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2018 DIGILAW 645 (ALL)

ANNAPURNA @ POOJA MISHRA v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-03-16

DINESH KUMAR SINGH I

body2018
JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Dinesh Kumar Singh-I,J. This criminal revision has been preferred against the judgement and order dated 23.01.2012 passed by the Additional Principal Judge Family Court, Kanpur Nagar in Case No. 323 of 2006 (783 of 2004), Smt. Annpurna and one another Vs. Kailash Narain Johari, whereby the application moved under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code for awarding maintenance has been rejected. 2. In the grounds of revision, it has been mentioned that the impugned order has been passed arbitrarily without considering the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the revisionists as well as, Smt. Sadhna Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the Opposite Party No. 2 and perused the record. 4. It is revealed from perusal of the record that an application under section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code was moved by the revisionists with the allegations that she was legally wedded wife of O.P. No. 2, whom she had married 4 years prior to filing the application on 24.9.2005 at Kanpur Nagar. The Revisionist No. 2 was real son of the Revisionist No. 1, who was adopted son of opposite party No. 2. The first marriage was performed of the Revisionist No. 1 with Ravi Shukla from whom she had taken divorce on false representation made by the opposite party No. 2 that he was unmarried and would marry the Revisionist No. 1 and her son would also be adopted by him. Pursuant to this the Revisionist No. 1 married opposite party No. 2 and the Revisionist No. 2 was his adopted son. After solemnisation of their marriage, she came to know that the opposite party No. 2 was already married, having a wife and two daughters and when she enquired about it from opposite party No. 2, he became annoyed, had beaten her and stated that he had married her due to greed for her property. Thereafter, the behaviour of the opposite party No. 2 became cruel towards her and started building pressure upon her that she should exert pressure upon her parents to get him a house purchased. Thereafter, the behaviour of the opposite party No. 2 became cruel towards her and started building pressure upon her that she should exert pressure upon her parents to get him a house purchased. Thereafter, her parents got a house purchased and also got construction made thereon, despite that the greed of the opposite party No. 2 did not stop and the opposite party No. 2 started exerting pressure upon her that she should sell that plot and the amount of consideration of the said sale should be fix-deposited in the name of his first wife and children. Upon her refusing to do so, the opposite party No. 2 deserted her and started living with his first wife and children. He did not give any maintenance amount to the Revisionist No. 1 despite the fact that she had no source of income and that revisionist No. 2 also needed support as he was studying in Class IV. She claimed Rs. 5000/- per month for herself and the same amount for her son as maintenance amount as the opposite party No. 2 was employed as a senior engineer in Railways who was earning around Rs. 27,000/- per month as salary and over and above that he was earning around Rs. 15,000/- - 20,000/- per month illegal money. 5. The opposite party No. 2 refuting the claim of the revisionists filed objection dated 24.9.2005 stating therein that the Revisionist No. 1 never married him nor did they ever live like husband and wife. The opposite party No. 2 had married Smt. Meena Jauhari on 29.11.1985, who is still alive and he was residing with her. He had never adopted Revisionist No. 2. The revisionist No. 1 is a lady of loose character. She had never taken divorce from her husband Ravi Shukla. She is out to blackmail him and wants to extort money from him by setting up a concocted story. No details have been given by her of the purchase of plot, which she alleges that opposite party No. 2 was pressurising her to sell. He was residing in Railway Colony in an allotted accommodation with his wife. The revisionist No. 1 can claim maintenance from her husband. He does not earn Rs. 27,000/- per month. No details have been given by her of the purchase of plot, which she alleges that opposite party No. 2 was pressurising her to sell. He was residing in Railway Colony in an allotted accommodation with his wife. The revisionist No. 1 can claim maintenance from her husband. He does not earn Rs. 27,000/- per month. A case No. 194 of 2001, Smt. Annpurna vs Ravi Shukla was filed by revisionist No. 1 in District Unnao, which was pending till the year 2002. The application deserved to be dismissed with cost. 6. After giving opportunity to both the sides to adduce oral as well as documentary evidence and after hearing arguments of both the sides, the learned Court below has rejected the said application giving detailed findings and reasoning in support thereof. 