JUDGMENT : Ashok Menon, J. 1. These Writ Appeals are by the Government directed against the common judgment of the learned Single Judge in WP(C) Nos.7046/2017 and 20799/2017 dated 10.10.2017 and the judgments in WP(C) Nos. 33647/2017 and 5588/2018 dated 21.11.2017 and 5.3.2018 respectively, following the common Judgment reported in Shaiju v. Joint Regional Transport officer [2017 (4) KLT 69] of the learned Single Judge. No appeal is seen preferred from the judgment in WP(C) 20799/2017. 2. Writ Petitioners are operators of contract carriages with push back seats, for which valid permits were obtained. On an amendment made to the Schedule of the Taxation Act, the rate for those vehicles with push back seats was enhanced to Rs.1000/- per seat. The writ petitioners applied for conversion of the seats from push back to fixed seats and in one case after effecting the same sought for reduction of tax payable to Rs.750/- per seat, as applicable to contract carriages with straight back seats. In WP(C) No.7046/2017, the inspecting authorities indicated that irrespective of conversion of seats from push back to fixed, the petitioner would have to pay motor vehicles tax at the rate applicable to contract carriages fitted with push back seats. In WP(C) Nos. 33647/2017 and 5588/2018, the authorities refused to grant permission to convert the seats from push back to fixed, alleging that it would be in contravention of Circular 05/2014 of the Transport Commissioner of Kerala Order No.C1/11664/TC/2014 dated 26.06.2014. The petitioners thus approached this court by challenging the action of the registering authorities. 3. After hearing both sides, the learned Single Judge observed that prior to the amendment introduced through Finance Act, 2014, tax payable for contract carriages fitted with push back seats as well as fixed seats were similar; purely based on the number of seats. As per the Kerala Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, 1976 ('Act', for short), a distinction is made of push back seats and straight back ones for the purpose of differential taxation. The learned Single Judge after considering the nature of the amendment observed that change over from push back seats to ordinary seats will not cause any revenue loss to the petitioner, since the seating capacity is not reduced. The revenue loss, if any, is only to the State attributable to differential rate of tax stipulated for push back seats as against ordinary seats. The revenue loss, if any, is only to the State attributable to differential rate of tax stipulated for push back seats as against ordinary seats. The learned Single Judge observed that the mere change in the type of seats in a contract carriage without change in the number of seats, cannot be a reason for the Motor Vehicles Department to deny a request for such change, though it would result in reduced liability to tax for the operator concerned. Relying on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in 1973 (2) SCC 551 [Kelvinator of India Ltd. v. State of Haryana], the learned Judge observed that if a party had a choice of arranging his affairs in such a manner as to avoid its liability to tax, it was open to the party to so arrange his affairs so as to minimise/avoid the tax liability. The decisions in 1997 (1) KLT 386 [Gopalakrishnan v. RTO, Alleppey] and 2014(1) KLT 575 [Musthaffa K.K. and Others v. Asst. Motor Vehicle Inspector, Thrissur and Another] were distinguished by the learned Single Judge. 4. 1998 (2) KLT 112 [Vishwanatha Menon v. Addl. Registering Authority] was a case wherein a Full Bench of this Court found that the operator of a contract carriage who intends to reduce the seating capacity of a vehicle covered by contract carriage permit, need not seek any permission under Section 52 of the Act, since the liability to tax was on the seating capacity as specified by the manufacturer of the vehicle and in terms of the permit that was granted to the operator in question. The learned Single Judge held that the levy of tax has to be on a vehicle, in the state at which it is presented before the motor vehicle authorities at the commencement of the assessment period. In the instant case, since at the commencement of the assessment period, the vehicle pursuant to its alteration had to be classified as a contract carriage fitted with ordinary seats, which could carry more than 20 passengers, the tax for the relevant period would necessarily have to be at the rate of Rs.750/- for every passenger and not at the enhanced rate of Rs.1,000/- for every passenger applicable to contract carriages fitted with push back seats. The writ petitions were therefore allowed directing the appellant/respondent to fix the tax structure of the vehicles in question, accordingly. 5. The writ petitions were therefore allowed directing the appellant/respondent to fix the tax structure of the vehicles in question, accordingly. 5. The appellant-State relying on the decisions in Gopalakrishnan and Musthaffa K.K. (supra) argued for the proposition that the owners of the vehicles could alter the seats covered by the contract carriage permit, but the change in the nature of the seats cannot result in reduction of the tax payable by them. It is submitted that the ground of loss of revenue urged, was wrongly negatived by the learned Single Judge. It is argued that reduction in tax consequent to alteration of seats of the contract carriages which were originally fixed with push back seats will result in loss of revenue and therefore, the respondents/petitioners cannot demand a reduction of the tax on the basis of alteration of seats. The learned Government Pleader relies on the amendment that was introduced through Kerala Finance Act, 2014 and also relies on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Gopalakrishnan (supra), where it was held that when the owner of a vehicle, who was operating his vehicle with 50 seats, wanted to reduce it for paying lesser tax, it was found to be not a valid ground for alteration. It is also argued that the observation of the Honourable Supreme Court in Kelvinator (supra) has no relevance to the present cases wherein the facts and the law applicable are entirely different, for reason of the applicable taxation enactments being quite distinct. 