JUDGMENT : Since common questions are involved in these matters, the same are heard together and disposed of by this common Judgment. 2. The present appeals are filed by Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board [‘KIADB’, for short], calling in question the Judgment and Award dated 1.3.2016 passed by the Court of I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Ballari, at Ballari, in L.A.C. No.32/2013 and connected matters, whereby the compensation fixed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB has been enhanced from Rs.1,50,000/-per acre together with statutory benefits thereon as applicable, to Rs.30,20,270/-per acre together with solatium at 30% additional market value and interest as directed therein. 3. The KIADB has filed these appeals along with applications seeking permission of the Court to prosecute the appeals, contending that the Secretary, KIADB, a necessary party to the proceedings was not arrayed as party/respondent in the proceedings before the Reference Court. It was only the Special Land Acquisition Officer and the beneficiary i.e., M/s. Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited have been arrayed as party/respondents. 4. The KIADB in exercise of its powers under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 [‘Act’, for short], had acquired 4,156.07 acres of land in Kuduthini Village and 709.57 acres of land in Haraginadoni Village, vide Preliminary Notification issued under Section 28[1] of the Act on 6.2.2010 and the final Notification issued under Section 28[4] of the Act on 4.5.2010 for formation of industrial area. The Land Acquisition Officer passed the Award determining the market value of the acquired lands at Rs.1,50,000/-per acre along with all statutory benefits. The claimants not being satisfied with the Award passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, filed Reference Petitions under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [‘LA Act’, for short]. The Reference Court enhanced the market value from Rs.1,50,000/-per acre in Kuduthini Village to Rs.30,20,270/-per acre together with all statutory benefits. Being aggrieved by the same, KIADB is in appeal. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. S. Vijay Shankar representing learned Counsel Sri. Veeresh R. Budihal, for the Appellant, submitted that KIADB is a necessary party for adjudication of reference petition. The Judgment and Award passed by the Reference Court suffers from a fundamental legal defect in not notifying the necessary party KIADB, in whose benefit, the lands were acquired. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. S. Vijay Shankar representing learned Counsel Sri. Veeresh R. Budihal, for the Appellant, submitted that KIADB is a necessary party for adjudication of reference petition. The Judgment and Award passed by the Reference Court suffers from a fundamental legal defect in not notifying the necessary party KIADB, in whose benefit, the lands were acquired. It was submitted that KIADB is a statutory and wholly owned infrastructure agency of Government of Karnataka, set up under the Act and functions as per statutory provisions, rules and regulations enacted thereunder. KIADB comprises of Senior Government Officers in their Ex-officio capacities. The applicant being first Government Organization in Karnataka has obtained ISO.9001 certification in the year 1997 and is following ISO 9001:2000 module covering its functions of land acquisition, development and allotment functions in the State of Karnataka. That being the position, the Secretary, KIADB was a necessary party respondent before the Reference Court. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB is only the designated authority having delegated powers of holding an enquiry under the relevant provisions of the Act, to determine the compensation and market value of the lands and to pass general award. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB is only adjudicating authority performing quasi judicial function of determining the compensation and as such no relief can be sought as against the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB, who is neither an aggrieved person nor a necessary party whereas the appellant herein is a proper and necessary party. The land acquisition proceedings under the scheme of the Act commenced from the stage of issuance of Preliminary Notification till passing of the Award and after passing of the Award, the Special Land Acquisition Officer does not have any power, authority or competence as such. The Special Land Acquisition Officer takes over possession of the lands acquired under the proceedings and hands over the same to the appellant herein. The powers of the Special Land Acquisition Officer stands extinguished thereafter and as such, the Special Land Acquisition Officer is not a necessary party, but it is the appellant herein who necessarily has to be heard in the matter. 6. The powers of the Special Land Acquisition Officer stands extinguished thereafter and as such, the Special Land Acquisition Officer is not a necessary party, but it is the appellant herein who necessarily has to be heard in the matter. 6. It was further contended that under the scheme of the Act, it is the KIADB represented by its Secretary who is required to comply with the Judgment and Award impugned herein and hence KIADB being a necessary party has to be allowed to file the instant appeals. It was the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that the KIADB is a person interested in the acquisition and moreover amount so ordered to be paid to the claimants has to be borne by KIADB. Inviting attention of the Court to Section 20[2][c] of the Karnataka State Amendment to the ‘LA Act’, submitted that if the acquisition is not made for Government, the person and authority for whom it is made is a necessary party on whom it is mandatory to cause a notice to determine the reference. In such circumstances, the Judgment and Award impugned herein is per se vitiated for not causing service of notice on KIADB. 