7. The learned lower Court had framed following issues for consideration: (1) whether revisionist No. 1 married opposite party No. 2 on 7.6.2001 according to Hindu rites?; (2) whether opposite party No. 2 had adopted revisionist No. 2?; (3) whether revisionists were unable to maintain themselves?; (4) whether opposite party No. 2 ignored maintaining the revisionists?; (5) whether opposite party No. 2 was a man equipped with adequate resources? 8. With regard to issue No. 1, a detailed discussion has been made in the impugned judgement/order. The learned lower Court has mentioned in its judgement that revisionist No.1 produced herself as A.P.W. 1 and stated on oath that her marriage was solemnised with Ravi Shankar Shukla in 1992, who was still alive, who was father of revisionist No. 2, Anmol. No decree of divorce was passed dissolving their marriage. In the year 1998, she had moved an application under section 125 Cr. P.C. to seek maintenance from him, which was decreed in her favour but she had not given any application for realising the amount of maintenance. Thereafter she stated in cross-examination that she married opposite party No. 2 on 07.06.2001 in a temple but she could not tell the name of the priest who performed the marriage. The priest was brought about by Hajara Singh, who was a resident of her own village. The marriage was attended by 2 - 4 persons. No card for marriage was printed. Both of them had decided to marry each other. The priest was brought about by Hajara Singh, who was a resident of her own village. The marriage was attended by 2 - 4 persons. No card for marriage was printed. Both of them had decided to marry each other. She had met opposite party No. 2 in Sutarkhane Kanpur, where opposite party No. 2 used to live and she also was living there with her family members. She stated that it was right to say that opposite party No. 2 was living in Railway Colony, House No. 203 with her family where she also lived there with wife of O.P. No.2 of the opposite party No. 2. She also stated that it was also correct to say that she had stayed in a rented accommodation after marriage with opposite party No. 2 for 3 months, address being 16 LIG, W-block. She has been staying in her house since 2001, which was purchased by her father on 31.12.2001 and was staying there since then only. The learned court below has also analysed the statement given by opposite party No. 2 as O.P.W.1, in which, in cross-examination, he stated that at present he stays in Railway Colony, House No. 1, Mirzapur with his wife and children. His marriage cards were got printed. He had met Annpurna Mishra about 7 - 8 years back, while he was going to join his duty. He had found that towards the western yard from Kanpur Central Station, there was a little crowd assembled. On enquiry it turned out that a lady was coming on a railway track with an intention to commit suicide, who was caught by people there. She apprised them that she was fed up of the circumstances and was going to commit suicide. Under such circumstances people had given some financial aid to her and he also contributed in that. One week after that episode, in his absence she reached his house and met his wife and children. He himself did not meet her more than twice. She used to borrow money from her house. Neither he nor his wife ever tried to find out as to where she was living. He had never gone to Unnao except to find out about the status of the case pending between the revisionist No. 1 and her husband. In his railway card, there is an entry made of him and his family members. Neither he nor his wife ever tried to find out as to where she was living. He had never gone to Unnao except to find out about the status of the case pending between the revisionist No. 1 and her husband. In his railway card, there is an entry made of him and his family members. Some photographs were shown to him, in which he was found present. He could not clarify as to how those photographs were obtained by the revisionist No. 1. He stated that the said photograph were not his genuine photographs. 9. The learned Court below has made in-depth analysis of the evidence on record, to give its finding, on the issue as to whether the revisionist No. 1 was legally wedded wife of opposite party No. 2 and simultaneously it was also found to be worth considering as to whether on 7.6.2001, without divorce from the earlier husband, Ravi Shukla, during his lifetime, she solemnized marriage with opposite party No. 2. 