JUDGMENT : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. Regard being had to the present assailment and the prima facie materials furnished with the petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14962/2017, this Court issued notices on 20.11.2017 directing dasti service on the respondents. However, the other above-numbered writ petitions gradually got tagged, having regard to the identicalness of the issues involved. 2. The contextual facts, which encompass the issues in all these writ petitions, permit analogous adjudication thereof. 3. These writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have been preferred claiming, in sum and substance, the following reliefs: "A. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the letter/communication dated 20.04.2015 (Annexure-10) may kindly be quashed and set aside qua the decision of withholding 1005 vacancies of Compounder/Nurse Junior Grade from giving appointments in the department of Ayurved, Unani & Homeopathy. B. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, any order passed which are not in the knowledge of the petitioners, denying their candidature on the post of Compounder/Nurse Junior Grade in all the 3 departments of Ayurved, Homeopathy & Unani for the recruitment process, 2013 may kindly be quashed and set aside. C. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed to publish cutoff, select list and give appointments to the present petitioners in accordance with their respective merit on the remaining 285 vacancies (127 vacancies in Unani & 128 vacancies in Homeopathy Department) for compounder/nurse junior grade, 2013. D. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be directed to complete the recruitment process of 2013 by publishing the select list and giving appointment to the present petitioners if found meritorious against the 1005 withhold vacancies of compounder/nurse junior grade in Ayurved, Unani & Homeopathy department. E. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be restrained from de-notifying and reducing the unfilled 1290 vacancies of compounder/nurse junior grade in the Ayurved, Unani and Homeopathy department from the recruitment process, 2013. F. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be restrained from filling or carrying forward these unfilled 1290 vacancies of compounder/nurse junior grade, 2013 through any subsequent or future advertisement. F. By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the respondents may kindly be restrained from filling or carrying forward these unfilled 1290 vacancies of compounder/nurse junior grade, 2013 through any subsequent or future advertisement. G. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioners. H. Writ petition filed by the petitioner may kindly be allowed with costs." 4. Since the foundational and skeletal facts, which constitute the essence of the dissension, are identical so much so that the sequence of events, if drawn from any of the petitions, would suffice to comprehend the issues to be addressed, therefore, looking to the striking likeness of the factual framework of the cases in hand, for the sake of brevity and convenience, facts in bare minimum, as available in the pleadings of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14962/2017, would be adverted to. 5. To start with, the respondents initiated a recruitment process in the year 2013 for filling up 1605 vacancies of Compounder/Nurse Junior Grade in the Ayurved, Homeopathy and Unani Departments. The advertisement dated 07.06.2013 however, was not acted upon, and thus, the regular recruitment process was brought to halt. 6. The respondents thereafter, vide the impugned letter/communication dated 20.04.2015, withheld 1005 vacancies in question, out of total 1605 vacancies, for the Ayurved, Homeopathy and Unani Departments collectively. 7. The Finance Department, vide circular dated 01.04.2015, required all the concerned Departments, Bodies, Institutes etc. to get approval of the Finance Department before beginning the recruitment process for filling up the vacancies. The requirement of the financial sanction was however, kept prospective in nature. 8. The impugned communication dated 20.04.2015 stated that due to the non-approval by the Finance Department, 665 + 160 + 180 : 1005 vacancies in Ayurved, Homeopathy and Unani Departments respectively amongst the total advertised 1605 vacancies of Compounder/Nurse Junior Grade in recruitment process of 2013 were kept in abeyance. 9. Before adverting to the rival contentions advanced, it would be expedient to complete the narration of facts pleaded before this Court and having a significant bearing on the course of adjudication. 10. By orders dated 18.01.2018 and 30.01.2018, this Court formulated the following queries requiring the State/respondents to file response thereto: "Query (a). 9. Before adverting to the rival contentions advanced, it would be expedient to complete the narration of facts pleaded before this Court and having a significant bearing on the course of adjudication. 10. By orders dated 18.01.2018 and 30.01.2018, this Court formulated the following queries requiring the State/respondents to file response thereto: "Query (a). The status of implementation of the selection process for the advertised posts in accordance with the circular of the respondents dated 20.04.2015? Query (b). The respondents shall be required to furnish before this Court as to why the posts have been desanctioned? Query (c). The respondents shall be further required to explain the impact of the circular dated 01.04.2015, whereby the sanction from the Finance Department was not required for filling such posts. Query (d). Under what circumstances, the regular advertised posts have been converted into contractual posts? Query (e). The rationality and objectivity of the State Government for curtailing the selection process?" 11. To be exact in the portrayal, it would be apt to extract ad verbatim the averments in the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the Ayurved Medical Officer (Legal Cell), Add. Director Office, Jodhpur, sequel to the aforesaid orders dated 18.01.2018 and 30.01.2018. Precise answers to the queries formulated by this Court, as aforementioned, are quoted herein below: "Response to Query (a): In regard to the query (a) submit that by order dated 15.06.2015 the selection list of the candidates for 313 posts were issued and vide order dated 21.08.2015 were given appointment. Response to Queries (b) & (e): In regard to the (b) and (e) queries it is submitted that the vide order sheet dated 27.02.2015 the Finance Department categorically observed that no approval has been sought before inclusion of Junior nurse/Compounders (Ayurved/Unani/Homoeopath department) in regular selection process undertaken by the ayurved department. A copy of the order sheet dated 27.02.2015 is placed herewith and marked as Annexure AA/1. Apart from the above it is relevant to mention here that the order-sheet dated 25.02.2015 pertains to the cogent reason which were assigned to desanction the posts are placed on record and marked as Annexure AA/2. A copy of the order sheet dated 27.02.2015 is placed herewith and marked as Annexure AA/1. Apart from the above it is relevant to mention here that the order-sheet dated 25.02.2015 pertains to the cogent reason which were assigned to desanction the posts are placed on record and marked as Annexure AA/2. In furtherance vide order dated 18.03.2015 the Finance Department issued directions regarding the 1005 posts of NRHM which were included in the regular selection process of Junior Nurse/Compounders (Ayurved/Unani/Homeopath/Department) to be kept in abeyance/suspended because the NRHM is one of the Organization and the posts under the Organization has to be filled as per PIP on contractual basis. A copy of the letter dated 18.03.2015 is placed herewith and marked as Annexure AA/3. In this view the finance department didn't accord its approval to include contractual post of NRHM scheme to be sanctioned against regular posts. That in pursuance of the aforesaid vide order dated 20.03.2015, the posts included under NRHM were desanctioned and abolished. A copy of the order dated 20.03.2015 is placed on record and marked as Annexure AA/4. Thereafter vide order dated 10.04.2015 it is communicated that the aforesaid orders were approved by the Hon'ble Chief Minister and it was decided to undertake the NRHM posts on contractual basis in terms of circular dated 27.06.2014. A copy of the order dated 10.04.2015 is placed on record and marked as Annexure AA/5. The circular dated 27.06.2014 as mentioned in the order dated 10.04.2015 is also placed on record for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court and same is marked as Annexure AA/6. Response to Query (d): That in regard to the query (d) put up by the Hon'ble Court vide order dated 30.01.2018 it is submitted that the posts en-cadred in NRHM scheme are co terminus with the scheme and the scheme has to be implemented phase wise, therefore, all the appointments made in the NRHM are on contractual basis are paid remuneration in ratio of GOI/State 60:40. A copy of the summary of the scheme of NRHM is placed on record and marked as Annexure AA/7. A copy of the summary of the scheme of NRHM is placed on record and marked as Annexure AA/7. Response to Query (c): That in regard to the query c of the order dated 18.01.2018 it is submitted that curing the course of argument the petitioners have placed reliance upon circular dated 1/04.2015 (Annex-12), whereby, the finance department issued directions in regard to the recruitment process on vacant posts due to retirement after 01.04.2010 due to budget announcements and newly sanctioned posts with assent of finance department, the petitioner has specifically replied upon clause 2 sub clause-ii of circular dated 01.04.2015. in this regard it is submitted that a note appended to the sub clause ii, makes it mandatory that the proposal in set performa has to be sent to finance department within 15 days from the issuance of the circular dated 04.04.2015, meaning thereby, the finance department has to accord its approval on the number of advertised posts." 12. In this eventful factual background, it is indispensable and essential to present the fascicule and prefatory introduction of the National Rural Health Mission (for brevity, henceforth to be referred to as 'the NRHM'), which was launched by the Government of India in the year 2005 with a view to provide impetus to the healthcare mechanism in the rural sector of the country. 