JUDGMENT & ORDER : S. TALAPATRA, J. 1. This is an appeal by the victim under proviso to Section-372 of the Cr.P.C. from the judgment and order of acquittal dated 17.09.2015 delivered in S.T. 66(ST/S) of 2014 by the Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia. By the said judgment and order, the respondents No. 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been acquitted from the charge under Section-498A and 306 of the IPC. 2. The genesis of the prosecution against the accused-respondents is rooted in the written ejahar filed by the appellant (PW1) disclosing that his daughter, Shima Akhtar was given marriage to one Harun Miah, the respondent No. 2. For about 6 (Six) months, her marital life was peaceful but after that she found that the respondent No. 2 was having an illicit relation “with another lady of that village”. When she raised her protest, the respondent No. 2 and that lady (the name withheld for protecting her identity in the given context) started assaulting her. 3. There were some village meetings to mitigate the matrimonial crisis, but the respondent No. 2 and the said lady did not relent from assaulting the daughter of the informant (PW1). On 27.03.2013 as revealed in the written ejahar (Exbt.1), the informant’s daughter was abused in filthy languages. That apart, that lady had beaten her. Having failed to bear the torture, she [the informant’s daughter] committed suicide by hanging her. 4. On that very date at about 9 O’clock at night, the informant’s daughter who was pregnant committed suicide by hanging. On the following day, the informant got the information and immediately rushed to the matrimonial home of his daughter and found her hanging in the eastern dwelling hut. Though the incident had occurred on 27.03.2013 and the informant got such information on 28.03.2013 in the morning, the said written ejahar was lodged to the Officer Incharge of Manu Bazar police station, Sabroom, South Tripura, on 29.03.2013 at about 2.05 pm. 5. Based on the said written ejahar (Exbt.8) Manu Bazar P.S. Case No. 18 of 2013 under Section 498A/306 of the IPC was registered and taken up for investigation. On completing the investigation, the police filed the final police report chargesheeting the respondents No. 2, 3, 4 and 5 for committing offence punishable under Section-498A and 306 of the IPC. 5. Based on the said written ejahar (Exbt.8) Manu Bazar P.S. Case No. 18 of 2013 under Section 498A/306 of the IPC was registered and taken up for investigation. On completing the investigation, the police filed the final police report chargesheeting the respondents No. 2, 3, 4 and 5 for committing offence punishable under Section-498A and 306 of the IPC. The police papers were committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur, for proceeding in accordance with law. 6. The trial was transferred to the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur, who framed the charge under Sections-498A and 306 of the IPC separately, to which the respondents No. 2, 3, 4 and 5 had pleaded innocence and claimed to be tried. 7. In order to substantiate the charge, the prosecution has adduced as many as 18 witnesses including the informant and the postmortem doctor (PW15). In addition thereto, the prosecution introduced the documentary evidence (Exbt.1 to 10) including the written ejahar, the postmortem examination report etc. 8. After recording the prosecution’s evidence, the respondents were examined under Section313 of the Cr. P.C. when they reiterated the plea of innocence. On appreciation of the evidence and the arguments as placed by the prosecution and the defence, the trial court, the Court of the Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia, [to be noted that the said case was retransferred] acquitted the respondents No. 2 to 5 on recording that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges framed under Sections-498A/306 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt. 9. The State did not file any appeal against the acquittal. It is the victim (the father of the deceased) has approached this Court by filing this appeal to challenge the said judgment and order of acquittal. 10. Mr. N. Majumder, learned counsel having appeared for the appellant has submitted that the findings as returned by the trial court cannot be sustained as the testimonies of the material witnesses were not properly appreciated. That apart, the trial court has failed to appreciate the provisions of Section-113A of the Indian Evidence Act, as no presumption has been drawn in terms of the said section even though, it has been established by the prosecution that the said daughter of the informant had committed suicide within a period of 7 (seven) years from the date of her marriage. As the respondent No.2 and his inmates had subjected her to cruelty, the court ought to have presumed having noticed the attending circumstances as placed in the records of evidence that such suicide had been abetted by the respondent No. 2 and his inmates, inasmuch the daughter of the appellant was subjected to cruelty for protesting against the illicit relation that the respondent No. 2 was having with the said lady. 11. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has severely criticized the finding of the trial court. According to him, the first ejahar was lodged on 28.03.2013, but there the informant did not mention the name of any person as the accused. In the subsequent FIR filed on 29.03.2013 (Exbt-1) when the informant did mention the names of the accused persons. It is an afterthought, according to the defence, and for taking revenge against the respondent No. 2 and the other relatives for shocking death of her daughter. 12. Mr. Majumder, learned counsel has further submitted that if the evidence is reappreciate, it would be apparent that the prosecution has quite successfully established the charge brought against the accused-respondents. From the other side, Mr. H. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 2 and 3 has quite emphatically submitted that the PW17 has categorically stated in his cross examination carried out by the defence as under: “The same informant on 28.03.2013 gave me a written information about the death of Shima Aktar and that information is registered as FIR of UD Case. The informant did not disclose any cognizable offence in the ejahar made on 28.03.2013.” 13. Further Mr. Debnath, learned counsel has pointed out to this Court, while repelling the submission made by Mr. Majumder, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that PW14, Sri Sankar Saha, one of the Investigating Officers of the case has categorically stated that before registration of that case, there was one UD Case No.06 of 2013 registered under Section-174 of the Cr. P.C. The informant of the present case (PW1)was also the informant of that UD case. 14. Mr. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has further contended that it is apparent on the face of the records that the deceased was given marriage to the respondent No. 2 against her will and that might be the probable cause for her committing suicide. That apart, Mr. 14. Mr. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has further contended that it is apparent on the face of the records that the deceased was given marriage to the respondent No. 2 against her will and that might be the probable cause for her committing suicide. That apart, Mr. Debnath, learned counsel has submitted that there is no evidence of abetment by the respondents No. 2 to 5 or by any one of them, either collectively or individually. 15. Mr. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has also submitted that there was no other allegation against the respondents No. 2 to 5 except “assaulting the deceased”. There was no agitation of unlawful demand. 14. By development of law, it is now well recognized that the High Court in an appeal against acquittal has substantive power to review at large the evidence on which acquittal is founded and to reach to its own conclusion in respect of whether the order of acquittal should be revised or not. But at the same time, when the presumption of innocence has been further consolidated by way of the order of acquittal, the High Court should always give proper weight and consideration to the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses. Presumption is certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial, the right of the accused to the benefit of doubt and the slowness of the appellate court in interfering the finding of fact arrived by the judge who had advantage of seeing the witness. 15. When two views surface on evidence the High Court should not interfere merely because it feels that it would take a different view from the view as taken by the trial court but the High Court will certainly interfere if it finds that the judgment is manifestly erroneous and the trial court has acted with material irregularity or its appreciation of evidence lacks coherence or it has made assumptions which are unwarranted or its evaluation of evidence is as such to shock sense of justice. 16. Generally, the order of acquittal, strengthens the presumption of innocence despite that the High Court may, in the suitable circumstances carry out the re-appreciation of the evidence if the ground of perversity in appreciation of the evidence is raised in the appeal. 16. Generally, the order of acquittal, strengthens the presumption of innocence despite that the High Court may, in the suitable circumstances carry out the re-appreciation of the evidence if the ground of perversity in appreciation of the evidence is raised in the appeal. In the catena of decisions, the apex court, has sounded the caution that if the trial court’s view is reasonable and plausible, the High Court should not reverse the order of acquittal merely on the ground that different view on evidence was plausible. 17. The High Court as the appellate court interferes only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons for doing so”. If the order is “clearly unreasonable” it is a compelling reason for interference. Hence, the High Court should not ordinarily reverse the judgment of acquittal when two views are plausible unless the trial court’s judgment is perverse. 