JUDGMENT : 1. By means of this writ petition the petitioner has challenged the memoranda dated 24.01.2004 and 21.07.2004 (Annexures 2 and 3 respectively to the writ petition) and has urged this court for directing the respondents to revoke or rescind those memoranda dated 24.01.2004 and 21.07.2004 as well as to refund a sum of Rs.1,22,500 which has been recovered from the petitioner without observing any fair procedure. 2. The petitioner while working as the Supervisor in the Tripura State Cooperative Bank Limited, hereinafter referred to as “the bank-respondent”, received the memorandum bearing No.C-2/903/TSCB/Estt/10044-48/04 dated 24.01.2004 containing allegations, inter alia, that on 21.01.2004 there was a shortage of cash to the extent of Rs.2,45,000 resulted by fraudulent withdrawal of the cash. It had been further alleged that one Chan Mohan Saha, Branch Manager and the petitioner holding the post of Grade-III officers were responsible for such fraudulent withdrawal. By the said memorandum dated 24.01.2004 both the petitioner and Chan Mohan Saha were saddled with the financial liability in equal share and it was directed that a sum of Rs.1,22,500 would be recovered from both the petitioner and Chan Mohan Saha by instalment at the rate of Rs.2,000 per month from their respective monthly salaries till the recovery is complete. 3. After the said recovery, a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner on a set of charges which hinge on misappropriation and the breach of trust. The petitioner by filing a written statement of defence disputed such allegations. 4. Even though the inquiry in respect of those charges has been complete long back, but no final order has yet been issued. Since the petitioner was due to retire from 01.08.2004 he has urged the bank-respondent for granting him extension of service for 3(three) months. 5. Pursuant thereto, the General Manager of the bank-respondent issued the memorandum bearing No.F.C-3/81/TSCB/ESTT/2744-48/04 dated 21.07.2004, rejecting the said prayer of the petitioner. During that time, the petitioner was admittedly under suspension and no final order, as stated, was passed by the disciplinary authority. 6. For the said occurrence, the bank-respondent had filed a written complaint to the West Agartala Police Station disclosing occurrence of criminal breach of trust. Based thereon, West Agartala P.S. Case No.07/2004 under Section 406/408 of the IPC was registered. 7. 6. For the said occurrence, the bank-respondent had filed a written complaint to the West Agartala Police Station disclosing occurrence of criminal breach of trust. Based thereon, West Agartala P.S. Case No.07/2004 under Section 406/408 of the IPC was registered. 7. On completion of the purported investigation, final report chargesheeting the petitioner was filed and on taking cognizance and in observance of the procedure the charge was framed both against the petitioner and Chan Mohan Saha under Section 408 of the IPC. On recording the evidence, the petitioner and the other accused person were examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. 8. The trial court, by the judgment and order dated 12.04.2011 in G.R. No.46/2004, acquitted the petitioner from the criminal liability. While passing the said order of acquittal the trial court had occasion to observe as under: “Over and above on meticulous analysis we find that two views may be possible i.e. one view speaks that the manager being satisfied with the signatures of the ledger keeper and the passing officer he made final payment order and the view is there might be no such existence of cheque. It is settled principle of law that if two views are possible the accused should get the benefit. In fact, the procedure of the bank was not proper so far the movement of cheque is concerned. Anyway the evidence so far produced by the prosecution is not at all sufficient to conclude that the accused persons are involved in the alleged defalcation. In my considered view the prosecution miserable failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.” [Emphasis added] The said judgment, according to the learned counsel appearing for the parties, has reached its finality. 9. Before this court proceeds further, it is constrained to record that with the writ petition neither a copy of the memorandum of charge nor a copy of the written statement or the records of the prosecution has been filed by either of the parties. However, the respondents by filing their reply, have averred that the petitioner was working as the Cashier on 21.01.2004 at Agartala Branch of the said bank-respondent and on the closure of the day a shortage of money to the extent of Rs.2,45,000 was located. However, the respondents by filing their reply, have averred that the petitioner was working as the Cashier on 21.01.2004 at Agartala Branch of the said bank-respondent and on the closure of the day a shortage of money to the extent of Rs.2,45,000 was located. On scrutiny by the officials along with the Cashier and the Branch Manager of the said Bank, it was detected that the payment of Rs.2,45,000 was made by the petitioner to M/S Saha Sound without any valid cheque. Though the entry was made against a cheque, but the instrument was not found in the bank’s record. Further it has been averred that on scrutiny it was located that no such cheque was ever produced before the bank for encashment. The cheque number as entered in the cash transaction register was false. As per the norms of the Bank the Cashier and the Bank Manager are liable to keep the days transaction up to date and to prepare the record accordingly for the next date/s cash transaction. In that circumstance, the petitioner and the Bank Manager were jointly asked to meet the shortage of cash. The respondents had given the opportunity to the petitioner to make good of the said shortage by monthly instalments of Rs.2,000 per month until the entire recovery is complete. If the entire recovery could not be made for any reason, that shall be recovered from the retiral benefits as per the rule of the bank. The respondents have further averred that since the petitioner had been acquitted from the charge on benefit of doubt, there is no bar to continue with the departmental proceeding which has been set up for misconduct of the petitioner, which he had indulged in, in contravention of the rules of the bank-respondent. They have further averred that the writ petition as filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be maintained as this court cannot issue any writ of mandamus or certiorari inasmuch as the bank-respondent is a cooperative society under the Tripura Cooperative Societies Act, 1974, as amended from time to time and the State does not have any financial and administrative control over the Tripura State Cooperative Bank Ltd. The management of affairs of the bank is wholly controlled by the Board of Directors. The bank-respondent, since is not a Government undertaking and it cannot be brought within the meaning of the “State” as provided by Article 12 of the Constitution, hence the bank-respondent is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Hon’ble High Court. As such the respondents have urged this court to axe the writ petition without any further consideration. 