13. The National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) was launched on 12th April, 2005 by the Government of India, throughout the country, with an objective to reduce the Maternal Mortality Rate, the Infant Mortality Rate and the Total Fertility Rate. The Service Guarantees provided under this scheme, which are to be made available by 2010 (according to the timeline prescribed by the Government) are: Early registration of pregnancy before 12th week of pregnancy Minimum of 4 antenatal check-ups first-when pregnancy is suspected, second-around 26 weeks of pregnancy, third-around 32 weeks, fourth-around 36 weeks Associated services like general examination such as weight, BP, anemia, abdominal examination, height and breast examination, Injection Tetanus Toxoid, treatment of anemia, etc. (as per the Guidelines for Antenatal care and Skilled Attendance at Birth by ANMs and LHVs) Minimum laboratory investigations like hemoglobin, urine albumen and sugar. Identification of high-risk pregnancies and appropriate and prompt referral Counselling. Folic acid supplementation in the first trimester. (as per the Guidelines for Antenatal care and Skilled Attendance at Birth by ANMs and LHVs) Minimum laboratory investigations like hemoglobin, urine albumen and sugar. Identification of high-risk pregnancies and appropriate and prompt referral Counselling. Folic acid supplementation in the first trimester. Iron and Folic Acid supplementation from twelve weeks, Skilled attendance at home deliveries as and when called for A minimum of 2 postpartum home visits. First within 48 hours of delivery, second within 7-10 days. Initiation of early breast-feeding within half hour of birth Counselling on diet and rest, hygiene, contraception, essential new born care, infant and young child feeding. (As per Guidelines of GOI on Essential newborn care) and STI/RTI and HIV/AIDS Education, Motivation and Counselling to adopt appropriate Family planning methods, Provision of contraceptives such as condoms, oral pills, emergency contraceptives, IUD insertions (Wherever the ANM is trained on IUD insertion) Counselling and appropriate referral for safe abortion services (MTP) for those in need. Appropriate and prompt referral of cases needing specialist care Essential Newborn Care Promotion of exclusive breast-feeding for 6 months. Full Immunization of all infants and children against vaccine preventable diseases as per guidelines of GOI Vitamin A prophylaxis to the children as per guidelines. Prevention and control of childhood diseases like malnutrition, infections, etc. 14. The essential thrust of the NRHM is of 'convergence' of different schemes. The idea is to put in place a system that facilitates easy accessibility of the public health systems while at the same time making it accountable. 15. Although the NRHM Scheme was launched by the Government of India and in the years 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08, the financial contribution of the Union Government towards the Scheme was 100%, but looking to the expenditure to be incurred thereon, which currently account for nearly two-third of the total public expenditure, the State of Rajasthan, like other States-except North-East States and the special category States (J&K, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand) having State share only to the extent of 10%-, contributes 40% of the share under the Scheme, in terms of the financial sharing pattern of the responsibility between Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India and the State of Rajasthan. The basic project implementation framework has been prescribed by the Government of India, which require strict adherence. The basic project implementation framework has been prescribed by the Government of India, which require strict adherence. Even though the States can allow the change or revision as per Program Implementation Plan (PIP) approval, but the Government of India has been empowered to allow/disallow the same as per the availability of funds in mission pool; States cannot draw margin beyond the approval. 16. The quintessence of the contrasting contentions next needs to be outlined, to appreciate the controversy from a proper perspective. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in the first instance, have drawn the attention of this Court to the Rajasthan Ayurvedic, Unani, Homoeopathy and Naturopathy Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1966), which were required to be followed by the respondents for the purpose of composition and strength of the service i.e. creation of cadre. 18. At this juncture, it is apposite to reproduce relevant Rule 4 of the Rules of 1966 as hereunder:- "4. Composition and strength of the Service:-(1) The service shall consist of three Groups as mentioned in the schedule. The nature of posts in each group of the service shall be as specified in column 2 of the schedule. (2) The strength of posts in each group shall be such as may be determined by government from time to time; provided that government may- (a) create any post, permanent or temporary, from time to time as may be found necessary; and: (b) leave unfilled or hold in abeyance or abolish or allow to lapse any post, permanent or temporary from time to time, without thereby entitling any person to any compensation." 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that keeping the vacancies in abeyance is nothing, but a mockery of justice, as a hope was created among the unemployed youth, who are trained and experienced by virtue of the advertisements and the policy decisions supporting those advertisements. The cadre strength was to be created in accordance with law, particularly the Rules of 1966 and proper and appropriate appointments on merits were required to be made. 20. The cadre strength was to be created in accordance with law, particularly the Rules of 1966 and proper and appropriate appointments on merits were required to be made. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners have further stated that such withholding of the vacancies by the respondents was arbitrary and without application of mind, and thus, even though the respondents were holding a larger prerogative, but still they would not conform to the basic parameters of giving reasoned order as to why such abeyance was ordered. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also submitted that as per the afore-quoted Rule 4 of the Rules of 1966, the cadre strength was required to be created and once such initiation was made, then converting the same into the contractual appointment, was nothing, but simple exploitation of the trained unemployed youth for the job. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the arbitrariness and highhandedness of the respondents is clear from the fact that the posts advertised were for regular appointment and just to undo the same, the respondents have taken a decision to make the same appointment on contractual basis. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also pointed out that without furnishing any justifiable reason, the recruitment process initiated in the year 2013 has been kept in abeyance and since 2015, no definite stand of the respondents, as to their requirement regarding the cadre strength to be filled in accordance with the Rules of 1966, is forthcoming. 24. The abandonment of regular and meritorious direct recruitment process by the respondents has caused the grievance to the petitioners, who have approached this Court with the prayer that the respondents should be directed to operate the recruitment process of 2013 for the Ayurved, Homeopathy and Unani Departments on the merits of the candidate concerned. 25. In order to reinforce their submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in B.N. Nagarajan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., reported in AIR 1979 SC 1676 , relevant para 5 of which reads as under:- "5. The first order appointing promotees as Assistant Engineers is dated the 15th of November, 1958 (Exhibit A). That order made it clear that all the promotees covered by it were appointed officiating Assistant Engineers and were to hold office until further orders. The first order appointing promotees as Assistant Engineers is dated the 15th of November, 1958 (Exhibit A). That order made it clear that all the promotees covered by it were appointed officiating Assistant Engineers and were to hold office until further orders. The promotion was also made subject to review after the finalisation of the inter se seniority list of Supervisors and the Recruitment Rules. The notification went on to state that in the case of 94 of the officers promoted under it, their appointment as Assistant Engineers was being made on a purely temporary basis inasmuch as they would have to vacate the posts against which they were being fitted, as soon as candidates were available through a process of direct recruitment. The language employed leaves no doubt that the promotion of the 167 officers was not substantively made, the tenure being specifically stated to be either "officiating" or "purely temporary" which expressions clearly militate against a substantive appointment. Orders made by the State Government later on and right upto the 31st of October, 1961 when the direct recruits were appointed Assistant Engineers did not improve the position of any of the promotees in any manner. Those orders were either silent on the point of the nature of the tenure of the promotees as Assistant Engineers, or stated in no uncertain terms that the promotees would hold the posts of Assistant Engineers on a temporary or officiating basis. That is why Dr. Chitaley and Mr. Sen, learned Counsel for the promotees, mainly placed their reliance on the two notifications dated the 27th of February, 1962, and order exhibit D dated the 6th of October, 1962, the combined effect of which was to promote the said 107 officers as Assistant Engineers with effect from the 1st of November, 1956 "on a regular basis". It was argued that the regularisation of the promotion gave it the colour of permanence and the appointments of the promotees as Assistant Engineers must therefore be deemed to have been made substantively right from the 1st of November, 1956. The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly the words "regular" or "regularisation" do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly the words "regular" or "regularisation" do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. They cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of the appointments. In this connection reference may with advantage be made to State of Mysore and Anr. v. S.V. Narayanappa [1971]1 SCR 128 and R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah and Anr. (1972)I LLJ 565 SC. In the former this Court observed: "Before we proceed to consider the construction placed by the High Court on the provisions of the said order we may mention that in the High Court both the parties appear to have proceeded on an assumption that regularisation meant permanence. Consequently it was never contended before the High Court that the effect of the application of the said order would mean only regularising the appointment and no more and that regularisation would not mean that the appointment would have to be considered to be permanent as an appointment to be permanent would still require confirmation. It seems that on account of this assumption on the part of both the parties the High Court equated regularisation with permanence." In Nanjundappa's case also the question of regularisation of an appointment arose and this Court dealt with it thus: "...Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that regularisation would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment whereas counsel on behalf of the State contended that regularisation did not mean permanence but that it was a case of regularisation of the rules under Article 309. Both the contentions are fallacious. It the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularised. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules." Apart from repelling the contention that regularisation connotes, permanence, these observations furnish the second reason for rejection of the argument advanced on behalf of the promotees and that reason is that when rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are in force, no regularisation is permissible in exercise of the executive powers of the Government under Article 162 thereof in contravention of the rules. The regularisation order was made long after the Probation Rules, the Seniority Rules and the Recruitment Rules were promulgated and could not therefore direct something which would do violence to any of the provisions thereof. Regularisation in the present case, if it meant permanence operative from the 1st of November, 1956, would have the effect of giving seniority to promotees over the direct recruits who, in the absence of such regularisation, would rank senior to the former because of the Seniority Rules read with the Probation Rules and may in consequence also confer on the promotees a right of priority in the matter of sharing the quota under the Recruitment Rules. In other, words, the regularisation order, in colouring the appointments of promotees as Assistant Engineers with permanence would run counter to the rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. What could not be done under the three sets of Rules as they stood, would thus be achieved by an executive fiat. And such a course is not permissible because an act done in the exercise of the executive power of the Government as already stated, cannot override rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. The case has, for both the above reasons, to be decided on the footing that all through the relevant period the promotees held appointments as Assistant Engineers in a non-substantive capacity, i.e., either on an officiating or a temporary basis. The case has, for both the above reasons, to be decided on the footing that all through the relevant period the promotees held appointments as Assistant Engineers in a non-substantive capacity, i.e., either on an officiating or a temporary basis. This being the position, they would all rank junior to the direct recruits who, from the very start, held appointments made "substantively in clear vacancies." 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners have thus tried to make out a case that it was not within the domain of the respondents to convert the regular recruitment into contractual recruitment. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioners, to buttress their submissions, also placed reliance on the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and Ors., reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 , relevant paras 3, 4 and 6 of which read as under:- "3. A sovereign government, considering the economic situation in the country and the work to be got done, is not precluded from making temporary appointments or engaging workers on daily wages. Going by a law newly enacted, The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, the object is to give employment to at least one member of a family for hundred days in an year, on paying wages as fixed under that Act. But, a regular process of recruitment or appointment has to be resorted to, when regular vacancies in posts, at a particular point of time, are to be filled up and the filling up of those vacancies cannot be done in a haphazard manner or based on patronage or other considerations. Regular appointment must be the rule. 4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is bypassed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten. 6. The power of a State as an employer is more limited than that of a private employer inasmuch as it is subjected to constitutional limitations and cannot be exercised arbitrarily (See Basu's Shorter Constitution of India). Article 309 of the Constitution gives the Government the power to frame rules for the purpose of laying down the conditions of service and recruitment of persons to be appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any of the States. Article 309 of the Constitution gives the Government the power to frame rules for the purpose of laying down the conditions of service and recruitment of persons to be appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any of the States. That Article contemplates the drawing up of a procedure and rules to regulate the recruitment and regulate the service conditions of appointees appointed to public posts. It is well acknowledged that because of this, the entire process of recruitment for services is controlled by detailed procedure which specify the necessary qualifications, the mode of appointment etc. If rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules. The State is meant to be a model employer. The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 was enacted to ensure equal opportunity for employment seekers. Though this Act may not oblige an employer to employ only those persons who have been sponsored by employment exchanges, it places an obligation on the employer to notify the vacancies that may arise in the various departments and for filling up of those vacancies, based on a procedure. Normally, statutory rules are framed under the authority of law governing employment. It is recognized that no government order, notification or circular can be substituted for the statutory rules framed under the authority of law. This is because, following any other course could be disastrous inasmuch as it will deprive the security of tenure and the right of equality conferred on civil servants under the Constitutional scheme. It may even amount to negating the accepted service jurisprudence. Therefore, when statutory rules are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution which are exhaustive, the only fair means to adopt is to make appointments based on the rules so framed. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that the contractual appointment is nothing, but a mode adopted by the respondents to circumvent the framework of the Rules, framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, so as to promote exploitative tendencies by not adhering to the parameters of the statute required for regular appointment. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court in Surendra Kumar Gurjar & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 29. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court in Surendra Kumar Gurjar & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4582/2017 decided on 03.04.2017), relevant portion of which reads as under: "Therefore, this Court in consonance with aforesaid law issues following directions :- "(a) The State Government is restrained from appointing any persons on contract basis or otherwise allowing any person to work through placement agency on any government post or posts created under any particular scheme henceforth; (b) The State Government is henceforth directed to make appointments only in accordance with the rules framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India for the various services in the State or the rules framed for the various departments, Corporations under the State; (c) The State Government is further directed to make appointments on the posts created under various schemes sponsored by State or by the Centre on contract basis or otherwise only by conducting selection through open advertisement and after inviting applications and conducting written examinations and selecting persons on merit basis by a transparent method. For the said purpose, the State Government may lay down procedure and a recruiting agency either department wise or a Central nodal agency may be created for the said purpose keeping in view the provisions laid down for conducting public examinations. However, there shall be no interviews method followed in order to avoid any room for arbitrariness or pick and choose method and subsequent litigation; (d) The merit of the candidates so prepared, shall be published showing the marks obtained by each candidate and after publishing the answer key; (e) In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Mitendra Singh Rathore (SLP No. 32671/2013 decided on 17.02.2017, the State Government may provide additional bonus marks to those candidates who have prior working experience with the State Government. The bonus marks quantum should be on the basis of number of years of service already rendered by any contractual employee but the exact quantum may be decided by the Government while conducting selections for individual schemes/posts; (f) Every attempt should be made to see that the entire selection process is transparent and without any ambiguity; (g) If any selections are found to be wrongful, accountability of the concerned Officials who have conducted selection must be necessarily fixed and action be taken under the relevant provisions of law against them; (h) Considering that such exercise would take some time to be implemented, this Court grants three months time to the Government to make such provisions from the date of submission of the certified copy of this order; (i) All the persons presently working in the State Government through placement agency will now henceforth be treated as working directly on contractual basis till the aforesaid selection process is completed; (j) Services of the persons however, shall be continued only if the Government takes a decision to continue them otherwise their services shall be dispensed with forthwith and new selections shall only be conducted after issuing advertisements as directed herein above." 30. Learned counsel for the petitioners have further placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Kumar Mayank & Ors. v. Delhi Technological University & Ors., reported in 2016(160) DRJ 211 , relevant portion of which reads as under: "2. It is now over 10 years since the of passing of the judgment by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others 2006 (4) SCC 1 and which judgment effectively puts to an end the 'industry' created of temporary appointments and thereafter regularization of such temporary employees. The Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear in Umadevi's case (supra) that before appointing of persons on a regular/permanent basis there have to exist recruitment rules or specific eligibility criteria laid down for the appointments, there must be sanctioned posts, there must be vacancies in the sanctioned posts, and finally there must be issued advertisements for filling the posts; not as temporary or contractual posts but as permanent posts; so that there should be a level playing field of competition with respect to prospective appointees. Candidates can also be called from the lists of employment exchanges. Umadevi's case (supra) has laid down the following ratio:- "(I) The questions to be asked before regularization are:- (a) (i) Was there a sanctioned post (court cannot order creation of posts because finances of the state may go haywire), (ii) is there a vacancy, (iii) are the persons qualified persons and (iv) are the appointments through regular recruitment process of (b) A court can condone an irregularity in the appointment procedure only if the irregularity does not go to the root of the matter. (II) For sanctioned posts having vacancies, such posts have to be filled by regular recruitment process of prescribed procedure otherwise, the constitutional mandate flowing from Articles 14, 16, 309, 315, 320 etc is violated. (III) In case of existence of necessary circumstances the government has a right to appoint contract employees or casual labour or employees for a project, but, such persons form a class in themselves and they cannot claim equality (except possibly for equal pay for equal work) with regular employees who form a separate class. Such temporary employees cannot claim legitimate expectation of absorption/regularization as they knew when they were appointed that they were temporary inasmuch as the government did not give and nor could have given an assurance of regularization without the regular recruitment process being followed. Such irregularly appointed persons cannot claim to be regularized alleging violation of Article 21. Also the equity in favour of the millions who await public employment through the regular recruitment process outweighs the equity in favour of the limited number of irregularly appointed persons who claim regularization. (IV) Once there are vacancies in sanctioned posts such vacancies cannot be filled in except without regular recruitment process, and thus neither the court nor the executive can frame a scheme to absorb or regularize persons appointed to such posts without following the regular recruitment process. (V) At the instance of persons irregularly appointed the process of regular recruitment shall not be stopped. Courts should not pass interim orders to continue employment of such irregularly appointed persons because the same will result in stoppage of recruitment through regular appointment procedure. (V) At the instance of persons irregularly appointed the process of regular recruitment shall not be stopped. Courts should not pass interim orders to continue employment of such irregularly appointed persons because the same will result in stoppage of recruitment through regular appointment procedure. (VI) If there are sanctioned posts with vacancies, and qualified persons were appointed without a regular recruitment process, then, such persons who when the judgment of Uma Devi is passed have worked for over 10 years without court orders, such persons be regularized under schemes to be framed by the concerned organization. (VII) The aforesaid law which applies to the Union and the States will also apply to all instrumentalities of the State governed by Article 12 of the Constitution". 3. The aforesaid ratio of the Supreme Court can be culled out from the following paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Umadevi's case (supra) :- "2. Public employment in a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic, has to be as set down by the Constitution and the laws made there under. Our constitutional scheme envisages employment by the Government and its instrumentalities on the basis of a procedure established in that behalf. Equality of opportunity is the hallmark, and the Constitution has provided also for affirmative action to ensure that unequals are not treated equals. Thus, any public employment has to be in terms of the constitutional scheme. 3. A sovereign government, considering the economic situation in the country and the work to be got done, is not precluded from making temporary appointments or engaging workers on daily wages. Going by a law newly enacted, The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005, the object is to give employment to at least one member of a family for hundred days in an year, on paying wages as fixed under that Act. But, a regular process of recruitment or appointment has to be resorted to, when regular vacancies in posts, at a particular point of time, are to be filled up and the filling up of those vacancies cannot be done in a haphazard manner or based on patronage or other considerations. Regular appointment must be the rule. 4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is by-passed. Regular appointment must be the rule. 4. But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is by-passed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten. 5. This Court has also on occasions issued directions which could not be said to be consistent with the Constitutional scheme of public employment. Such directions are issued presumably on the basis of equitable considerations or individualization of justice. The question arises, equity to whom? Equity for the handful of people who have approached the Court with a claim, or equity for the teeming millions of this country seeking employment and seeking a fair opportunity for competing for employment? When one side of the coin is considered, the other side of the coin, has also to be considered and the way open to any court of law or justice, is to adhere to the law as laid down by the Constitution and not to make directions, which at times, even if do not run counter to the Constitutional scheme, certainly tend to water down the Constitutional requirements. It is this conflict that is reflected in these cases referred to the Constitution Bench. 6. The power of a State as an employer is more limited than that of a private employer inasmuch as it is subjected to constitutional limitations and cannot be exercised arbitrarily (See Basu's Shorter Constitution of India). Article 309 of the Constitution gives the Government the power to frame rules for the purpose of laying down the conditions of service and recruitment of persons to be appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any of the States. That Article contemplates the drawing up of a procedure and rules to regulate the recruitment and regulate the service conditions of appointees appointed to public posts. It is well acknowledged that because of this, the entire process of recruitment for services is controlled by detailed procedure which specify the necessary qualifications, the mode of appointment etc. If rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules. It is well acknowledged that because of this, the entire process of recruitment for services is controlled by detailed procedure which specify the necessary qualifications, the mode of appointment etc. If rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules. The State is meant to be a model employer. The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 was enacted to ensure equal opportunity for employment seekers. Though this Act may not oblige an employer to employ only those persons who have been sponsored by employment exchanges, it places an obligation on the employer to notify the vacancies that may arise in the various departments and for filling up of those vacancies, based on a procedure. Normally, statutory rules are framed under the authority of law governing employment. It is recognized that no government order, notification or circular can be substituted for the statutory rules framed under the authority of law. This is because, following any other course could be disastrous inasmuch as it will deprive the security of tenure and the right of equality conferred on civil servants under the Constitutional scheme. It may even amount to negating the accepted service jurisprudence. Therefore, when statutory rules are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution which are exhaustive, the only fair means to adopt is to make appointments based on the rules so framed. xxxxx xxxxx 11. In addition to the equality clause represented by Article 14 of the Constitution, Article 16 has specifically provided for equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Buttressing these fundamental rights, Article 309 provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Acts of the legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. In view of the interpretation placed on Article 12 of the Constitution by this Court, obviously, these principles also govern the instrumentalities that come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution. With a view to make the procedure for selection fair, the Constitution by Article 315 has also created a Public Service Commission for the Union and Public Service Commissions for the States. With a view to make the procedure for selection fair, the Constitution by Article 315 has also created a Public Service Commission for the Union and Public Service Commissions for the States. Article 320 deals with the functions of Public Service Commissions and mandates consultation with the Commission on all matters relating to methods of recruitment to civil services and for civil posts and other related matters. As a part of the affirmative action recognized by Article 16 of the Constitution, Article 335 provides for special consideration in the matter of claims of the members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes for employment. The States have made Acts, Rules or Regulations for implementing the above constitutional guarantees and any recruitment to the service in the State or in the Union is governed by such Acts, Rules and Regulations. The Constitution does not envisage any employment outside this constitutional scheme and without following the requirements set down therein. 12. In spite of this scheme, there may be occasions when the sovereign State or its instrumentalities will have to employ persons, in posts which are temporary, on daily wages, as additional hands or taking them in without following the required procedure, to discharge the duties in respect of the posts that are sanctioned and that are required to be filled in terms of the relevant procedure established by the Constitution or for work in temporary posts or projects that are not needed permanently. This right of the Union or of the State Government cannot but be recognized and there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits such engaging of persons temporarily or on daily wages, to meet the needs of the situation. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have the right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. But the fact that such engagements are resorted to, cannot be used to defeat the very scheme of public employment. Nor can a court say that the Union or the State Governments do not have the right to engage persons in various capacities for a duration or until the work in a particular project is completed. Once this right of the Government is recognized and the mandate of the constitutional requirement for public employment is respected, there cannot be much difficulty in coming to the conclusion that it is ordinarily not proper for courts whether acting under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Article 32 of the Constitution, to direct absorption in permanent employment of those who have been engaged without following a due process of selection as envisaged by the constitutional scheme. xxxxx 14. During the course of the arguments, various orders of courts either interim or final were brought to our notice. The purport of those orders more or less was the issue of directions for continuation or absorption without referring to the legal position obtaining. Learned counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that chaos has been created by such orders without reference to legal principles and it is time that this Court settled the law once for all so that in case the court finds that such orders should not be made, the courts, especially, the High Courts would be precluded from issuing such directions or passing such orders. The submission of learned Counsel for the respondents based on the various orders passed by the High Court or by the Government pursuant to the directions of Court also highlights the need for settling the law by this Court. The bypassing of the constitutional scheme cannot be perpetuated by the passing of orders without dealing with and deciding the validity of such orders on the touchstone of constitutionality. While approaching the questions falling for our decision, it is necessary to bear this in mind and to bring about certainty in the matter of public employment. The bypassing of the constitutional scheme cannot be perpetuated by the passing of orders without dealing with and deciding the validity of such orders on the touchstone of constitutionality. While approaching the questions falling for our decision, it is necessary to bear this in mind and to bring about certainty in the matter of public employment. The argument on behalf of some of the respondents is that this Court having once directed regularization in the Dharwad case (supra), all those appointed temporarily at any point of time would be entitled to be regularized since otherwise it would be discrimination between those similarly situated and in that view, all appointments made on daily wages, temporarily or contractually, must be directed to be regularized. Acceptance of this argument would mean that appointments made otherwise than by a regular process of selection would become the order of the day completely jettisoning the constitutional scheme of appointment. This argument also highlights the need for this Court to formally lay down the law on the question and ensure certainty in dealings relating to public employment. The very divergence in approach in this Court, the so-called equitable approach made in some, as against those decisions which have insisted on the rules being followed, also justifies a firm decision by this Court one way or the other. It is necessary to put an end to uncertainty and clarify the legal position emerging from the constitutional scheme, leaving the High Courts to follow necessarily, the law thus laid down. xxxxx xxxxx 17. We have already indicated the constitutional scheme of public employment in this country, and the executive, or for that matter the Court, in appropriate cases, would have only the right to regularize an appointment made after following the due procedure, even though a non-fundamental element of that process or procedure has not been followed. This right of the executive and that of the court, would not extend to the executive or the court being in a position to direct that an appointment made in clear violation of the constitutional scheme, and the statutory rules made in that behalf, can be treated as permanent or can be directed to be treated as permanent. xxxxx xxxxx 26. With respect, why should the State be allowed to depart from the normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts? xxxxx xxxxx 26. With respect, why should the State be allowed to depart from the normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State making regular and proper recruitments and is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent transgression of the rules of regular recruitment. The direction to make permanent-the distinction between regularization and making permanent, was not emphasized here-can only encourage the State, the model employer, to flout its own rules and would confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of many waiting to compete. With respect, the direction made in paragraph 50 of Piara Singh (supra) are to some extent inconsistent with the conclusion in paragraph 45 therein. With great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognized in the earlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be made permanent. xxxxx xxxxx 33. It is not necessary to notice all the decisions of this Court on this aspect. By and large what emerges is that regular recruitment should be insisted upon, only in a contingency an ad hoc appointment can be made in a permanent vacancy, but the same should soon be followed by a regular recruitment and that appointments to non-available posts should not be taken note of for regularization. The cases directing regularization have mainly proceeded on the basis that having permitted the employee to work for some period, he should be absorbed, without really laying down any law to that effect, after discussing the constitutional scheme for public employment. xxxxx xxxxx 39. There have been decisions which have taken the cue from the Dharwad (supra) case and given directions for regularization, absorption or making permanent, employees engaged or appointed without following the due process or the rules for appointment. The philosophy behind this approach is seen set out in the recent decision in The Workmen of Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd. v. The Management of Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd. (2006) ILLJ 842 SC, though the legality or validity of such an approach has not been independently examined. The philosophy behind this approach is seen set out in the recent decision in The Workmen of Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd. v. The Management of Bhurkunda Colliery of Central Coalfields Ltd. (2006) ILLJ 842 SC, though the legality or validity of such an approach has not been independently examined. But on a survey of authorities, the predominant view is seen to be that such appointments did not confer any right on the appointees and that the Court cannot direct their absorption or regularization or re-engagement or making them permanent. xxxxx xxxxx 43. Thus, it is clear that adherence to the rule of equality in public employment is a basic feature of our Constitution and since the rule of law is the core of our Constitution, a Court would certainly be disabled from passing an order upholding a violation of Article 14 or in ordering the overlooking of the need to comply with the requirements of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. Therefore, consistent with the scheme for public employment, this Court while laying down the law, has necessarily to hold that unless the appointment is in terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition among qualified persons, the same would not confer any right on the appointee. If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. It has also to be clarified that merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. It is not open to the court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. High Courts acting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue directions for absorption, regularization, or permanent continuance unless the recruitment itself was made regularly and in terms of the constitutional scheme. Merely because, an employee had continued under cover of an order of Court, which we have described as 'litigious employment' in the earlier part of the judgment, he would not be entitled to any right to be absorbed or made permanent in the service. In fact, in such cases, the High Court may not be justified in issuing interim directions, since, after all, if ultimately the employee approaching it is found entitled to relief, it may be possible for it to mould the relief in such a manner that ultimately no prejudice will be caused to him, whereas an interim direction to continue his employment would hold up the regular procedure for selection or impose on the State the burden of paying an employee who is really not required. The courts must be careful in ensuring that they do not interfere unduly with the economic arrangement of its affairs by the State or its instrumentalities or lend themselves the instruments to facilitate the bypassing of the constitutional and statutory mandates. 44. The concept of 'equal pay for equal work' is different from the concept of conferring permanency on those who have been appointed on ad hoc basis, temporary basis, or based on no process of selection as envisaged by the Rules. This Court has in various decisions applied the principle of equal pay for equal work and has laid down the parameters for the application of that principle. The decisions are rested on the concept of equality enshrined in our Constitution in the light of the directive principles in that behalf. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. But the acceptance of that principle cannot lead to a position where the court could direct that appointments made without following the due procedure established by law, be deemed permanent or issue directions to treat them as permanent. Doing so, would be negation of the principle of equality of opportunity. The power to make an order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before this Court, would not normally be used for giving the go-by to the procedure established by law in the matter of public employment. Take the situation arising in the cases before us from the State of Karnataka. Therein, after the Dharwad decision, the Government had issued repeated directions and mandatory orders that no temporary or ad hoc employment or engagement be given. Some of the authorities and departments had ignored those directions or defied those directions and had continued to give employment, specifically interdicted by the orders issued by the executive. Some of the appointing officers have even been punished for their defiance. It would not be just or proper to pass an order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution or in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India permitting those persons engaged, to be absorbed or to be made permanent, based on their appointments or engagements. Complete justice would be justice according to law and though it would be open to this Court to mould the relief, this Court would not grant a relief which would amount to perpetuating an illegality. xxxxx xxxxx 50. It is argued that in a country like India where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no equality of bargaining power, the action of the State in not making the employees permanent, would be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. But the very argument indicates that there are so many waiting for employment and an equal opportunity for competing for employment and it is in that context that the Constitution as one of its basic features, has included Articles 14, 16 and 309 so as to ensure that public employment is given only in a fair and equitable manner by giving all those who are qualified, an opportunity to seek employment. In the guise of upholding rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, a set of persons cannot be preferred over a vast majority of people waiting for an opportunity to compete for State employment. The acceptance of the argument on behalf of the respondents would really negate the rights of the others conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution, assuming that we are in a position to hold that the right to employment is also a right coming within the purview of Article 21 of the Constitution. The argument that Article 23 of the Constitution is breached because the employment on daily wages amounts to forced labour, cannot be accepted. After all, the employees accepted the employment at their own volition and with eyes open as to the nature of their employment. The Governments also revised the minimum wages payable from time to time in the light of all relevant circumstances. It also appears to us that importing of these theories to defeat the basic requirement of public employment would defeat the constitutional scheme and the constitutional goal of equality. xxxxx xxxxx 53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. Narayanappa (supra), R.N. Nanjundappa (supra), and B.N. Nagarajan (supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not sub-judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme." 31. Learned counsel for the petitioners have further submitted that contractual appointments shall create havoc among the trained manpower in the medical field as well as general public, as the medical services to be accorded by the State of Rajasthan shall be directly affected thereby, and it is not the case of the respondents that they no longer required such medical services. 32. Contrario sensu, learned counsel for the respondents tried to make out a case that in accordance with Rule 4 of the Rules of 1966, which is reproduced hereinabove, the respondent-State was empowered to keep the cadre posts in abeyance or to abolish or allow the same to lapse or without entitling any person for any compensation. 33. Learned counsel for the respondents have thus tried to make out a case that the part of the selection process of the advertised posts has been completed, as the select list of candidates for 313 posts has been issued on 21.08.2015. 34. Learned counsel for the respondents have further submitted that in the internal process of the respondents, the policy was impacted by the financial approval. 35. Learned counsel for the respondents have also submitted that 1005 posts, which the petitioners are harping upon, are in fact the posts of the NRHM, which were included in the regular selection process for Nurse Junior Grade/Compounder for Ayurved, Homeopathy and Unani Departments, but have been kept in abeyance after due application of mind, as NRHM is a Scheme for providing rural health and entitles the respondents to give contractual appointment to man the NRHM. 36. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the State of Rajasthan is not making any regular appointment in its regular cadre, as it is not required at this stage. However, learned counsel for the respondents makes it clear that 1005 posts, which were NRHM posts and were included in the chart showing total number of vacancies, have in fact been taken on contractual basis to support the NRHM Scheme exclusively. 37. However, learned counsel for the respondents makes it clear that 1005 posts, which were NRHM posts and were included in the chart showing total number of vacancies, have in fact been taken on contractual basis to support the NRHM Scheme exclusively. 37. Learned counsel for the respondents have also stated that such persons appointed on contractual basis for the purpose of NRHM Scheme shall not be utilized by the State of Rajasthan in discharge of regular works to be manned by regular cadre. Therefore, such appointments are required to be made only to achieve the targets of the NRHM Scheme. 38. Learned counsel for the respondents has shown to this Court Annexure-AA/1 dated 27.02.2015, which reflects that the NRHM posts were not given separate approval by the Finance Department. 39. Learned counsel for the respondents has also shown to this Court Annexure-AA/2 dated 25.02.2015, relevant portion of which reads as under: "53. In this connection the AD was informed vide para 29/N(2) that "FD is of the view that Department may reconsider the matter and possibilities may be explored to fill up the posts of National Rural Health Mission on contract basis in accordance with GOI guidelines and FD (Rules) guidelines issued for contract appointment. Review of posts under National Rural Health Mission is also required by the Department looking to the actual need. This exercise will help in reducing the financial implication besides possibility of discontinuance of the contract service in case the scheme is closed by the GOI." 40. Learned counsel for the respondents thus submitted that this recommendation exploring the filling up of the posts for NRHM Scheme on contractual basis in accordance with the Government of India Guidelines and FD (Rules) Guidelines issued for the contractual appointments, has to be considered. 41. Learned counsel for the respondents have further shown to this Court that the proposal Annexure-AA/2 dated 25.02.2015 was made after due application of mind. 42. Learned counsel for the respondents have also shown to this Court Annexure-AA/3 dated 18.03.2015, wherein the reason for keeping the cadre strength shown was that NRHM is a separate institution, and as per the policy, the same posts were to be filled as per PIP on contractual basis. 43. 42. Learned counsel for the respondents have also shown to this Court Annexure-AA/3 dated 18.03.2015, wherein the reason for keeping the cadre strength shown was that NRHM is a separate institution, and as per the policy, the same posts were to be filled as per PIP on contractual basis. 43. Learned counsel for the respondents have thus justified the de-sanctioning and abolishing of the regular cadre recruitment vide order Annexure-AA/4 dated 20.03.2015, which is also on record and the same reads as under:- "With reference to AD's para 1-20/N and discussion held with departmental officers, FD comments are as under: It is a matter of fact that the consent of FD was given earlier for creation of regular posts on 04.07.2012 and thereafter under NRHM in lieu of contract posts available earlier. The same was agreed by FD in view of the following: (1) A Budget announcement was made by Hon'ble CM in 2012-13 (Para 47) that 21,000 regular posts will be created under NRHM for implementation of this scheme. (2) Earlier contract services were admissible as per the guideline of FD (Rules), but these guidelines were withdrawn by FD vide order dated 29.04.2011. as such there was no provision to engage persons on contract at the time of giving the consent of FD in 2012-13. However, later on the guidelines have been issued by FD (Rules) on 27.06.2014 regarding appointment on contract, which are applicable in respect of all the projects, schemes and autonomous bodies etc. In view of this, it would not be appropriate to allow the Department of regular recruitment on the posts of NRHM now. In view of the aforesaid position, all the regular posts created under NRHM in lieu of contract posts (including additionally) is hereby abolished and contract posts be created and filled in as per provisions of GOI guidelines and FD (Rules) guidelines referred above, to the extent of the strength approved in PIP of NRHM. The Department is also advised to go ahead for regular recruitment on remaining 14,383 regular posts only. This bears approval of Hon'ble CM (F). SD- (Mahaveer Prasad Sharma) JSF(Exp-2)" 44. Learned counsel for the respondents have also shown to this Court the document Annexure-AA/6 dated 27.06.2014, which provides for policy to appoint persons on contract basis on fixed remuneration for services in State Government agencies for External Aided Projects/Centrally Sponsored Schemes/State Government Schemes etc. This bears approval of Hon'ble CM (F). SD- (Mahaveer Prasad Sharma) JSF(Exp-2)" 44. Learned counsel for the respondents have also shown to this Court the document Annexure-AA/6 dated 27.06.2014, which provides for policy to appoint persons on contract basis on fixed remuneration for services in State Government agencies for External Aided Projects/Centrally Sponsored Schemes/State Government Schemes etc. The said policy circular dated 27.06.2014 reads as under:- "GOVERNMENT OF RAJASTHAN FINANCE DEPARTMENT (RULES DIVISION) No.F.1(4)FD/Rules/2011 Pt.II Jaipur, dated: 27 Jun 2014 All Additional Chief Secretaries/Principal Secretaries/All Secretaries to Government of Rajasthan CIRCULAR Sub: Appointments of persons on contract on fixed remuneration of services in State Government Agencies for External Aided Projects/Centrally Sponsored Schemes/State Government Schemes etc. The State Government undertakes departmental schemes/projects for social and economic development as welfare State. Most of these projects/schemes are implemented through specific agencies/undertaking corporation etc which are not governed by service rules in Government for regulating civil appointments in Government. By their very nature the development schemes undertaken by the government are usually of shorter/medium periods. Developmental priorities of the government and development strategy/technology also keep on changing requiring different skill sets and competence etc. Most of the developmental schemes/projects also require skill/experience in social/economic sector which are available in the non-government sector and are not exclusive to the Government. Therefore, State Government needs to allow such posts to be filled on contract in societies and autonomous organizations. 2. To facilitate hiring the specific services on direct contract a standard document along with clarificatory instructions was issued vide FD Circular No. F.1(15) FD (Rules)/2002, dated 09.01.2007. Subsequently the provision of maternity leave period for female contractual employees was increased to 180 days from two months period vide FD circular No. F.1(6)FD (Rules)/2007, dated 19/06/2009. The main terms and conditions of such contract appointments are at Annexure-'A'. 3. The circulars/orders issued for contractual appointments from time to time in societies/non-departmental organizations were, however, withdrawn vide circular of even number dated 29.4.2011. 4. The matter of contractual appointment has once again been examined and it has been decided to re-introduce contractual appointments on fixed remuneration for services in State Government agencies for External Aided Projects/Centrally Sponsored Schemes/State Government Schemes etc. 5. Standard Model contract agreement and instructions are placed at Annexure-'B'. 6. 4. The matter of contractual appointment has once again been examined and it has been decided to re-introduce contractual appointments on fixed remuneration for services in State Government agencies for External Aided Projects/Centrally Sponsored Schemes/State Government Schemes etc. 5. Standard Model contract agreement and instructions are placed at Annexure-'B'. 6. The terms and conditions contained in the model agreement at Annexure 'B' may be made applicable to the existing individual contractual employee wherever the contracts entered into under the earlier arrangement still subsist. 7. It may be noted that the selection of contractual appointees shall be made only after following the procedure laid down in the rules of the Societies/Non-Departmental organizations contract. None will be employee on these contracts without following the regular process of appointment as per applicable rules of the concerned Non Departmental organizations. 8. Contractual arrangement for services provision through agencies can be made under the 'Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Act, 2012' and rules made therein. Sd/- (Subhash Chandra Garg) Principal Secretary to Government" 45. Learned counsel for the respondents have further shown to this Court the structuring of the MOU, whereby financial sharing between the State Government and the Central Government has been developed. 46. Learned counsel for the respondents have thus submitted that the policy of the State dated 27.06.2014 permits contractual appointments on fixed remuneration for services in State Government agencies for External Aided Projects/Centrally Sponsored Schemes/State Government Schemes etc., and apparently, the NRHM is a Scheme of the Central Government, which has to be implemented with the help of such contractual appointees. 47. Learned counsel for the respondents have shown to this Court the application of mind of the State of Rajasthan at appropriate level for coming to the conclusion that since 1005 posts of Compounder/Nurse Junior Grade in the Ayurved, Homeopathy and Unani Departments were for the purpose of implementing the NRHM Scheme, therefore, shifting the same appointment from regular cadre to contractual appointment was well justified. The same was also in consonance with the flexibility of the Scheme, which can be changed from time to time as per the policy decision of the Central Government. 48. The same was also in consonance with the flexibility of the Scheme, which can be changed from time to time as per the policy decision of the Central Government. 48. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case along with the precedent law cited at the Bar, this Court is satisfied that 1005 posts of Compounder/Nurse Junior Grade for Ayurved, Homeopathy and Unani Departments shown as regular cadre strength, were in fact for executing the NRHM Scheme. 49. This Court finds that according to Rule 4 of the Rules of 1966, the respondents had the statutory power to abolish or keep the posts in abeyance or allow the posts to lapse. 50. However, to appropriately appreciate the competing and contrasting assertions and averments, this Court considers it expedient to traverse through the judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Apex Court in respect of the scope of judicial review vis-à-vis the policy decision, and the Constitutional obligation of the State to provide adequate medical services to its citizens. 51. In DDA v. Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 672 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down certain parameters for making interference in the policy decision, while observing thus: "64. An executive order termed as a policy decision is not beyond the pale of judicial review. Whereas the superior courts may not interfere with the nitty-gritty of the policy, or substitute one by the other but it will not be correct to contend that the court shall lay its judicial hands off, when a plea is raised that the impugned decision is a policy decision. Interference therewith on the part of the superior court would not be without jurisdiction as it is subject to judicial review. 65. Broadly, a policy decision is subject to judicial review on the following grounds: (a) if it is unconstitutional; (b) if it is dehors the provisions of the Act and the regulations; (c) if the delegatee has acted beyond its power of delegation; (d) if the executive policy is contrary to the statutory or a larger policy." 52. In Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 737 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding scope of judicial review observed as under:- "16. The scope of judicial review of governmental policy is now well defined. In Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 737 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding scope of judicial review observed as under:- "16. The scope of judicial review of governmental policy is now well defined. Courts do not and cannot act as Appellate Authorities examining the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy of the Government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere with policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review (vide Asif Hameed v. State of J&K [1989 Supp (2) SCC 364], Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1990) 3 SCC 223 ], Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [ (1996) 10 SCC 304 ], BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India [ (2002) 2 SCC 333 ], State of Orissa v. Gopinath Dash [ (2005) 13 SCC 495 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1225] and Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh (3) v. State of A.P.[ (2006) 4 SCC 1 62])" 53. In State of Rajasthan v. Sevanivatra Karamchari Hitkari Samiti, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 117 , the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "24. It is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the liberalised benefit for pension should have also been accorded to the government servants retiring prior to 29-2-1964 because such exercise being a matter of policy decision for the executive, must be left to the consideration of the State Government. The wisdom in a policy decision of the Government, as such, is not justiciable unless such policy decision is wholly capricious, arbitrary and whimsical thereby offending the Rule of law as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution or such policy decision offends any statutory provisions or the provisions of the Constitution. Save as aforesaid, the Court need not embark on uncharted ocean of public policy." 54. Save as aforesaid, the Court need not embark on uncharted ocean of public policy." 54. In Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, reported (2003) 2 SCC 673 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has enunciated thus: "27. Article 14 guarantees to everyone equality before law. Unequals cannot be clubbed. The proposition is well settled and does not require reference to any precedent though many decisions were cited. Likewise, an arbitrary exercise of executive power deserves to be quashed, is a proposition which again does not require support of any precedent. It is equally well settled that an order passed without application of mind deserves to be annulled being an arbitrary exercise of power. At the same time, we have no difficulty in accepting the proposition urged on behalf of the Government that if two views are possible and the Government takes one of it, it would not be amenable to judicial review on the ground that the other view, according to the court, is a better view." 55. Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, who was an American lawyer and jurist, who served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and also, previously, served as the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, in his legal classic, "Nature of Judicial Process" at Page 141 thereof, observed thus: "The Judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the social life'. Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains." 56. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to 'the primordial necessity of order in the social life'. Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains." 56. Lord Scarman in Nottinghamshire County Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1986 AC 240, 251 : (1986) 1 All ER 199] proclaimed : "'Judicial review' is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficial power." Commenting upon this Michael Supperstone and James Goudie in their work Judicial Review (1992 Edn.) at p. 16 say: "If anyone were prompted to dismiss this sage warning as a mere obiter dictum from the most radical member of the higher judiciary of recent times, and therefore to be treated as an idiosyncratic aberration, it has received the endorsement of the Law Lords generally. The words of Lord Scarman were echoed by Lord Bridge of Harwich, speaking on behalf of the Board when reversing an interventionist decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Butcher v. Petrocorp Exploration Ltd. 18-3-1991." 57. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141, 154], Lord Brightman said: "Judicial review, as the words imply, is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made. Judicial review is concerned, not with the decision, but with the decision-making process. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will in my view, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power." In the same case Lord Hailsham commented on the purpose of the remedy by way of judicial review under RSC, Ord. 53 in the following terms: "This remedy, vastly increased in extent, and rendered, over a long period in recent years, of infinitely more convenient access than that provided by the old prerogative writs and actions for a declaration, is intended to protect the individual against the abuse of power by a wide range of authorities, judicial, quasi-judicial, and, as would originally have been thought when I first practised at the Bar, administrative. It is not intended to take away from those authorities the powers and discretions properly vested in them by law and to substitute the courts as the bodies making the decisions. It is intended to see that the relevant authorities use their powers in a proper manner (p. 1160)." 58. In R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p Datafin plc [(1987) 1 All ER 564], Sir John Donaldson, M.R. commented: "An application for judicial review is not an appeal." 59. In Lonrho plc v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [(1989) 2 All ER 609], Lord Keith said: "Judicial review is a protection and not a weapon." It is thus different from an appeal. When hearing an appeal the Court is concerned with the merits of the decision under appeal. In Amin, Re [Amin v. Entry Clearance Officer, (1983) 2 All ER 864], Lord Fraser observed that: "Judicial review is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the manner in which the decision was made.... Judicial review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal. It is made effective by the court quashing the administrative decision without substituting its own decision, and is to be contrasted with an appeal where the appellate tribunal substitutes its own decision on the merits for that of the administrative officer." 60. In R. v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex p in Guinness plc [ (1990) 1 QB 146 : (1989) 1 All ER 509], Lord Donaldson, M.R. referred to the judicial review jurisdiction as being supervisory or 'longstop' jurisdiction. Unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power. 61. In Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 165 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had propounded thus :- "16. A healthy body is the very foundation for all human activities. That is why the adage "Sariramadyam Khaludharma Sadhanam". In a welfare State, therefore, it is the obligation of the State to ensure the creation and the sustaining of conditions congenial to good health. This Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [ (1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 389] aptly observed: (SCC p. 183. That is why the adage "Sariramadyam Khaludharma Sadhanam". In a welfare State, therefore, it is the obligation of the State to ensure the creation and the sustaining of conditions congenial to good health. This Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [ (1984) 3 SCC 161 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 389] aptly observed: (SCC p. 183. para 10) "It is the fundamental right of everyone in this country, assured under the interpretation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullin case [Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 212] to live with human dignity, free from exploitation. This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include protection of the health and strength of the workers, men and women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no State-neither the Central Government nor any State Government-has the right to take any action which will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials." While endorsing what has been said above, we would refer to Article 47 in Part IV of the Constitution. That article provides: "The State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health." This article has laid stress on improvement of public health and prohibition of drugs injurious to health as one of the primary duties of the State. In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 246 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 50] this Court has pointed out that: (SCC pp. In Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 246 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 50] this Court has pointed out that: (SCC pp. 308-09, para 123) "The fundamental rights are intended to foster the ideal of a political democracy and to prevent the establishment of authoritarian rule but they are of no value unless they can be enforced by resort to courts. So they are made justiciable. But, it is also evident that notwithstanding their great importance, the Directive Principles cannot in the very nature of things be enforced in a court of law.... It does not mean that directive principles are less important than fundamental rights or that they are not binding on the various organs of the State." In a series of pronouncements during the recent years this Court has culled out from the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution these several obligations of the State and called upon it to effectuate them in order that the resultant pictured by the Constitution Fathers may become a reality. As pointed out by us, maintenance and improvement of public health have to rank high as these are indispensable to the very physical existence of the community and on the betterment of these depends the building of the society of which the Constitution makers envisaged. Attending to public health, in our opinion, therefore, is of high priority-perhaps the one at the top." 62. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of W.B., reported in (1996) 4 SCC 37 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it cannot be ignored that it is the constitutional obligation of the State to provide adequate medical services to the people which includes free legal aid to the poor class and merely on the ground of financial constraints, State cannot deprive the citizen from their rights. 63. The postulations judicially adumbrated, as can be gleaned from the above-referred decisions, verily convey the quintessence of the content and expanse thereof. Needless it is, thus, to burden this adjudication by referring to other pronouncements on the issue. 64. Viewed in this precedential backdrop, learned counsel for the respondents have shown sufficient reason as to why the State Government has taken a decision to supplement the NRHM Scheme with 1005 posts on contractual basis. The policy decision is on record and the minutes of the policy decision are also on record. 64. Viewed in this precedential backdrop, learned counsel for the respondents have shown sufficient reason as to why the State Government has taken a decision to supplement the NRHM Scheme with 1005 posts on contractual basis. The policy decision is on record and the minutes of the policy decision are also on record. 65. Learned counsel for the respondents have also satisfied this Court by its policy decision dated 27.06.2014, which permits appointment of person on contractual on fixed remuneration for services in State Government agencies for External Aided Projects/Centrally Sponsored Schemes/State Government Schemes etc. 66. Thus, this Court finds that 1005 posts are required by the State Government for executing NRHM Scheme in accordance with the Government of India Guidelines and MOU reached with the Central Government. This Court also finds that the application of mind by the State is there on record to show as to why the regular recruitment initiated in the year 2013 was firstly kept in abeyance, and thereafter, converted into contractual one to be filled-in by the respondents for the purpose of executing the NRHM Scheme. 67. This Court further finds that NRHM is a Scheme and the appointment for the purpose of such Scheme may be co-terminus with the Scheme and in its implementation, the Government of India/State ratio has to be respected. 68. Thus, on a cumulative consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, in the wake of the aforementioned judicial pronouncements, and with a view to give a quietus to the present dissension, this Court, keeping in view, (a) the simmering epicenter of the assailment being located in the Rules of 1966, and which engaged the serious attention of the contestants, (b) the plight of the trained unemployed youth and (c) the Constitutional duty cast upon the State to accord medical services to its citizens, disposes the present writ petitions with the following directions:- (i) The contractual appointments against 1005 posts of Compounder/Nurse Junior Grade shall be only for the purpose of executing the NRHM Scheme. (ii) If the regular cadre is to be filled for regular discharge of medical and health services, then the respondents shall be required to make regular recruitment in consonance with the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and Ors. (supra) and other precedent laws. (ii) If the regular cadre is to be filled for regular discharge of medical and health services, then the respondents shall be required to make regular recruitment in consonance with the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and Ors. (supra) and other precedent laws. (iii) Any regular recruitment shall be in conformity with the Rajasthan Ayurvedic, Unani, Homoeopathy and Naturopathy Subordinate Service Rules, 1966. (iv) The respondents shall afresh identify the requirement of the posts of Compounder/Nurse Junior Grade for the purpose of regular discharge of duties in the Ayurved, Homeopathy and Unani Departments. Such fresh assessment shall be made by the respondents within a period of three months from today. (v) Since the respondent/State owes a duty to discharge all the medical obligations, therefore, such assessment shall entitle the respondents to issue fresh advertisement and make fresh recruitment in accordance with the requirements for the regular cadre. (vi) The respondents shall restrict the contractual appointments only for the purpose of implementing and completing the NRHM Scheme.