JUDGMENT : 1. Although all the petitions have been labelled as one under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, yet having regard to the fact that the challenge is to the order of the Tribunal and also considering the nature of the pleadings and the reliefs prayed for, the applications are in substance one invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Since the issues raised in all the captioned applications are interconnected, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 3. For the sake of convenience, the Special Civil Application No.10589 of 2017 is treated as the lead matter. 4. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the State of Gujarat calls in question the legality and validity of the order dated 26th February 2007 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.TEN/BA/ 260 of 2001 and has also prayed for the following reliefs : "(C) That the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order and/or directions declaring that the land in question situated at land bearing old survey No.168, 171, Block No.162 paiki, admeasuring Acre-4 and 22 Gntha, Moje Jagatpur, Taluka : Daskroi, (The Then) Ghatlodiya. District Ahmedabad, are having restrictions of Section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and are "New Tenure" lands and may be pleased to issue necessary direction to the Respondent No.4 and Respondent No.6 to deposit the amount of premium as it may be fixed by the State Government. (D) During the pendency, hearing and final disposal of the petition, Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to stay the operation, implementation and execution of the impugned orders passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Revision Application No.TEN/BA/260 of 2001 dated 26.02.2007 and the order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi (E) Your Lordships may be pleased to pass such other and further relief in favour of the petitioner, as deemed just and proper, in the facts and circumstances of the case." 5. The case put up by the State of Gujarat, while questioning the legality and validity of the order passed by the Tribunal, is as under : 4.1 The land bearing old Survey No.168, 171, Block No.162 paiki, admeasuring Acre-4 and 22-Guntha, Moje Jagatpur, Taluka Daskroi, (The Then) Ghatlodiya, District Ahmadabad (hereinafter referred to as “Land in question” for sake of brevity. It is submitted that Respondent No.5 are the original owner of the land in question and Respondent no. 4 got the land as tenancy right as a tenant and respondent no.6 is subsequent purchaser of the land in question. Since the issue involved in the matter relates to the land in question and subsequent purchasers are affected by the outcome of the proceedings, they are joined a party respondents in the present petition. 4.2 That the land in question was running in the name of the Respondent No.5 and the father of the respondent no.4 i.e. Maganbhai Jivabhai was cultivating the land in question as “Protected Tenant”. 4.3 That upon coming into force of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 whereby the after initiating the proceedings under section 32-G of the Tenancy Act, 1948 Manubhai Maganbhai had purchased the said land in question after paying the purchase price and same was mutated in revenue record vide entry no.458 dated 23.07.1965. It is respectfully submitted that the since 1935-1936 to 1965-1966 Manubhai Maganbhai were cultivating the said land in question as "Protected Tenant”. they were declared as deemed purchasers. 4.4 The Petitioner states and submits that the right from the inception the land in question is shown as “New Tenure” land as reflected in the revenue record since 1939, 1940. Since the land the question was acquired by the Respondent No 4 as deemed purchaser under the provision of the Tenancy Act, 1948 the land in question has continued as restricted tenure land under the provision of section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. It is pertinent to note that the Respondent No. 4 cultivating the land in question as “Protected Tenant”. It is clearly mentioned in the 7/12 extract second column. It is pertinent to note that the Respondent No. 4 cultivating the land in question as “Protected Tenant”. It is clearly mentioned in the 7/12 extract second column. It is pertinent to note that as per the section 43(l) of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 any land purchased under the provisions of section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 shall be subject to the restrictions of the section 43(1) Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. 4.5 On 03.10.1992 Respondent No.4 made an application before the Respondent No.1 i.e. Deputy Collector, (Land Reforms) Appeals, Ahmadabad and claiming the status of Permanent Tenant in the land in question. Application was registered as Tenancy Revision Application No.612 of 1992 to 622 of 1992 and 627 of 1992 to 629 of 1992. On 23.10.1992 Respondent No.1 remanded back the matter to the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi with a limited direction to examine whether the respondent deemed purchaser are the permanent tenant or not. 4.6 The Mamlatdar & ALT Daskroi initiated inquiry by registering the Tenancy Case No.571 of 1992 to 575 of 1992 and 580 of 1992 to 589 of 1992. Kindly be noted that these cases were in respect of various survey numbers of village Jagatpur. Thereafter, notices were issued to the Respondent. Upon hearing the respective parties, The Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi. On 23.11.1992 within short time, without properly verifying the correct facts and without properly appreciating the correct position of law, held that the Respondent No. 4 “Permanent Tenant”. 4.7 Order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi was taken into suo moto review after a period of four years by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Appeal by exercise of power under section 76A of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and registered Tenancy case No. 105 of 1996 to 119 of 1996. 4.7 Order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi was taken into suo moto review after a period of four years by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Appeal by exercise of power under section 76A of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and registered Tenancy case No. 105 of 1996 to 119 of 1996. On 31.12.1998 the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) Appeal, Ahmadabad declared that the land in question is not attracting the restrictions of section 43(l) of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 also declared that Tenant as permanent Tenants, restrictions under section 43 of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 not applicable and removed the restrictions and Withdraw the notice under section 76(A) of the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and confirm the order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi. 4.8 On 16.12.1998 the Collector, Ahmedabad granted permission under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948 to respondent no.6 with certain conditions. It is pertain to note that after granting permission till today there is no constructions made by respondent no.6 in the said land in question. On 27.02.2014 after granting more than sufficient time the Collector, Ahmedabad reject the application for extension of time. 4.9 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 31.12.1998 passed by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms), Appeal Ahmadabad as well as the order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi, the Petitioner herein preferred the Revision Application No. TEN/BA/260 of 2001 before the Hon’ble Gujarat Revenue Tribunal under section 76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. On 26.02.2007 the Hon’ble Gujarat Revenue Tribunal rejecting the Revision Application of the present Petitioner by ignoring the order dated 31.12.1998 passed by the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) Appeal Ahmadabad as finding the same without jurisdiction on the ground that powers under section 76A were exercised beyond period of limitation of one year whereas, on other hand was pleased to confirm the order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi. That the Hon’ble Gujarat Revenue Tribunal was pleased to reject the revision on the ground that the order of the Deputy Collector (Land Reforms) Appeal, Ahmedabad dated 23.10.1992 remanding the matter back to the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi stands final, in absence of any challenges, The Mamlatdar & ALT had rightly passed the impugned order dated 23.11.1992. 