10. That apart, the bank-respondent have stated that the petitioner has not disputed the shortage of Rs.2,45,000 in the transaction as taken place on 21.01.2004, but he has stated that he is not liable to meet the said shortage in any manner. They have also stated that the entire liability of the petitioner has been recovered from his salary and from the retiral benefits. The respondents have further submitted that as per the norms of the bank, if any shortage is found or located in the cash counter or transaction at the time of closure of the daily bank account under the Cashier, the officers who are liable to hand over the correct cash balance of that day to the Branch Manager, in the event of shortage, they are liable to meet the shortage from their own fund. In para 19 of the reply, the respondents have averred as under: “It is expected that the Departmental proceeding against petitioner for the charge of misconduct etc. would be concluded shortly. I most respectfully submit that, the State Government has no financial and administrative control on the Tripura State Cooperative Bank Ltd. The total management of the affairs of the Bank are wholly controlled by the decisions of the Board of Directors as it vested to them, and TSCB Ltd. is a registered society and it has “By-Laws” approved by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Govt. of Tripura. The TSCB is not a government undertaking and not a State or Other authorities as per the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, so no writ petition would lie against the answering Respondents. The Respondent Bank has its own service rules for its employees. So the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable.” 11. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has strenuously submitted that such contention of the respondents that the bank-respondent is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction, cannot be sustained inasmuch as the State-Government has 25% of the share capital of the said bank. So the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable.” 11. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has strenuously submitted that such contention of the respondents that the bank-respondent is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction, cannot be sustained inasmuch as the State-Government has 25% of the share capital of the said bank. In support of this contention, Mr. Deb, learned counsel has produced the profit and loss account of the bank-respondent as on 31.03.2016 showing that the Government of Tripura has “A” Class share to the extent of 84,153,000 valued at Rs.81,153,000 out of total paid-up share capital of Rs.245,971,298. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has, therefore, submitted that it is obvious that someone be deemed having substantive share in the bank to have control over the management, even though that control may not be visible in terms of the rule or in management plank of the bank. 12. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has further submitted that very recently this court has decided a similar controversy between one retired officer of the said bank-respondent and the bank-respondent in Sukumar Das vs. The Tripura State Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Ors. (judgment and order dated 04.05.2017 delivered in W.P.(C) No.85/2012). The respondents in that writ petition did not raise the question of jurisdictional limit of this court under Section 226 of the Constitution, but suddenly they have raised this jurisprudential objection in this writ petition. According to Mr. Deb, learned counsel, the respondents are estopped now to raise such objection. 13. Mr. G.S. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that even if in Sukumar Das (supra) such jurisprudential objection was not raised, the bank-respondent is not debarred or estopped in raising such issue as the principle of estoppel cannot operate against them inasmuch as the doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against law. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has relied on a decision of the apex court in S.S. Rana Vs. Registrar, Coop. Societies & Anr., reported in (2006) 11 SCC 634 , where the apex court had occasion to observe as under: 10. It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. The State furthermore is not the majority shareholder. The State has the power only to nominate one director. It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. The State furthermore is not the majority shareholder. The State has the power only to nominate one director. It cannot, thus, be said that the State exercises any functional control over the affairs of the Society in the sense that the majority directors are nominated by the State. For arriving at the conclusion that the State has a deep and pervasive control over the Society, several other relevant questions are required to be considered, namely, (1) How the Society was created? (2) Whether it enjoys any monopoly character? (3) Do the functions of the Society partake to statutory functions or public functions? and (4) Can it be characterized as public authority? 11. Respondent 2, the Society does not answer any of the afore- mentioned tests. In the case of a non-statutory society, the control thereover would mean that the same satisfies the tests laid down by this Court in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi : (1981) 1 SCC 722 . [See Zoroastrian Coop. Housing Society Ltd. vs. Distt. Registrar, Coop. Societies (Urban) : (2005) 5 SCC 632 ]. 