7. Further, it was submitted that the enhancement of compensation by the Reference Court from Rs.1,50,000/-per acre along with statutory benefits to Rs.30,20,270/-per acre along with statutory benefits is arbitrary and not based on any scientific method of determination. It is based only on Exhibit. R7, certified copy of proceedings of Deputy Commissioner, Ballari, the market value of the acquired lands has been determined by the Reference Court. The Reference Court relying on the said Exhibit, misinterpreting the said document, has astronomically enhanced the market value which deserves to be set aside. Exhibit.R7 was the communication addressed, according to which the value of the agricultural lands at Kuduthini was fixed at Rs.1,50,000/-per acre. The lands in question being agricultural lands, ought not to have been considered as non agricultural lands in the absence of lands being converted into non agricultural lands under the relevant provisions of law. No material evidence was placed on record by the claimants to enhance the compensation to Rs.30,20,270/-per acre with statutory benefits. The determination made by the Reference Court is rather unknown to market value determination jurisprudence as well as settled principles of law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of Judgments. No material evidence was placed on record by the claimants to enhance the compensation to Rs.30,20,270/-per acre with statutory benefits. The determination made by the Reference Court is rather unknown to market value determination jurisprudence as well as settled principles of law enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of Judgments. Considering the nature, situation and potentiality of the lands acquired, enhancement made by the Reference Court on imaginary assumptions and presumptions is wholly illegal and calls for interference by this Court. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following Judgments: [a] ‘THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD v. C.V. KRISHNAREDDY AND OTHERS’ [MFA No.7635/2015 and connected matters – DD 26.10.2016] [b] ‘THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB v. SMT. AMMENAMMA AND OTHERS’ [MFA No.4923/2008 – DD 17.11.2011]. [c] ‘THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AND LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, BASAVAKALYAN, BIDAR DISTRICT v. DILIPKUMAR AND OTHERS’ [2011 [3] KLJ 385 [DB]. [d] ‘PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN [DEAD] BY LRs AND OTHERS v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER’ [2015] 10 SCC 469. 8. Learned Senior Counsel Sri. Padmanabha V. Mahale, representing Sri Rajashekar Gunjalli and Sri Hareesh Bhandari, learned Counsel for claimants submitted that the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB is the adjudicating authority performing quasi judicial function of determining the compensation and as such, no relief can be sought as against the Special Land Acquisition Officer, is wholly erroneous. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB was represented by the Counsel duly appointed by KIADB. Since the Special Land Acquisition Officer was a party to the proceedings, KIADB is neither ‘aggrieved’ nor ‘necessary party’ for effective adjudication of the proceedings before the Reference Court. It was submitted that beneficiary Company – Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as respondent No.3) filed application before the Reference Court for dismissal of the claim petition, on the ground that the Special Land Acquisition Officer is only an adjudicating authority performing quasi judicial function of determining the compensation and as such, no relief can be sought against him. The Reference Court rejected the said application. Neither the appellant nor the Special Land Acquisition Officer nor the beneficiary Company have questioned the said order and the same has reached finality. 9. The Reference Court rejected the said application. Neither the appellant nor the Special Land Acquisition Officer nor the beneficiary Company have questioned the said order and the same has reached finality. 9. It was the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the claimants that the lands in question were acquired for the benefit of M/s. Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited, Respondent No.3 herein, by the State Government. The liability to pay compensation is on the beneficiary. Neither the State nor the KIADB is liable to pay compensation. As such, KIADB has no locus to prefer an appeal. It was argued that Chapter-VII of the Act deals with the acquisition of lands for KIADB. Under the scheme of the Act, the lands shall be acquired by the State Government by issuing Notification through the Special Land Acquisition Officer who is an Officer of the State Government deputed to serve under the KIADB. The KIADB is only an agency and neither the acquiring party nor the beneficiary. As such, it is not an aggrieved party to prefer an appeal against the Award passed by the Reference Court, more particularly, there being no liability to pay compensation by the KIADB. To substantiate this argument, learned Senior Counsel emphasized on the averments made in the appeal memo that the appellant is a statutory and wholly owned infrastructure agency of Government of Karnataka, set up under the Act. In such fact situation, KIADB has no role to play in awarding compensation. Reliance was placed on Section 31 of the Act, which provides delegation of powers by the State Government. The State Government in furtherance of the same, has framed rules. Rule 14 provides for delegating powers of the State Government. Acting under Rule 14, the Special Land Acquisition Officer is representing the State Government. When the Special Land Acquisition Officer was arrayed as a party, it is not necessary to notify the appellant herein to adjudicate the reference. 10. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the Reference Court has complied with Section 20[2][c] of the LA Act by serving notice on Special Land Acquisition Officer. It was further argued that the Reference Court was justified in enhancing the compensation considering the prevailing market value of similarly situated lands as admitted by the Authorities as per Exhibit.R7. It was contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the Reference Court has complied with Section 20[2][c] of the LA Act by serving notice on Special Land Acquisition Officer. It was further argued that the Reference Court was justified in enhancing the compensation considering the prevailing market value of similarly situated lands as admitted by the Authorities as per Exhibit.R7. Considering the norms, nature of lands as non agricultural lands, the same having been acquired for industrial purpose, the compensation awarded by the Reference Court fixing the market value at Rs.30,20,270/-per acre is justifiable and do not call for any interference by this Court. 11. In support of his contentions, learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the following Judgments: [a] ‘THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD v. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS’ [2009] 1 KLJ 102]. [b] ‘M.S.N. NADAF [DECEASED] BY LRs AND OTHERS v. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER’ [ AIR 2004 SC 3444 ] [c] ‘ARAVIND AND OTHERS v. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER’ [ILR 2006 KAR 922] [d] ‘BALLARPUR INDUSTRIES LTD., v. COURT OF THE CIVIL JUDGE, KARWAR AND OTHERS’ [ILR 1987 KAR 3445] 12. Heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties and perused the material on record. 13. To appreciate the respective contentions, it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act. The object of the Act is to make provision for orderly establishment and development of industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for Industrial Development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of Industries. 14. The object of the Act is to make provision for orderly establishment and development of industries in suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is proposed to specify suitable areas for Industrial Development and establish a Board to develop such areas and make available lands therein for establishment of Industries. 14. Section 2[2] of the Act defines ‘Board’ as the Industrial Areas Development Board established under this Act; Section 2[5] defines ‘Development’ as to mean the carrying out of levelling, digging, building, engineering, quarrying or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in any building or land, and includes re-development; and “to develop” shall be construed accordingly; Section 2[6] defines ‘industrial area’ as any area declared to be an industrial area by the State Government by notification which is to be developed and where industries are to be accommodated and industrial infrastructural facilities and amenities are to be provided and includes, an industrial estate; Section 2[11] defines the expression ‘land’, and the expression ‘person interested’ shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 15. Chapter-VII of the ‘Act’ deals with acquisition and disposal of land. In terms of Section 28[1], if at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land; As per Section 28[4], the State Government if satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect; In terms of Section 28[5] on the publication in the official gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances; Section 29 contemplates payment of compensation. It is the State Government which is required to pay the compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act wherein land is acquired by the State Government under Chapter VII. It is the State Government which is required to pay the compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act wherein land is acquired by the State Government under Chapter VII. Sub-Section [2] of Section 29 provides, where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement; Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid in terms of Sub-Section [3]. In terms of Sub-Section [4] of Section 29, the Deputy Commissioner under sub-section (3), shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land; As per Section 30 of the Act, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of lands acquired under Chapter-VII; Section 31 provides for delegation of powers by the State Government wherein if it thinks fit delegate any of its powers under this Chapter to any of its officers, by rules made in that behalf. 16. The aforesaid provisions of the Act, makes it clear that the acquisition of agricultural lands in the notified industrial area vide Notifications issued under Sections 28[1] and 28[4] of the Act empowers the State Government to acquire the lands for the purpose of industrial development. Sections 29 and 30 of the Act read with Sections 11, 18 and 30 of the ‘LA Act’ would clearly mandate that both the State Government and KIADB are liable jointly or severally to pay the compensation to the owners or interested persons of the acquired land as enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in PEERAPPA’s case [supra]. The Reference Court placing reliance on PEERAPPA’s case [supra], held that the beneficiary Respondent No.3 herein has no locus to participate in the reference proceedings albeit the application of claimants to implead Respondent No.3 in the proceedings was allowed. The Reference Court placing reliance on PEERAPPA’s case [supra], held that the beneficiary Respondent No.3 herein has no locus to participate in the reference proceedings albeit the application of claimants to implead Respondent No.3 in the proceedings was allowed. The Hon’ble Apex Court in PEERAPPA’s case [supra] was considering the case of the beneficiary challenging the Award of the Reference Court sans notifying it before determination of the market value. In the said case, lands were acquired by the State Government for the development by KIADB for establishment of the industries. After allotment of the land, agreement was executed by KIADB in favour of the beneficiary company as provided under the Regulation 10[a] and [c] of the KIADB Regulations. The Notifications issued under Sections 28[1] and 28[4] of the Act by the State Government was for the purpose of industrial development by KIADB in Sedam Taluk. In such circumstances, it was concluded that the KIADB is the beneficiary and not the company. In that context, it was held that the company is neither a beneficiary nor an interested person in the land as on the date of acquisition of the land as the land was acquired by the State Government in favour of KIADB who is the beneficiary and it has allotted in favour of the company after the land was acquired in its favour by the State Government and executed a lease agreement. As such, company has no right to participate in the Award proceedings for determination of the market value. Accordingly, writ petition filed by the company questioning the correctness of the Award passed by the Reference Court which was affirmed by the High Court was held to be not maintainable in law. But, the factual position in the present case is altogether different. 17. In the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN supra, Sections 29 and 30 of the Act read with Sections 11, 18 and 30 of the LA Act would mandate both the State Government and KIADB jointly and severally to pay the compensation to the owners or interested persons of the acquired land. In view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in DILIPKUMAR AND OTHERS supra, only the aggrieved party who has liability to pay the compensation can file an appeal. In view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in DILIPKUMAR AND OTHERS supra, only the aggrieved party who has liability to pay the compensation can file an appeal. In the instant fact situation, KIADB is a necessary party to the proceedings and ought to have been notified in the award proceedings. 18. The contention of the learned counsel for the claimants that the application filed by the beneficiary/R-3, contending the very same grounds before the Court below having been dismissed and attained finality, neither the Board nor the beneficiary can agitate the same grounds in the appeal proceedings, cannot be countenanced for the reason that appellant-Board was not a party to the said proceedings and whatever the order passed therein is not binding on the appellant-Board merely for the reason that appellant-Board has not made any efforts to implead itself to be added as a party to the proceedings, cannot disentitle it from seeking leave of this Court to prosecute the appeal. It was mandatory to notify the authority-Board which acts as an agency of the State Government in terms of Section 20 (2) (c) of the Karnataka Amendment to the LA Act coupled with Section 29 of the Act where the liability is fixed on the State Government to pay the compensation. 19. However, the finding of the Reference Court on issue No.1 that beneficiary company has no locus to participate in the reference proceedings is not challenged by the company. 20. We are astound by the conduct of respondent No.3/beneficiary. No arguments were advanced on behalf of respondent No.3 albeit represented by a counsel. The trial Court having held that respondent No.3 is not a necessary party to the proceedings, Special Land Acquisition Officer not being a competent authority to challenge the order impugned, in the absence of notifying KIADB, the net result would be the order impugned attaining finality which would adversely affect the rights of the parties who are liable to pay the compensation more particularly, when the compensation amount is enhanced from Rs.1,50,000/-per acre to Rs.30,20,270/-per acre. 21. It is the further contention of the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 that Special Land Acquisition Officer representing the Board was engaged by KIADB and as such notifying the KIADB separately would not arise. 21. It is the further contention of the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 that Special Land Acquisition Officer representing the Board was engaged by KIADB and as such notifying the KIADB separately would not arise. This argument also does not hold good as the Board is a separate entity constituted under Section 6 of the Act. The Special Land Acquisition Officer of the Board becomes functus officio as soon as the market value is determined in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Special Land Acquisition Officer being quasi judicial authority cannot challenge the impugned award. Even from this angle also, Board has to be notified. 22. It is the main contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant that the mandatory requirement of Section 20[2][c] of the LA Act, is not complied with. It is true that Section 20[2][c] of the LA Act (Karnataka Amendment) contemplates to cause notice on the person and authority for whom it is made if the acquisition is not made for Government. In the present set of facts, as could be seen from the Notification issued under Sections 28[1] and 28[4] of the Act, lands were acquired for industrial purpose i.e., for M/s. Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited. Hence, the beneficiary company for whom the acquisition was made by the State Government was also a necessary party to the reference proceedings along with KIADB. 23. In BALLARPUR’s case [supra], the Division Bench of this Court was considering the case of the company challenging the Award proceedings on the ground that, it was not notified in terms of Section 20(2) [c] of the LA Act. KIADB also had preferred writ petition which was on the contention similar to the contention of the company, by assailing that it ought to have been notified in terms of Section 20(2)[c] of the LA Act. In the said proceedings, the Division Bench has referred to the Judgment of the ‘SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BELGAUM v. GOVINDAPPA FAKIRAPPA BAGAI’, in MFA. KIADB also had preferred writ petition which was on the contention similar to the contention of the company, by assailing that it ought to have been notified in terms of Section 20(2)[c] of the LA Act. In the said proceedings, the Division Bench has referred to the Judgment of the ‘SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BELGAUM v. GOVINDAPPA FAKIRAPPA BAGAI’, in MFA. No. 789 of 1984, DD -13-12-1984, wherein it is held thus: "...........Whereas the Government of Karnataka is of the opinion that the lands specified in the Schedule below are required for development by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board for establishment of Industries therein for the Ghataprabha Sahakari Sakkere Karkhane Nivamit Gokak, Taluka Gokak." From the reading of this notification and the real purpose of the acquisition discernible there from, it would appear that both the Board and the 'Sugar Factory' are the authority' and person for whom the acquisition is made. If the acquisition had been proposed for the benefit of the 'Board7 alone, it would be sufficient compliance of S.20(c) if 'Board' was alone notified of the proceedings. The further step of enquiring into the identity of and notifying, persons who were intended by the 'Board' to be beneficiaries of the acquisition would not be within the strict requirement of S.20(c) as long as the Board was notified of ,he proceedings. In such a case, those who might derive interest in or title to the acquired lands from the Board may not, as of right, be entitled to notice under S. 20(c) of the L. A. Act. But, in the present case, the intendment of the preliminary notification under S.28(l) of the Act and the purpose of the very initiation of the proceedings of acquisition, as made manifest by the notification, is that both the Board and the Sugar factory are the person and authority for whom the acquisition was made and it would, therefore, be proper in the circumstances of the present case, to hold that both the Board as well as the Sugar factory were entitled to notices under Sec. 20(c) in the proceedings of reference. In view of the admitted circumstance that the Board and the Sugar factory have not been so notified in the proceedings of reference, the determination of market value and the enhancement of compensation made by the Court below in Award under appeal are rendered in firm in law and cannot be supported. The award under appeal would, on that ground alone, require to be set aside and the matter remanded to the Court below for afresh disposal in accordance with law." 24. After analyzing the factual aspects of the said case, more particularly, wherein the lands were acquired for development for ‘establishment of industries’ and in the absence of Notifications and the Awards furnished before the Court, the lands not being acquired neither for the Board nor for the company, it was held that notice under Section 20(2)[c] of the LA Act was not necessary even if it is assumed that the said provision governs the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act. However, it is clear from the said judgments, if the acquisition had been proposed for the benefit of the Board alone, it would be sufficient compliance of Section 20[c] if Board was notified of the proceedings. If the acquisition had been proposed for the benefit of the Board and the company, both the Board and the Beneficiary are required to be notified. In view of the Notification specifying the purpose of initiation of proceedings of acquisition for M/s. Arcelor Mittal India Private Limited read with Section 20 (2) (c) of the LA Act, Karnataka Amendment as well as Section 29 of the Act, KIADB is also a necessary party to the proceedings. 25. The Division Bench of this Court in DILIP KUMAR’s case [supra] has held that the Land Acquisition Officer is a quasi judicial authority who determines the market value in accordance with the provisions of the LA Act. The land is evidently acquired for the benefit of the company which is a sugar factory and the liability is on the sugar factory to pay the compensation, if aggrieved, should file an appeal. The land is evidently acquired for the benefit of the company which is a sugar factory and the liability is on the sugar factory to pay the compensation, if aggrieved, should file an appeal. In such circumstances, when the land is acquired for the benefit of third party and State has no liability to pay compensation, the Land Acquisition Officer or the State will not have any locus to file an appeal against such Award, only aggrieved party who has liability to pay compensation can file an appeal. Much emphasis was placed on this Judgment by both the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties. That the Special Land Acquisition Officer is not competent authority to file an appeal if aggrieved by the Award of Reference Court. As held by this Court, the aggrieved party who has liability to pay compensation can file an appeal. In the present case, the liability is on the KIADB and the Company jointly and severally as per Sections 29 and 30 of the Act to pay compensation. Hence, we are of the considered view that KIADB has locus to challenge the impugned judgment and award of the reference Court. 26. In the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in C.V. KRISHNAREDDY’s case [supra], it was held that the Reference Court has not complied with the mandatory provision of Section 20[2][c] of the LA Act as amended in Karnataka, setting aside the Judgment and Award of the Reference Court, remanded the matter to the Reference Court. Similarly, in AMMENAMMA’s case [supra], the Division Bench has followed the Judgment of DILIP KUMAR’s case [supra] and held that KIADB is a necessary party in the reference proceedings. These judgments are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 27. In the case of N. SOMASHEKAR AND OTHERS V. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS, this Court while dealing with Rule 14 of KIADB Rules, 1966, held that as it originally existed delegated the powers exercisable by the Government under Section 28(2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) of the Act to the Assistant Commissioner, in charge of the Revenue Sub-Divisions alone. The Rule was, however, amended by the Notification dated 10th October, 1983, to provide for delegation in favour of Special Land Acquisition Officers in KIADB. The Rule was, however, amended by the Notification dated 10th October, 1983, to provide for delegation in favour of Special Land Acquisition Officers in KIADB. A proviso to the Rule so amended makes it clear that where the powers are delegated to the Special Land Acquisition Officers or Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer, the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the revenue sub-division shall cease to exercise the powers in the areas falling within the jurisdiction of such Officers. What is clear from a careful reading of this Rule is that the power exercisable by the State Government under Section 28 of the Act has been delegated to the Special Land Acquisition Officers or the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officers in the Board. This delegation of powers to the Special Land Acquisition Officers or the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officers cannot be continued subsequent to passing of the award. As aforesaid, Special Land Acquisition Officer becomes functus officio after passing of the award. As such, this judgment would not come to the assistance of the claimants – respondents. 28. The judgment of SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, KIADB, supra, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Similarly, the judgment in M.S.N. NADAF supra, has been rendered in a different context considering the charges to be deducted for development. Hence, we are of the considered view that the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel that there are number of cases wherein Special Land Acquisition Officer of KIADB, filed appeals against the awards, representing the Board would also not come to the assistance of the respondents in view of the subsequent judgments of this Court in DILIPKUMAR supra, C.V. KRISHNAREDDY supra and SMT. AMMENAMMA supra. 29. For the forgoing reasons, we allow IA-3/2016 permitting the appellant to prosecute the appeal. For the reasons narrated in the preceding paragraphs, the impugned judgment and award dated 01.03.2016 in LAC No.32/2013 and connected matters passed by the Reference Court is set aside. The matter is remanded to the Reference Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law after notifying the appellant-KIADB as per Section 20 (2) (c) of the LA Act (Karnataka Amendment) as well as the beneficiary/respondent No.3. 30. All contentions of the parties are kept open. The matter is remanded to the Reference Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law after notifying the appellant-KIADB as per Section 20 (2) (c) of the LA Act (Karnataka Amendment) as well as the beneficiary/respondent No.3. 30. All contentions of the parties are kept open. Parties are given liberty to adduce evidence, if any, within the time to be granted by the Reference Court. 31. The Reference Court is directed to dispose of the proceedings expeditiously and in any event not later than four months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order and the appearance of the appellant-KIADB and beneficiary/respondent No.3 whichever is later. 32. As the matter is remanded to the Reference Court for a fresh decision, the appellant is entitled for refund of the court fee in terms of Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958. Registry shall refund the court fee accordingly. 33. Amount deposited by the KIADB before this Court shall be transferred to the reference Court. In the event of withdrawal by the claimants, the same shall be subject to the result of reference petitions. 34. Registry shall return the LCR forthwith. 35. Appeals stand disposed of in the above terms. 36. In view of the disposal of the appeals, all the pending IAs are consigned to file.