10. In analysis made by the learned Court below, it is mentioned that the revisionist No. 1 had not disclosed her date of marriage with opposite party No. 2 to be 07.06.2001 in paragraph 1 of her petition, however, the place of marriage is reported to be temple of Bara Devi, where her marriage was performed according to Hindu rites. But the learned Court below has not held the said marriage proved because she could not tell the name of the pundit who had performed the marriage, who was brought by Hazara Singh. Even Hazara Singh had not been examined. Two - four persons were reported to have attended the marriage besides her whole family, but none of these witnesses was examined by her in support of her version. If marriage was performed according to Hindu rites, then it was essential for her to prove that saptpadi (seven 'phere') had taken place, but even that was not proved. Further it is mentioned that she had admitted in cross-examination that her marriage was performed with Ravi Shankar Shukla and that till the date of recording her statement, no divorce decree was passed dissolving marriage between them and also admitted that she had no decree of divorce in her favour, rather she has stated that a case under section 125 Cr. P.C. was filed against Ravi Shukla, in which maintenance was awarded. P.C. was filed against Ravi Shukla, in which maintenance was awarded. A certified copy of the earlier decided maintenance case was filed by her, which proved that she was awarded maintenance to be paid by her first husband. Besides that a certified copy of an ex-parte judgment passed under section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act was also presented by her which was decreed on 01.02.2011 from the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, Unnao, although in cross-examination she had stated that she did not have any decree of divorce from her first husband. This proves that on 7.6.2001, when it is alleged that she had married opposite party No. 2, she had no divorce decree proving divorce from her first husband. According to law, during the lifetime of the spouse, no second marriage could be solemnised till a decree of divorce was taken from the earlier husband. In case any marriage is solemnised in contravention of this, the same would be treated to be null and void according to the provisions of section 5 of Hindu Marriage Act. It is further mentioned that a case under section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act was filed by revisionist No.1, Smt. Annpurna in the year 2009, while proceedings under section 125 of Cr.P.C. against opposite party No. 2 were initiated in the year 2005, which proves that she wanted maintenance to be paid by the opposite party No. 2 illegally, as she was already awarded maintenance from her first husband Ravi Shukla. The said order of maintenance was still in force as no application was moved for getting the same set aside, nor any proof thereof was brought on record. Therefore it is evident that without divorce having been taken from the earlier husband, she could not have married opposite party No. 2 during lifetime of the earlier husband. It is further mentioned in the said judgment that the proof which has been adduced of her marriage with opposite party No. 2 is an affidavit sworn by notary, which bears photographs of both of them. In this regard the learned lower Court has held that notary Magistrate has no power to solemnise marriage. The marriage is alleged to have taken place with opposite party No. 2 on 07.06.2001, while the said document (notary affidavit) was executed on 13.4.2002. In this regard the learned lower Court has held that notary Magistrate has no power to solemnise marriage. The marriage is alleged to have taken place with opposite party No. 2 on 07.06.2001, while the said document (notary affidavit) was executed on 13.4.2002. Even the witnesses who were named in the said affidavit i.e. Anil Kumar Gupta and Jasbeer Singh were not examined, hence even that notary affidavit could not be held proved. The opposite party No. 2 had refused to know about any person by the name Anil Kumar Gupta or Jasbeer Singh. He also denied his signature on the said document and also his photo affixed thereon was denied to be his photo and address, the same being a forged one. The revisionist No. 1 had not got the signature of opposite party No. 2 on the said document proved by handwriting expert, therefore simply because the said document had photo of opposite party No. 2 on it, could not be sufficient to prove the solemnization of marriage between them. It is also recorded in the judgment that all the documents which belonged to the period prior to filing the present case, in none of them the name of Annpurna, revisionist No. 1 was mentioned as Pooja Mishra by way of alias name. For the first time, in the present revision, she had written her name as Pooja Mishra, the reason of which has not been made clear by her. As against this, the O.P.W.1 clearly stated in his cross-examination that he had two children from his wife Meena Jauhari, whose names were entered in official record of railway department and also in service book which was issued by North Central Railways, Kanpur Engineering Division. In the said service book, the name of Meena Jauhari was recorded as his wife and no other names of sons or daughters were recorded except the names of two daughters begotten from O.P. No.2 and his wife, Meena Jauhari. In the said service book, the name of Meena Jauhari was recorded as his wife and no other names of sons or daughters were recorded except the names of two daughters begotten from O.P. No.2 and his wife, Meena Jauhari. It is also mentioned in the judgment that one more argument was was made by the revisionist No. 1, on the basis of documents produced by her, that the name of father of revisionist No. 2 in school records was recorded as Kailash Narain Jauhari and that a dispute had