JUDGMENT AND ORDER : N.V. Anjaria, J. These two petitions involved similar facts and identical issue. Accordingly they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 1.1 Heard learned Senior Advocate Mr.Deven Parikh with learned advocate Mr.Kunal Vyas for Nanavati Associates for the petitioners, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr.Manan Mehta for respondent - State, learned Senior Advocate Mr.Yatin Oza with learned advocate Mr.Viral Shah for respondent Nos.4, 5 and 6 in both petitions and learned Senior Advocate Mr.R.S. Sanjanwala with learned advocate Mr.Satyam Chhaya for respondent Nos.13 to 16 in Special Civil Application No.114 of 2017 and respondent Nos.12 and 15 in Special Civil Application No.115 of 2017. 2. The challenge in Special Civil Application No.114 of 2017 is directed against judgment and order dated 03rd October, 2016 of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, Ahmedabad, in Revision Application No.40 of 2015 whereas in the other Special Civil Application No.115 of 2017, it is the judgment and order of even date in Revision Application No.41 of 2015 delivered by the Revenue Tribunal that is brought under challenge. These two Revision Applications before the Tribunal arose from orders of Deputy Collector, Olpad Prant, in Ganot Appeal No.05 of 2013 and No.06 of 2013, both dated 24th March, 2015. 2.1 In the first referred case, land involved was Block No.136, Survey No.109/1 and Survey No.110 situated at Village Kharvasa, Taluka Choryasi, Surat. In the second case, the land was Survey No.40/1, Block No.51 as well as Survey No.68/1, Block No.78 situated at the same village. The dispute dealt with by the authorities and the Tribunal was in respect of tenancy rights claimed by the present petitioners in respect of the said lands. The facts narrated hereinbelow are referable to the first captioned petition. 3. The petitioners' case is that their ancestor - Pratapsinh Gohil had been cultivating the land since the year 1978. After death of said Pratapsinh in the year 1999, the petitioners have been in possession and cultivation. The administrator of the respondents, who stayed abroad, gave threat in the year 2006 to dispossess the petitioners from the land. The petitioners therefore filed Tenancy Application No.87 of 2006 (New No.136 of 2006) before the Additional Mamlatdar, Choryasi, under Section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. In the said application, it was prayed by the petitioners to declare them as tenants of the land. The petitioners therefore filed Tenancy Application No.87 of 2006 (New No.136 of 2006) before the Additional Mamlatdar, Choryasi, under Section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. In the said application, it was prayed by the petitioners to declare them as tenants of the land. 3.1 The Mamlatdar rejected this application by order dated 31st August, 2013. The rejection was on the ground that as Section 32-O of the Act was deleted from the statute, the claim was not acceptable. The second reason given was also that the petitioners did not produce any documentary evidence to show their cultivation of the land. The petitioners filed Tenancy Appeal No.05 of 2013 before the Deputy Collector challenging the order of the Mamlatdar, which appeal was dismissed by the Deputy Collector, Olpad on 24th March, 2015. In the second Ganot Appeal also, the Deputy Collector passed order on the same date. Thereafter came to be filed two Revision Applications as above before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal dismissed the Revision Application in each case which are the judgment and order respectively impugned in these two petitions. 3.2 Before adverting to the rival submissions, the case of the petitioners in their application under Section 70(b) of the Act may be considered with some detail. It was a case that the land in question originally belonged to Nathubhai alias Manubhai Vallabhbhai, Gatubhai alias Govindbhai Vallabhbhai Desai and Kamuben Vallabhbhai wd/o.Dayalji. They all were staying in South Africa. It was stated that the lands were under cultivation of predecessor Pratapsinh Kanbaji since 1978 and after his death, petitioners have been undertaking cultivation. It was the case that the lands in question were given to said Pratapsinh Gohil - the ancestor of the petitioner by conferring on him tenancy rights for the amount to be paid as ganot price. The petitioners stated that since that time they have been cultivating and are in possession of the land. 3.3 The petitioners further stated that the corp of Sugarcane was grown on the land and was sold to one Maroli Vibhag Khand Udyog Sahakari Mandli Limited. The petitioners averred that receipts reflecting sale of Sugarcane to the said co-operative society were available which was in the name of their father and after the death of the father, in the name of the mother, as the mother had been administering the land. The petitioners averred that receipts reflecting sale of Sugarcane to the said co-operative society were available which was in the name of their father and after the death of the father, in the name of the mother, as the mother had been administering the land. The petitioners further stated that they had ample evidence and material to indicate that they were tenants in the land. They stated that one electric motor on the land was installed which was obtained in the name of said Pratapsinh. The bills of electricity were relied on to show consumption of electricity on the land by the petitioners. 