ORDER : The present batch of petitions have been filed by the petitioners challenging the order of termination of their services under Rule 23-A of Rajasthan Service Rules (RSR) 1951. 2. The question before this Court is whether petitioners/probationers working on the post of Constable, in Police can be removed from service during probation by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR by treating them temporary employee. 3. The grievance of all the petitioners is common and as such, these petitions are decided by a common order. 4. The facts of SBCWP No.13898/2016: Dinesh Kumar Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., are taken as a lead case. 5. The petitioner had participated in the selection process for the post of Constable (GD) in pursuance of advirtisement dt.14.07.2013 issued by the respondents. The petitioner after finding his name in the merit list, came to be appointed by order dt.19.01.2016 and he was put on probation for period of two years on the fixed salary of Rs.8910/- per month. 6. The petitioner was sent on training at ITBP, Panchkula Haryana on 12.02.2016. The petitioner has pleaded in his petition that due to ailment of his father, he had to leave the training and he had moved an application dt.16.02.2016 for granting him leave for going to his home town. 7. The petitioner has submitted in his petition that on 11.03.2016 a notice was served to him for joining duties otherwise it was to be treated as misconduct and for which action was to be taken under Rule 86 of Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 (hereafter referred as ‘Rules of 1951’). The said notice was given for unauthorized absence from duty. 8. The petitioner was served with another notice under Rule 86 of RSR dt.14.03.2016 asking him to join the duties otherwise, departmental enquiry was to be initiated against him. 9. The petitioner has submitted that notice dt.15.03.2016 under Rules 23-A of RSR came to be served by Deputy Police Commissioner (Police Headquarter), Jaipur where a direction was given to him to join duties within one month from the date of receipt of the notice, otherwise the services of the petitioner were to be terminated. 10. The petitioner has alleged that without waiting for joining time of 30 days w.e.f. 15.03.2016, impugned order dt.12.04.2016 came to be passed, terminating his services along with other 17 persons by invoking powers under Rule 23-A of RSR. 11. 10. The petitioner has alleged that without waiting for joining time of 30 days w.e.f. 15.03.2016, impugned order dt.12.04.2016 came to be passed, terminating his services along with other 17 persons by invoking powers under Rule 23-A of RSR. 11. The petitioner has submitted in his petition that realising mistake of issuing illegal order, the respondents cancalled the order dt.12.04.2016 and on the very next date, the order dt.13.04.2016 was issued cancelling the order issued under Rule 23-A of RSR. 12. The petitioner has submitted that after order dt.12.04.2016 being passed, he joined his duty at training camp on 14.04.2016 and on 18.04.2016 he was issued movement order relegating him to the office of Superintendent of Police, Jaipur. The petitioner has alleged that he joined his duty before the Deputy Commissioner, Jaipur on 20.04.2016 and he started reporting for duties there. 13. The petitioner has alleged that the respondents by invoking power under Rule 23-A(1)(b) of RSR issued the impugned termination order dt.10.06.2016 on the ground that the petitioner remained willful absent for 65 days. The petitioner is said to have made representation to the higher authorities along with medical documents in support of his illness, but it did not yield any result and order dt.10.06.2016 was not revoked. 14. The petitioners have preferred the present petition challenging the illegal action of the respondents by invoking the power under Rule 23-A of RSR for terminating their services by treating them as temporary employees. 15. It would be relevant to mention that in some cases the respondents have exercised the power under Rule 23-A (2) (a) of RSR and in some cases, the power under Rule 23-A (1) of RSR has been exercised. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the services of the petitioners could not have been terminated by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR as the petitioners were not termporary employees and as such, the respondents have committed a grave illegality by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the alleged absence of the petitioners could not be a ground to dispense with their services by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the alleged absence of the petitioners could not be a ground to dispense with their services by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR. Learned counsel have submitted that for alleged willful absence, the respondents themselves have treated such act of petitioners as misconduct and accordingly, they were initially issued notices under Rule 86 of RSR for conducting departmental enquiry for proving the charge of absence from duty and later on invoked power under Rule 23A of RSR. 18. Learned counsel have submitted that the office of Director General of Police (DGP) has issued Standing Order 14/2014 dt.05.08.2014, wherein it has been provided that during probation period if a probationer either does not report back after expiry of leave sanctioned or he remains absent without his application of leave being sanctioned, the authorities are required to inform the Superintendent of Police/Commandant concerned/appointing authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against such persons and termination of services is not envisaged in such order. 