12. It is well settled that general regulations under an Act, like Companies Act or the Cooperative Societies Act, would not render the activities of a company or a society as subject to control of the State. Such control in terms of the provisions of the Act are meant to ensure proper functioning of the Society and the State or statutory authorities would have nothing to do with its day-to-day functions. 13. The decision of the seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas : (2002) 5 SCC 111 , whereupon strong reliance has been placed, has no application in the instant case. In that case, the Bench was deciding a question as to whether in view of the subsequent decisions of this Court, the law was correctly laid down in Sabhajit Tewary vs. Union of India : (1975) 1 SCC 485 , and it not whether the same deserved to be overruled. The majority opined that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The majority opined that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. This Court noticed the history of the formation thereof, its objects and functions, its management and control as also the extent of financial aid received by it. Apart from the said fact it was noticed by reason of an appropriate notification issued by the Central Government that CSIR was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal in terms of Section 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It was on the aforementioned premises this Court opined that Sabhajit Tewary: (1975) 1 SCC 485 did not lay down the correct law. This Court reiterated the following six tests laid down in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi : (1981) 1 SCC 722 : "(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with Governmental character. (3) It may also be relevant factor ..whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) 'Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference' of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government." This Court further held [Pradeep Kumar Biswas : (2002) 5 SCC 111 ]: "40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi : (1981) 1 SCC 722 are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi : (1981) 1 SCC 722 are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be - whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State." (emphasis supplied) 14. As Respondent 1 does not satisfy any of the tests laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas : (2002) 5 SCC 111 , we are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in arriving at a finding that the bank-respondent is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. [Emphasis supplied] 14. Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel, has in view of the said decision of the apex court and having referred that the State does not exercise any direct and indirect control over the affairs of the society and such control is wholly vested with the Board of Directors, submitted that the bank-respondent cannot be held to be “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution so that the above observations do not fall berserk. It may be mentioned that in S.S. Rana (supra) the apex court has considered Nayagarh Coop. Central Bank Ltd. Vs. Narayan Rath, reported in (1977) 3 SCC 576 , where it has been observed that the writ petition can be maintainable against any order of the Cooperative Societies if the said order was challenged before the Registrar of Cooperative Societies, who is a statutory authority under the Cooperative Societies Act. The order of the Cooperative Societies can then be challenged with the order of the Registrar. There cannot be any amount of doubt that the law as enunciated in S.S. Rana (supra) has been made unambiguous through the interpretative prism of Article 12 of the Constitution. The order of the Cooperative Societies can then be challenged with the order of the Registrar. There cannot be any amount of doubt that the law as enunciated in S.S. Rana (supra) has been made unambiguous through the interpretative prism of Article 12 of the Constitution. 15. In rejoinder, Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has referred U.P. State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. Vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey & Ors., reported in (1999) 1 SCC 741 , where it has been held as under: 11. The appellant though a cooperative society registered under the U.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (for short "the Societies Act') is constituted under the Utter Pradesh Cooperative Land Development Bank Act, 1964 (for short the “Bank Act”). It is, therefore, governed by the provisions of both these Acts and the Rules framed thereunder. Section 122 of the Societies Act prescribes constitution of an authority to control employees of cooperative societies. This Section we may reproduce as under : "122. Authority to control employees of co-operative societies.- (1) The State Government may constitute an authority or authorities, in such manner as may be prescribed, for the recruitment, training and disciplinary control of the employees of co-operative societies, or a class of co-operative societies, and may require such authority or authorities to frame Regulations regarding recruitment, emoluments, terms and conditions of service including disciplinary control of such employees and, subject to the provisions contained in Section 70, settlement of disputes between an employee of a co-operative society and the society. (2) The Regulations framed under sub-section (1) shall be subject to the approval of the State Government and shall, after such approval, be published in the Gazette, and take effect from the date of such publication and shall supersede any Regulations made under Section 121." [Emphasis added] 16. Finally, in Chandra Bhan Dubey (supra), the apex court had occasion to observe as under: “We have seen above that the appellant is functioning as a co-operative society under the Societies Actbut it has been constituted under the provision of the Bank Act. In exercise of power conferred on the State Government by Section 30 of the Bank Act, Rules have been framed called "the U.P. Cooperative Land Development Banks Rules, 1971". In exercise of power conferred on the State Government by Section 30 of the Bank Act, Rules have been framed called "the U.P. Cooperative Land Development Banks Rules, 1971". For the service condition of the employees of the appellant, we have to refer to the Societies Act and the Regulations framed by the U.P. Cooperative Institutional Service Board constituted under Section 122 of the Societies Act as well as to the Service Rules framed by the appellant under Regulation 102 of the Service Regulations. .....” [Emphasis added] It has been enunciated that the affairs of the said Cooperative Bank, if are controlled by the State Government even though it functions as a cooperative society, is certainly to be treated as an extended arm of the State and thus is an instrumentality of the State or authority as provided under Article 12 of the Constitution. 17. Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, therefore, has contended that since the State Government has substantive shares in the Bank it has definite control over the affairs of the bank and as such the bank-respondent has to be held as amenable to the jurisdiction as conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has also referred a decision of the apex court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology & Ors., reported in (2002) 5 SCC 111 , where the apex court has observed that, keeping pace with the broad approach to the concept of equality under Articles 14 and 16, Courts have whenever possible, sought to curb an arbitrary exercise of power against individuals by 'centres of power', and there was correspondingly an expansion in the judicial definition of 'State' within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution. 18. In Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) the apex court has observed as under: 27. Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India : (1979) 3 SCC 489 was noted and quoted with approval in extenso and the tests propounded for determining as to when a corporation can be said to be an instrumentality or agency of the Government therein were culled out and summarised as follows: (1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character. (3) It may also be a relevant factor ..whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) “Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government. [Emphasis supplied] 19. On discussing the precedents, it has been thereafter laid down that the picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 722 are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a “State” within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a “State”. Though Mr. Deb, learned counsel has referred this decision interfaced with the account of profit and loss, but this court is unable to accept the analogy that even though the bank-respondent is a Cooperative Society, the State Government has the pervasive control on the bank-respondent by virtue of their share. No such material has been placed before this court. On the contrary, the bank-respondent have categorically stated that they are entirely managed by their own Board of Directors. Even the State Government does not exercise any regulatory control in any manner. No such material has been placed before this court. On the contrary, the bank-respondent have categorically stated that they are entirely managed by their own Board of Directors. Even the State Government does not exercise any regulatory control in any manner. When the control is merely regulatory it would not make the body a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and hence this decision does not in the final consideration supports the contention as advanced by Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. 20. Mr. Deb, learned counsel thereafter has submitted that to interfere the action of a body under Article 226, it is not in all the time required that over the body, the State must have its pervasive control. In Janet Jeyapaul Vs. SRM University & Ors., reported in (2015) 16 SCC 530 , the apex court has referred Zee Telefilms Ltd. Vs. Union of India, reported in (2005) 4 SCC 649 , to observe as under: “31. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some duties like the selection of an Indian cricket team, controlling the activities of the players and others involved in the game of cricket. These activities can be said to be akin to public duties or State functions and if there is any violation of any constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely because it or he is not a State. Under the Indian jurisprudence there is always a just remedy for the violation of a right of a citizen. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much wider than Article 32. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 33. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is much wider than Article 32. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 33. Thus, it is clear that when a private body exercises its public functions even if it is not a State, the aggrieved person has a remedy not only under the ordinary law but also under the Constitution, by way of a writ petition under Article 226.” [Emphasis added] The apex court in Janet Jeyapaul (supra), has held that, if a body discharges public duties, an aggrieved party can, for this reason, seek a public law remedy against that body. 21. Applying the aforesaid principle of law, the bank-respondent cannot be held to be amenable to the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the contrary, as the bank discharges public duties, the bank-respondent becomes amenable to the writ jurisdiction. If the body is purely a private body with no public duty, mandamus will not lie. But if the body discharges public function by any manner, against it the writ jurisdiction would extend. The term “authority” as used in Article 226, in the context, is bound to receive a liberal meaning unlike the term “State” in Article 12 of the Constitution. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of the fundamental rights under Article 32 or under Article 226. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body is not very relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. 22. No doubt, the bank-respondent is under the control of Reserve Bank of India by virtue of the Reserve Bank of India Act. No matter by what means the duty is imposed, if a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. 