JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. By this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applicant - original accused calls in question the legality and validity of the order dated 7th April, 2018 passed by the Special Judge (CBI), Court No.1, Ahmedabad, below Exh.1 in the Special (CBI) Sessions Cases Nos. 2 of 2014, 1 of 2014 and 3 of 2014. 2. By the impugned order referred to above, the learned Special Judge thought fit to exercise suo motu powers under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to summon and examine a responsible officer of the department of RTO, Junagadh, with directions to such officer to remain present before the court with necessary documents. 3. The learned Special Judge also thought fit to exercise its suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to re-examine few other witnesses as, in the opinion of the learned Special Judge, their re-examination is necessary for the just decision of the case. 4. The facts giving rise to this application may be stated as under : 4.1. One, Amit Jethwa, stated to be an activist, who was complaining against the illegal mining in and around the Gir Forest Sanctuary, was murdered. The FIR being I-C.R. No. 163 of 2010 was registered on July 20, 2010 at the Sola Police Station, Ahmedabad, under Sections 302 and 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) read with Section 25(1) of Arms Act, 1959. In this FIR, amongst others, Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki (applicant No.2 herein) and his nephew were also implicated. According to the father of Amit Jethwa (who was the complainant), The State Police showed slackness in investigating the said case. He approached the High Court for transfer of investigation and vide order dated September 25, 2012, his petition was allowed and the investigation was transferred to the CBI. On transfer, the CBI registered RC.11(S)/2012 SCU.V/SC.II/CBI and undertook the investigation. The aforesaid order dated September 25, 2012 passed by the High Court was challenged by Mr. Solanki as well as by the State of Gujarat by filing Special Leave Petitions in the Supreme Court. In the Special Leave Petition filed by Mr. Solanki, he had prayed for stay of operation of the judgment and order dated September 25, 2012. This miscellaneous application was dismissed by the Supreme Court and the CBI was given liberty to complete the investigation. In the Special Leave Petition filed by Mr. Solanki, he had prayed for stay of operation of the judgment and order dated September 25, 2012. This miscellaneous application was dismissed by the Supreme Court and the CBI was given liberty to complete the investigation. After the dismissal of his application, Mr. Solanki was arrested on November 5, 2013. Status report of the investigation was submitted by the CBI in the Supreme Court and after completion of the investigation, a supplementary charge-sheet under Section 302 read with Section 120-B, IPC was filed before the concerned Court in January, 2014. In the charge-sheet, Mr. Solanki has been arrayed as one of the main conspirators along with his nephew Pratap alias Shiva Solanki (applicant No.1 herein) and few others. The Criminal Appeal No. 492 of 2014 arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 8406 of 2012 filed by Mr. Solanki as well as Criminal Appeal No. 493 of 2014 arising out of SLP (Cri.) No. 8292 of 2012 filed by the State of Gujarat, challenging the order dated September 25, 2012 of the High Court, were ultimately dismissed by the Supreme Court by a detailed judgment and order dated February 25, 2014 which is reported as Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 4 SCC 626 : (2014 AIR SCW 1722). 4.2. During the trial, it transpired that most of the witnesses had turned hostile. This further prompted the complainant to approach this Court with an appropriate writ petition seeking certain reliefs including that of de novo trial. 4.3. This Court decided the writ petition filed by the complainant vide its judgment dated June 29, 2017. Allowing the said writ petition, this Court directed de novo trial of the case with the following specific directions: "95. This writ application is disposed of with the following directions: (1) The High Court on the administrative side shall pass an appropriate order transferring all the three CBI Sessions cases i.e. CBI Sessions Cases No. 1 of 2014, 2 of 2014 and 3 of 2014 as on date pending in the Court of the Presiding Officer, namely, Shri Dinesh L. Patel, CBI Courts, Court No. 4, Ahmedabad to any other CBI Court. On all the three CBI Sessions cases referred to above being transferred to a particular Court, the Presiding Officer concerned shall retry all the accused persons on the self-same charge framed. On all the three CBI Sessions cases referred to above being transferred to a particular Court, the Presiding Officer concerned shall retry all the accused persons on the self-same charge framed. (2) The prosecuting agency i.e. the CBI shall obtain the witness summons from the Court concerned and start examining the witnesses afresh. (3) The retrial shall commence at the earliest and shall proceed