18. The apex court in Chandrappa & Ors vs State Of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 has laid down the general principles for determination of appeal against acquittal in the manner as stated below: “(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restrictions or conditions on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 19. Whether appreciation of the evidence in this case is grossly perverse leading to an unreasonable conclusion of acquittal has to be found from the records of evidence and for that purpose we are inclined to take out a survey of the evidence in a meaningful manner. It appears that the informant Harun Miah (PW1) has stated in the examination-in-chief that her daughter when raised her objection in respect of the illicit relation, that the respondent No. 2 was involved, she was tortured by the said lady. Even the matter was taken to the village shalish (the conciliatory meeting) but even thereafter, the cruelty did not stop. Being unable to bear torture, the informant was compelled to commit suicide. 20. PW1 lodged the written ejahar (Exbt.1). He is also a witness of the memory card (MO Exbt1). In the cross-examination, he has stated as under: “On 28.03.2013 I gave an information to the Manubazar P.S. about the death of my daughter. In the ejahar given on 28.03.2013, I did not mention name of anybody as an accused. On 29.03.2013, I lodged second ejahar. In the second ejahar, I alleged against Harun Miah and Golap Bibi. Golap Bibi is the aunt of Harun Miah (Mashi).” 21. He has further stated in the said cross-examination that he did not specifically state that her daughter told him about her torture in the matrimonial home. Even has admitted that in the ejahar he did not mention that her daughter stayed for one month in their house and she returned a month’s later. In the cross-examination PW1 has further admitted that he did not tell as stated in the ejahar that Nepal Das one panchayat member and Harun Miah came to his house for taking back his daughter. In the cross-examination PW1 has further admitted that he did not tell as stated in the ejahar that Nepal Das one panchayat member and Harun Miah came to his house for taking back his daughter. He has further stated that he was not present in the village Shalish but one Nepal Das were present as told by Nepal Das himself. 22. PW1 has significantly admitted that he had given the marriage of the deceased (Shima Aktar) with Harun Miah (the respondent No. 2) against her will. But he has denied that can be the reason of suicide. Significantly in the cross-examination, PW1 has stated that the age of Harun is about 22/23 years whereas the age of the lady with whom the respondent No. 2 is alleged of having illicit relation was about 60 years. He has denied that he was in an illicit relation. 23. Smt. Bina Aktar (PW2), is the mother of the deceased. She has stated that the dispute started only on discovery of illicit relation with the said lady. She has also stated that the respondent No. 2 and the said lady used to torture her daughter. Once her daughter was brought back to their house and she stayed there for about one month. Thereafter, she was taken back by Harun Miah and Nepal Das after the village shalish was convened in respect of their family dispute, but there was no improvement in the matrimonial situation. She has also stated that the lady was the aunt of the respondent No. 2. 24. PW3, Sri Idu Miah, is the uncle of the deceased. He has almost replicated the statement of PW2. That apart, he was the witness of seizure (Exbt.MO.1). He has identified the signature and the seizure list (Exbt2). But in the cross-examination he has clearly stated that he did not see the incident of torture with his own eyes. He has also admitted that the lady, with whom illicit relation is alleged of, is the aunt of the respondent No. 2 and between them there was a huge age gap. But he has denied that there was any illicit relation as alleged. 25. PW4, Md. Aju Miah, is not a material witness. 26. PW5, Md. Abdul Karim, in the examination-in-chief has stated that PW1 told him once that the said lady used to torture her daughter (Shima Aktar). But he has denied that there was any illicit relation as alleged. 25. PW4, Md. Aju Miah, is not a material witness. 26. PW5, Md. Abdul Karim, in the examination-in-chief has stated that PW1 told him once that the said lady used to torture her daughter (Shima Aktar). But he has admitted in the cross-examination that he did not state that to the investigating officer. 27. PW6, Smt. Kamala Khatun, has projected a different story that she heard from PW1 that the deceased was tortured by her husband and the mother in law. 28. PW7, Alam Miah, is not a material witness as he has clearly stated in the examination-in-chief that he does not know anything about this case. 29. PW8, Noor Ahmed Miah, was declared hostile, even in the cross-examination he had denied to have stated to the investigating officer that “there was often quarrels between Harun Miah and her wife and Harun Miah used to assault his wife and Harun Miah also used to tell his wife to die. On 27.03.2013 in the afternoon I saw Harun Miah was beating his wife in his house and was coming. Thereafter, in that night at 9 pm I heard that Shima Aktar committed suicide.” His statement was marked (Exbt-3), subject to confirmation by the investigating officer. 30. PW9, Sri Biswanath Bhowmik, is a witness of seizure of wearing materials of the deceased (Exbt. M.O –II series). 31. PW10, Smt. Saleya Begum was also declared hostile and she was cross-examined but neither in the examination-in-chief and in the cross-examination she has stated anything material. 