3.4 The petitioners stated in their application that they would examine two witnesses Ramanbhai Vallabhbhai Nayak and Damyantiben, both resident of Village Kharvasa and would produce other witnesses as well in order to substantiate their case. The cause of action to file the application was stated to be that the administrator Dolatray Gulabbhai Nayak gave threats before four months asking the petitioners to give possession of the land and even thereafter continued to gave such threats for dispossession. 4. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted with reference to the documents (copies at Pages 57 onwards in the petition) that the petitioners had prima facie material to prove their case as the tenant. He invited attention of the Court to the revenue receipts (copies at Page 96) and that the amount of land revenue was paid through the family member on behalf of the petitioners. He then referred to the documents relating to supply of Sugarcane to the co-operative society (copies at Page 115 onwards) , in order to further the case of the case of the petitioners about cultivation and possession of the land as tenants. The documents in the nature of correspondence (copies at Pages 109 to 127) as well as copy of the Panchnama of the land were sought to be relied on to suggest that the petitioners had tenancy rights over the land. 4.1 Learned senior counsel further submitted that the application by the petitioner was under Section 70B of the Tenancy Act and petitioner ought to be given opportunity to establish that his case falls within the ambit of the said provision to claim the tenancy. 4.1 Learned senior counsel further submitted that the application by the petitioner was under Section 70B of the Tenancy Act and petitioner ought to be given opportunity to establish that his case falls within the ambit of the said provision to claim the tenancy. He also relied on the definition of "deemed tenant" under Section 4 of the Act, to submit that a person lawfully cultivating would become deemed tenant of the land in question. It was submitted that the petitioner was not given opportunity to establish his case as the evidence was closed by the Tribunal. 4.2 Learned senior counsel also assailed the reasoning of the Tribunal that since Section 32-O was deleted from the Act, the case of the petitioner for being treated as tenant could not be furthered or accepted, by submitting that the said aspect did not have any nexus to the claim of the petitioner which was required to be examined in light of and under Section 70B of the Act. 4.3 On the other hand, learned senior advocate for private respondent Nos.4, 5 and 6 vehemently submitted that case of the petitioner would be required to be appreciated in light of and as pleaded in his application. It was submitted that case of the petitioner was that he was contractual tenant, which he could not establish by any evidence. He submitted that whether the oral tenancy was created was a matter of proof to be established by cogent evidence, however there was a total dearth of evidence of such nature with the petitioner. Also was pressed into service observation in paragraph 4 from the decision of the Supreme Court in Hanmanta Daulappa Nimbal since deceased by his heirs and Lrs. v. Babasaheb Dajisaheb Londhe, (1995) 6 SCC 58 . It was submitted that the petitioner pleaded that the oral tenancy was created in his favour which was for consideration and that he gave details of the payment made. 4.4 According to the submission of learned senior counsel for respondent Nos.4 to 6, the concept of tenancy is not "pay and enter the land". He relied on contents of paragraph 10 of the reply to further submit that not only the case of the petitioner was not tenable prima facie, it was at the best, based on the secondary evidence which was rightly not relied on by the Tribunal. He relied on contents of paragraph 10 of the reply to further submit that not only the case of the petitioner was not tenable prima facie, it was at the best, based on the secondary evidence which was rightly not relied on by the Tribunal. Learned senior counsel submitted that the petitioner was never in possession. 4.5 Learned senior counsel for respondent Nos.13 to 16 while adopting the submissions made on behalf of respondent Nos.4 to 6, further emphasised that the case of the petitioners was that they were contractual tenants. He submitted that when the originally pleaded case was of contractual tenancy, the petitioners could not enlarge the ambit. He submitted that the petitioners could not travel beyond their pleadings and have to stick to their case and have to succeed only on what they have pleaded. 5. In the context of case put-forth and the submissions advanced by rival parties, certain provisions of the Tenancy Act, 1948 may be looked at. The 'tenant' is defined under Section 2(18) who means a person who holds land on lease and includes (a) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4; (b) a person who is a protected tenant; and (c) a person who is a permanent tenant. It is provided that the word 'landlord' shall be construed accordingly. 'Tenancy' as defined in Section 2(17) means the relationship of landlord and tenant. 