occurred between Meena Jauhari and opposite party No. 2 which culminated in divorce, which proves that the revisionist No. 1 was married to opposite party No. 2. The learned Court below has recorded that the argument of the revisionist No. 1 that she had taken divorce from her earlier husband, Ravi Shukla and thereafter solemnised marriage with opposite party No. 2, was not credible, because both the parties were Hindus and hence they could marry or divorce only according to Hindu Marriage Act. What were those customs, which were followed in giving divorce to her husband and marrying the opposite party No. 2 were not given in detail, nor any evidence was adduced thereon. The maintenance case, contested between the opposite party No. 2 and Meena Jauhari would not benefit the revisionist No. 1 in any manner, because that matter was between the above two, moreover no divorce decree dissolving marriage between opposite party No. 2 and Meena Jauhari has been brought on record. Although it appeared from the document that a case under section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act was filed as petition No. 596/1990, certified copy of which was filed, but there was no divorce decree filed, which could prove that divorce between them had taken place. In these circumstances it cannot be held that the opposite party No. 2 married the revisionist No.1 concealing facts of his first marriage. It is further recorded in the judgment that a photocopy of High School Examination, 2011 (not made clear whether it was photocopy of High School Certificate or Mark-sheet) was submitted by the revisionist No. 1, in which the name of mother of Anmol Jauhari was recorded as Pooja Jauhari and his father's name was recorded as KN Jauhari. It is further recorded in the judgment that a photocopy of High School Examination, 2011 (not made clear whether it was photocopy of High School Certificate or Mark-sheet) was submitted by the revisionist No. 1, in which the name of mother of Anmol Jauhari was recorded as Pooja Jauhari and his father's name was recorded as KN Jauhari. In this regard the Court mentions that it was needed to be taken into consideration that the alias name of the revisionist No. 1 was nowhere mentioned as Pooja Mishra or Pooja Jauhari prior to filing the petition. An ex parte decree of divorce from Ravi Shukla was obtained on 01.02.2011, due to which the name of opposite party No. 2 was mentioned as father of revisionist No. 2, this contention of the Revisionist No.1 was beyond comprehension. It, therefore, appeared to court that the same was got written by revisionist No. 1 as per her wish. The name of Pooja Jauhari is nowhere else found written except on mark sheet, nor the same is found written in any of the earlier cases filed in courts. 11. The above reasoning given by the Court below seems to be sound on the principles of law. The relevant provisions may be quoted herein-below. Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides as follows: "5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage.- A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely: - (i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage; (ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party - (a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or (b) though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or (c) has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity (iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride the age of eighteen years at the time of the marriage: (iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two" 12. Therefore the above provision clearly indicates that a person having spouse already alive at the time of marriage, such marriage would not be permissible under law, as is in the case at hand. 13. Section 125 of the Code reads as follows which clothes the "wife" with the right to receive maintenance in a summary proceeding under the Code: "Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents. 125. (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain- (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct : Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means: ............................ Explanation.-For the purposes of this Chapter,- (a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875); is deemed not to have attained his majority; (b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried." 14. Therefore, it is apparent from the above provision that "wife" used in the section means only a legally wedded wife. 15. For appreciating the status of a Hindu woman marrying a Hindu male with a living spouse, some of the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, have to be examined which declare a marriage as null and void in the following terms: "11. Void marriages. 15. For appreciating the status of a Hindu woman marrying a Hindu male with a living spouse, some of the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, have to be examined which declare a marriage as null and void in the following terms: "11. Void marriages. - Any marriage solemnised after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto (against the other party), be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i) (iv) and (v) of section 5." 