6. At this stage, let me look into the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. The relevant observations made by the Tribunal are as under : "7. Shri Pandit further contended that the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT is dated 23.11.1992 and it was taken in suo motu revision by the learned Dy.Collector under Sec.76A of the Act, in the year 1996 i.e. after the lapse of about 4 years and beyond the period of one year prescribed under Sec. 76A of the Act. Therefore, he alternatively argued that the learned Dy.Collector on account of limitation prescribed in Sec.76A had no jurisdiction to initiate revisional proceedings or to exercise suo motu powers under Sec.76A of the Act. Therefore, the said order of the learned Dy.Collector being without jurisdiction is a nullity. According to him, if this be a situation, in absence of any appeal under Sec.74 of the Act, preferred by the State Government, the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT dated 23.11.1992 now cannot be disturbed by way of these revision applications under Sec.76 of the Act. In support of his argument, he has cited authority reported in 1995(1) GLR p-636 in the case of Thakorbhai V/s State of Gujarat, wherein it has been held that the revisional powers cannot be exercised by the Collector even at the instance of State Government after the expiration of one year from the date of concerned order. He further submitted that all the revision applications which have been filed on 23.8.2001 are clearly time barred since the impugned order of the learned Dy. Collector is dated 31.12.1998. He submitted that for condonation of delay, the affidavit filed by the Resident Dy. Collector, Ahmedabad does not mention any grounds which would come within the parameter of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and no sufficient cause has been shown. Therefore, he submitted that the revision applications be dismissed. Collector is dated 31.12.1998. He submitted that for condonation of delay, the affidavit filed by the Resident Dy. Collector, Ahmedabad does not mention any grounds which would come within the parameter of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and no sufficient cause has been shown. Therefore, he submitted that the revision applications be dismissed. He further contended that the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, has already granted the permission for development of these lands for residential purpose by order dated 1.11.2001 and, therefore, the equity is created in favour of the opponents which is also a fact required to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case. He also submitted that the opponents have already submitted an application to the learned Collector for granting permission to convert the suit lands for Non agricultural use on 1.4.1999 which is pending. 8. Admittedly, the grievance of the State is that the learned Dy.Collector (L.R.) Appeal, Ahmedabad has confirmed the finding of the Mamlatdar & ALT, which is ex-facie illegal but in this connection, it is to be noticed that undisputedly; (a) The learned Dy. Collector remanded the matter back to the Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi, by his order dated 23.10.1992 which has not been challenged. (b) The Mamlatdar & ALT, Daskroi, by his order dated 23.11.1992 held the deemed purchasers to be the permanent tenants. (c) The said order of the Mamlatdar & ALT was taken in suo motu review by the learned Dy.Collector (L.R.) Appeal, Ahmedabad in suo motu Revision cases in the year 1996 i.e. after the a lapse of 4 years. 9. In such admitted position, if we peruse the provisions of Sec.76A of the Act, it empowers the Dy.Collector to exercise suo motu jurisdiction. It clearly lays down the limitation for such exercise of powers of one year only from the date of the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT and not thereafter. The authority cited on behalf of the contested opponents also speaks for the same proposition of law wherein it has been laid down that no record can be called for by the Collector after the expiry of one year from the date of order made by the Mamlatdar & ALT or Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such order. The proviso of Sec.76A would be applicable even in a case where a reference is made by the State Government requiring the Collector to call for record for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of the order. The limitation of one year is very clear and explicit and the Collector will have no revisional powers to be exercised beyond the period of one year prescribed by proviso to Section 76A. In this settled legal situation, the Dy.Collector could not have exercised his revisional powers and, therefore, the impugned order of the learned Dy.Collector can safely be said to be an order without jurisdiction apart from the merits of the case. But this situation does not rest here. If the order of the learned Dy.Collector is held to be an order without jurisdiction, the fact remains that the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT passed in each case stands as it is because the same has not been challenged by the State Government under Sec.74 of the Act. Admittedly, the State Government cannot challenge the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT under Sec.76 of the Act: before this Tribunal and for that purpose the appellate authority i.e. Collector or Dy.Collector under Sec.74 and admittedly, the State Government has not filed any appeal against any order of the Mamlatdar & ALT. Therefore, even if the order of the learned Dy.Collector challenged under Sec.76 of the Act, is held to be illegal and without jurisdiction, the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT stands as it is and, therefore, all the revision applications become redundant or infructuous. 10. In view of above legal situation, this Tribunal does not find it fit to examine the merits of the case on the ground that the deemed purchasers are not permanent tenants. 11. Much has been stressed on the point of limitation that the revision applications have been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for which no explanation establishing sufficient cause has been shown. In this regard, it is the contention of the State Government that they came to know of it a month back before the date of filing of the applications about the order passed by the learned Dy.Collector. In this regard, it is the contention of the State Government that they came to know of it a month back before the date of filing of the applications about the order passed by the learned Dy.Collector. However, it may be mentioned here that, as discussed earlier, the order passed by the learned Dy.Collector is Without jurisdiction and non-est and, therefore, in a sense, it is nullity order and, therefore, as observed earlier, in absence of any appeal preferred by the State Government under Sec.74 of the Act, the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT dated 23.11.1992 stands as it is and considering the provisions of Sec.76 of the Act which confers the jurisdiction on this Tribunal, the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT cannot be challenged straightway and, therefore, looking to the settled legal situation, if we ignore the contention of the contesting opponents about the limitation, then also the revision applications become redundant and therefore even ignoring the question of limitation, these revision applications deserve to be dismissed. 12. It may be stated here that as per the doctrine of merger of orders, ordinarily an order passed by the court below merges in the order passed by the appellate or revisional authority. But that principle can be applied only when the order of the appellate or the revisional court is not without jurisdiction or is not non-est. Here, as discussed earlier, the learned Dy.Collector had exercised the suo motu revisional powers under Sec.76A of the Act, after the prescribed period of one year which he could not have exercised and, therefore, the order of the learned Dy.Collector (L.R.) Appeal, Ahmedabad is without jurisdiction and non-est. Therefore, the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT cannot be said to have merged with the order of the learned Dy.Collector and, therefore, as discussed earlier, the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT, passed on 23.11.1992 stands as it is in absence of any challenge to it under Sec.74 of the Act, and, therefore also, the question of limitation raised by the State, in our opinion, does not cause any significant aspect in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. 13. Over and above this facts it does transpire from the record that the learned Collector, Ahmedabad by order dated 19.6.2001, and also by order dated 22.3.2000, and by order dated 16.12.99 and by order dated 21.3.2000, and by order dated 16.1.2001, and by order dated 12.12.2000 has granted the permission under section 63 of the Act read with rule 36 of the Bombay Tenancy Rules 1956 has granted the permission to sell the suit lands to opponent No.5-Sursuta Co. Op. Housing Society Ltd and accordingly in each case the sale deeds have been executed by the original landlords in favour of the opponent No.5 society and each transaction is not less than for Rs.three lakhs. When the learned Collector himself has granted the said permission without imposing any premium and that too for residential non-agricultural use, it should be impliedly said that the order passed by both the lower authorities declaring owners as permanent tenants were acquiesced by the learned Collector i.e. representative of the State Government in each case and therefore in other words by the present revision applications the learned Collector, Ahmedabad wants to revoke those permissions and this step taken by the state government is not permissible on the ground of estoppel. On one hand before filing these revision application they granted the permission under section 63 to the opponent No.5 society to purchase the suit lands for a huge amount before filing these revision application and now by this revision application they challenge the order of the lower authorities declaring the deemed purchasers as permanent tenant. The state government cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold in the same breath. Once the permission under section 63 is granted by the state government unconditionally to opponent No.4&5 for residential purpose, it would not lie in the mouth of the state government to challenge the impugned orders by way of this revision as the stand taken by Collector in filing these revision applications is diametrically opposite to the stand taken in granting the various permissions under section 63 of the Act for residential use in favour of Opponent No.5 society and therefore also on these additional grounds all the revision applications are required to be dismissed. 