on the day-to-day basis. (4) The retrial shall be in-camera proceedings. (5) The prosecuting agency i.e. the CBI as well as the State police machinery is directed to ensure that full protection is given to each of the witnesses and they be assured that no harm would befall upon them in any manner. For ensuring of a sense of confidence in the mind of the witnesses, and to ensure that they depose freely and fearlessly before the Court, the following steps shall be taken: (i) Ensuring safe passage for the witnesses to and from the Court precincts. (ii) Providing security to the witnesses in their place of residence wherever considered necessary, and (iii) Relocation of witnesses to any State or to any other place, as thought fit, wherever such a step is necessary. Let me at this stage clarify something important. It could be argued that the directions issued by this Court amounts to directly or indirectly exerting pressure on the witnesses, but the answer to this is an emphatic "No". These directions are necessary and are in line of doing complete justice. * * * * * * * * * "96. I conclude this judgment reminding one and all that justice is a concept involving the fair, moral and impartial treatment of all persons. In its most general sense, it means according individuals what they actually deserve or merit, or are in some sense entitled to. Justice is a particularly foundational concept within most systems of "Law". From the prospective of pragmatism, it is a name for a fair result. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere." IMPUGNED ORDER : 5. The impugned order passed by the trial court is extracted hereunder : "(1) In this case, the prosecution has produced closing purses vide Exhibit-1199. For proving the charge against the accused persons, depositions of 26 witnesses of the prosecution were recorded again as per the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The impugned order passed by the trial court is extracted hereunder : "(1) In this case, the prosecution has produced closing purses vide Exhibit-1199. For proving the charge against the accused persons, depositions of 26 witnesses of the prosecution were recorded again as per the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thereafter, the prosecution preferred an application to examine seven Investigating Officers out of all the Investigating Officers. As this application was granted, their oral evidence was led and recorded by the prosecution. (2) In view of the oral and documentary evidences produced by the prosecution in this case, the Investigating Officers had, vide Exhibit-701, Exhibit-702, Exhibit-741, Exhibit-742 and other letters, asked for the information from various mobile provider companies like BSNL Mobile Company, Idea Cellular Limited, Vodafone, etc., regarding mobiles of various persons associated with this case, wherein demand was made for the names and addresses of the mobile phone owners, incoming and outgoing call details of required time period with tower location and such information was provided by the mobile companies. Call detail reports were produced in this case vide Exhibit-627, Exhibit-628, Exhibit-629, Exhibit-630, Exhibit-631, Exhibit-601, Exhibit-636, Exhibit-637, Exhibit-638, Exhibit-705, Exhibit-743(CD), Exhibit-745, Exhibit-762, Exhibit-763, Exhibit-764, Exhibit-765, etc. The details of tower location does not clearly appear from the documents on record, that is, from which place the person made the phone call and the person receiving the phone call received such phone under the tower location of which place. The Investigating Officer Mr. S.M. Chaudhari, Crime Branch, Ahmedabad City has given deposition vide Exhibit-830. He has been asked for details of mobiles with tower location of the company to which he asked for the reports of the call details. He stated that the respective mobile provider company has provided the necessary information. Thereafter, it was asked by the Court that there is no clarity as regards the tower location in the said report. P.I. Mr. S.M. Chaudhari replied to the Court that the mobile company had mentioned I.D. number of the tower locations in the CDR (which means the details of area such as Village, Taluka, City has not been clearly mentioned.) (3) The Investigating officer of CBI, Mr. Mukesh Sharma has given deposition vide Exhibit-840, wherein upon being asked before the Court, he states that he called for the CDR from the mobile company along with the tower location. Mukesh Sharma has given deposition vide Exhibit-840, wherein upon being asked before the Court, he states that he called for the CDR from the mobile company along with the tower location. Upon being asked about the non-description of tower location in CDR by the Court, he stated that the Nodal Officer of the mobile provider company or any conversant officer can inform about the tower location of mobile. (Thus, he also admitted that the CDR were produced without tower location.) (4) The Investigating Officer P.I. Mr. Himmatlal Mohanlal Kundaliya has deposed at Exhibit-811 in this case. On being asked by the court, he states that he has not received the C.D.R. with the tower