16. Clause (i) of section 5 lays down that for lawful marriage, necessary condition is that neither party should have a spouse living at the time of the marriage. A marriage in contravention of this condition is, therefore, null and void. 17. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2 upon Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav vs Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Anr., AIR 1988 SC 644 , in which following is held: - "4. The question, then arises as to whether the expression ''wife' used in section 125 of the Code should be interpreted to mean only as legally wedded wife not covered by section 11 of the Act. The word is not defined in the Code except indicating in the Explanation its inclusive character so as to cover a divorcee. A woman cannot be divorcee unless there was a marriage in the eye of law preceding that status. The expression must, therefore, be given the meaning in which it is understood in law applicable to the parties, subject to the explanation (b), which is not relevant in the present context. 5. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the term ''wife' in section 125 of the Code should be given a wider and extended meaning so as to include therein not only a lawfully wedded wife but also a woman married in fact by performance of necessary rites or following the Procedure laid down under the law. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Mahd. Ahmad Khan vs Shah Bano Beghum, (1985) 3 SCR 844 , it was argued that the personal law of the parties to a proceeding under section 125 of the Code should be completely excluded from consideration. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Mahd. Ahmad Khan vs Shah Bano Beghum, (1985) 3 SCR 844 , it was argued that the personal law of the parties to a proceeding under section 125 of the Code should be completely excluded from consideration. The relationship of husband and wife comes to an end on divorce, but a divorcee has been held to be entitled to the benefits of the section, it was urged, and therefore applying this approach a woman in the same position as the present appellant should be brought within the sweep of the section. We are afraid, the argument is not well founded. A divorcee is included within the section on account of clause (b) of the Explanation. The position under the corresponding section 488 of the Code of 1898 was different. A divorcee could not avail of the summary remedy. The wife's right to maintenance depended upon the continuance of her married status. It was pointed out in Shah Bano's case that since that right could be defeated by the husband by divorcing her unilaterally under the Muslim Personal Law or by obtaining a decree of divorce under any other system of law, it was considered desirable to remove the hardship by extending the benefit of the provisions of section to a divorced woman so long as she did not remarry, and that was achieved by including clause (b) of the Explanation. Unfortunately for the appellant no corresponding provision was brought in so as to apply to her. The legislature decided to bestow the benefit of the section even on an illegitimate child by express words but none are found to apply to a de facto wife where the marriage is void ab initio. 6. The attempt to exclude altogether the personal law applicable to the parties from consideration also has to be repelled. The section has been enacted in the interest of a wife, and one who intends to take benefit under such section (1) (a) has to establish the necessary condition, namely, that she is the wife of the person concerned. This issue can be decided only by a reference to the law applicable to the parties. It is only where an applicant establishes her status on relationship with reference to the personal law that an application for maintenance can be maintained. This issue can be decided only by a reference to the law applicable to the parties. It is only where an applicant establishes her status on relationship with reference to the personal law that an application for maintenance can be maintained. Once the right under the section is established by proof of necessary conditions mentioned therein, it cannot be defeated by further reference to the personal law. The issue whether the section is attracted or not cannot be answered except by the reference to the appropriate law governing the parties. In our view the judgement in Shah Bano's case (A.I.R. 1985 SC 945) does not help the appellant. It may be observed that for the purpose of extending the benefit of the section to a divorced woman and an illegitimate child the Parliament considered it necessary to include in the section specific provisions to that effect, but has not done so with respect to women not lawfully married. 7. Lastly it was urged that the appellant was not informed about the respondent's marriage with Lilabai when she married the respondent who treated her as his wife, and, therefore, her prayer for maintenance should be allowed. There is no merit in this point either. The appellant cannot rely on the principle of estoppel so as to defeat the provisions of the Act. So far as the respondent treating her as his wife is concerned, it is again of no avail as the issue has to be settled under the law. It is the intention of the legislature which is relevant and not the attitude of the party. 