19. Learned counsel have submitted that in view of Standing Order, the respondents ought to have conducted the departmental enquiry and without undertaking said procedure under Rule 16 of CCA Rule 1958, the entire proceedings are illegal. 20. Learned counsel have further submitted that the petitioners/probationers could not have been removed from service by the respondents by treating their absence as unsatisfactory performance and the language of the impugned orders shows that power under Rule 23-A of RSR has been exercised by treating them temporary employees and not the power which is given to the employer to judge the performance of an incumbent, while he is on probation. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that if absence from duty/training was the foundation for removing them, the employer cannot exercise such powers as the order discharging from service becomes punitive in nature and the Court has got inherent power to see that the real basis/the foundation for passing the order, was the alleged absence from duty. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners have further submitted that different Appointing Authority of the Constables in different Districts, have adopted a different procedure for dealing with the case of the employees/probationers/petitioners who were also sent on training along with them to ITBP, Panchkula Haryana. 23. The petitioners were appointed in District Jaipur and District Dausa. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners have further submitted that different Appointing Authority of the Constables in different Districts, have adopted a different procedure for dealing with the case of the employees/probationers/petitioners who were also sent on training along with them to ITBP, Panchkula Haryana. 23. The petitioners were appointed in District Jaipur and District Dausa. While on the one hand, Superintendent of Police/Appointing Authority has decided to invoke Rule 23-A of RSR to dispense with the services, but on the other hand, the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer has adopted the method for conducting preliminary enquiry and after preliminary enquiry, the charge-sheet has been issued to such persons under Rule 16 of CCA Rules, 1958 and regular departmental enquiry is being conducted against the similarly situated Constables like the petitioners who were also put on probation and the petitioners & other similarly situated persons, were selected in same selection process and they were sent for training. 24. Learned counsel submitted that only due to different Appointing Authority in each Districts, no separate course of action can be adopted and thus, the similarly situated persons, cannot be discriminated and all Superintendent of Police-Appointing Authority, have to adopt uniform method of dealing with Constables in respect of same fact situation of remaining absent during their training. 25. Learned counsel have submitted that this Court as well as the Apex Court has time and again laid down principle with respect to status of the probationers and it has been reiterated that the probationers cannot be removed from service on account of committing any misconduct and the appointment of probationers are regular and they are substantive appointees and services of such employees cannot be dispensed with without giving prior opportunity of hearing to them or holding a regular departmental enquiry if the foundation of the termination order passed, is based on misconduct committed by them. 26. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners have argued that under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Services Rules, 1989 (for short, “The Rules of 1989”) period of probation is provided of two years and while confirming, or extending the period of probation or discharging the persons during probation, Rule 39(4) of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 provides that if a probationer is placed under suspension or disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or have been initiated against him, the period of probation may be, extended till such time the departmental proceedings are finalised. Learned counsels submit that once the notice under Rule 86 of RSR, 1951 was given to petitioners, the respondents had made up their mind to initiate the departmental proceedings and as such without taking any action as per law, the impugned orders were issued in a haste and illegal manner. 27. Learned counsel have relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Shamsher Singh Vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. reported in (1974) 2 SCC 831 , S.B.I. Vs. Palak Modi reported in (2013) 3 SCC 607 , The State of Haryana Vs. Jagdish Chander reported in (1995) 2 SCC 567 , Shyam Sunder Sharma Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 1993 (2) WLC 288, Pradeep Kumar Yadav Vs. RSRTC, Dalip Kumar Yadav Vs. JCTCL & Anr., JCTCL & Anr. Vs. Dalip Kumar Yadav & Kumari Manjulata Shukla Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2008(6) WLC 795. 28. Mr. Himanshu Jain, Adv. has relied upon the judgment in the case of Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary Vs. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences, Patna, Bihar & Ors. reported in 2015(15) SCC 151 . 