5.1 Section 70(b) of the Act casts duty on the Mamlatdar to decide whether a person is or was a tenant, a protected tenant or a permanent tenant. The application for being declared as tenant is made by the petitioners under this provision. Section 4 which pertains to concept of deemed tenant. This Section reads as under. "4. Persons to be deemed tenant.: (1) A person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another persons shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not, - (a) A member of the owner's family, or (b) A servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not crop share or hired labourer cultivating the land under the personal supervision of the owner of any member of the owner's family, or (c) A mortgagee in possession. Explanation I. - A person shall not be deemed to be tenant under this section if such person has been on an application made by the owner of the land as provided under section 2A of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, decided by a competent authority not to be a tenant. Explanation II.- Where any land is cultivated by a widow or a minor or a person who is subject to physical or mental disability or a serving member of the armed forces through a tenant then notwithstanding anything contained in Explanation I to clause (6) of section 2, such tenant shall be deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of this section." 5.2 The Supreme Court in Dahya Lal v. Rasul Mohamed Abdul Rahim, (1964) AIR(Supreme Court) 1320, viewing the tenancy law in the Act of 1948 encompasses beneficent provisions stated that not only tenants who held land for the purpose of cultivation under contracts from the owners, but also the persons who are deemed to be the tenants are covered. The Apex Court held that Section 2(18) devised a special definition of tenant and included therein the persons who are not contractual tenants. It also negatived the contention that under Section 4, the person claiming to be the status of a deemed tenant, must be cultivating the land with the consent or authority of the owner. 5.3 The Supreme Court observed and held to assert that essential ingredient to be searched and satisfied to become a deemed tenant under Section 4 of the Act is the lawful cultivation of the land by the person, "... The relevant condition imposed by the statute is only that the person claiming the status of a deemed tenant must be cultivating land "lawfully" : It is not the condition that he must cultivate land with the consent of or under authority derived directly from the owner. To import such a condition is to rewrite the section, and destroy the practical utility. A person who derives his rights to cultivate land from the owners would normally be a contractual tenant and he will obviously not be a "deemed tenant". Persons such as licences from the owner may certain be regarded as falling within the class of persons lawfully cultivating land belonging to others, but it cannot be assumed therefrom that they are the only persons who are covered by the section. Persons such as licences from the owner may certain be regarded as falling within the class of persons lawfully cultivating land belonging to others, but it cannot be assumed therefrom that they are the only persons who are covered by the section. The Act affords protection to all persons who hold agricultural lands as contractual tenants and subject to the exceptions specified all persons lawfully cultivating lands belonging to others, and it would be unduly restricting the intention of the Legislature to limit the benefit of its provisions to persons who derive their authority from the owner, either under a contract of tenancy, or otherwise. In our view, all persons other than those mentioned in Clauses (a) , (b) and (c) of Section 4 who lawfully cultivate land belonging to other persons whether or not their authority is derived directly from the owner of the land must be deemed tenants of the lands." (Para 6) 5.4 The content and crux in operation of Section 4 for acquiring by a person the status of a deemed tenant, was explained by this Court in Harivadan Bhagwandas v. Chandaben being Special Civil Application No.934 of 1996 decided on 15th December, 2006 stating as under, "From a fair and legal understanding of the section, it will be clear that a person who is in lawful cultivating possession would be deemed to be a tenant if the land is not cultivated by the owner and such person in cultivating possession is not, a member of the owner's family or, a servant on wages payable or a hired labourer or any member of the owner's family or a mortgagee in possession. The moment it appears to the court that a person is lawfully cultivating the property and owner fails in proving that the entry of name of such person in revenue records was illegal, then, the presumption would be strengthened and the burden would be extra heavy upon the owner / landlord to prove that the entry was illegal or agricultural activities carried on by such person were unlawful. In the present case, entries made in the revenue records clearly prove that the father of the respondent No.1 was in cultivating possession and he was recorded as a tenant either in 1956 and thereafter. The owner / landlord never moved any application to the revenue authority for correction of the records. In the present case, entries made in the revenue records clearly prove that the father of the respondent No.1 was in cultivating possession and he was recorded as a tenant either in 1956 and thereafter. The owner / landlord never moved any application to the revenue authority for correction of the records. He accepted the entries as those were. The revenue entries have a presumption of bring truthful unless the correctness of the same is rebutted. In the present