JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 12.05.2014 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sibsagar, in Crl. A. No. 3(1)/2014. By the said judgment, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the accused respondent of the charge under Section 498A IPC by allowing his appeal against the judgment and order passed in GR case No. 1023/2010. 2. As per prosecution case, the victim (PW-6) and the respondent were married on 18.02.2010 and since after three months of marriage, in-laws of the victim started torturing her physically and mentally by demanding dowry. On 14.08.2010, the members of her husband’s family tortured her physically and mentally and had driven out her from the house. She took shelter in the house of her brother-in-law and on 18.08.2010 at the intervention of the Mahila Samitee, her husband brought her back to the matrimonial home. But, again she was subjected to torture and finding no other way, she took shelter in the house of the uncle of the accused/respondent. On 19.08.2010, the accused/respondent, went away from the house of his uncle leaving the victim there. He also committed theft of Rs. 300/- and an earring of the victim. Having failed to contact her husband during the whole day, she lodged an FIR. On the basis of the said FIR, police registered a case and after usual investigation submitted charge sheet against the accused/appellant under Section 498A IPC. On the basis of the said charge sheet, learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and the accused stood trial for offence under Section 498A IPC. 3. In course of trial, prosecution examined 8 witnesses to establish the charge and on appreciation of the evidence, learned Judicial Magistrate convicted the accused/respondent under Section 498A IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- with default stipulation. Learned Trial Court also awarded compensation of Rs. 57,000/- in favour of the informant. 4. Aggrieved by conviction and sentence, the accused/respondent preferred an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge and the learned Sessions Judge allowing the appeal acquitted the accused/respondent. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge acquitting the accused/respondent, the informant preferred the instant appeal. 6. I have heard Mr. S.K. Barkataki, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. S. Jahan, learned Addl. P.P., Assam for the State. 7. Learned counsel Mr. 5. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge acquitting the accused/respondent, the informant preferred the instant appeal. 6. I have heard Mr. S.K. Barkataki, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. S. Jahan, learned Addl. P.P., Assam for the State. 7. Learned counsel Mr. S.K. Barkataki submitted that there were sufficient evidence to bring home the charge under Section 498A IPC and the learned Trial Court rightly convicted the accused/respondent. However, learned appellate court without appreciating the evidence properly acquitted the respondent, which resulted in miscarriage of justice requiring interference by this Court. 8. Out of 8 witnesses examined by the prosecution, PW 1 pleaded ignorance about the occurrence. According to PW-2, he noticed the accused and his wife quarreling one year ago. PW-3, PW-4 & PW-5 stated that the accused/respondent complained before them that he was subjected to torture by his wife. All the three witnesses have stated that when they went to verify the allegation, PW-6, the victim told them that the accused/respondent tortured the victim. The testimony of PW-3, PW-4 & PW-5 transpired that they did not have any personal knowledge about the occurrence and they came to know from the victim that she was subjected to torture. 9. The victim (PW-6) in her evidence stated that she was rebuked by her mother-in-law and her husband assaulted her demanding money and therefore she opened a LIC policy of Rs. 10,000/- in the name of her husband. She also stated that one day, while she was sleeping, her husband dealt her with a blow and another day, the elder sister of her husband dashed her against the wall while she was in school. She further stated that on 14.08.2010, she did not prepare food and therefore her husband asked her to go home and to bring money for purchasing a vehicle, which she objected. She also stated that the brother, sister and mother of the accused rebuked her and driven her out of the house, whereupon she went to her sister’s house at Joysagar and on the next day, she went to her paternal home. She also stated that the brother, sister and mother of the accused rebuked her and driven her out of the house, whereupon she went to her sister’s house at Joysagar and on the next day, she went to her paternal home. There was a discussion in the house of her sister for amicable settlement and the accused promised that he would not allow the victim to be subjected to torture and took her back to the house, but the members of the family of her husband did not allow them to enter into house and therefore they went to the house of his uncle as he could not manage a rented house. On the next morning he left the house. Later on, she could know that her earring and Rs. 300/- was missing and in the evening the FIR was lodged by the victim herself. In the FIR surprisingly the victim did not allege anything against her husband except allegation of committing theft of Rs. 300/- and the earring. The entire allegations made in the FIR were against the mother, brother and sister of the accused/respondent and only allegation brought against the accused that he committed theft of Rs. 300/- and a pair of earring. But in her evidence, she has not stated about commission of theft by her husband, rather, she stated that she did not found her earring and Rs. 300/-. In her evidence, she stated that immediately after her coming back all the