29. The State/respondents have filed reply to the writ petition and it has been pleaded by them that the petitioners willfully absented from training and the services were not found satisfactory during probation and as such services of the petitioner can be terminated under the powers given under Rule 23-A of RSR. The respondents have averred in the reply that initially notice was given under Rule 23-A, however, it was noticed by them that the services of the petitioners/probationers were wrongly terminated under Rule 23-A of RSR and as such vide order dt.13.04.2016, the order dt.12.04.2016 was cancelled and a fresh order terminating the services of the petitioners under Rule 23-A(1)(b) of RSR was issued on 10.06.2016. 30. 30. The respondents have admitted that the petitioners had reported back on training at ITBP, Panchkula Haryana after they got the final notice. Training Institute, ITBP Panchkula, Haryana did not allow them to join and relieved for concerned District Superintendent of Police vide different movement orders and later the petitioners reported for duty in Police Lines. They all were absent for more than 60 days and in some other cases for a considerable long time. 31. The respondents have submitted that sub-Rule 1(a) of Rule 23-A of RSR provides that except as otherwise provided in sub-Rule (2), the services of a temporary Government servant can be terminated at any time by notice in writing and further sub-Rule 1(b) provides that period of such notice can be one month or payment of salary in lieu of one month notice. 32. Dr. A.S. Khangarot, Addl. Govt. Counsel for the respondents has submitted that the respondents have taken a decision to terminate the services of the petitioners by invoking the powers given under Rule 23-A of RSR since the petitioners were not confirmed employees and they were temporary employees, their services could have been dispensed with and procedure of giving them one month salary, along with notice, was followed. 33. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that if the petitioners remained absent during probation period, the employer was within its domain to form an opinion about satisfactory performance of a probationer and the action taken by the respondents, was in accordance with the law. 34. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the petitioners being member of a disciplined force, could not have taken a liberty of remaining absent without leave being sanctioned or permission being granted to them to leave the Training Camp. 35. This Court on 15.02.2018 had asked Dr. A.S. Khangarot, Addl. Govt. Counsel for the respondents to seek necessary instructions from the respondents as to why a different yardstick was adopted while terminating services of the petitioners, who were on probation, as in some of the cases, Superintendent of Police, withdrew the order passed under Rule 23A of RSR and in some cases, persons were given charge-sheet under Rule 16 of CCA Rules, 1958. 36. 36. Learned counsel was specifically asked with respect to the decision taken by the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer as to how he was following the procedures under Rule 16 of CCA Rules, 1958 in respect of probationers who remained absent during training and how the Superintendent of Police, Jaipur and Dausa were following the procedure of removing the probationers by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR. 37. Dr. A.S. Khangarot, Addl. Govt. Counsel on previous hearing had produced the correspondence between the Superintendent of Police, Dausa and Inspector General (Headquarters), Jaipur. Learned counsel has not got the information till date from the Inspector General of Police (Headquarters), as how different yardstick was followed by the Appointing Authority while dealing with the case of the petitioners in their respective District. 38. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on judgment passed by this Court in SBCWP No.5265/2014 Madan Lal Kulahri Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. dt.23.11.2015, wherein this Court permitted the employer to take action as per Rule 23A of the RSR after giving notice to the delinquent-employee. 39. I have heard counsel for both the parties and perused the material available on record. 40. It would be relevant to quote the Rule 23-A of RSR. “Rule 23A. Notice for termination of service of a temporary employee : 1[(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in sub-rule (2), the service of a temporary Government Servant shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant. (b) The period of such notice shall be one month; provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith, and on such termination the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus alloweances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of the services or as the case may be for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. 2[(2) (a) The service of a termporary Government servant who has been in continuous Government service for more than three years and who satisfied the suitability in respect of age and qualification prescribed for the post and has been appointed in consultation with the Rajasthan Public Service Commission where such consultation is necessary, shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice of three months given in writing either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant. Provided that the service of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith, and on such termination the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus alloweances for the period of notice at the same rate at which he was drawing immediately before the termination of his service for the period by which such notice falls short of three months, as the case may be. (b) Where reduction has occurred in the number of posts available for Government servants not in permanent service, termination of service consequent upon the reduction of posts in the