22. No doubt, the bank-respondent is under the control of Reserve Bank of India by virtue of the Reserve Bank of India Act. As such, it is obligated to discharge the public duty and as such, this court is not inclined to accept the jurisprudential objection as raised by the respondents contending that the bank-respondent is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That apart, on the merit of the case, this court would observe that the grievance of the petitioner is two-fold viz. (i) the recovery of the money without giving them any reasonable opportunity of defence and (ii) the departmental proceeding that was initiated against the petitioner is pending for long. What further the petitioner has urged that the money that has been recovered from him shall be refunded by the respondents. 23. The respondents have taken a stand that if any shortage of fund in the cash by the end of the day?s transaction is gathered, then the Bank Manager is primarily made responsible for that shortage and they are bound to make good of that shortages as per the bank rule and for that purpose no reasonable opportunity is required to be afforded to those bank officials as stated. Despite existence of such rule, this court would not hesitate to hold that such recovery can always be questioned by the person who is affected by such recovery. If the departmental inquiry has been initiated, the said person, in this case, the petitioner, would get adequate opportunity to lay his case to show that the recovery was wholly unwarranted and the recovery has been made without any fault of the petitioner or for breach of the rules of the bank. 24. As already stated, from this court the memorandum of charge as well as the written statement of defence as filed by the petitioner, have been withheld and as such this court is not in a position to inspect those records and as such what stand the petitioner has taken in the departmental inquiry remained unknown to this court. 24. As already stated, from this court the memorandum of charge as well as the written statement of defence as filed by the petitioner, have been withheld and as such this court is not in a position to inspect those records and as such what stand the petitioner has taken in the departmental inquiry remained unknown to this court. But as it has been placed before this court that on the same charge the criminal prosecution as instituted has failed resulting in the acquittal of the petitioner and the petitioner has contended in the course of arguments that now the departmental inquiry has become meaningless, this court has to weigh the consequence emanating from the said acquittal. In this regard, reference can be made to a decision of the apex court in G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in (2006) 5 SCC 446 , where the apex court had occasion to observe as under: 30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are not distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony case will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. [Emphasis added] 25. According to Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the acquittal of the petitioner is liable to be termed as the honourable acquittal whereas Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has submitted that it was on benefit of doubt and in that circumstances the departmental inquiry can proceed to its logical end. 26. [Emphasis added] 25. According to Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the acquittal of the petitioner is liable to be termed as the honourable acquittal whereas Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has submitted that it was on benefit of doubt and in that circumstances the departmental inquiry can proceed to its logical end. 26. Having regard to these aspects of the matter, this court is of the view that since no record of the departmental inquiry has been produced before this court and there is no opportunity to make any tangible comparison of the allegations made in the memorandum of charge and the written complaint for launching the prosecution, it should be left with the departmental authority to make a fair assessment whether the departmental inquiry shall proceed further or not, in view of the judgment and order of acquittal as referred above. This court is also not aware whether the petitioner has produced the judgment and order dated 12.04.2011 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) to the disciplinary authority or not. The entire matter has been left in limbo by the petitioner. 27. Thus, in the circumstances of the case, this court is of the opinion that the petitioner shall furnish a representation to the disciplinary authority by filing a copy of the judgment and order dated 12.04.2011 delivered in G.R.46 of 2004 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) afresh within a period of 15(fifteen) days from the date of this judgment and the disciplinary authority shall make a review in terms of the law as enunciated in G.M. Tank(supra). If the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that the continuance of the disciplinary proceeding in terms of G.M. Tank(supra) is meaningless, the disciplinary authority shall pass the final order in that proceeding within a period of 2(two) months from the date when the representation from the petitioner shall be received by him. But, if the disciplinary authority finds that there is substantive difference, not trivial, in the allegations made in the written complaint for launching the criminal prosecution and the memorandum of charge, the disciplinary proceeding shall be brought to its end within a period of 4(four) months from the day when the petitioner shall produce a copy of this order. But, if the disciplinary authority finds that there is substantive difference, not trivial, in the allegations made in the written complaint for launching the criminal prosecution and the memorandum of charge, the disciplinary proceeding shall be brought to its end within a period of 4(four) months from the day when the petitioner shall produce a copy of this order. It is needless to say that if the petitioner is exonerated from the proceeding, the amount that has been recovered from the petitioner shall be refunded without delay. 28. Having observed thus, this writ petition stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs.