wrapped around her neck. At the instance of Tilakdas (PW-2), Merg Intimation (Ex.P-1) & FIR (Ex.P-24) was registered. Inquest on the body of deceased was prepared vide Ex.P-9 on 24.3.2010. Body was sent for post-mortem examination which was conducted by Dr. P. Singh (PW-8) & Dr. Seema Nandini Choudhary (not examined) vide Ex.P-14 and they noticed following injuries and symptoms on the body of deceased;- • Rigor mortis present over both upper & lower limbs. Eyes closed, mouth partially opened, tongue protruded. • Abrasion over right forearm of 5x2 cm in size. • Contusion over right scapular region of 6x3cm in size. • Multiple abrasions over the right forearm. • Bruises of 2x2cm over both sides of breast. • Contusion and abrasions over chin and right ear of the size 5x3cm. Swelling in the neck. • Multiple abrasions over vagina and anterior vaginal orifice. • Abrasion over left nipple of the breast. • Contusion over right scapular region of 6x3cm in size. • Multiple abrasions over the right forearm. • Bruises of 2x2cm over both sides of breast. • Contusion and abrasions over chin and right ear of the size 5x3cm. Swelling in the neck. • Multiple abrasions over vagina and anterior vaginal orifice. • Abrasion over left nipple of the breast. As per opinion of the doctors, the cause of death was asphyxia and cardio respiratory arrest due to throttling (manual strangulation) and death was homicidal in nature. While the matter was being investigated, accused/appellants made extra-judicial confession in the presence of various villagers including Tulsidas (PW-3) that they had raped the deceased and thereafter strangulated her to death. On the basis of this confessional statement, the accused/appellants were arrested and sent for medical examination which was conducted by Dr. Ajay Kumar Miri (PW-13) on 31.3.2010 vide Ex.P-34, P-35, P-36 respectively and he found them capable of performing sex. Underwear of accused/appellants concerned were also seized by the police and the same were send for chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory from where report of Ex.P-37 was received confirming presence of semen on Articles EI & FI i.e. underwear of accused/appellant No.1 & 3, and also on the skirt, panty, vaginal swab & slides of the deceased prosecutrix. 3. After completing investigation, the challan was filed against the accused persons for the offence punishable under Sections 376 (2) (g) & 302/34 of IPC and accordingly the charges were framed by the trial Court against them. The prosecution in order to substantiate its stand, examined 13 witnesses and exhibited a number of documents. Statement of accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which they denied the circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication in the crime in question. 4. After hearing counsel for the parties, the trial Court by the impugned judgment convicted & sentenced the accused/appellants in the manner as described above. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that; • conviction of the appellants is solely based on the extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellants before Tilakdas (PW-2), but this witness did not support the prosecution and turned hostile. This apart, there was no material corroboration from independent source to the extra-judicial confession. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that; • conviction of the appellants is solely based on the extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellants before Tilakdas (PW-2), but this witness did not support the prosecution and turned hostile. This apart, there was no material corroboration from independent source to the extra-judicial confession. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the case on the basis of evidence of extra judicial confession and as such the conviction based on extra-judicial confession is not safe and sound. • the value of extra-judicial confession becomes less when it is obtained by a person after investigation of the case by the Police has started. In the present case also the alleged extra-judicial confession has been made on 25.3.2010 when he investigation had already commenced, therefore, it cannot be believed. • In absence of report of serology, mere presence of semen on the underwear of accused/appellants No.1 & 3 is of no consequence. 6. On the other hand, supporting the impugned judgment, it has been argued by the State Counsel that ; • there was no infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference by this Court against any of the three appellants. • there is no evidence that the witness to extra-judicial confession had inimical relation with the appellant and that is why he has falsely implicated them. • Mere fact that the witness to extra-judicial confession had been declared hostile, it would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution because it is settled position that if some portion of the statement of the hostile witness supports the case of the prosecution, it can be relied upon. In this case also, PW-3 has admitted in the cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor that the accused persons had confessed that they have committed murder of the deceased after committing rape with her. • At the relevant point of time, PW-1 saw accused/appellant No.1 sitting near the place where from body of the deceased was recovered. Likewise, PW-6 had also seen other two accused persons near the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time. • Semen stains were also found on the underwear of appellants No.1 & 3. No explanation has been offered by them in this regard. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record including the impugned judgment. 