cadre under the appointing authority shall take place in the order of Juniority.]” The definition of Probationer as provided in Rule 7 (30) of RSR is as under:- “[(30) Probationer : means a person appointed provisionally against a substantive vacancy in the cadre of a service or on a substantively vacant post.]” 41. Rule 7 (30A) of RSR provides definition of Probationer trainee as insurted by notification w.e.f 20.01.2006 is as under:- “[(30A) Probationer-trainee : means a person appointed through direct recruitment against a clear vacancy in the cadre of service and placed under training on fixed remuneration for a period of two years or extended period, if any.]” 42. The Rule regarding probation etc. under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Rules 1989 is quoted hereunder. The Rule regarding probation etc. under the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Rules 1989 is quoted hereunder. “37 Period of Probation- (1) All persons appointed to the service by direct recruitment against a substantive vacancy shall be placed on probation for a period of two years and those appointed to the service by promotion/special selection against a substantive vacancy shall be placed on probation for a period of one year : Provided that:- (1) Such of them as have previous to their appointment by promotion/special selection or by direct recruitment against a substantive vacancy, officiated temporarily on the post which is followed by regular selection may be permitted by the Appointing Authority to count such officiating or temporary service towards the period of probation. This shall however not amount to supersession of any senior person or disturb the order of their preference in respective quota or reservation in recruitment. (2) Any period after such appointment during which a person has been on deputation on a corresponding or higher post shall count towards the period of probation. (3) During the period of probation specified in sub-rule (1) each probationer may be required to pass such Departmental Examination and to undergo such training as the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, may from time to time specify. If a probationer fails in the examination whether in any subject or subjects in indoor or outdoor examination or the aggregate, held after the conclusion of his training, he shall be given one more chance to pass the same after undergoing a further training of such duration as may be prescribed by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police from time to time. Explanation- In case of a person who dies or is due to retire on attaining the age of superannuation the period of probation shall be reduced so as to end one day earlier, on the date immediately preceding the date of his death or retirement from Government service. The condition of passing the Departmental Examination in the rule regarding confirmation shall be deemed to have been waived in case of death or retirement. Amendment of Rule 37.- The existing rule 37 of the said rules shall be substituted by the following, namely:- “37. The condition of passing the Departmental Examination in the rule regarding confirmation shall be deemed to have been waived in case of death or retirement. Amendment of Rule 37.- The existing rule 37 of the said rules shall be substituted by the following, namely:- “37. Period of Probation.- (1) A person entering the service by Direct Recruitment against a clear vacancy shall be placed as Probationer-trainee for a period of 2 years: Provided that any period after such appointment during which a person has been on deputation on a corresponding or higher post shall count to wards the period of probation. (2) During the period of probation specified in sub-rule (1), each probationer trainee may be required to pass such Departmental Examination and to undergo such training as the Government may, from time to time, specify.” 39. Confirmation, extention of probation and discharge- A member of the service who successfully completes his probation period and passes the Departmental Examination prescribed by Director General of Police shall be eligible for confirmation at the end of the probation period, provided the Appointing Authority is satisfied that his integrity is unquestionable and that he is otherwise fir for confirmation. Explanation- (1) In case the Departmental Examination could not be held due to unavoidable circumstances even after completion of two years’ period, the candidate will become due for confirmation after passing of the departmental examination with effect from the date on which he completed the probation period. (2) In case a candidate of service under probation fails to pass the prescribed examination in two attempts, he shall be liable to be discharged from such post in the manner as a probationer or reverted to a lower post, if any, to which he may be entitled: Provided further that no person shall be debarred from confirmation after the said period of service if no reasons to the contrary about the satisfactory performance of his work are communicated to him within the said period. (3) Where a candidate has not given a satisfactory account during the probation period or has failed in the prescribed examination during the first attempt, his probation period may be extended upto one year by the Appointing Authority or an Authority superior to the Appointing Authority. (3) Where a candidate has not given a satisfactory account during the probation period or has failed in the prescribed examination during the first attempt, his probation period may be extended upto one year by the Appointing Authority or an Authority superior to the Appointing Authority. Provided further that the Appointing Authority may, if it so thinks fit in case of persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, as the case may be extended the period of the probation by a period not exceeding three years. (4) Where a probationer is placed under suspension or disciplinary proceedings are contemplated or have been initiated against him, the period of his probation may be, extended till such time the departmental proceedings are finalised. (5) A probationer reverted or discharged from service during or at the end of the period of probation under sub-rule (1), shall not be entitled to any compensation.” 