JUDGMENT : KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA, J. 1. Whether a defence taken in a civil suit or testimony of the accused in a civil court vest a right in the investigating agency to re-initiate criminal proceedings in which Final Report in negative form has been accepted by the competent court of jurisdiction, especially when the protest petition filed by the complainant was rejected, is an issue before this court. 2. Bone of contention in the present case is a piece of land qua which agreement to sell (Annx. 1) dated 12.10.2005 was executed. Petitioners, sellers/executant of the agreement to sell, agreed to sell ?rd share of their land in the undivided house which admittedly was not partitioned. On 22.7.2006 complainant-respondent No. 2 had sent a notice (Annx. 2) calling upon the petitioners to execute the sale deed in pursuance of agreement to sell (Annx. 1) dated 12.10.2005. The notice (Annx. 2) was replied by the counsel for the petitioners. The said reply to the notice is Annexure-3. In para-8 of the reply to notice (Annx. 3) it was stated that the petitioners are ready and willing to execute the sale deed in pursuance to agreement to sell (Annx. 1) and therefore, they called the complainant-purchaser on 1.8.2006 between 10.30 AM to 4.30 PM in the office of Sub Registrar, Beawar, for execution of the sale deed. Case of the petitioners before this court is that in pursuance of reply (Annx. 3) to notice, respondent No. 2 purchaser never turned up. 3. Be that as it may, complainant for breach of agreement to sell, lodged FIR (Annx. 4) bearing No. 357/06 dated 6.10.2006. In Annexure-4, it was specifically stated that since the accused not being holder of ?rd land, have executed the agreement to sell, they have committed offences punishable under Sections 420, 406, 120B IPC. Impugned FIR (Annx. 4) was thoroughly investigated. The investigating agency submitted report (Annx. 5) in which it was opined that the matter is entirely of civil nature and hence, Final Report in negative form is being presented. 4. It is contended that the said Final Report in negative form was accepted and the protest petition filed by the complainant was dismissed by the concerned Magistrate. Meanwhile, the complainant filed a suit for specific performance. Accused petitioners appeared in the said suit. 5. 4. It is contended that the said Final Report in negative form was accepted and the protest petition filed by the complainant was dismissed by the concerned Magistrate. Meanwhile, the complainant filed a suit for specific performance. Accused petitioners appeared in the said suit. 5. Shri Suresh Sahni, learned counsel for the complainant-respondent No. 2, has submitted that in the written statement filed to the civil suit, respondent No. 10 to the said suit, Smt. Mohini Devi, took following preliminary objection:— ^^;g fd okn i= dk in uEcj 2 ftl izk:i esa fy[kk x;k gS] xyr gS rFkk Lohdkj ugha gSA bl in esa of.kZrkuqlkj mRrjnkrk izfroknh;k us fdlh Hkh izdkj dh lgefr o Loh—fr ugha nh o u gh dfFkr bdjkjukek fnukad 12-10-2005 esa of.kZr 'krksZa ls mRrjnkrk izfrokfn;k ikcUn gS o u gh mldh ikyuk djus ds fy;s mRrjnk;h gSA ;fn mRrjnkrk izfrokfn;k dh lgefr o Loh—fr gksrh rks mlds Hkh gLrk{kj dfFkr bdjkjukek fnukad 12-10-2005 ij djk;s tkrsA^^ 6. Copy of reply filed by Mohini Devi produced by Shri Sahni, learned counsel for the complainant-respondent No. 2, as not denied by counsel for the parties, is taken on record. 7. Shri Sahni has contended that the accused petitioners had executed agreement to sell dated 12.10.2005 on behalf of all the petitioners and thus, denial of same by one of the executant fastened them with criminal liability. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 9. Following undeniable facts have emerged for consideration of the court:— (a). Agreement to sell was executed between the accused-petitioners and complainant-respondent No. 2 on 12.10.2005 (Annx. 1). (b). Complainant-respondent No. 2 had issued a notice (Annx. 2) through his counsel dated 22.7.2006 calling upon the accused-petitioners to execute the agreement to sell. (c). In reply (Annx. 3) to the above said notice, the petitioners, seller/executants to the agreement to sell, called upon the complainant-purchaser for execution of the sale deed, but the complainant had not turned up. (d). Complainant on 6.10.2006 lodged the FIR (Annx. 4). (e). The above said FIR (Annx. 4) was investigated and the investigating agency came to the conclusion that the matter is of civil nature and submitted the Final Report in negative form (Annx. 5). (f). (d). Complainant on 6.10.2006 lodged the FIR (Annx. 4). (e). The above said FIR (Annx. 4) was investigated and the investigating agency came to the conclusion that the matter is of civil nature and submitted the Final Report in negative form (Annx. 5). (f). It is agreed by the learned counsel for both the parties that the said Final Report in negative form was accepted and the protest petition filed by the complainant was rejected by the concerned Magistrate. (g). Complainant had filed a civil suit for specific performance. (h). One of the defendants to the suit raised a plea in the written statement that agreement to sell was not with her consent. 