matter, the case of the present petitioners was that they were cultivating the land through some one else, but beyond that he did not say that how the father of the respondents or the respondents came in possession of the property. Under sec.4 of the Act, a person would not be a tenant, where he is a trespasser or is a servant or is a mortgagee. It is not the case of the respondents that the father of the respondents was or the respondents were trespasser. Even otherwise, right from 1956, the petitioners never took any step for dispossession of the father of the respondents or the respondents. He allowed them to cultivate the property, non-action on the part of the petitioners would speak against the petitioners." (Para 8) 5.5 When it comes to the consideration whether a person cultivating is a deemed tenant to be qualified with such status under Section 4 of the Act, the interpretational dimensions are several. It is in several circumstances that the courts have viewed that the person becomes a deemed tenant. The primary and pre-condition is that person must be in lawful cultivation. The lawful cultivation is the centripetal requirement for acquiring the status of deemed tenant. 5.6 In Jagan alias Jagannath Umaji v. Gokuldas Hiralal Tewari, (1987) Supp1 SCC 566, the Supreme Court observed that when the appellant was admittedly cultivating land in question and was not a member of landlord's family, nor was a hired labourer, the cultivation was clearly lawful. In that case, the appellant was allowed to cultivate the land and appropriate the crop in view of payment of service. He was held to be a deemed tenant. In that case, the appellant was allowed to cultivate the land and appropriate the crop in view of payment of service. He was held to be a deemed tenant. Again in Papila Bai v. Chavdas T. Bhortakke (dead) by Lrs., (2005) 2 SCC 509 the Apex Court negatived the contention that unless there was an express provision in the mortgage deed empowering the mortgagee in possession to induct the tenant, any person inducted on the land would be a trespasser and that therefore he could not be said to be in "lawfully" cultivation of the land. In such circumstances also, a person could acquire the deemed tenancy. In Kizhakke Mundayadan Kunhiraman Nambiar v. A. K. Kerala Verma Raja, (2006) 9 SCC 751 , the tenancy claim was based on the adverse possession which was negatived by the High Court but the Supreme Court allowed the appeal holding that the appellant was deemed tenant within the meaning of Section 7 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. 5.7 Decision of the High Court of Bombay in Kishan Ramchandra Kumbha v. Dr.Kashinath Bandu Tela, (2004) 1 MhLJ 285 which was relied on behalf of the petitioners stated after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dahya Lal, "From the above ruling, it is seen that a person, who is lawfully cultivating the land belonging to another person and not falling under the excepted category, shall deemed to be a tenant of that land. And if he is so cultivating on the tillers day i.e. on 01st April, 1957, he would become deemed purchaser of such land. This is the mandate of the scheme of the provisions of the Act." 5.8 A submission was advanced on behalf of the private respondents that there was no evidence more particularly in the nature of receipts etc. of payment of rent to substantiate the claim of the petitioners that they became tenants of the land. This is the mandate of the scheme of the provisions of the Act." 5.8 A submission was advanced on behalf of the private respondents that there was no evidence more particularly in the nature of receipts etc. of payment of rent to substantiate the claim of the petitioners that they became tenants of the land. Responding to this on behalf of the petitioners, a decision also of Bombay High Court in Shri Jagannath Vithu Jadav since deceased through legal heirs v. The State of Maharashtra being Writ Petition No.616 of 2005 decided on 11th January, 2013, was cited in which also the Bombay High Court took into account the propositions of law laid down in Dahya Lal to observe in paragraph 14 of the judgment and held in light of the facts of that case, "It can, thus, clearly be seen that this Court has taken a consistent view that it is not necessary to have an entry in the tenancy column or rent note or rent receipt to support the claim of the tenant of statutory tenancy. It has further been held that all that is required under section 4 of the said Act is lawful cultivation by a person other than the member of the family of the landlord, subject to the other conditions laid down in section 4. As such, the finding of learned MRT that in the absence of rent receipts and lease-deed the case of the petitioner that he is tenant cannot be accepted is nothing but perverse. When the authorities below on appreciation of evidence have found that the petitioner has established to be a tenant from 1959-60 there is no reason for the learned MRT to upset the concurrent findings of fact and come to the finding that the findings recorded by the authorities below are perverse." 