43. The first issue is with regard to applicability of Rule 23-A of RSR to the probationers, this Court finds that a bare reading of Rule 23-A makes it clear that services of a termporary Government servant can be terminated by the employer at any time by a notice in writing and in case notice is not to be given and if the employer wants to terminate the services of termporary Government servant forthwith, notice pay can be given to such employee. This Court finds that Rule 23-A only applies to the temporary Government servants and not to the probationers. 44. This Court is of the opinion, that if the person is appointed after undergoing regular mode of selection, his service conditions are governed by statutory Rules (like in the present case, the service condition of petitioners are regulated after their appointment as per Rajasthan Police Subordinate Rules of 1989). Such person acquires a status of probationer and he is not temporary Govt. employee. The Court finds that once the petitioners were appointed on probation, they could not have been treated as a termporary Government servant and respondents exercised power under Rule 23-A of RSR in a wrong and illegal manner. The definition given under RSR of Probationer and Probationer-Trainee makes it very clear that persons appointed on substantive basis against substantive post have been appointed on regular basis and they are not temporary Govt. employees. 45. The definition given under RSR of Probationer and Probationer-Trainee makes it very clear that persons appointed on substantive basis against substantive post have been appointed on regular basis and they are not temporary Govt. employees. 45. This Court also finds substance in the submissions made by counsel for the petitioners that the Appointing Authority working in different Districts, have adopted two different courses to deal with the probationers. The Superintendent of Police/Appointing Authority in District Jaipur & Dausa have adopted the course of removing the probationers from service by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR. On the contrary, the Superintendent of Police/Appointing Authority of District Ajmer, has got preliminary enquiry conducted against such similarly situated persons and finally charge-sheets have been served under Rule 16 of CCA Rules for committing misconduct of remaining absent during training period. This course is not understandable as how the appointing authority for the post of Constable, can adopt two different yardstick to deal with the service condition of the persons, who are governed by one set of Rules i.e. Rajasthan Police Subordinate Rules, 1989. This Court is also of the opinion that the respondents themselves have not followed the Standing Order 14/2014 issued by the DGP (Training Director), wherein specific direction have been given to all the authorities that in case during training, if the trainee remains absent without leave being granted or does not join before expiry of leave, such person has to be proceeded by way of a departmental enquiry at the instance of the Superintendent of Police concerned. 46. This Court finds that the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer has initiated the action as per Standing Order while the Appointing Authority i.e. Superintendent of Police Jaipur and Dausa have not followed the same Standing Order. The submission of counsel for the State that Standing Orders cannot be over and above the service Rules, this Court finds that the service conditions are regulated by Rules of 1989 and further if Standing order has been issued to regulate the service condition during probation/training period, the same is required to be adhered to by the authorities, who are subordinate to the Director General of Police, who issued the standing order. 47. 47. This Court finds that the Rule 39(4) of the Rules of 1989 provides that if the departmental proceedings are contemplated or have been initiated against the probationers, the authorities are bound to extend the time of probation till the departmental proceedings are finalised. 48. The reading of the Standing order also makes it clear that for the period of absence, the training period will be extended and an incumbent would be sent back for his training. The Standing Order is in connosance with the main Rule 39(4) of Rules of 1989. 49. The case law cited by counsel for the petitioners is with regard to nature of order of a probationer, as to whether the orders of termination is simplicitor or stigmatic order. This Court finds that in the present case, the power has been exercised by the employer in an illegal manner terminating the services of the probationers terming their performance unsatisfactory during probation. The services have been dispensed with by treating them as temporary Government employee and since this Court has held that Rule 23-A of RSR does not apply to the probationers, in the humble opinion of the Court, the authorities which are cited by counsel for the petitioners, do not require further elaboration. 