10. Relevant portion of the fresh i.e. second FIR (Annx. 7) bearing No. 720/16 registered at Police Station Beawar City, District Ajmer, vesting alleged fresh cause of action to lodge the second FIR on the same set of allegations is given in Paras-4 and 5 of the FIR (Annx. 10. Relevant portion of the fresh i.e. second FIR (Annx. 7) bearing No. 720/16 registered at Police Station Beawar City, District Ajmer, vesting alleged fresh cause of action to lodge the second FIR on the same set of allegations is given in Paras-4 and 5 of the FIR (Annx. 7):— ^^4- ;g fd ifjoknh dh vkSj ls bdjkjukek cspku dh ikyuk gsrq vfHk;qDRkx.k dks le; le; ij fyf[kr esa o eksf[kd rksj ij foØ; vuqca/k dh ikyuk gSrq lwfpr fd;k x;k ijUrq ikyuk ugh dh xbZA vfHk;qDrx.k n~okjk foØ; vuqca/k dh ikyuk ls ;g dgrs gq, badkjh dh tk jgh gS fd vfHk;qDRk la[;k 1 ls 3 o 7] 8 vfHk;qDRk la[;k 4 ls 6 o 9 ls 11 ds vf/kd`r izfrfuf/k gS ,oa vfHk;qDr la[;k 4 ls 6 o 9 ls 11 n~okjk bdjkj cspku ugh fd;k x;k gSA 5- ;g fd vfHk;qDrx.k n~okjk tks fd vkil esa lxs HkkbZ cgu gS o ,d gh ifjokj ds yksx gS n~okjk ifjoknh dh jde gM+ius o mldks uktk;t gkfu igqapkus dh fu;r ls o vius vkidks uktk;t rkSj ij ykHk igqpkusa dh fu;r ls cnfu;rhiwoZd QthZ rjhds ls ifjoknh ds le{k vius vkidksa vfHk;qDr la[;k 4 ls 6 o 9 ls 11 dk vf/kd`r izfrfuf/k crkrs gq;s ifjoknh ds gd esa bdjkj cspku dj fn;k ftl ckcr vfHk;qDr la[;k 4 ls 6 o 9 ls 11 dh Hkh lgefr jghA vc bu lHkh vfHk;qDrx.k n~okjk bdjkj cspku ls badkjh dh tk jgh gS ,oa vfHk;qDr la[;k 1 ls 3 o 7 o 8 n~okjk vius vkidksa vfHk;qDRk la[;k 4 ls 6 o 9 ls 11 dk vf/kd`r izfrfuf/k gksus ls badkjh dh tk jgh gS bl laca/k esa vfHk;qDrx.k n~okjk U;k;ky; esa fyf[kr esa Hkh dFku of.kZr fd;s gSA 11. A tendency has emerged among the police officers not to respect the orders passed by the court. After opinion of the investigating agency that the dispute between the parties is of civil nature, was accepted by the competent court of jurisdiction by accepting the Final Report in negative form and rejecting the protest petition, a decade later it was incumbent for the investigating agency to re-approach the court of concerned Magistrate as a matter of propriety to seek permission to start initiation of the proceedings as in the first FIR already Final Report in negative form was accepted. It is true that in a murder case or in a case which is having large socio-economic ramifications, investigating agency without seeking permission, can act under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The investigating officers may be reminded that they only act under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. in the FIR which on same set of allegations was already registered, but they cannot coin another FIR on the same self allegations because a new plea has been taken in a civil court by one of the defendants who is not accused in the FIR, had not given consent. 12. It may be noted that defendant No. 10 of the civil suit is not an executant to the agreement to sell (Annexure-1) dated 12.10.2005 and in the agreement to sell it was specifically stated that undivided share has been sold by the petitioners. Investigating officer cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the courts and cannot become law into themselves. It is to be noted that in the present case, an attempt was made to bypass the orders of the court. 13. It will be appropriate to reproduce following observations made by the Supreme Court in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 6 SCC 348 : “37. This Court has consistently laid down the law on the issue interpreting the Code, that a second FIR in respect of an offence or different offences committed in the course of the same transaction is not only impermissible but it violates Article 21 of the Constitution. In T.T. Anthony (supra), this Court has categorically held that registration of second FIR (which is not a cross case) is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. The following conclusion in paragraph Nos. 19, 20 and 27 of that judgment are relevant which read as under: 19. The scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure is that an officer in charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of entry of the first information report, on coming to know of the commission of a cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion Under Section 169 or 170 Code of Criminal Procedure, as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned Under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. On completion of investigation and on the basis of the evidence collected, he has to form an opinion Under Section 169 or 170 Code of Criminal Procedure, as the case may be, and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned Under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. However, even after filing