6. We heard both sides. At the outset we have to indicate that the decision in Kelvinator of India (supra) cannot be brushed aside merely on the taxation being by different enactments. Tax evasion is what is frowned upon, attracting recovery and penalties, but not tax avoidance by legal means. This principle is applicable in any compulsory exaction, by way of tax, and the citizen would be entitled to arrange his affairs in such a manner so as to avoid or reduce the incidence or brunt of taxation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "It is also obvious that if there is a choice before the parties of so arranging their matters that in one case they would have to incur liability to pay tax and in the other case the liability to pay tax would not be attracted, they would prefer the latter course. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "It is also obvious that if there is a choice before the parties of so arranging their matters that in one case they would have to incur liability to pay tax and in the other case the liability to pay tax would not be attracted, they would prefer the latter course. There is nothing illegal or impermissible to a party so arranging its affairs that the liability to pay tax would not be attracted or that the brunt of taxation would be reduced to the minimum.” (para-15) 7. The thrust of the argument advanced by the learned Government Pleader for the appellant is that reduction in tax consequent to the alteration in seats would result in revenue loss. Vishwanatha Menon (supra) was concerned with a reference made by a learned Single Judge finding a Division Bench (D.B) having held in conflict with another. The earlier D.B. decision was 1996 (2) KLT 477 [Radhamani Vs. Joint R.T.O.]. The question arising was whether a reduction of seating capacity from that shown in the permit or registration certificate required a permission under Section 52. The Full Bench considered a host of decisions of different Division Benches of this Court. Gopalakrishnan (supra) and a few others were distinguished finding that the vehicles therein were stage carriages, for which the rules prescribed a minimum seating capacity. The rejection of application for reduction of seating capacity was upheld on grounds of the requirement as per the rules as also loss of revenue. Radhamani (supra) was concerned with light motor vehicles with manufactured bodies and seats fitted by the manufacturer themselves as distinguished from stage carriages, whose body is built by the owner of the vehicle after purchase of chassis. Vishwanatha Menon (supra) was concerned with stage carriage owners who sought for reduction of seating capacity and also proportionate reduction in tax. The reduced tax was sought since a different rate was applicable to vehicles having seating capacity of 6 to 12 and 12 to 20. The subject vehicles had seating capacity of 15 to 16 and the reduction sought was to 12. 8. The reduced tax was sought since a different rate was applicable to vehicles having seating capacity of 6 to 12 and 12 to 20. The subject vehicles had seating capacity of 15 to 16 and the reduction sought was to 12. 8. The Full Bench agreed with the finding in Radhamani which was as follows: “The above discussion leads us to the conclusion that whenever a registered owner of the motor vehicle wants to charge the seating capacity either by reduction or by increase, he need not obtain any approval of the registering authority. At the same time, the proviso to S. 52(1) necessitates such an approval if the addition or removal of fittings or accessories will result in exceeding 2% of the weight entered in the certificate of registration.” The Full Bench found that in contract carriages for reduction of seating capacity there is no requirement for a permission under Section 52 unless the unladen weight of the vehicle is reduced or increased in excess of 2%. However the reduction would not enable a lesser rate of tax since the taxation is on the seating capacity as seen from the registration certificate and the permit. 9. Musthaffa K.K.’s case followed Vishwanatha Menon’s case and held that there is no requirement of permission for altering the seating capacity and there can be no refusal on grounds of adversely affecting the interest of the revenue. In Musthaffa K.K. (supra), the Division Bench of this Court observed that Vishwanatha Menon (supra) was not rendered laying down any principle of law that would apply to the question as to whether the liability to tax under the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act would depend on the number of seats as regards contract carriage vehicles. The Division Bench held that by reducing the seating capacity, the tax payable under the Act for contract carriage cannot be reduced and will be on the basis of the seating capacity as fixed by the manufacturer. 10. In the cases before us, a distinction is drawn with regard to the nature of the seats fixed in contract carriages and two rates are specified by virtue of the amendment that was introduced by the Finance Act. 10. In the cases before us, a distinction is drawn with regard to the nature of the seats fixed in contract carriages and two rates are specified by virtue of the amendment that was introduced by the Finance Act. The contract carriages with fixed seats had the liability to tax at the rate of Rs.750/- per seat, whereas those having push back seats will have to pay tax at the rate of Rs.1000/- per seat. There would not be any change in the number of seats to be determined because that would be in accordance with the manufacturers specification and tax will have to be paid in accordance with the seating capacity as described in the registration certificate. But in view of the fact that there is an alteration in the nature of the seats, the owner of the vehicle would only be liable to pay tax at the rate described in the schedule depending on the nature of the seats, which he is at liberty to alter for which no specific permission is even required under Section 52 of the Act. The nature of seats; whether it is push back or straight back is not a specification of the manufacturer nor prescribed by the statute or rules and is exclusively the volition of the owner who builds the body. There need not be any permission for alteration sought for making such alteration as the same would not alter the unladen weight by 2% either way. The taxation has to be on verification of the nature of the seats actually fitted. We are, therefore, of the view that the decision of the learned Single Judge allowing the writ petitions was perfectly justified. There is no reason whatsoever to interfere with the same. The Writ Appeals, hence, fail and are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.