8. • Semen stains were also found on the underwear of appellants No.1 & 3. No explanation has been offered by them in this regard. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record including the impugned judgment. 8. Smt. Narbada Bai (PW-1) is the aunt of deceased. She has stated that on 23.2.2010 at about 9 in the morning the deceased had gone to field to graze the cattle. At about 12.30-1.00 in the afternoon the deceased returned home carrying dung and after leaving dung, she again left the house for the filed because the cattle were there. She has further stated that after returning home, she went to asleep. At about 2 in the afternoon she woke up and found that the deceased had not returned home and then she went in her search towards the field but could not find her. At about 3 p.m. when she again went in search of the deceased at the field, she found the deceased lying in a dead condition in the field. A kerchief was wrapped around her neck, blood was coming out from her nose and her panty was torn from front side. She has further stated that when she was going to search the deceased second time, she saw accused Ajay sitting near the Well of accused Bhola alias Dilchand. As soon as she went ahead of the Well, accused Ajay fled from there towards the village. 9. Tilakdas (PW-2) is the person at whose instance Merg Intimation (Ex.P-1) & FIR (Ex.P-24) was lodged. He is also witness of seizure memo Ex.P-2 to Ex.P-7. He has duly supported the prosecution case. 10. Tulsidas Vaishnav (PW-3) is the witness before whom the appellants are said to have confessed their guilt. Though this witness has not supported the prosecution case and as such declared hostile, but in the leading questions asked by the Additional Public Prosecutor after obtaining permission from the Court, he has admitted that on being questioned by the villagers in respect of the incident, accused persons had admitted that all of them had done bad work with the prosecutrix and thereafter strangulated her to death. In answers to the questions put by the Court, this witness has admitted that though he was not present at the time of enquiry by the villagers from the accused persons, but he was there when they were confessing their guilt,. He has further stated that at that time Sakitram Yadav, Tilakdas Mahant, Santosh Kumar Yadav, Hemlal Suryavanshi, Mohan Karsh & others were also present there. This witness had also clarified that as the incident had taken place few months back, he forgot to mention about the same and once he has been reminded, he disclosed the correct facts. He has denied the suggestion that the accused persons were questioned in the police station. 11. Maan Singh (PW-4) is the witness of inquest (Ex.P-9). Hemlal Suryavanshi (PW-5) is the witness of seizure memos Ex.P-8 to P-10. 12. Sakitram Yadav (PW-6) has stated that on the date of incident at about 2.00 p.m. he had gone towards the village pond to answer the nature's call. At that time, he met accused Dilchand alias Bhola on the way. Thereafter when he reached near the well situated in the field of Mahettar, she found accused Nawal Kumar sitting there. In the evening he came to know that the deceased had been murdered. 13. Yadunath (PW-7) is the witness of spot map (Ex.P-11) and spot inspection memo (Ex.P-12). He is also a witness of inquest Ex.P-9. 14. Dr. P. Singh (PW-8) is the doctor who along with Dr. Seema Nandani Choudhary conducted post-mortem examination over the body of deceased and noticed the injuries as described above. This witness has opined that cause of the death of the deceased was asphyxia and the death was homicidal in nature. He has further opined that prior to her death, the deceased was subjected to rape. 15. Medni Narayan (PW-9) & Ramkrishna Dubey (PW-10) have assisted in the investigation. Shyam Kumar Rathore (PW-11) is the Patwari who prepared the spot map (Ex.P-11). G.P. Sriwas (PW-12) is the investigating officer who has duly supported the prosecution case. Dr. Ajay Kumar Miri (PW-13) is the doctor who medically examined the accused/appellants vide Ex.P-31 to P-34 and found each of them capable of performing sex. 16. Shyam Kumar Rathore (PW-11) is the Patwari who prepared the spot map (Ex.P-11). G.P. Sriwas (PW-12) is the investigating officer who has duly supported the prosecution case. Dr. Ajay Kumar Miri (PW-13) is the doctor who medically examined the accused/appellants vide Ex.P-31 to P-34 and found each of them capable of performing sex. 16. After considering the entire facts of the case it emerges from the evidence on record and finding that the entire case was based upon circumstantial evidence of extra judicial confession, recovery of underwear of concerned appellants stained with semen and that the accused persons were seen by the prosecution witnesses near the place of occurrence at the relevant point of time. 17. Admittedly, the witness of extra-judicial confession i.e. PW-3, turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case initially, therefore, the impact of the evidence of PW-3 has to be seen in the light of other attending circumstances of the case. 18. The law relating to the testimony of a hostile witness is now well settled. Simply because a witness has been declared hostile, his whole testimony does not ipso facto become worthless or incredible. His evidence should be evaluated like that of any other witness, keeping, of course, the label of his hostility in view. It is always open to Court to accept a part of his testimony or to reject it in toto. The rule of prudence, however, requires that if a hostile witness is a thoroughly discredited witness, whole of his testimony should be rejected. In Satpal v. Delhi Administration reported in AIR 1976 SC 29 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus: “In a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the Court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed of the record altogether. It is for the Judge in fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. It is for the Judge in fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record that part of his testimony which he finds to be credit worthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge, should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.” 19. In Attar Singh v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 11 SCC 719 the Apex Court that has held as under: 14. We have meticulously considered the arguments advanced on this vital aspect of the matter on which the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant is based. This compels us to consider as to whether the conviction and sentence recorded on the basis of the testimony of the witness who has been declared hostile could be relied upon for recording conviction of the appellant-accused. But it was difficult to overlook the relevance and value of the evidence of even a hostile witness while considering as to what extent their evidence could be allowed to be relied upon and used by the prosecution. It could not be ignored that when a witness is declared hostile and when his testimony is not shaken on material points in the crossexamination, there is no ground to reject his testimony in toto as it is well settled by a catena of decisions that the court is not precluded from taking into account the statement of a hostile witness altogether and it is not necessary to discard the same in toto and can be relied upon partly. If some portion of the statement of the hostile witness inspires confidence, it can be relied upon. He cannot be thrown out as wholly unreliable. If some portion of the statement of the hostile witness inspires confidence, it can be relied upon. He cannot be thrown out as wholly unreliable. This was the view expressed by this Court in Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka [ (1980) 1 SCC 30 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 59] whereby the learned Judges of the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Karnataka High Court which had discarded the evidence of a hostile witness in its entirety.” 20. On a careful perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, now we have to see whether the evidence of witness Tulsidas (PW-3) in whose presence extra judicial confession was made by the accused persons, could be relied upon and the conviction and sentence of the lower Court mainly based on the said extra judicial confession is proper. 21. In the instant case, since the Public Prosecutor was not satisfied with the deposition of Tulsidas Vaishnav (PW-3), he was declared hostile and when with the permission of the Court, the Public Prosecutor cross-examined this witness, then he deposed that on being questioned by them, the accused persons confessed to have raped and committed murder of the deceased by strangulating her neck by means of kerchief. He has further stated that the accused persons voluntarily confessed to have committed the crime in question. This witness has admitted that at the time of examination-in-chief by mistake (weak memory) he has omitted to mention the fact of extra-judicial confession made by accused persons. This witness, in the cross-examination, has denied the suggestion put by the defence that accused persons had not made any confession to him or that the accused persons were not questioned by the villagers. Perusal of the record also goes to show that in the statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC this witness has mentioned about the extra judicial confession made by the accused persons and proved the same in the Court by admitting that the police had recorded his statement. Further, there is absolutely no evidence on record to suggest that the appellants were having inimical relation with the aforesaid witness to extra-judicial confession. Mere non-mention of the fact of extra-judicial confession on account of mistake or otherwise, by itself cannot be taken as a circumstance shaking the prosecution evidence or its case. Further, there is absolutely no evidence on record to suggest that the appellants were having inimical relation with the aforesaid witness to extra-judicial confession. Mere non-mention of the fact of extra-judicial confession on account of mistake or otherwise, by itself cannot be taken as a circumstance shaking the prosecution evidence or its case. On an appreciation of the evidence of this witness, it appears to this Court that the statement of this hostile witness elucidated in the cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor, which remained unshaken in cross-examination by the defence, inspires confidence and being so, we are of the opinion that the trial Court has rightly relied upon the testimony of this witness to hold that the appellants had voluntarily made extra-judicial confession to the aforesaid witness. 22. Now the question arises whether the conviction can be founded mainly on the evidence of extra judicial confession. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, in the matter of State of UP v. M.K. Anthony reported in (1985) 1 SCC 505 the Supreme Court observed thus;- “15.There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extra-judicial confession cannot be relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The courts have considered the evidence of extra-judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. See Jagta v. State of Haryana and State of Punjab v. Bhajan Singh and Ors. In Sahoo v. State of U.P. , it was held that 'an extra-judicial confession may be an expression of conflict of emotion, a conscious effort to stifle the pricked conscience; an argument to find excuse or justification for his act; or a penitent or remorseful act of exaggeration of his part in the crime.' Before evidence in this behalf is accepted, it must be established by cogent evidence what were the exact words used by the accused. The Court proceeded to state that even if so much was established, prudence and justice demand that such evidence cannot be made the sole ground of conviction. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In that case, the evidence was that after the commission of murder the accused was heard muttering to himself that he has finished the deceased. The High Court did not interfere with the conviction observing that the evidence of extra-judicial confession is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. It may be used only as a corroborative piece of evidence. In that case, the evidence was that after the commission of murder the accused was heard muttering to himself that he has finished the deceased. The High Court did not interfere with the conviction observing that the evidence of extra-judicial confession is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. However, in Pyara Singh v. State of Punjab (1978) 1 SCR 661, this Court observed that the law does not require that evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated. It thus appears that extra-judicial confession appears to have been treated as a weak piece of evidence but there is no rule of law nor rule of prudence that it cannot be acted upon unless corroborated. If the evidence about extra-judicial confession comes from the mouth of witness/witnesses who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an untruthful statement to the accused; the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, if it passes the test, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction. In such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trust-worthy and beyond reproach the same can be relied upon and a conviction can be founded thereon.” 23. In Gura Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2001) 2 SCC 205 the Supreme Court observed as under:- 6. It is settled position of law that extra-judicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. Despite inherent weakness of extra judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. Relying upon an earlier judgment in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh ( 1954 SCR 1098 ), this Court again in Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1975 SC 1320 ] held that the evidence in the form of extra-judicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. In Narayan Singh v. State of MP [ AIR 1985 SC 1678 ] this Court cautioned that it is not open to the court trying the criminal case to start with presumption that extra judicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. The retraction of extra-judicial confession which is a usual phenomenon in criminal cases would by itself not weaken the case of the prosecution based upon such a confession. In Kishore Chand v. State of HP [ AIR 1990 SC 2140 ] this Court held that an unambiguous extra judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the alleged confession, the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and is not the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26. The Court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting that it may not be true. The Court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting that it may not be true. All relevant circumstances such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made have to be scrutinised. To the same effect is the judgment in Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana [ AIR 1991 SC 37 ]. After referring to the judgment in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1977 SC 2274 ] this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey & anr [JT 1992 (3) SC 270] held that the extra judicial confession which is not obtained by coercion, promise of favour or false hope and is plenary in character and voluntary in nature can be made the basis for conviction even without corroboration.” 24. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram reported in (2003) 8 SCC 180 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated the principle that an extra judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the Court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of evidence as to confession, like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The Court, further expressed the view that such a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from the mouth of witness who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. 25. In the case of Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2010) 10 SCC 604 it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court thus;- “29. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material.” 26. Again in Baskaran & another v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2014) SCC 765 the Supreme Court observed thus;- “17. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material.” 26. Again in Baskaran & another v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2014) SCC 765 the Supreme Court observed thus;- “17. It is no doubt true that this Court time and again has held that an extra-judicial confession can be relied upon only if the same is voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind. The value of the evidence as to the confession like any other evidence depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made. The value of the evidence as to the confession depends on the reliability of the witness who gives the evidence. But it is not open to any court to start with the presumption that extra-judicial confession is insufficient to convict the accused even though it is supported by the other circumstantial evidence and corroborated by independent witness which is the position in the instant case. The Courts cannot be unmindful of the legal position that even if the evidence relating to extra-judicial confession is found credible after being tested on the touchstone of credibility and acceptability, it can solely form the basis of conviction.” 27. Since we have already held above that the trial Court has not committed any illegality in placing reliance on the testimony of Tulsidas (PW-3), a witness to extra judicial confession, therefore, keeping in mind the above legal principles, we proceed further to examine whether there is any other independent corroborative evidence to the evidence of Tulsi Das (PW-3). 28. In the instant case, the chemical examiner's report (Ex.P-37) revealed the presence of semen stains not only on the underwear of accused Ajay & Dilchand but also on the underwear of the deceased prosecutrix, which they had been wearing. There was no explanation from the accused as to how semen came on their underwear, therefore, it can be safely presumed that semen came on their underwear when they committed rape with the prosecutrix. Thus, presence of semen on the underwear of accused/appellants concerned is a strong piece of evidence which corroborates the version given by Tulsidas Vaishnav (PW-3), a witness to extra-judicial confession. 29. Thus, presence of semen on the underwear of accused/appellants concerned is a strong piece of evidence which corroborates the version given by Tulsidas Vaishnav (PW-3), a witness to extra-judicial confession. 29. Another strong corroborative piece of evidence against the accused/appellants is that the witnesses i.e. Narmada Bai (PW-1) & Sakitram (PW-6) had seen accused Dilchand, Nawal Kumar and Ajay nearby the spot. According to Narmada Bai (PW-1), when second time she went in search of the deceased, she found accused/appellant No.1 sitting near the Well of accused/appellant Dilchand and as soon she moved ahead of the well, he fled from there towards the village. According to Sakitram (PW-6), on the date of incident at about 2 in the afternoon when he had gone to answer the call of nature, he met accused Dilchand who asked for a box from him and on his refusal, he went towards the Well where accused Nawal Kumar was also sitting. A question was put to the appellants regarding their presence on the spot during their examination under Section 313 CrPC but they did not offer any plausible explanation regarding their presence except saying that it is incorrect. 30. It is well settled in law that when the attention of the accused is drawn to the said circumstances that inculpated him in the crime and he fails to offer appropriate explanation or gives a false answer, the same can be counted as providing a missing link for building the chain of circumstances. In the instant case, when the above circumstances were put to the accused/appellants in their examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., they chose not to offer any explanation except choosing the mode of denial by replying that it is false. Thus, it is also a circumstance that goes against him. 31. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that extra-judicial confession regarding causing death of the deceased after ravishing her was voluntarily made by the accused/appellants before Tulsidas (PW-3), this evidence of extra-judicial confession by accused before this witness inspire confidence of the Court as the same stands corroborated by recovery of semen stained underwear of concerned accused/appellants and the fact that they were seen by the prosecution witnesses at the place from where body of deceased was recovered. In other words, we are satisfied that the confession was voluntary and was not the result of inducement, threat or promise as contemplated by Section 24 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and on the basis of that, the accused/appellants can be convicted. 32. Coming to the contention put forth on the side of the appellants that since the extra-judicial confession has been recorded after commencement of investigation, it is not admissible in evidence. True it is that extra-judicial confession was made after commencement of investigation, but, in our view, the same would not make the confession invalid or inadmissible, particularly when it is not only voluntary and free from doubt but also corroborated by independent material like recovery of semen stained underwear and that the appellants were noticed by the witnesses near the place of incident. Therefore, the extra-judicial confession given by the accused/appellants can be acted upon. 33. Thus, regard being had to the overall evidence, we are of the opinion that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case were sufficient to connect the accused/appellants with the commission of crime for which they were rightly held guilty, convicted and sentenced by the trial Court. We find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment rendered by the trial Court. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Since the accused/appellants are already in jail, no further direction regarding their surrender etc. is needed.