8. We, therefore, hold that the marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with the man having a living a spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law and she is not entitled to the benefit of section 125 of the Code. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. - .." 18. From the above position of law, it is absolutely clear that in the case at hand, the revisionist No.1 cannot be held to be a legally wedded wife of opposite party No. 2 because she had full knowledge that the opposite party No. 2 was a married person having two children. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. - .." 18. From the above position of law, it is absolutely clear that in the case at hand, the revisionist No.1 cannot be held to be a legally wedded wife of opposite party No. 2 because she had full knowledge that the opposite party No. 2 was a married person having two children. Even if contention that she married opposite party No. 2, be taken to be correct, though the same could not be proved by her, which is apparent from the analysis of evidence, made by the learned Court below, with which this Court concurs, it has come on record that she had not taken divorce from his earlier husband, therefore in view of above provisions of law her marriage with opposite party No. 2 would be treated to be a nullity. 19. The second important issue which is framed by the learned Court below is whether revisionist No. 2 was adopted by the opposite party No. 2. Clear finding has been given by the Court below that the burden to prove that revisionist No. 2 was adopted by opposite party No. 2, was upon the revisionist No. 1, mother of the revisionist No. 2, but no such evidence has been adduced on the basis of which it could be held proved that he had been adopted by the opposite party No. 2. No 'Godnama' has been presented nor any such witness has been examined before whom any ceremony concerning 'Godnama' may have been performed. There is only one piece of evidence, presented by the revisionist No. 1 in this regard which was an information provided by the school, where revisionist No. 2 had studied, in which it was mentioned that at the time of filling up form, the name of father of revisionist No. 2 had been filled up wrong, which was later on corrected and it was mentioned as KN Jauhari. As the learned court below has mentioned in this regard that the said fact that the name of father of revisionist No. 2 was mentioned wrong was astonishing because the revisionist No. 1 had admitted that divorce from her earlier husband Ravi Shukla had taken place on 01/02/2011, hence how in the information given by Mother Teresa Higher Secondary School the name of the father of revisionist No. 2 could be taken to have been wrongly mentioned as Ravi Shukla (first husband of the revisionist No. 1). In this backdrop even the documentary evidence of above type, was not found credible and rightly so. Therefore this Court is also absolutely in agreement with the conclusion drawn by the learned lower Court that the revisionist No. 1 had failed to prove that the revisionist No. 2 had been adopted by the opposite party No. 2. 20. The other issues framed by the learned Court below did not require to be considered because finding of the Court in view of the first two issues has gone against the revisionists. 21. This Court with a view to further clarifying the position of law in respect of maintenance to woman under section 125 Cr.P.C. would like to refer the interpretation made by the Apex Court in Badshah vs Urmila Badshah Godse and another, (2014) 1 SCC 188 , the relevant paragraphs of which are as follows: "12. No doubt, in Chanmunia Vs. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, (2011) 1 SCC 141 , the Division Bench of this Court took the view that the matter needs to be considered with respect to Section 125 CrPC, by a larger Bench and in Para 41, three questions were formulated for determination by a larger Bench which are as follows: (SCC p. 149) "1. Whether the living together of a man and woman as husband and wife for a considerable period of time would raise the presumption of a valid marriage between them and whether such a presumption would entitle the woman to maintenance under section 125 CrPC? 2. Whether it is strict proof of marriage is essential for a claim of maintenance under section 125 CrPC having regard to the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005? 3. 2. Whether it is strict proof of marriage is essential for a claim of maintenance under section 125 CrPC having regard to the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005? 