location during investigation, and he asked for call details with tower location and he states that no tower location was mentioned in the reports received by him. (5) The evidence regarding location of the spot of the mobile call maker and mobile call receiver is necessary for the just decision of the case if clarification regarding tower location is given in the C.D.R. The details of the tower location i.e. area should be clearly mentioned in the C.D.R. so that no party feels injustice and purpose of the justice is served. (6) The details of conversation between the mobile holders indicating the date, time and duration of call and details as to whether phone calls had been received or made, along with the IMEI and location have been mentioned at Exhibit-869. Names of the persons among whom conversation took place are shown as Shivo, Bahadur, Pachan, Shailesh, Sanjay, Samir and Suleman. But, any kind of clarification is not made anywhere in the document of Exhibit-869 as to by whom it has been prepared, as to when it has been prepared, as to how it has been prepared and on what basis it has been prepared, and it does not bear the signature of the officer who prepared the report. The said documents have been produced by Mr.Mukesh Sharma, D.S.P. of C.B.I. during his examination-in-chief of Exhibit-840 at para 108 and it is mentioned therein that the document bearing Mark-111/2/120 and containing total 55 pages is a phone analysis report. The said report is received during the investigation and included in the case papers and it is given Exhibit-869. The court has asked Mr. The said report is received during the investigation and included in the case papers and it is given Exhibit-869. The court has asked Mr. Mukesh Sharma, D.S.P. of C.B.I. as to by whom the details of mobile phone, which is produced at Exhibit-869, was prepared and in reply thereof, he has stated that the said document was produced by Mr. Raghavendra Vatsa, Superintendent of Police of S.I.T. with the production report and it is a report regarding analysis made by himself (Raghvendra Vatsa). He has stated that Raghvendra Vatsa prepared the said report on the basis of the C.D.R. of suspicious mobiles called for by him during the investigation. Therefore, the ends of justice would be served if such fact is brought in evidence on record as to how the said report was prepared by Raghvendra Vatsa, Superintendent of Police of S.I.T. and as to whether it has been, in fact, prepared by him or not. It is necessary to produce the information showing full names of the persons with surnames as full names have not been shown in the reports. Therefore, this court deems it proper to examine the said witness Mr. Raghvendra Vatsa to find out as to how the said S.P., Mr. Raghvendra Vatsa collected the said information of Exhibit-869 and to find out reliability thereof. (7) One of the facts as alleged by the prosecution is that the accused Bahadursinh Dhirubha Vadher had gone to give Rs. eleven lakhs to Mr. Pachalbhai Gopalbhai Desai at Gir Gadhada in his car bearing registration No. GJ-11-S-6873, Chassis No. 547471, Engine No.1395857. The said car was seized by the Investigating Officer Mr. S.M.Chaudhary and the same is produced by Panchnama at Exhibit-436 in this case. It is necessary to bring on record the fact as to in whose name, the said car was registered with the R.T.O. records in June, July and August, 2010. (8) Considering section 311 of Criminal Procedure Code, it is as follows Section-311: Any court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this code, summon any person its a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined, and the court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case. Considering Section 311 of Criminal Procedure Code, following witnesses are found just to be examined. Hence, following order is passed in the interest of justice. - :: O R D E R :: - (1) Witness summons be issued to the R.T.O. Junagadh to produce the documentary evidence from its office record as to in whose name, the Maruti Swift VDI Car bearing registration No. GJ.11.S.6873, Chassis No.547471, Engine No.1395857, was registered in the R.T.O. during the period from May-2010 to August-2010. (2) Witness summons be issued for the re-examination, to the Investigating Officer of this case S.P. Mr. Raghavendra Vatsa to be present with the details and information of the documents produced under Exhibit-869. (3) Witness summons be issued for the re-examination, to the witnesses who were examined previously in this case namely to the P.W.No.138 - Dhirenbhai Jayantilal Lariya, Nodal Officer of Vodafone Mobile Services Company Limited, P.W.No.126 - Jahidkhan Yasinkhan Pathan, Nodal Officer of Tata Tele Services, P.W.No.166-Ravi Harikishan Soni, Junior Telecom Officer of B.S.N.L., P.W.No.169-Bhavik Arvindbhai Joshi, Nodal Officer of Idea Company and P.W. No. 181-Kshatriya Satindranath, State Nodal Officer of Reliance Jio, to be present with the details of the tower locations (details of particular area) of the C.D.R. of the mobile numbers which were produced earlier during their depositions. It is hereby clarified that, any of the above Nodal