such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, he need not register a fresh FIR; he is empowered to make further investigation, normally with the leave of the court, and where during further investigation he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports; this is the import of Sub-section (8) of Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure. 20. From the above discussion it follows that under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 Code of Criminal Procedure only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. On receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering the FIR in the station house diary, the officer in charge of a police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure. 27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. There cannot be any controversy that Sub-section (8) of Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. There cannot be any controversy that Sub-section (8) of Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report Under Section 173(2) Code of Criminal Procedure. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Code of Criminal Procedure, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report Under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. The above referred declaration of law by this Court has never been diluted in any subsequent judicial pronouncements even while carving out exceptions. …………………………………………… …………………………………………… 54. In the light of the factual details, since the entire larger conspiracy is covered in the first FIR dated 01.02.2010 and in the investigation of the said FIR, the CBI, after investigating Tulsiram Prajapati's encounter recorded a finding in supplementary charge sheet dated 22.10.2010 filed in the killings of Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi case that the said encounter was a fake one, we are satisfied that the decision in Ramlal Narang (supra) would not apply to the facts of the case on hand. Even otherwise, as pointed out by learned senior Counsel for the Petitioner, in Ramlal Narang (supra), the charge-sheet filed pursuant to the first FIR was withdrawn which was a fact which weighed with this Court while delivering the judgment in the second case. ………………………………………. ………………………………………. 58.1. Even otherwise, as pointed out by learned senior Counsel for the Petitioner, in Ramlal Narang (supra), the charge-sheet filed pursuant to the first FIR was withdrawn which was a fact which weighed with this Court while delivering the judgment in the second case. ………………………………………. ………………………………………. 58.1. This Court accepting the plea of the CBI in Narmada Bai (supra) that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR directed the CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief prayed for i.e., registration of a fresh FIR. Accordingly, filing of a fresh FIR by the CBI is contrary to various decisions of this Court. 58.2 The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the First Information Report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of evidence collected, Investigating Officer has to form an opinion Under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the concerned Magistrate Under Section 173(2) of the Code. 58.3 Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation normally with the leave of the Court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from sub-sec. (8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. 58.4 Further, on receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering FIR in the Station House Diary, the officer-in-charge of the police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 of the Code. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further reports to the Magistrate. A case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report Under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, is liable to be interfered with by the High Court by exercise of power Under Section 482 of the Code or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 58.5 First Information Report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR.” 14. It will be pertinent to note that in civil case, number of pleas are raised. Merely because a plea is raised, which is yet to be adjudicated by the civil court in no way shall vest right in the investigating agency to register second FIR, hence, the impugned second FIR is liable to be quashed especially when second FIR contain allegations pertaining to same transaction qua which first FIR was registered, in view of law laid in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra). 