6. From the statutory provisions noted and the judicial pronouncements noticed above, it has to be concluded that while discharging his duty in law under Section 70(b), the Mamlatdar has to address the question for deciding whether a person has acquired tenancy rights in the land or not and in that the Mamlatdar has also to consider whether the person is a deemed tenant under Section 4 of the Act. The exercise of the decision to be arrived at under Section 70(b) requires leading of elaborate evidence by the parties. The exercise of the decision to be arrived at under Section 70(b) requires leading of elaborate evidence by the parties. The corners of Section 4 are wide. It would be an interactive exercise based on evidence by applying Section 70(b) read with Section 4 of the Act. There would be no gainsaying that the Tribunal has to be required to advert to this exercise by permitting the parties to lead evidence for deciding the case of the petitioners. 6.1 The petitioners have pleaded a specific case in their application under Section 70(b) of the Act. The petitioners relied on several cases of documents seeking to establish the case of tenancy rights of the petitioners. Although the case of the other side was that the evidence was too inadequate and insufficient to be accepted to accord to the petitioners the status of tenant, the Tribunal has to duly appreciate the material relied. The petitioners has to be given fullest opportunity to establish their case by leading evidence of whatever nature they have produced. 6.2 A striking aspect was noticed that the process of leading of evidence was left in the middle. It is the undenied specific case of the petitioners that after their examination-in-chief was taken and the case was at the stage of crossexamination of the other side, on a particular date, when the petitioners could not remain present in the Court, the application was dismissed and the evidence was left incomplete. When there is a specific case of the petitioners seeking to be declared as tenant and when the statutory provisions require the status of tenancy to be established on facts by leading evidence, not completing the process of taking evidence amounted to both irregularity and illegality. 6.3 In addition to the above aspects having not been addressed, the consideration which weighed with the authorities including the Tribunal was that Section 32-O was deleted from the statute book on 24th July, 2009. The said Section dealt with the right of tenant whose tenancy was created after tiller's day to purchase the land. It was provided in Section 32-O that in respect of any tenancy created after tiller's day, notwithstanding any agreement or usage to the contrary, a tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled to within one year from the date of commencement of such tenancy, to purchase from the landlord the land held by him or such part thereof. It was provided in Section 32-O that in respect of any tenancy created after tiller's day, notwithstanding any agreement or usage to the contrary, a tenant cultivating personally shall be entitled to within one year from the date of commencement of such tenancy, to purchase from the landlord the land held by him or such part thereof. Admittedly, the application filed by the petitioners under Section 70(b) was in the year 2006, that is much prior to the deletion of Section 32-O. Even otherwise, the submission is that deletion of Section 32-O would have no bearing on the claim of the petitioners for establishment of his tenancy right under Section 70(b) of the Act which is to be viewed as an independent proceedings. 6.4 All the above questions have not been adverted to by the Tribunal. The Tribunal was therefore suffers from non-application of mind in multiple way. 6.5 In view of the discussion preceded and the rival contentions noted, since the controversy between the parties involve several aspects and facets of facts and law, which the Revenue Tribunal failed to notice and advert to and for which the parties are required to be accorded opportunity of leading evidence, the proper course is to remand the proceedings of Revision Application No.40 of 2015 as well as Revision Application No.41 of 2015 to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal for its fresh consideration and decision. 6.6 Since the case in both the Revision Applications involve similar facts and issues, common directions, as are issued herein would govern them. 7. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order dated 03rd October, 2016 delivered in Revision Application No.40 of 2015 as well as judgment and order in Revision Application No.41 of 2015 are hereby set aside, in order to enable the Tribunal to deal with the controversy afresh. The Gujarat Revenue Tribunal is directed to reconsider the case and after giving opportunity to both the sides to lead and adduce evidence, render its decision in both the cases afresh in accordance with law. 8. This Court has not expressed any opinion on the final merits of the case of the either side except noticing and highlighting the facets and aspects of the controversy and the contentions raised with regard to the same by the contesting parties. 8. This Court has not expressed any opinion on the final merits of the case of the either side except noticing and highlighting the facets and aspects of the controversy and the contentions raised with regard to the same by the contesting parties. 8.1 In order that the new equities are not created and the multiplicity of proceedings do not arise, it is directed that the parties shall maintain status quo and that the land shall not be transferred or encumbered and no third party rights shall be created with regard to the subject matter land until the appropriate decision is taken by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal as above. 9. Both the petitions stand partly allowed in the aforesaid terms.