50. This Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Sharma (supra) had an occasion to deal with the similar issue with respect to termination of the services of a trainee Constable. This Court found that the services of the petitioner in that case who was working on the post of Constable came to be terminated by order of discharge on account of unsatisfactory performance found by the Superintendent of Police, the Court found that if the probationer remained absent form duty, question of his performance becoming unsatisfactory, did not arise. The Court further found that if termination of service has been brought about on account of alleged willful absence, action of the respondents was liable to be quashed on this ground alone as no notice was given to the petitioners and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him before the Superintendent of Police, who took the decision of dispensing with the services merely on the ground of the alleged willful absence. The relevant para of the judgment is quoted hereunder:- “9. The relevant para of the judgment is quoted hereunder:- “9. Coming to the legal aspect of the matter, I must observe that while in the order of discharge from service reason of unsatisfactory performance has been given out as the basis of the action taken by the Superintendent of Police, in the reply respondents have come out with the case that the petitioner has wilfully remained absent from duty and, therefore, the competent authority issued order of his discharge from service. If petitioner is said to have remained absent from duty, question of his performance being unsatisfactory simply did not airse. That apart if termination of his service has been brought about on account of his alleged wilful absence, action of the respondents is liable to be quashed only on the ground that no action oriented notice was given to the petitioner and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him before the Superintendent of Police took a decision to dispense with his service on the ground of alleged wilful absence. It cannot be doubted that wilful absence from duty amounts to misconduct and any action on the basis of such allegation of misconduct can be taken only in accordance with the provisions of 1958 Rules and the principles of natural justice. Since neither Rules of 1958 nor the principles of natural justice have been followed before passing the order of termination of service of the petitioner on 26.08.1982, this Court is left with little option but to declare the order of termination of service of the petitioner to be illegal. A similar question has been examined by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 324/85 Kaluram Vs. State of Rajasthan and others, 1993 Vidhi Patrika 43. After making reference to a number of decisions of the British Courts and of the Supreme Court of India including Jaishankar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 492 , and of this Court in Chetan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1976 WLN (UC) 377, it has been held that termination of service of an employee on the allegation of absence from duty without following the procedure prescribed in the Rules and the principles of natural justice, is liable to be declared as void. 10. In the result the writ petition is allowed. Order dated 26.8.82 passed by the Superintendent of Police is declared illegal and it is hereby quashed. 10. In the result the writ petition is allowed. Order dated 26.8.82 passed by the Superintendent of Police is declared illegal and it is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service. He shall be again given opportunity of completing his training. He shall be confirmed in service after successful completion of training. His service shall be treated as continuous without any break. However he shall not be entitled to the benefit of actual wages for the period between the date of termination of his service and the date of this order. Costs made easy.” 51. The counsel for the respondents has placed reliance in the case of Madan Lal Kulahri (supra), this Court finds that the issue raised in that writ petitions was in respect of violation of Rule 23-A of RSR as the employee was not given prior notice or one month wage in lieu thereof and as such the Court found that since no notice or one month wage in lieu of notice was given, the order was not found sustainable. The Court only permitted liberty to the respondents to pass a fresh order. 52. This Court is of the opinion, that said judgment is of no help to the respondents as it does not decide the controversy as to whether the Appointing Authority has the power to terminate the services of a probationer by invoking Rule 23-A of RSR which is only applicable to a termporary Government servant. This Court finds that the impugned orders passed by the respondents are not sustainable in the eye of law and their action of terminating the services of the petitioners, is found to be illegal and bad in law. 53. Resultantly, the present writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders are quashed and set aside. This Court is further of the opinion that the respondents can always proceed as per law and the persons who are put on probation, can be dealt with as per powers available with the respondents/employer as per relevant Service Rules and Standing Orders issued from time to time. 54. The respondents are directed to implement the present order and further they are directed to reinstate the petitioners back in service within a period of five weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 55. A copy of this order may be placed in each file.