14. 14. It may be noted here that in respect of the suit lands the proceedings under section 84C of the Act were initiated in those proceedings, this Tribunal by way of revision application No.TEN.B.A.234/2001, 235/2001, 236/2001, 237/2001, 239/2001, 241/2001, 244/2001 and 246/2001. The Division Bench of this Tribunal consisting of the then President and learned member of this Tribunal by order dated 16.7.2004 have rejected those revision applications preferred by State of Gujarat and the notices under section 84C were discharged on the ground that the transaction entered into by and between the parties and are valid transactions. It may be noted here that for those revision applications decided earlier parties, were some with same survey numbers. It does not transpire that these orders passed on 16.7.2004 have been challenged by the state government and therefore those orders also have become final and conclusive between the parties and therefore also these revision applications are not acceptable." 7. On 3rd August 2017, this Court passed the following order : "In these set of petitions filed by the State of Gujarat, the challenge is to the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal way back in the year 2007. A preliminary contention has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents that these petitions may not be entertained only on the ground of delay of 10 years in questioning the legality and validity of the order passed by the Tribunal. In the memo of the petitions, no explanation worth the name has been offered for the delay of 10 years in challenging the orders passed by the Tribunal. As a preliminary contention has been raised, the State Government need to explain why such a long delay has occurred. Let such delay be explained by way of an additional affidavit pointing out the circumstance, if any. Post the matters on 13/09/2017." 8. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court, referred to above, calling upon the State to explain the gross delay of ten years in filing these applications, the State filed an additional affidavit duly affirmed by one Shri Balmukund N.Patel, Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad, inter alia, stating as under : "3.1 The impugned order dt. 26.2.2007 came to be passed by the hon’ble Gujarat revenue Tribunal whereby the legal opinion of the Government Pleader was received by the office of Collector on 3.9.2009. 26.2.2007 came to be passed by the hon’ble Gujarat revenue Tribunal whereby the legal opinion of the Government Pleader was received by the office of Collector on 3.9.2009. The Collector, Ahmedabad had called for record of the cases as various parcel of lands were involved. 3.2 That upon considering the records of the cases of different parcel of land, the Collector was of the firm opinion of filing writ petition challenging the order of the tribunal before this Hon’ble Court. Therefore, considering the fact that ultimately the economic interest of State is prejudice, vide letter being A.C.B./T.N.C./Jagatpur/G.R.T./10, dated 22.6.2010, the Collector sought permission of the Revenue Department. 3.3 That various details were called for and after period of 8 months, vide communication no.Tenant-11-2010-1721-Z, dt. 5.02.2011, the Section officer of the Revenue Department had called for separate files of each cases and separate proposals with relevant revenue record. 3.4 That again the papers and orders of each six matters were collected with separate legal opinions and proposal was send. That in between correspondence had taken place between two offices as the record was bulky which include 8 different parcels of land at Jagatpur. That it may kindly be appreciated that original records of the Tenancy cases were of Year 1992. That in response to the communication dt. 10.6.2011, the Collector office had submitted relevant papers and had vide communication dt. 27.9.2013, requested the Revenue Department to give sanction to file writ petition. 3.5 That the Section officer, once again vide communication dt. 25.11.2013, requested the Collector, Ahmedabad to examine the legal opinion of the Government pleader of each case and submit his clear opinion on merits of the case. 3.6 The Collector after careful consideration of each cases, and after analysing the facts of the case submitted his detailed opinion on 21.7.2014 and requested the State to give permission to file writ petition before this Hon’ble Court. 3.7 The State Government called for relevant case papers vide communication dt. 27.3.2015. Thereafter, the officer from the office of Collector was requested to remain personally present with the record for discussion vide letter dt. 04.09.2015. 3.8 That vide communication dt. 14.07.2017, the Revenue Department granted permission to file writ petition before this Hon’ble Court in all the six cases. 3.7 The State Government called for relevant case papers vide communication dt. 27.3.2015. Thereafter, the officer from the office of Collector was requested to remain personally present with the record for discussion vide letter dt. 04.09.2015. 3.8 That vide communication dt. 14.07.2017, the Revenue Department granted permission to file writ petition before this Hon’ble Court in all the six cases. That the office of the Government pleader was consulted and relevant papers were provided and some time was consumed in drafting the petition and finalizing the draft. The office of Government Pleader, High Court of Gujarat had called for reasons for the time consume in challenging the impugned order of Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and petition came to be filed thereafter. 4. In aforesaid facts and circumstances, I humbly say and submit that as per law officers rule, the authority before approaching to the Court has to get sanction form the concerned department to file any proceedings in consultation with the Legal department. As can be seen from the aforesaid dates and events, it may kindly be noted that all throughout there was no deliberate attempt by the State authorities to delay the proceedings. On the contrary, all through out the attempt was made to get sanction for filing the petition. I further humbly say and submit that even otherwise no prejudice is likely to be caused to the private respondents in as much as that the equities have not changed the hand. At one stage, the tribunal has recorded that section 63 permission has been granted to the Society by the Collector way back in the Year 2000-2001 but admittedly the same was subject to terms and conditions namely putting to non agricultural use and admittedly till date no construction has been put on the land in question, in fact application was moved praying for extension of section 63 permission which was though earlier extended but vide communication 27.2.2014, has been refused. It is therefore, humbly prayed that there being no change in the position of land in question no hardship is going to occur to the respondents, if delay is condoned and the matter is decided on merits. It is therefore, humbly prayed that there being no change in the position of land in question no hardship is going to occur to the respondents, if delay is condoned and the matter is decided on merits. I further say and submit that the State interest is protected if the private respondent no.5 Society is agreeable to pay premium however, the said society is misinterpreting the impugned orders and insisting that the land in question be treated as “old tenure”, dehors the finding and conclusion of the Mamlatdar & ALT and the further confirmation by the Hon’ble Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and hence this cause of action has arose to file the present petition. So far as delay is concerned, it may kindly be appreciated that as per the settled position of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jesinghbhai Gohel and others, the relevant date for fixing premium would be the date of order fixing premium. It is, therefore, humbly stated and submitted that no prejudice is likely to be caused to the private respondents on count of delay and assuming for a moment, without admitting the same the fact remains the land continues to be “new tenure” land, for the facts stated above and therefore also, if the present petition is entertained no prejudice is likely to be caused to the private respondents. On the other hand, the petitioner State may suffer financial loss in case the wrong interpretation is assumed to be correct while giving meaning to the word “permanent tenant”. Again this may established a wrong precedent in respect of other cognate cases which may ultimately result in loss of huge premium of the State Government. I may also draw the attention of the Hon’ble court where in almost identical question of law in respect of land of same village of Jagatpur, State had filed writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal being SCA no. 14567 of 2015, wherein this Hon’ble Court vide Oral order dt. 15.9.2015 was pleased to admit the matter and grant ad-interim relief. Herewith annexed and marked as Annexure A is the copy of the order dt.15.9.2015 passed by the Learned Single Judge in SCA no. 14567 of 2015. That the said order was challenged by the private respondents by way of a Letters Patent Appeal being LPA no. 15.9.2015 was pleased to admit the