Officers if transferred to other place or not available, the witness summons be issued to the Nodal Officer to be present, who is conversant with the information of the tower location. The investigating Officer Mr.Mukesh Sharma and Mr.S.M.Chaudhary are directed to inform the witnesses as to with which details they shall remain present as directed in the order, so that the witness may not appear with the incomplete details and the trial may not be delayed. Pronounced in the open court today on this 7th day of April, 2018. Sd/-illegible (Kamlesh Madanlal Dave) Special Judge (C.B.I.), Court No.1, Ahmedabad Unique ID No. GJ00362" 6. Mr.S.V.Raju, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, vehemently submitted that the trial court committed a serious error in exercising its suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that the impugned order could be termed as without jurisdiction. 7. Mr.S.V.Raju, the learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant, vehemently submitted that the trial court committed a serious error in exercising its suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that the impugned order could be termed as without jurisdiction. 7. The principal argument of Mr.Raju is that pursuant to the judgment of the Supreme Court, referred to above, the trial court was directed to only re-examine 26 witnesses in the course of the retrial. According to Mr.Raju, in such circumstances, the trial Court, on its own, could not have exercised suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code for the purpose of re-examination of few other witnesses over and above the 26 witnesses, which the Supreme Court permitted to be re-examined in the course of retrial. 8. According to Mr.Raju, if the trial court thought fit to exercise its suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code in the interest of justice, then it ought to have sought the necessary permission from the Hon'ble Supreme Court in this regard. 9. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr.Raju, the learned senior counsel, prays that there being merit in this application, the same be allowed and the impugned order be quashed. 10. On the other hand, this application has been vehemently opposed by Mr.Kodekar, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the CBI. Mr. Kodekar submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the court below in passing the impugned order. According to Mr. Kodekar, the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to above, should not be construed as restricting the trial court in the course of the proceedings of retrial from exercising its suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code. According to Mr. Kodekar, cogent reasons have been assigned by the court below for the purpose of passing the impugned order. In such circumstances, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the CBI, prays that there being no merit in this application, the same be rejected. ANALYSIS : 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the court below committed any error in passing the impugned order. The history of this litigation speaks for itself. ANALYSIS : 11. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is, whether the court below committed any error in passing the impugned order. The history of this litigation speaks for itself. Even, in the course of the retrial, all witnesses turned hostile except one, i.e. the PW22, namely Bhagwandas Himmatlal Dhakan. 12. I take notice of the fact that the court below has thought fit to summon a responsible officer from the office of the RTO, Junagadh, with relevant documents, as regards the registration of one Maruti Swift VDI car bearing No.GJ-11-S-6873, Chassis No. 547471, Engine No.1395857. For the just decision of the case, the trial court wants to know as to in whose name this vehicle was registered in the records of the RTO, for the period between May 2010 and August 2010. 13. In the same manner, the trial court has thought fit to re-examine the Investigating Officer, namely Shri Raghvendra Vatsa, Superintendent of Police. He has been asked to remain present for the purpose of explaining the details as contained in the documents Exh.869. 14. So far as the other witnesses are concerned, they all appear to be the employees of different mobile-phone companies. They have been re-summoned for the purpose of collecting information with regard to the tower locations (exact area) is concerned. They have been asked to appear for re-examination for the purpose of producing the details of CDR of different mobile-phones. 15. Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under:- "311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present: Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case." 16. Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is in two parts. Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is in two parts. In the first part, discretion is given to the court and enables it, at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code, (a) to summon anyone as a witness, or (b) to examine any person present in the court, or (c) to recall and reexamine any person whose evidence was already been recorded; on the other, the second part appears to be mandatory and requires the court to take any of the steps mentioned above if the new evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case. The object of the provision, as a whole, is to do justice not only from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also justice from the point of view of the orderly society. The court examines evidence under this section neither to help the prosecution nor to help the accused. It is done neither to fill up any gaps in the prosecution evidence nor to give it any unfair advantage against the accused. The fundamental thing to be seen is whether this evidence the court thinks necessary in the facts and circumstances of the particular case before it. If this resulting in what is sometimes thought to be the filling of lacunae as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that is purely a subsidiary factor and cannot be taken into consideration. Section 311 of the Code confers jurisdiction on the Judge to act in aid of justice. 17. Even if a witness, whose statement under Section 161 of the Code had not been recorded at the time of the investigation, can be allowed to be examined under Section 311 of the Code. Under Section 231 of the Code, the court is to take all evidence produced in support of the prosecution. Therefore, where the statement of witness is not recorded under Section 161 of the Code, but the prosecution with the prior permission of the court produce such a witness, the accused cannot be said to have been taken by surprise. Under Section 231 of the Code, the court is to take all evidence produced in support of the prosecution. Therefore, where the statement of witness is not recorded under Section 161 of the Code, but the prosecution with the prior permission of the court produce such a witness, the accused cannot be said to have been taken by surprise. When a witness examined in court, whose statement has not been recorded at the time of the investigation under Section 161 of the Code, the evidentiary value to be attached to the evidence of such witness has to be looked into and if, it is found that prejudice has been caused to the accused, then the evidence of such witness may not be acted upon. 18. I may quote with profit a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of reported in Abdulla Gafur Sumra v. State of Gujarat, (1993) CrLR 159 (Gujarat). "23. Shri Barejia for the appellant has then urged that the witness at Exh. 122 was not cited as a witness in the charge-sheet and he could not have been examined at trial by and on behalf of the prosecution in support of its case. In fact the submission urged before us by Shri Barejia for the appellant was to the effect that if a witness is not cited in the first information report or the complaint or the charge-sheet he cannot be examined as a witness on behalf of the prosecution at trial. This submission has to be stated only to be rejected for the simple reason that acceptance of such submission would render nugatory S. 311 of the Cr.P.C. It cannot be gainsaid that the enabling provision contained therein is not for gracing the statute book or as an empty or idle formality. The court cannot be oblivious to the fact that it has not only to see that no innocent person is convicted and sentenced but it has also to see that no guilty person escapes the clutches of the penal law." 19. Section 138 of the Evidence Act, reads as under:- "138. Order of examinations-witness shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined. Section 138 of the Evidence Act, reads as under:- "138. Order of examinations-witness shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) re-examined. The examination and cross-examination must relate to the relevant facts, but the cross- examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief. Direction of re-examination-The re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination; and, if new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter." 20. In the case of Rajaram Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar and another, (2013) CriLJ 3777 : ( AIR 2013 SC 3081 ), the Supreme Court has very exhaustively discussed the law on the subject of Section 311 of the Code. I may quote with profit the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court as under: "14. A conspicuous reading of Section 311, Cr.P.C. would show that widest of the powers have been invested with the Courts when it comes to the question of summoning a witness or to recall or re-examine any witness already examined. A reading of the provision shows that the expression "any" has been used as a pre fix to "court", "inquiry", "trial", "other proceeding", "person as a witness", "person in attendance though not summoned as a witness", and "person already examined". By using the said expression "any" as a pre-fix to the various expressions mentioned above, it is ultimately stated that all that was required to be satisfied by the Court was only in relation to such evidence that appears to the Court to be essential for the just decision of the case. