Suhas S/o. Vishwanath Kalghatgi v. State of Karnataka
2018-01-08
JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA, S.SUJATHA
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. This is an intra court appeal filed under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, whereby the order passed by the learned Single Judge in WP No.62510/2012(LR) is called in question. 2. With the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the matter is taken up for final disposal. 3. The appellants had called in question the order passed by the Land Tribunal, Belagavi (for short, ‘Tribunal’) on IA filed by the tenants i.e. respondent Nos.3 to 10 under Section 48-A(3) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act’) read with Section 151 of CPC for amendment of Form No.7 filed on 16.08.1974. The amendment application was filed on 13.09.2011, which was refuted by the appellants by filing detailed objections. After considering the same, the Tribunal by its majority opinion, passed an order allowing the said application and permitted the above said respondents to amend Form No.7 as sought for. A divergent opinion was expressed by the Chairman, whereas the members of the Tribunal opined that the amendment application requires to be allowed. Considering the majority opinion, the amendment application came to be allowed. The appellants challenged the said order on various grounds before the writ Court. The learned Single judge after hearing both the parties, allowed the writ petition in part. The amendment application allowed by the Tribunal is confirmed on imposing costs of Rs.5,000/- on the respondent Nos.3 to 10 to be payable to the appellants, with a direction to the Tribunal to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners are in appeal. 4. Learned counsel Sri. G.B. Shastry, appearing on behalf of Sri. Jagadish Patil, learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the amendment application filed by the tenants is time barred. It was contended that Form-7 submitted before the Land Tribunal specifically contains a ‘Note’ mentioning that “the applicants are in possession as tenants to the extent of 4 acres 18 guntas”. Originally, Tribunal granted occupancy rights to the applicants in respect of land bearing Sy.No.64/2 in Kangrali Budruk village, measuring 11 acres 36 guntas. Assailing the same, WP No.13007/1997 was filed by the appellants before this Court.
Originally, Tribunal granted occupancy rights to the applicants in respect of land bearing Sy.No.64/2 in Kangrali Budruk village, measuring 11 acres 36 guntas. Assailing the same, WP No.13007/1997 was filed by the appellants before this Court. The learned Single Judge of this Court was pleased to set-aside the order of the Land Tribunal modifying the grant of occupancy rights to an extent of 11 acres 36 guntas of Sy.No.64/2, Kangrali Budruk village, in favour of original respondent Nos.3 to 5 to an extent of 3 acres out of Sy.No.64/2 of Kangrali village, on the basis of spot inspection report, which indicates that the tenants were cultivating the land only to an extent of 3 acres and land to the extent of 7 acres 18 guntas is a fallow land, which has wild growth of shrubs and grass. This order was challenged by respondent Nos.3 to 5 in WA No.2162/2006(KLRA), whereby the division bench of this Court was pleased to set-aside the order of the learned Single Judge observing that if the grant made by the Tribunal was in excess of the cultivating area, the learned Single Judge should have set-aside the order and remanded the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration and ought not to have modified the grant order to the extent of 3 acres. Accordingly, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration in terms of the order dated 20.06.2007. On remand in the proceedings before the Tribunal, the tenants filed amendment application under Section 48- A(3) of the Act read with Section 151 of CPC seeking for deletion of the “Note” made in Form-7 filed on 16.08.1974. As such, the amendment application filed by the tenants is time barred, in terms of the provisions of the Act. No amendment can be made after the cut off date i.e., 30.06.1979. There is absolute bar under Section 48-A of the Act to seek for any amendment subsequent to the cut off date. 5. Secondly, it was contended that the admission in pleadings cannot be deleted. The admission made by the tenants styled as “note” in Form-7 specifies that they were cultivating the lands as tenants only to an extent of 4 acres 18 guntas. In terms of Rule 17 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules, 1974 (for short, ‘the Rules’), enquiry was conducted.
Secondly, it was contended that the admission in pleadings cannot be deleted. The admission made by the tenants styled as “note” in Form-7 specifies that they were cultivating the lands as tenants only to an extent of 4 acres 18 guntas. In terms of Rule 17 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules, 1974 (for short, ‘the Rules’), enquiry was conducted. After holding the spot inspection, it was noticed that only 3 acres of land was cultivated land and remaining 7 acres 36 guntas was a fallow land, wherein shrubs and grass were grown. It was only 4 acres 18 guntas of lands shown in the RTC records as cultivated, which was in possession of the tenants. The land vested with the Government, as per Tahsildar report, was only to an extent of 4 acres 18 guntas. Moreover, admission made by the tenants was that they were in possession of 4 acres 18 guntas of the land as tenants. In such circumstances, the Land Tribunal ought not to have allowed the amendment application filed by the tenants. Nextly, it was contended that in terms of Rule 17(8) of the Rules, it is mandatory that the order of the Land Tribunal shall be signed, in addition to the Chairman, by the other members of the Tribunal who heard the case. In the present case, the order is signed by the Chairman and the other three members, whereas the third member among the four members, who heard the matter has not signed the order. Such an order which is contrary to Rule 17(8) is nullity in the eye of law. Further, it was contended that allowing the amendment application after 37 years would prejudice the rights of the appellants. 6. In support of these contentions, learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the following rulings: (i) ILR 1987 KAR 1779, SEETHADEVI Vs. NARAYANA KAMATH (ii) ILR 1994 KAR 809, PAKEERA MOOLYA VS. MARI BHAT (iii) AIR 2008 (SC) 2234 , CHANDER KANTA BANSAL VS. RAJINDER SINGH ANAND (iv) 2008(12) SCC 338 , HONNAMMA AND ORS. VS. NANJUNDALAH SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS. AND ORS. (v) 1998 (1) SCC 278 , HEERALAL VS. KALYAN MAL AND OTHERS (vi) 2017(5) SCC 212 , CHAKRESHWARI CONSTRUCTION PRIVATE LIMITED VS. MANOHAR LAL (vii) 2016 AIR(SCW) 3635, NARAYANAPPA (D) BY LRS. VS. B.S. RAMASWAMY (D) BY LRS. & OTHERS. 7. Learned counsel Sri.
VS. NANJUNDALAH SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS. AND ORS. (v) 1998 (1) SCC 278 , HEERALAL VS. KALYAN MAL AND OTHERS (vi) 2017(5) SCC 212 , CHAKRESHWARI CONSTRUCTION PRIVATE LIMITED VS. MANOHAR LAL (vii) 2016 AIR(SCW) 3635, NARAYANAPPA (D) BY LRS. VS. B.S. RAMASWAMY (D) BY LRS. & OTHERS. 7. Learned counsel Sri. M.G. Naganuri, appearing for contesting respondent Nos.3 to 10 submitted that there is no embargo to allow amendment application under Section 48-A(3) of the Act subsequent to 30.06.1979. Amendment effected by Act No.1 of 1979 makes it clear that the Land Tribunal may for valid and sufficient reasons permit the tenant to amend the application. It was contended that the said provision is not akin to the proviso to the Order VI Rule 17 of CPC amended w.e.f. 1.7.2002. Section 48-A(3) of the Act does not prescribe a time limit for filing an amendment petition by the tenant. Satisfactory reasons having been explained by the tenant, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the application. It was submitted that no new item was added in Form-7. The claim made by the tenants in terms of Form-7 was to the extent of 11 acres 36 guntas. However, Note appended therein was noticed by the tenants only during the proceedings before the Tribunal after remand, as such there was no delay in seeking amendment of Form-7 to delete the said “Note”, as the amendment sought for, do not change the nature of the claim. 8. Secondly, it was contended that the division bench of this court setting-aside the order of the learned Single Judge has remanded the matter for fresh consideration by the Tribunal. In such proceedings, which was alive, the amendment was sought for. Distinguishing the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narayanappa(D) By Lrs. (supra), it was contended that in the said case, the amendment application was filed seeking for amendment in Form-7, subsequent to dismissal of the application/Form-7 by the Tribunal. Whereas, in the present set of facts, the application was filed during the pendency of the proceedings and hence the said judgment is not applicable. Similarly, learned counsel made an endeavour to distinguish the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants. Further, it was contended that Rule 17(8) of Rules is not mandatory. It was submitted that the said Rule is akin to Order XX Rule 3 of CPC.
Similarly, learned counsel made an endeavour to distinguish the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants. Further, it was contended that Rule 17(8) of Rules is not mandatory. It was submitted that the said Rule is akin to Order XX Rule 3 of CPC. Non-signing of the order does not vitiate the order. It was further contended that the appellants have admitted in their appeal memo that the tenants were in possession of the land in question to the extent of 11 acres 36 guntas. The learned Single Judge after examining the material on record in extenso has confirmed the order of the Tribunal, allowing the amendment application as sought for, which is justifiable and does not call for any interference by this Court. 9. In support of his contentions, learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments: (i) (2007) 15 SCC 629, SYED BEARY (DEAD) BY LRS. V/S DENNIS LEWIS (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANOTHER (ii) (2009) 17 SCC 630 , DODDAIAH VS. T.N. SIDDALLINGAPPA(DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANOTHER 10. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the material on record. 11. It is beneficial to refer to the scheme of the Act. The Act was enacted with the intention of having a uniform law in the State of Karnataka. The main object of the Act is to confer the ownership on tenants relating to agrarian relationship ceiling on land holdings. A radical change brought about by the said legislation was, all the tenanted lands as on the appointed date as on 1.3.1974 vested with the Government free from all encumbrances. The tenants who were in possession of the land therein on the appointed date were conferred a right to seek for registration of the occupancy of the land, which were in their possession. The Land Tribunals were constituted for grant of occupancy rights. The last date fixed for filing an application in Form-7 claiming occupancy rights was 30.06.1979. In the present case, the applicants filed an application in Form-7 under Section 48-A(3) of the Act on 16.08.1974 within the time prescribed. 12. Section 48-A(3) of the Act contemplates that the form of the application, the form of the notices, the manner of publishing or serving the notices and all other matters connected therewith shall be such as may be prescribed.
12. Section 48-A(3) of the Act contemplates that the form of the application, the form of the notices, the manner of publishing or serving the notices and all other matters connected therewith shall be such as may be prescribed. The Tribunal may for valid and sufficient reasons permit the tenant to amend the application. This provision fell for consideration in catena of judgments rendered by this Court as well as the Hon’ble Apex Court. In the case of Seethadevi(supra), the division bench of this Court has held that no person can make an application in Form No.7 or an application in the nature of an amendment after the expiry of the period fixed under Section 48A(1) of the Act seeking occupancy right in respect of new item of land not included in the application filed within time. 13. In Pakeera Moolya’s case (supra), it was held that it is no doubt true that the tenants and landlords who reside in rural areas may not be fully aware of particulars of land entered in revenue records. The time for filing applications was extended by five years from 1.3.1974 to 30.06.1979 and by which time there was at least one round of litigation or another and enough time to find out particulars of land thereof. The argument of ignorance of litigants therefore does not appeal to us because for a person of diligence five years is a very long period to set right all discrepancies of substantial nature…… If any land is omitted in the original application and after expiry of the period of limitation, it will not be permissible to amend such an application to include new item of land is very clear because that would amount to making a new claim in respect of a new item. Reference was made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in A.K. Gupta and Sons Ltd. Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation, wherein it is held that the expression ‘cause of action’ in that context does not mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chakreshwari Constructions Pvt. Ltd.(supra), observed that that the principle applicable for deciding the application made for amendment in the pleadings remains no more res-integra and is laid down in several cases. 15. The principles laid down in Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs.
14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chakreshwari Constructions Pvt. Ltd.(supra), observed that that the principle applicable for deciding the application made for amendment in the pleadings remains no more res-integra and is laid down in several cases. 15. The principles laid down in Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. Narayanaswamy & Sons, (2009) 10 SCC 84 was referred to which reads as under: “63. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment: (1) whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case; (2) whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide; (3) the amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case; and (6) as a general rule, the court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation on the date of application.” 16. Similarly, in the case of Narayanappa(D) by Lrs. supra, it was held that the Tribunal could only correct clerical or arithmetical error as permitted by Section 48-A of the Act. The ruling of Honnamma’s case supra is distinguishable in as much as amended application was with respect to same survey number, which did not figure in the original application. In that context, it was observed that a mere mis-description while identifying the land in Form No.7 as originally filed would not be hit by the embargo with respect to the last date of the filing of Form No.7 i.e. on 30th June, 1979. The observations in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal Vs.
In that context, it was observed that a mere mis-description while identifying the land in Form No.7 as originally filed would not be hit by the embargo with respect to the last date of the filing of Form No.7 i.e. on 30th June, 1979. The observations in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal Vs. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267 were referred to enunciate the legal proposition that a party cannot be refused amendment in a case of a mis-description of property as the purpose of amendment is to ensure that the real issues are addressed and that in such a case no question of limitation would arise and the amended plaint must be deemed to have been instituted on the date on which the original plaint had been filed, the finding of the High Court on the question of limitation is erroneous. 17. Chander Kanta Bansal supra referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants refers to amendment of written statement which would not be relevant to decide the issue on hand. It is apt to refer to the decision rendered by the division bench of this Court in the case of Vijaya Bank Founders Branch, Mangalore Vs. Secretary to the Government of Karnataka, Revenue Department, 2008 ILR (KAR) 1481, whereby it is held that the failure of the members to sign is not merely a technical lapse, but it goes to the root of the matter. Referring to Rule 17(8) of the Rules, it was observed that the judicial discipline requires that in a multi member judicial/quasi judicial adjudicatory body, all the adjudicators, who have heard the matter should pronounce their written opinion at the same time and place and all of them should sign the order. The said salutary object of law is effectively manifested in Rule 17(8) of the Rules. The order of the Tribunal which is not signed by the all members, who have heard the matter is a nullity and the said order cannot be considered as a valid juridical adjudication. 18.
The said salutary object of law is effectively manifested in Rule 17(8) of the Rules. The order of the Tribunal which is not signed by the all members, who have heard the matter is a nullity and the said order cannot be considered as a valid juridical adjudication. 18. In Syed Beary’s case supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the case wherein the landlord himself had admitted that the tenants were in possession of the land in respect of which amendment was sought for in Form-7 held that the error pertaining to obvious mistake committed in mentioning the correct survey number in Form No.7, survey number mentioned in Form No.7 not even existing in village in question was not a case of making a new claim for grant of occupancy rights. 19. In Doddaiah’s case supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to Section 48-A(3) of the Act held that the Tribunal has power to allow amendment application. In the said case, view of the learned single judge was that the Tribunal had no such power. 20. In the light of these judgments, case on hand is examined and analysed. 21. There is no doubt that the Tribunal has power to entertain the amendment application filed by the tenant. It is also true that the same has to be appreciated considering the facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, as narrated above, in the first round of litigation, the Tribunal has granted occupancy rights to an extent of 11 acres 36 guntas to the tenants. In WP No.13007/1997 filed before this Court, it was noticed that the land vested with the Government is to the extent of 3 acres. Spot inspection report as well as RTC extracts fortifies the same. As such, the learned single judge of this Court modified the extent of lands granted to respondent Nos.3 to 5 to an extent of 3 acres which was under actual cultivation. In an appeal filed by the tenants, the division bench of this Court observed that the learned single judge ought to have remanded the matter to reduce the extent of land instead of modifying the grant order.
In an appeal filed by the tenants, the division bench of this Court observed that the learned single judge ought to have remanded the matter to reduce the extent of land instead of modifying the grant order. It is having suffered these orders, in the proceedings before the Tribunal after remand, on 13.9.2011 after 37 years of filing of the original application/Form-7, tenants have filed an application under Section 48-A(3) of the Act seeking for amendment of Form-7 to delete the “Note” appended thereto. It is relevant to refer to the ‘Note’ mentioned in the original application/Form-7, which reads as under: “NOTE: Applicants are in possession as tenants for the extent of 4 acres 18 guntas”. 22. Amendment application filed by original respondent Nos.3 to 5 is accompanied by an affidavit. Para-3 of the said affidavit states that “the tenants apprehending that the statement made against the word “Note” is interpolation amounting to forgery obviously appears to have been done by the landlord with an ulterior motive to defeat our claim of statutory tenancy rights for the extent of 11 acres 36 guntas.” Again in para-6, it is stated that “the amendment by way of deletion of the entry of note in regard to the applicants are in possession as the tenants for the extent of 4 acres 18 guntas mentioned in Form No.7 on first page at bottom is in formal one, and the same does not change the nature and extent of claim made in Form No.7, in respect of grant of occupancy rights. Therefore, the deletion of the note is deserved to be necessary by way of amendment to avoid further debate, complications and multiple proceedings on this point in the matter.” 23. Apparently, paras-3 and 6 of the said affidavit are contradictory to each other, at one breath the tenants make allegations against the landlords that the ‘Note’ is inserted by the landlords. On the contrary, it is stated that Note in Form-7 does not change the nature and extent of claim made in Form-7 in respect of grant of occupancy rights. The tenants are not serious as regards the allegations made against the landlords attributing the interpolation and forgery against them. The proceedings originating from very same Form-7 was the subject matter of the earlier round of litigation before this Court. The said ‘Note’ was very much available before the Court as part of Form-7.
The tenants are not serious as regards the allegations made against the landlords attributing the interpolation and forgery against them. The proceedings originating from very same Form-7 was the subject matter of the earlier round of litigation before this Court. The said ‘Note’ was very much available before the Court as part of Form-7. At no point of time in the original proceedings, the tenants disputed the contents of the ‘Note’. 24. It is also worth to refer to yet another ‘Note; in Form-7 which reads that the information given above, if found to be incomplete or incorrect, the petitioner is liable to conviction and levy of penalties as provided under Section 125 of the Act. A reading of the same would reveal that the information given by the tenants in Form-7 along with the ‘Note’ that they are in possession of the extent of 4 acres 18 guntas to be inferred as correct information. We are not examining whether the tenants are entitled for grant of occupancy rights to the extent of 11 acres 36 guntas or only to the extent of 4 acres 18 guntas. The case before us is confined only to the amendment application to delete the ‘Note’ in Form-7. As observed by us, the reasons assigned by the tenants for seeking amendment of Form-7 cannot be appreciated. No reasons are forthcoming for the delay of 37 years to seek amendment. The judgments referred to by the learned single Judge in as much as Honnamma’s case and Syed Beary’s case were rendered in the context of mistake committed in Survey number. In such circumstances, it was held that it was not the extent for new claim for grant of occupancy rights and the finding of the High Court on the question of limitation is erroneous. But in the present case, it is hard to accept the amendment as sought for i.e., to delete the admission made by the tenants. The admission of a party to the proceedings creates a right to the other party. The rights accrued to other party cannot be demolished at the instance of the party, who made admission. Even assuming that the law of limitation is not strictly applicable to seek amendment of application under Section 48-A(3) of the Act, same should be within a reasonable time.
The rights accrued to other party cannot be demolished at the instance of the party, who made admission. Even assuming that the law of limitation is not strictly applicable to seek amendment of application under Section 48-A(3) of the Act, same should be within a reasonable time. As aforesaid, the tenants having slept over the matter in the proceedings before this Court cannot awake in the remand proceedings to seek for amendment. 25. It is also beneficial to refer to sub-section 8 of Section 48-A of the Act, wherein it is provided that, where no application is made within the time allowed under sub-section(1), the right of any person to be registered as an occupant shall have no effect. In such circumstances, we are afraid to accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the tenants. 26. It is manifest that the matter was heard by four members along with the Chairman of the Tribunal but the order of the Tribunal is admittedly not signed by one member, i.e. Sri. Shivappa R Solabannavar. Though the Chairman has given a divergent opinion, based on the majority opinion, the amendment application is allowed. In terms of Rule 17(8) of the Rules, the order not being signed by all the members, who heard the matter, the same is a nullity and is vitiated. This view is fortified by the division bench of this Court in Vijaya Bank Founders Branch’s case, supra. 27. The finding of the learned single judge in as much as the impugned order contained signature of all the members as well as the Chairman is contrary to the material placed on record at Annexure-G to the writ petition. Though the learned counsel for the respondents made an endeavour to contend that the said Rule is only directory and not mandatory, the same requires to be negated for the reasons aforesaid. The learned single judge proceeded to hold that the delay in filing the said application requires to be condoned imposing costs of Rs.5,000/- payable to the appellants, which would meet the ends of justice. It is not only on the point of delay but on the other grounds urged by the appellants as mentioned above, the appeal deserves to be allowed setting-aside the order of the learned single judge. Accordingly, the order of the learned single Judge is set-aside. 28. Appeal is allowed.
It is not only on the point of delay but on the other grounds urged by the appellants as mentioned above, the appeal deserves to be allowed setting-aside the order of the learned single judge. Accordingly, the order of the learned single Judge is set-aside. 28. Appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal on I.A. dated 23.12.2011 vide Annexure-G to the writ petition is quashed. The Tribunal shall proceed on merits in accordance with law in an expedite manner. In view of disposal of the appeal, all the pending applications are consigned to file.