matter and grant ad-interim relief. Herewith annexed and marked as Annexure A is the copy of the order dt.15.9.2015 passed by the Learned Single Judge in SCA no. 14567 of 2015. That the said order was challenged by the private respondents by way of a Letters Patent Appeal being LPA no. 1254 of 2015, wherein the Hon’ble Division bench was pleased to confirmed the order of the Learned Single Judge vide order dt. 15.9.2015. Here with annexed and marked as Annexure B is the copy of the order dt.28.9.2015 passed by the Hon’ble Division Bench in LPA no.1254 of 2015 upholding the order of the Learned Single Judge. It further appears that the said order was also further taken in appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court being SLP no. of 2016 whereby the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to dismiss the said appeal upholding both the orders of the Hon’ble High Court. Ultimately, the private parties agreed to pay the premium as Was determined on date of decision and vide order dated 13.01.2016, the said petition being SCA no. 14567 of 2017 Was disposed. Here with annexed and marked as Annexure C is the copy of the said order dt. 13.01.2016 passed in SCA no.14567 of 2017. In these peculiar facts and circumstances, I humbly say and submit that in absence of my malaflde intention on part of the authority or deliberate attempt to prolonge the litigation, when the authority has continuously tried to persuade the State to grant permission, the present petition may kindly be entertained and allowed, in the interest of justice. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE : 9. Ms.Nisha Thakore, the learned AGP appearing for the State, submitted that the impugned order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal could be termed as absolutely illegal and erroneous in law. The learned AGP submitted that although there is a delay of ten years in questioning the common order passed by the Tribunal, yet having regard to the gross facts of the case the delay may be condoned and the matter may be looked into on merits. The learned AGP submitted that by way of an additional affidavit the State has explained why it took ten long years to file these applications questioning the legality and validity of the order passed by the Tribunal. The learned AGP submitted that by way of an additional affidavit the State has explained why it took ten long years to file these applications questioning the legality and validity of the order passed by the Tribunal. According to the learned AGP, reasonable and sufficient cause has been assigned in this regard. 10. Ms.Thakore, the learned AGP, submitted that the question of condonation of delay is one of the discretion of the court and should be decided on the basis of the facts of the case. According to the learned AGP, the defence of laches or inordinate delay is a defence in equity. Ms.Thakore, in support of her submissions, has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and others v. M.I.D.C. and others, reported in AIR 2013 SC 565 . His Lordship Dr.B.S.Chauhan, J. reiterated the position of law on the issue of delay. What was assailed before the Supreme Court was the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Bombay by way of which the High Court had rejected the claim of the appellants for compensation due to them for the land taken by the respondent authorities, without resorting to any procedure prescribed by law. It was contended before the Court that the delay and laches on the part of the appellants had extinguished the right to put forth a claim. In such circumstances, His Lordship made the following observations in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12, which, in my opinion, are very apt and helps the petitioners : "10. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional imitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 11. The question of condonation of delay is one of the discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party's defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S.Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. and Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (AIR 2008 SC (Suppl) 824);) 12. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide:Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 769 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. V. Mst. Katiji and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353 ; Delhi Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors., AIR 1993 SC 802 : (1992 AIR SCW 3181); Dayal Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2003 SC 1140 : (2003 AIR SCW 685); and Shankara Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. v. M.Prabhakar and Ors. AIR 2011 SC 2161 : (2011 AIR SCW 3033))" 11. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned AGP prays that there being merit in all the applications filed by the State, those be allowed and the impugned order of the Tribunal be quashed. 12. On the other hand, all these applications have been vehemently opposed by Mr.R.S.Sanjanwala, the learned senior counsel assisted by Mr.Sahil M.Shah, the learned counsel appearing for the private respondents. 13. Mr.Sanjanwala submitted that all the applications deserve to be rejected only on the ground of delay and laches. He would submit that by any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the State has been able to offer any reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay. According to Mr.Sanjanwala, there has been substantial developments in the last ten years, and if the order passed by the Tribunal is interfered or disturbed at this stage, then it may cause irreparable injury to his clients, which cannot be compensated in terms of money. 14. Mr.Sanjanwala seeks to rely upon the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed by his client, namely, Shri Bharatbhai Haribhai Kumbhani. Shri Bharatbhai has filed the affidavit-in-reply in his capacity as the Chairman of the Sursuta Cooperative Housing Society Vibhag-2. 14. Mr.Sanjanwala seeks to rely upon the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed by his client, namely, Shri Bharatbhai Haribhai Kumbhani. Shri Bharatbhai has filed the affidavit-in-reply in his capacity as the Chairman of the Sursuta Cooperative Housing Society Vibhag-2. The relevant averments are extracted hereunder : "I, Bharatbhai Haribhai Kumbhani S/0 Haribhai Kumbhani, Adult, Hindu, Indian inhabitant, Residing at 5, Ramji Krupa Soc. Katargam, Surat, do hereby solemnly affirm and state as under : 1. I state that I am conversant with the facts and circumstances of the case and am competent to file the present Affidavit in reply to the captioned petition. I state that I am working as the Chairman of Sursuta Co-operative Housing Society Vibhag-2, at present. 2. I state that Sursuta Co-operative Housing Society Limited, was divided into ten divisions in the year 2006. The lands in question, were assigned to Sursuta Cooperative Housing Society Limited Vibhag-1/Sursuta Cooperative Housing Society Limited Vibhag-2. The said entities being successor to Sursuta Cooperative Housing Society Limited, the order dated 26.02.2007 binds the said entities also. 3. I state and submit that there is a gross delay of more than 10 years in filing of the present petition. Such a gross delay in filing of the present petition ought not to be condoned merely on the ground that the present petition is being filed by the State Government. Institutionalised lethargy cannot be a ground to explain the laches of more than ten years. Merely because the bureaucratic machinery is involved, it cannot be a ground for seeking condonation of delay of more than 10 years. I state and submit that even as per the Petitioner themselves, the application for seeking permission of the concerned authority of the State Government, to file the present petition was submitted in the year 2010. Whereas, the decision to file the present petition was taken in the year 2016. The said fact clearly reflects that the lackadaisical attitude of the State Government. 4. The Petitioner herein, in effect seeks to challenge the order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Learned Mamlatdar. Accordingly, if the date of the order passed by the Learned Mamlatdar is considered, there is a delay of almost 25 years in filing of the present petition. The said fact clearly reflects that the lackadaisical attitude of the State Government. 4. The Petitioner herein, in effect seeks to challenge the order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Learned Mamlatdar. Accordingly, if the date of the order passed by the Learned Mamlatdar is considered, there is a delay of almost 25 years in filing of the present petition. A writ of certiorari being an extraordinary discretionary remedy, ought not to be granted in a case where there is such a gross delay on the part of the Petitioner. It is a settled principle of law that an unreasonable delay, may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. Therefore, if the present petition is admitted, despite such gross delay, it would result into miscarriage of justice and gross injustice to the answering Respondent herein. 5. I state and submit that the internal correspondences between the concerned authorities of the State Government, reflect the gross delay in filing of the present petition. The delay caused on part of the State Government in filing of the writ petition, clearly shows the neglect and the acquiescence on part of the State Government. 6. I further state and submit that severe prejudice has been caused to the answering Respondent as a result of the delay in filing of the present petition. Sursuta Co-operative Housing Society Limited was granted permission under Section 63 of the Gujarat Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 by the concerned authority, in the year 1999-2001. Subsequent thereto, the answering Respondent executed registered sale deeds in its favour. It is pertinent to state that the Revision applications were filed by the State Government before the Learned Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, subsequent to the execution of the sale deeds. 7. However, since the society was not able to file an application for obtaining N.A. permission within one year from the grant of permission under Section 63 of the Tenancy Act, applications were filed since the year 2008 onwards, for the purposes of seeking extension of time for filing of the application for obtaining N.A. permission. The Learned Collector, vide respective orders dated 03.11.2012 granted the extension of time for filing of the said application. The Society accordingly filed an application dated 24.12.2012 for the purposes of seeking N.A. permission, which came to be rejected. 8. The Learned Collector, vide respective orders dated 03.11.2012 granted the extension of time for filing of the said application. The Society accordingly filed an application dated 24.12.2012 for the purposes of seeking N.A. permission, which came to be rejected. 8. Subsequent thereto, the Society filed applications for seeking further extension of time, which also came to be rejected. The concerned authority had informed the Society, that it had been recommended by the concerned authority vide its letter dated 21.08.2014 to the State Government, that a writ petition should be filed for challenging the order dated 26.02.2007 passed by the Learned Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. It was further informed by the concerned authorities that the State Government, vide its letter dated 14.07.2016 had granted its approval for filing of the writ petition, for challenging the order dated 26.02.2007. 9. It is pertinent to state that the subsequent applications filed by the Society for obtaining N.A. permission were also rejected, on the inter alia ground that a writ petition would be filed before this Hon'ble Court for challenging the order dated 26.02.2007 passed by the Learned Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. Accordingly, it is submitted that severe prejudice has been caused to the answering respondent as a result of the delay in filing of the present petition, in as much as, the answering respondent has not been able to obtain N.A. permission and consequently has not been able to put the land to a non-agricultural use; despite having paid the sale consideration for purchasing the parcels of land in question. 10. It is submitted that the fact that the permission under Section 63 of the Act was granted, in itself shows that the State Government had accepted the fact that restrictions under Section 43 of the Act do not apply to the land in question. The permission granted under Section 63 of the Act has also not been challenged by the State Government. It is further submitted that the proceedings which were initiated under Section 84(C) of the Tenancy Act, for breach of Sections 43 and 63 of Act, against one New Garden View Farmer's Agriculture Co-operative Society Limited, relating to the same land in question, were dropped vide order dated 16.07.2004 passed by the Learned Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The said order dated 16.07.2004 has not been challenged by the State Government and has therefore attained finality. 11. The said order dated 16.07.2004 has not been challenged by the State Government and has therefore attained finality. 11. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, it is submitted that even on merits, the present petition deserves to be rejected by this Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that the Learned Gujarat Revenue Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 26.02.2007, had rightly rejected the revision application filed by the Petitioner. The Learned Tribunal had rightly held that the State Government had not filed any appeal for challenging the order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Learned Mamlatdar. The Learned Deputy Collector had initiated suo moto proceedings under Section 76(A) of the Tenancy Act, after a lapse of four years from the date of the order passed by the Learned Mamlatdar. The Learned Gujarat Revenue Tribunal had accordingly held that the order dated 31.12.1998 passed by the Learned Deputy Collector was a nullity; in as much as the suo moto proceedings were initiated beyond the period of one year, as prescribed under Section 76(A) of the Tenancy Act. It was also held by the Learned Tribunal, that since the State Government had not filed an appeal against the order dated 23.11.1992 passed by the Learned Mamlatdar, the said order could not be challenged by the State Government directly before the Learned Tribunal under Section 76 of the Tenancy Act. 12. It was further held by the Learned Tribunal, that the State Government having granted permission under Section 63 of the Tenancy Act to sell the parcels of land to the Society, and the sale deeds having been executed in favour of the Society for the sale consideration; it was now not open for the State Government to revoke those permissions by way of challenging the order dated 23.11.1992. It is accordingly submitted that the Learned Tribunal had rightly rejected the revision applications filed by the State Government, vide the impugned order dated 26.02.2007; and the same therefore does not deserve to be interfered with by this Hon'ble Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is accordingly submitted that the Learned Tribunal had rightly rejected the revision applications filed by the State Government, vide the impugned order dated 26.02.2007; and the same therefore does not deserve to be interfered with by this Hon'ble Court, in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that in view of the order dated 23.11.1992, the Society, which was a bona fide purchaser of the parcels of land in question, had challenged its position by executing the sale deeds; particularly in view of the fact that the State Government had not challenged the order dated 2.311.1992 passed by the Learned Mamlatdar and order dated 31.12.1998 passed by the Learned Deputy Collector, within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, if the present petition filed by the State Government, is entertained by this Hon'ble Court at such a belated stage, it would cause grave injustice to the answering Respondent herein. Therefore also, the present petition deserves to be dismissed in limine by this Hon'ble Court. 13. It is not open for the State Government to contend that merely because the purchase price was paid under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act, they concerned Respondent cannot be considered to be a permanent tenant. It is submitted that Section 32G of the Tenancy Act, is not correlated to the status of a permanent tenant i.e. whether the tenant is a permanent tenant or a protected tenant, is immaterial for the purposes of Section 32G of the Tenancy Act". 15. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned senior counsel prays that all the applications deserve to be rejected only on the ground of gross delay, without going into the merits of the matter. ANALYSIS : 16. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the State of Gujarat is justified in any manner in filing these applications, questioning the legality and validity of the order passed by the Tribunal after a period of ten years. 17. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the Courts. 17. The issues of limitation, delay and laches as well as condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every day by the Courts. The law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim "Interest Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium" (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of Limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties, rather the idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 18. It is true that the court helps the vigilant and not the indolent. Delay in moving an application is also a relevant factor for which the Court may refuse to entertain the writ-application for granting relief. Except in case where the delay is accounted, writ will not be granted unless applied for within a reasonable time after the alleged default or neglect of duty or refusal or violation of right and if such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse its issuance. This is particularly so, when to grant the writ after such a delay would work a prejudice to the parties affecting their rights. Though there is no specific period of limitation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court may refuse to exercise its extraordinary power/power of superintendence where the petitioner be it a private individual or a State is guilty of laches or undue delay, for which there is no satisfactory explanation. In other words, the petitioner should be diligent in pursuing his remedy and file his writ petition within a reasonable time from the date of the order challenged, and an undue delay on his part will debar him from getting the relief. There is no general rule as to what is a reasonable time within which the proceeding must be brought but, it depends upon the facts in each case. The measure of delay in a specific case depends upon the nature of the action involved. It is now well-settled that the principle of laches applies even to writ petitions complaining violation of the fundamental rights. Unless the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justify the laches or undue delay, an applicant under Article 226 would not be entitled to relief. It is now well-settled that the principle of laches applies even to writ petitions complaining violation of the fundamental rights. Unless the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justify the laches or undue delay, an applicant under Article 226 would not be entitled to relief. All that the High Court has to see in is, whether the laches on the part of the petitioner are such as to disentitle him to relief claimed by him. Howsoever delay, by itself, is not a ground to reject the writ petition. In an appropriate case, the court may condone the delay because of the reason that the court may not enquire into belated and stale claims, is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion to be exercised by the High Court under Articles 226 or 227 as the case may be, and there is no any inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the a writ petition under Article 226 or petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 19. The Privy Council, in General Fire and Life Assurance Corporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim ( AIR 1941 PC 6 ), relied upon the writings of Mr.Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures 1932 wherein it has been said that : "a law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party as the Judge cannot, on applicable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by law." 20. In P.K.Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. ( AIR 1998 SC 2276 ), the Supreme Court, while considering a case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held as under:- "Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds." 21. While considering a similar issue, the Supreme Court, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. While considering a similar issue, the Supreme Court, in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. (2013)12 SCC 649 , laid down various principles inter alia: "(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact (vi) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play xxx xxx xxx (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. xxx xxx xxx (xvii) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters." (See also: Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer ( AIR 2014 SC 746 ) 22. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for excusing or condonation of delay. However, the court, while allowing such application, has to draw a distinction between delay and inordinate delay for want of bonafides of an inaction or negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the court for condoning the delay. The Supreme Court has, time and again, held that when the mandatory provision is not complied with and that delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court should not excuse or condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 23. It is also a well-settled principle of law that if some person has taken a relief approaching the court just or immediately after the cause of action had arisen, the other persons cannot take benefit thereof approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of some diligent person. 24. In State of Karnataka and Ors. 24. In State of Karnataka and Ors. v. S.M.Kotrayya and Ors., (1996)6 SCC 267 , the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that the petitioner filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by the court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. The Supreme Court observed that such a plea was wholly unjustified and would not furnish any ground for ignoring the delay and laches. 25. The same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Lal and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors. ( AIR 1997 SC 2366 ), observing as under:- "Suffice it to state that appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and elected to wake-up when they had the impetus from Vir Pal Chauhan and Ajit Singh's ratios? Therefore desperate attempts of the appellants to re-do the seniority, held by them in various cadre.... are not amenable to the judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well." 26. In M/s. Rup Diamonds and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. ( AIR 1989 SC 674 ), the Supreme Court considered a case where the petitioner wanted to get the relief on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court, wherein a particular law had been declared ultra vires. The Supreme Court rejected the petition on the ground of delay and laches observing as under:- "There is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they have not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided." 27. The Supreme Court, in Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports ( AIR 1970 SC 769 ), dealing with the question what is the measure of delay held thus: "No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. That is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the High Court and like all matters left to the discretion of the Court, in this matter too discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably". 28. Generally speaking, the court would be justified in refusing the relief on the ground of delay and laches only in a case where the conduct of the petitioner, in keeping quite, created an equity in favour of the respondent or where the interest of third party is allowed to come into life or for such other similar reasons where the court is satisfied that granting of relief to the petitioner would result in undue hardship to the respondent or third parties or affect the public interest and not otherwise. The delay, as such, can never be an absolute bar for the court to entertain the petition if it finds that the complaint made in the petition is a continued violation of fundamental rights or other rights of the petitioner. 29. In the case reported in Bhagwan Swaroop and ors. v. Mool Chand and ors. ( AIR 1983 SC 355 ), D.A. Desai J., speaking for the Supreme Court, has emphatically stated that fair-play in action must inhere in judicial approach also as in administrative law and the court's approach should be oriented with this view whether substantial justice is done between the parties or technical rules of procedure are given precedence over doing substantial justice in the court. A Code of Procedure is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties. It needs to be noticed that the laws of procedure by themselves do not create any impediment or obstruction in the matter of doing justice to the parties. The main purpose is to see that justice is done to the parties. 30. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ), the Supreme Court has emphasised on the liberal approach to be adopted by the courts in the matter of condoning delay. The main purpose is to see that justice is done to the parties. 30. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ), the Supreme Court has emphasised on the liberal approach to be adopted by the courts in the matter of condoning delay. In para 3 of the Judgment, the Supreme Court held thus: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone the delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala-fides. A ligitant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala-fides. A ligitant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so". 31. In Dehri Rothas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board, Bhojpur and others, (1992)2 SCC 598 , the Supreme Court, while reiterating the principle that the court may decline relief on the ground of delay and laches held that the rule is not a rule of law but is a rule of practice, and if the court finds an illegality manifest in the impugned order and the applicant in the writ has explained the delay in not challenging the impugned action at an earlier point of time, then the court would be justified in condoning the delay. 32. In the case of H.D.Vora v. State of Maharashtra and others (AIR1984 SC 866), the Supreme Court had condoned even 30 years delay in approaching the court where it found violation of substantive legal right of the applicant. In that case, the requisition of a premises made by the State was assailed. It was found that the order of requisition did not set-out the public purpose for which it was made. No material was placed before the court to show what was the public purpose for which the order was made. It was also found by the court that the allottee to whom the requisitioned property was allotted was neither a government servant nor a homeless person as required under the law. In such circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had approached the court after a lapse of 30 years, the Supreme Court opined that there was justification for the court to step in under Article 226 of the Constitution and grant the relief to the writ applicant. 33. In such circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had approached the court after a lapse of 30 years, the Supreme Court opined that there was justification for the court to step in under Article 226 of the Constitution and grant the relief to the writ applicant. 33. In case of U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another, (2006)11 SCC 464 , the Supreme Court held that the delay and laches is one of the relevant factors in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution and laid down the chief points to be judged such issue first; acquiescence on the petitioners part and secondly; any change of position that has occurred on the respondents' part. It is further held that the litigants who sleep over their rights for long and wake up only after having impetus from a decision of the Court cannot be allowed to get a relief under the equitable doctrine in these words: "6. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and laches and delay has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief should be granted to him as was granted to person similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A chart has been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their retirement wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30-6-2005 and 31-7-2005. Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed. They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after their retirement. Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not? 7. They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after their retirement. Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not? 7. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has invited our attention to various decisions to impress upon that persons who are guilty of such laches and acquiesced with the situation should not be granted any relief because it is going to cost the Nigam a heavy financial burden to the tune of Rs. 17,80,43,108. Therefore, relief should be confined to those persons who were continuing in service and filed their writ petitions in time but not to all and sundry who woke up to file the writ petitions much after their retirement. In this connection, our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in Rup Diamonds v. Union of India wherein their Lordships observed that those people who were sitting on the fence till somebody else took up the matter to the court for refund of duty, cannot be given the benefit. In that context, their Lordships held as follows: (SCC pp. 356-57) "Petitioners are reagitating claims which they had not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared void. There is also an unexplained, inordinate delay in preferring the present writ petition which is brought after almost a year after the first rejection. As observed by the Court in Durga Prashad case, the exchange position of this country and the policy of the Government regarding international trade varies from year to year. In these matters it is essential that persons who are aggrieved by orders of the Government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order with utmost expedition. Therefore, these delays are sufficient to persuade the Court to decline to interfere. In these matters it is essential that persons who are aggrieved by orders of the Government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order with utmost expedition. Therefore, these delays are sufficient to persuade the Court to decline to interfere. If a right of appeal is available, this order rejecting the writ petition shall not prejudice petitioners' case in any such appeal." 8. Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in State of Karnataka v. S.M. Kotrayya. In that case the respondents woke up to claim the relief which was granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Therefore, the State approached this Court and this Court after considering the matter observed as under: (SCC p. 268) "Although it is not necessary to give an explanation for the delay which occurred within the period mentioned in sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether the explanation offered was proper. In the instant case, the explanation offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before the expiry of the period prescribed under sub- section (1) or (2). That was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in condoning the delay." 9. Similarly in Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the court, then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) "The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case. In that case it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 542) "The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus from Virpal Singh Chauhan case. The appellants' desperate attempt to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated stage." 10. In Union of India v. C.K. Dharagupta it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 398, para 9) "9. We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment of the Tribunal in R.P. Joshi gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other person. The respondent C.K. Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking benefit of Joshi case8. In view of our finding that the benefit of the judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief." 11. In Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 359-60, para 34) "34. The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar. The plea of delay, which Mr Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law." 12. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law." 12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows: "In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches." 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?" 34. In Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012)3 SCC 563 , the Supreme Court, after an exhaustive review of its earlier decisions on the subject, finally concluded and observed as under : "28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few." 35. In the premise of the law noticed above, I have to see, whether the State has shown sufficient cause and whether there are any mitigating circumstances on the basis of which this Court could excuse the delay and entertain the applications on merit. 36. The inviolable conclusion deducible from the above noted decisions are that the stale and dead claims should not be encouraged in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. A line of distinction is to be drawn between a vigilant and a non-vigilant litigant and they cannot be equated on the same footing. 37. Although Article 227 of the Constitution does not fix any particular period of limitation within which to present an application, yet it is well settled that a party wanting to claim relief under Article 227 must come up to the High Court as expeditiously as possible. This principle of law will apply to both, a private individual and the State. Since Article 227 itself does not provide for any period of limitations, no period of limitation can be fixed as such by an authority other than the parliament. So that it is for the Court to consider in each case whether there is gross delay in presenting a petition. Evidently, it must be a question of fact in each case, and what can be regarded as gross delay is not and cannot be capable of a precise definition. It is true that Article 227 confers upon a citizen as well as the State a valuable right. But a party wanting to take advantage of the right must act diligently. 38. Mr.Sanjanwala, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the decision in M/s.Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bombay, AIR 1970 SC 898 . This is what the Supreme Court at para 7 of the report held:- "It follows, therefore, that this Court puts itself in restraint in the matter of petitions under Article 32 and this practice has now become inveterate. This is what the Supreme Court at para 7 of the report held:- "It follows, therefore, that this Court puts itself in restraint in the matter of petitions under Article 32 and this practice has now become inveterate. The question is whether this Court will inquire into belated and stale claims or take note of evidence of neglected of one's own rights for a long time ? I am of opinion that not only, it would (not ?) but also that it should (not ?). The party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before other rights come into existence. The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person moving the Court. This principle is well recognized and has been applied by Courts in England and America." 39. In paragraph 10 of that very case, it has been observed thus : "I should say that utmost expedition is the since qua non for such claims. The party aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay." 40. In Durga Prasad v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, AIR 1970 SC 769 , it has been posited that : "There can be no doubt that if a citizen moves the High Court under Article 226 and contends that his fundamental rights have been contravened by any executive action, the High Court would naturally like to give relief to him; but even in such a case, if the petitioner has been guilty of laches, and there are other relevant circumstances which indicate that it would be inappropriate for the High Court to exercise its high prerogative jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner ends of justice may require that the High Court should refuse to issue a writ. There can be little doubt that if it is shown that a party moving the High Court under Article 226 for a writ is, in substance, claiming a relief which under the law of limitation was barred at the time when the writ petition was filed, the High Court would refuse to grant any relief in its writ jurisdiction." 41. In State of Orissa, etc. In State of Orissa, etc. v. Shri Arun Kumar Patnaik, etc., AIR 1976 SC 1639 : (1976 Lab IC 1122) as there was long and inexplicable delay and the grievance was too stale to merit redress, the relief was refused. 