3. Whether a marriage performed according to the customary rights and ceremonies, without strictly fulfilling the requisites of section 7 (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, or any other personal law would entitle the woman to maintenance under section 125 CrPC. 13. On this basis, it was pleaded before us that this matter be also tagged along with the aforesaid case. However, in the facts of the present case, we do not deem it proper to do so as we find that the view taken by the courts below is perfectly justified. We are dealing with a situation where the marriage between the parties has been proved. However, the petitioner was already married. But he duped the respondent by suppressing the factum of alleged first marriage. On these facts, in our opinion, he cannot be permitted to deny the benefit of maintenance to the respondent, taking advantage of his own wrong. Our reasons for this course of action are stated hereinafter: 13.1. Firstly, in Chanmunia case, the parties had been living together for a long time and on that basis question arose as to whether there would be a presumption of marriage between the two because of the said reason, thus, giving rise to claim of maintenance under section 125 CrP.C by interpreting the term "wife" widely. The Court has impressed that if man and woman have been living together for a long time even without a valid marriage, as in the case, term of valid marriage entitling such a woman to maintenance should be drawn and a woman in such a case should be entitled to maintain application under section 125 CrPC. On the other hand, in the present case, respondent 1 has been able to prove, by cogent and strong evidence, that the petitioner and respondent 1 had been married to each other. 13.2. Secondly, as already discussed above, when the marriage between Respondent 1 and the petitioner was solemnised, the petitioner had kept Respondent 1 in dark about his first marriage. A false representation was given to Respondent 1 that he was single and was competent to enter into marital tie with Respondent 1. 13.2. Secondly, as already discussed above, when the marriage between Respondent 1 and the petitioner was solemnised, the petitioner had kept Respondent 1 in dark about his first marriage. A false representation was given to Respondent 1 that he was single and was competent to enter into marital tie with Respondent 1. In such circumstances, can the petitioner be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong and turnaround to say that the respondents are not entitled to maintenance by filing the petition under Section 125 CrPC as Respondent 1 is not "legally wedded wife" of the petitioner? Our answer is in the negative. We are of the view that at least for the purpose of section 125 Cr PC, the Respondent 1 would be treated as the wife of the petitioner, going by the spirit of the two judgements we have reproduced above. For this reason, we are of the opinion that the judgements of this Court in Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav Vs. Anant Rao Shivram Adhav, (1988) 1 SCC 530 and Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya Vs. State of Gujarat, (2005) 3 SCC 636 cases would apply only in those circumstances where a woman married a man with full knowledge of the first subsisting marriage. In such cases, she should know that second marriage with such a person is impermissible and there is an embargo under the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore she has to suffer the consequences thereof. The said judgement would not apply to those Cases where a man marries a second time by keeping that lady in dark about the first surviving marriage. That is the only way two sets of judgements can be reconciled and harmonised. 13.3. Thirdly, in such Cases, purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of section 125 CrPC. While dealing with the application of a destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalised sections of the society. The purpose is to achieve "social justice" which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution of India. The preamble of the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. The preamble of the Constitution of India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the Court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society." 22. Therefore from the above position of law it is absolutely clear that in case, a woman had full knowledge that the person whom she was going to marry, was a married man and that there was no concealment made by the said person who was already married, from the said woman, such a woman has to suffer the consequences thereof. In the case at hand even if the only argument made by the revisionist No.1 be taken to be true that the revisionist No. 1 married opposite party No. 2, it is on record that she knew fully well that he was already married and had children. Therefore the revisionist No. 1 cannot be allowed to take benefit of her own wrong. As regards the revisionist No. 2, it has already been held that the revisionist No. 1 has failed to prove that revisionist No. 2 was adopted by the opposite party No. 2, hence, even he cannot be held entitled to maintenance from the opposite party No. 2. 23. Therefore there does not seem to be any infirmity in the impugned order of the Court below, the same deserves to be upheld. 24. This revision deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly, dismissed.