members of her husband’s family started to torture her. Whereas, in her statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC, she stated that after marriage they were pulling on well. 10. What therefore transpires is that her evidence in court is totally contradictory with her previous statement made in the FIR with regard to the material fact, more particularly, demand of dowry and physical assault by the accused/respondent. In the FIR lodged by the PW-6 herself no allegation of assault or demand of dowry was made against the husband. In fact, her entire allegations in the FIR were against the members of her husband’s family. While deposing court, she gave a different story. In the FIR lodged by the PW-6 herself no allegation of assault or demand of dowry was made against the husband. In fact, her entire allegations in the FIR were against the members of her husband’s family. While deposing court, she gave a different story. While deposing in court she stated that on 14.08.2010 she could not prepare food because of some inconvenience and therefore her husband asked her to go home to bring money for purchasing a car, to which she raised objection, whereas, in the FIR she narrated a different story. In the FIR, she stated that on 14.08.2010 all the members of her husband’s family assaulted her and driven her out from the house as per their planning. 11. The statement of the victim was also recorded under Section 164 CrPC, which was proved as Ext.2. In her statement under Section 164 CrPC, she had given a different story. If the statement of the victim made at different stages, more particularly evidence in court and the statement made in the FIR and also the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC are put in jasta position, it would appear that statement of the PW-6, the alleged victim were contradictory on material particulars and such contradiction on material particular rendered her testimony unworthy of inspiring confidence. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the FIR is not an encyclopedia in criminal case and it is not necessary to state all details in the FIR. There is no quarrel about the above legal proposition. Admittedly, in the instant case, the victim is a highly qualified woman being a Post Graduate Degree holder and the FIR was lodged by herself. When the material facts are not alleged in the FIR and the story narrated in the FIR is given a go bye while deposing in court and a different story is put forward, such inconsistency as to genesis of the occurrence certainly shakes the credibility of the prosecution case. 13. Having found the above discrepancy and contradiction in evidence of the victim, learned appellate court came to the finding that the victim was not a witness to be relied upon and therefore, the learned appellate court on appreciation of the evidence disbelieved her evidence and acquitted the accused/respondent. 13. Having found the above discrepancy and contradiction in evidence of the victim, learned appellate court came to the finding that the victim was not a witness to be relied upon and therefore, the learned appellate court on appreciation of the evidence disbelieved her evidence and acquitted the accused/respondent. When the evidence in court is found to be contradictory with the previous statement on material facts and because of such inconsistency the court finds the testimony unworthy of inspiring confidence, the court cannot be blamed for not believing such dented testimony. 14. It is the settled principle of law that in appeal against acquittal, interference is not permissible unless it is found that the judgment of acquittal is perverse or not based on evidence brought on record. Even if two views are possible, the one which favours the accused has to be accepted and the judgment of acquittal cannot be overturned by substituting the view of the appellate court, reason being that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. 15. The Apex Court in Bheru Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2009) 9 SCC 119 held that in appeal against acquittal, there cannot be any interference unless it is shown that the acquittal is unsustainable and perverse. In Dhanpal Vs. State by Public Prosecutor reported in (2009) 10 SCC 401 , the Apex Court held that if the trial court’s view is possible or plausible, acquittal cannot be set aside by merely substituting its reason by the High Court. 16. It is abundantly clear that the oral testimony of the victim, being the prime witness, upon which the entire prosecution case was banking, having not been found worthy of inspiring confidence, the court below acquitted the respondent. Since noticing infirmity in the testimony of the victim and gross inconsistency in the prosecution story, learned appellate court came to the finding that the offence was not proved, in my considered opinion, the findings of the appellate court did not suffer from perversity or any other glaring defects warranting interference. That apart, from the totality of the evidence, it cannot be said that an offence under Section 498A IPC has been established against the respondent. That apart, from the totality of the evidence, it cannot be said that an offence under Section 498A IPC has been established against the respondent. In order to prove a charge under Section 498A IPC, prosecution is bound to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was subjected to cruelty as defined in Explanation to the Section 498A IPC. As indicated above, the evidence against the respondent was also not adequate to substantiate a charge under Section 498-A IPC against the respondent. 17. Thus, having considered the totality of the evidence, I do not find any reason to disturb the finding of the learned appellate court recording acquittal of the respondent. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 18. Send down the LCR.