42. In Raja Jagdambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, AIR 1975 1816: (1975 Tax LR 818) this is what the Supreme Court said in paragraph 13 of the report : "Even so, the journey of the appellant is beset with insurmountable hurdles Art. 226 is not a blanket power, regardless of temporal and discretionary restrains. If a party is inexplicably insouciant and unduly belated due to laches the Court may ordinarily deny redress and if the High Court has exercised its discretion to refuse this Court declines to disturb such exercise unless the ground is too untenable. To awaken this Court's special power gross injustice and grievous departure from well established criteria in this jurisdiction have to be made out. In the present case, long years have elapsed not only after the impugned orders but even after the High Court held the taxed income agricultural. The reason for the inaction is stated to be an illusory expectation of suo motu modification of assessment orders on representation by the party. The High Court has examined and dismissed the plea and consequently refused relief. We do not think that in so refusing relief on ground of laches the High Court exercised its direction arbitrarily or improperly. And the story must thus close." 43. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 259 : (1975 Lab IC 165) it has been enunciated as follows : "In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend upon its own facts." 44. After making the aforesaid pertinent observation, their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the earlier judgment in Trilokchand's case, referred to by me hereinabove. 45. Each case must depend upon its own facts." 44. After making the aforesaid pertinent observation, their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to the earlier judgment in Trilokchand's case, referred to by me hereinabove. 45. The re’sume' of the judgment referred to by me hereinabove clearly shows that no straight-jacket formula can be evolved for saying that delay up to a particular time would not bar the petition, and delay beyond that time would bar it. Each case has to depend upon its own facts, when the question of delay, laches, etc. is raised to oppose a writ petition under Art. 226 or a petition under Art. 227 for that matter, even a writ petition before the Supreme Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution. However, the general principles that seem to have been evolved by the judgments, clearly indicate that a petitioner who wants to invoke the writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, and for that comes to the Court and if there is delay, he must explain that delay. The other principle that seeks to have been well founded is that normally delay beyond the period of limitation prescribed for an analogous civil suit would be treated to be fatal to the claim for a relief in a writ jurisdiction though of course no unviolable rule in that behalf has been laid down, and it has been held that delay of a period shorter than the period of limitation prescribed for the analogous suit could also be fatal and in a given case, delay of a period more than the period of limitation prescribed for the analogous suit may not come in the way of the petitioner seeking relief if other factors are in his favour. Thirdly it seems to have been well entrenched by a number of decision that if the conduct of the petitioner tantamounts to waiver, then, whatever be the period of delay, he should be refused relief. 46. According to the State, although the impugned order was passed on 26th February 2007, yet the office of the Collector received the legal opinion of the Government Pleader only on 3rd September 2009. It is not explained why it took more than two years by the office of the Collector to obtain the legal opinion of the Government Pleader of the High Court. 47. It is not explained why it took more than two years by the office of the Collector to obtain the legal opinion of the Government Pleader of the High Court. 47. It appears that on receipt of the legal opinion of the Government Pleader in September 2009, the Collector, by his letter dated 22nd June 2010, sought the permission of the Revenue Department of the State Government to challenge the order passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. There is no explanation why it took almost nine months for the Collector to address a letter to the State Government, seeking permission to file the petitions in the High Court. 48. It appears that thereafter there was no progress or any developments for a period of almost four years, i.e. till September 2013. The Section Officer, vide order dated 25th November 2013, asked the Collector, Ahmedabad, to examine the legal opinion of the Government Pleader in each case and submit his opinion on merits once again. 49. It appears that on 14th July 2017, the Revenue Department granted permission to file the petitions in this Court. 50. In my view, the explanation offered by the State is nothing but an eyewash. The explanation lack in bonafide. 51. In my view, the State has miserably failed to offer any explanation worth the name for the purpose of ignoring or excusing the delay of almost ten years. In such circumstances, there is no question of looking into the merits of the matter. 52. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdicition is discretionary jurisdiction. Hence, if a party approaches the Court Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India after an unreasonable delay, this Court can reject the writ petition/petition without going to the merits of the matter. Thus, in Raja Pratap Singh V/s. CBDT (vide para 13) the Supreme Court observed : "Article 226 is not a blanket power, regardless of temporal and discretionary restraints, if a party inexplicably insouciant and unduly belated due to laches, the Court may ordinarily deny redress. In this case, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner has approached this Court after unreasonable delay without any proper Explanation for the delay." 53. In Durga Prasad V/s. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports and Ors. In this case, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner has approached this Court after unreasonable delay without any proper Explanation for the delay." 53. In Durga Prasad V/s. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports and Ors. (vide para 3) the Supreme Court observed : "It is well settled that the relief under Article 226 is discretionary, and one ground for refusing relief under Article 226 is that the petitioner has filed the petition after delay for which there is no satisfactory Explanation.” 54. In State of Maharashtra V/s. Digambar the Supreme Court observed (vide para 12) that it is well settled by the decisions of the Court that no person is entitled to obtain equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if his conduct is blame-worthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. 55. Similarly in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar V/s. Shah Hyder Beig it was held that when there is inordinate delay in filing a writ petition, the High Court in its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can dismiss it on this ground without going into the merits. 56. In J.N. Maltiar V/s. State of Bihar, it was held that where the petitioner, a dismissed Government servant, after being informed that his services were terminated for misconduct, spent about three years in sending memorials to the Government, a remedy not provided by law, the High Court was justified in rejecting the petition on the ground of delay. 57. In Rajalakshmiah V/s. State of Mysore, 1967 AIR(SC) 993 : (vide para 13) the Supreme Court held that the appellants were guilty of laches because after the impugned order was passed in 1950, they should have filed a writ petition within a reasonable time thereafter. Merely because the chief engineer had espoused their cause and was writing letters from time to time to the State Government to do something for them did not mean that they could rest upon their oars if they really had grievance. 58. Thus, it is well settled that writ jurisdiction being discretionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked by a party who approaches the High Court after unreasonable delay [vide : S.A. Rasheed V/s. Director of Mines & Geology]. 59. The principle of laches i.e., undue delay certainly applies to writ jurisdiction. 58. Thus, it is well settled that writ jurisdiction being discretionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked by a party who approaches the High Court after unreasonable delay [vide : S.A. Rasheed V/s. Director of Mines & Geology]. 59. The principle of laches i.e., undue delay certainly applies to writ jurisdiction. The High Court has to exercise its writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction on settled legal principles, and one of these legal principles is that a writ petition is liable to be dismissed if the petitioner has come to the High Court after undue delay, as has happened in this case. 60. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction. Hence, even if there is violation of law, the High Court is not bound to interfere. The Supreme Court in Chandra Singh V/s. State of Rajasthan and Anr, 2003 (6) SCC 20 held as under : "Issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy [see Champalal Binani V/s. CIT]. The High Court and consequently this Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution of India may not strike down an illegal order although it would be lawful to do so. In a given case, the High Court or this Court may refuse to extend the benefit of a discretionary relief to the applicant." 61. In the result, all the applications fail and are hereby rejected.