32. PW11, Sri Nepal Das, who according to the said witness viz PW2, had taken initiative to bring the reconciliation between the respondent No. 2 and the deceased. A compromise was struck. On reading all these testimonies recorded in the trial, nothing meaningful does appear except convening a shalish, but there is no details to incriminate the respondents No. 2 to 5 in any manner. 33. PW12, Sri Dulal Ch. Banik, is the scribe and his testimony is not material for any other purpose. 34. PW13, Md. Mugal Ahamed, in the examination-in-chief has stated that the informant (PW1) told him that the deceased was not happy in her marital home. But he did not state anything more incriminating the respondents No. 2 to 5. 33. PW12, Sri Dulal Ch. Banik, is the scribe and his testimony is not material for any other purpose. 34. PW13, Md. Mugal Ahamed, in the examination-in-chief has stated that the informant (PW1) told him that the deceased was not happy in her marital home. But he did not state anything more incriminating the respondents No. 2 to 5. As consequence thereof, PW13 had been declared hostile but in the cross-examination neither the prosecution nor the defence could extract any statement which would support their respective cases and as such, there is no material value in the testimony of PW13. For not supporting the prosecution case, he was declared hostile. 35. PW14, Sri Sankar Saha, who is a Sub-inspector of police. He filed the charge sheet as the I.O, but he did not investigate any part. He simply put the materials together in the form of the charge sheet. 36. PW15, Dr. Debajyoti Majumder, who carried out the postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased (Shima Aktar) in connection with Manubazar P.S. Case No. 06 of 2013 under Section-174 of the Cr.P.C. has clearly stated in the trial that after the postmortem examination he prepared the report. According to the report, the cause of death was asphyxia. He identified his report (Exbt-7). 37. PW16, Smt. Nirjahan Begum Alias Nazimensha has stated that the respondent No. 2 and the deceased used to quarrel on flimsy grounds. 38. PW17, Sri Firoz Miah, who has testified that as the officer Incharge of the Manubazar police station, he registered the Manubazar P.S. case No. 18 of 2013 under Sections-498/306 of IPC and filled up the format of the FIR. He has revealed nothing more. 39. PW18, Sri Manindra Debbarma, who as the SI of police carried out the investigation, has clearly stated in his testimony that the information about the unnatural death of one Shima Aktar was given to the police station by PW1. Initially an entry was made in the general diary under No. GDE. No. 931 of Manubazar police station and subsequently it was registered as U.D Case No. 06 of 2013 dated 28.03.2013, under Section-174 of the Cr. P.C. 40. PW18 went to the place of occurrence without wasting time and found the corpus of the deceased hanging from a wooden beam of the hut. No. 931 of Manubazar police station and subsequently it was registered as U.D Case No. 06 of 2013 dated 28.03.2013, under Section-174 of the Cr. P.C. 40. PW18 went to the place of occurrence without wasting time and found the corpus of the deceased hanging from a wooden beam of the hut. He carried out the inquest procedure, seized the wearing apparels of the deceased and after postmortem examination, the dead body was handed over to PW1. Thereafter, on 29.03.2013, on the basis of the subsequent ejahar, Manubazar P.S. Case No. 18 of 2013 was registered and investigation was taken up. He carried out the investigation and he has briefly stated how he proceeded with the investigation. He prepared a sketch map of the place of occurrence. Thereafter, he started examination of the witnesses. He confirmed and proved the statement of Noor Ahamed (PW8) as recorded by him and the statement of Saleya Begum, PW10. 41. PW18 had arrested the respondent No. 2. He alone had examined the witnesses but he could not file the charge sheet. In the cross-examination he has revealed that the house of Saleya Begum, PW10 is in a faraway place. 42. Before we appreciate the evidence within the parameters as discussed above, let us read the postmortem examination report (Exbt-7). There is no external appearance of injuries in the person of the deceased. But internal injuries such as the fracture of the hyoid bone as a result of hanging has been located in the postmortem examination. The postmortem doctor found the ligature mark around about the neck at the level of thyroid. The medical opinion is definite and clear. According to the postmortem doctor, the cause of death is asphyxia due to hanging. 43. The case of death was never suspected even by the I.O. nor the appellant herein. The case of the prosecution is therefore is that there was abetment from the respondents No. 2 to 5 and as a result, the deceased committed suicide by hanging. There is no specific incident of abetment within the meaning of Section-107 of the IPC has been placed and proved in the evidence, but the appellant has testified that for the illicit relation the deceased was frustrated and when she protested she was regularly subjected to assault and abused and for that reason she had committed suicide. There is no specific incident of abetment within the meaning of Section-107 of the IPC has been placed and proved in the evidence, but the appellant has testified that for the illicit relation the deceased was frustrated and when she protested she was regularly subjected to assault and abused and for that reason she had committed suicide. The remoteness or immediacy of instigation has not been focused in the evidence. 44. Before we proceed further, let us have a look at the provision of Section-107 of the IPC. Section-107 of the IPC provides what abetment of a thing means. From overall reading of Section-107, it can be gathered that abetment involves a mental process of instigation of a person or intentional aiding the person and doing of a thing and in cases of conspiracy also it would involve the mental process of entering into conspiracy for the doing of that thing. 45. Instigating or aiding the doing of a thing is required. It can be said to be abetting the commission of offence under Section-306 of the IPC if that grave instigation is given. A person abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime (Sohan Raj Sharma vs State Of Haryana, reported in (2008) 11 SCC 215 ). 46. The word 'instigate' denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or unadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mensrea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation. It is common knowledge that the words uttered in a quarrel or in a spur of the moment cannot be taken to be uttered with mensrea. It is in a fit of anger and emotional (Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar vs State Of M.P reported in 2002 5 SCC 371 ). 47. Therefore, this Court has to search for the evidence of commission of: (a) cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC and (b) abetment to commit suicide as distinctly illustrated under Section-107 of the IPC for purpose of commission of offence punishable under Section-306 of the IPC. 48. 47. Therefore, this Court has to search for the evidence of commission of: (a) cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A of the IPC and (b) abetment to commit suicide as distinctly illustrated under Section-107 of the IPC for purpose of commission of offence punishable under Section-306 of the IPC. 48. There is reliable evidence that on 28.03.2013 the same informant informed to the Manubazar P.S. about the “unnatural” death of his daughter. It has surfaced in the evidence that at the time of filing of that information he did not disclose that any crime had been committed or the respondents No. 2 to 5 were the offenders. But after two days of the commission of offence as stated above, a written ejahar was filed stating all new facts relating to illicit relation with a lady, who is 40 years older to the respondent No. 2 and as her daughter protested against such relation, she was regularly abused or physically assaulted by the respondents No. 2 to 5. 49. It is been clearly stated in the ejahar that failing to bear such abuse and assault, she committed suicide, but nowhere in the ejahar, not even in the oral statement neither PW1 or PW2 have stated in the trial that the same was stated by the deceased on any point of time though there is some references of the village shalish but in this regard, there is no evidence wherefrom the past incrimination can be gathered. 50. There is no foundation of fact in this respect. Moreover, when such statement was made by the deceased, there was no endeavour from the prosecution to establish that such statement can be termed as the dying declaration of the deceased so as to cover the said statement of the deceased under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. As such, this Court cannot infer the fact relating to the abetment has been proved. 51. Moreover, in the circumstances the delayed filing of the ejahar on 29.03.2013, compounds more suspicion about the truthfulness of the revelation made in the written ejahar. Cumulative reading thereof leads us to believe that the allegations as made in the written ejahar or as deposed in the trial by PW1 and PW2 can be relied for returning the conviction of the respondents No. 2 to 5, the accused in the trial. 52. Cumulative reading thereof leads us to believe that the allegations as made in the written ejahar or as deposed in the trial by PW1 and PW2 can be relied for returning the conviction of the respondents No. 2 to 5, the accused in the trial. 52. There is no element in the records of evidence to bank upon for purpose of holding that there is evidence relating to cruelty within the meaning of Section-498A of the IPC. As already stated, unless there is independent evidence not based on the statement made by the deceased, no reliance can be placed. So for the statement of the deceased is concerned, it has to be shown that such statement can be exempted under Section-32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. But there had been no endeavour at all and as such, these statements are fatally hit by the hearsay rule. If the element of cruelty is not established, even if the unnatural death occurs within 7 years from the day of marriage, no presumption can be drawn of abetment under Section 113(A) of the Evidence Act. Hence, we do not find any infirmity in the finding returned by the trial court. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed. LCRs be returned forthwith.