15. In the present case, registration of second FIR (Annx. 15. In the present case, registration of second FIR (Annx. 7) qua agreement to sell which was executed in 2006 after more than 10 years, due to delay and latches also amount to misuse and abuse of the process of law. Supreme Court in Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny, 2012 Cri. L.J. 438, holding delay of ten years as good ground to quash FIR, relied on the case of Suresh v. Mahadevappa Shivappa Danannava, (2005) 3 SCC 670 , to hold as under:— “10. Before considering the validity or acceptability of the complaint and the consequential action taken by the Judicial Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code, let us advert to various decisions on this aspect. In Suresh v. Mahadevappa Shivappa Danannava, ( (2005) 3 SCC 670 : AIR 2005 SC 1047 : 2005 AIR SCW 989), this Court, on the ground of delay/laches in filing the complaint and the dispute relates to civil nature finding absence of ingredients of alleged offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC, set aside the order of the Magistrate and that of the High Court. In that case, the alleged agreement to sell was executed on 25.12.1988. A legal notice was issued to the Appellant therein on 11.07.1996 calling upon him to execute the sale deed in respect of the premises in question. Thus, the complaint was submitted after a gap of 71/2 years of splendid silence from the date of the alleged agreement to sell i.e. 25.12.1988. The Appellant therein responded to the legal notice dated 11.07.1996 by his reply dated 18.07.1996 through his lawyer specifically denying the alleged agreement and the payment of Rs. 1,25,000/- as advance. Nothing was heard thereafter and the complainant after keeping quiet for nearly 3 years filed private complaint under Section 200 of the Code before the IVth Additional CMM, Bangalore on 17.05.1999. The Magistrate, on the same date, directed his office to register the case as PCR and referred the same to the local police for investigation and to submit a report as per Section 156(3) of the Code. A charge-sheet was filed on 04.08.2000 by the police against the Appellant-Accused No. 1 only for offence under Section 420 IPC. The Magistrate took cognizance of the alleged offence under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code and issued summons to the accused-appellant therein. A charge-sheet was filed on 04.08.2000 by the police against the Appellant-Accused No. 1 only for offence under Section 420 IPC. The Magistrate took cognizance of the alleged offence under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code and issued summons to the accused-appellant therein. Aggrieved by the aforesaid process order dated 04.08.2000 passed by the Magistrate, the Appellant-accused preferred the criminal revision which was dismissed by the High Court. The order of the High Court was under challenge in that appeal. It was contended that as per the averments in the complaint, even as per the police report, no offence is made out against Accused Nos. 2-4 therein. Despite this, the Magistrate issued process against Accused Nos. 2-4 as well which clearly shows the non-application of mind by the Magistrate. It was further pointed out that a perusal of the complaint would only reveal that the allegations as contained in the complaint are of civil nature and do not prima facie disclose commission of alleged criminal offence under Section 420 IPC. After finding that inasmuch as the police has given a clean chit to Accused Nos. 2-4, this Court concluded that the Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the alleged offence against Accused No. 1 and that the complaint has been made to harass him to come to terms by resorting to criminal process. Regarding the delay, this Court pointed out that the complaint was filed on 17.05.1999, after a lapse of 101/2 years and, therefore, the private complaint filed by Respondent No. 1 therein is not at all maintainable at this distance of time. It was further observed that it is also not clearly proved that to hold a person guilty of cheating, it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise and finding that the order of the Magistrate and of the High Court requiring Accused No. 1/appellant therein to face trial would not be in the interest of justice, set aside the order of the High Court and of the Magistrate. It is clear that in view of inordinate delay and laches on the part of the complainant and of the fact that the complaint does not disclose any ingredients of Section 420 IPC and also of the fact that at the most it is the dispute of civil nature, this Court quashed the orders of the Magistrate and the High Court. ……………………………………. …………………………………. 16. The principles enunciated from the above-quoted decisions clearly show that for proceedings under Section 156(3) of the Code, the complaint must disclose relevant material ingredients of Sections 405, 406, 420 read with Section 34 IPC. If there is a flavour of civil nature, the same cannot be agitated in the form of criminal proceeding. If there is huge delay and in order to avoid the period of limitation, it cannot be resorted to a criminal proceeding.” 16. Hence, the present petition for the reasons stated above, is allowed and the impugned FIR (Annx. 7) bearing No. 720/16, registered at Police Station Beawar City, District Ajmer, along with all subsequent proceedings is quashed.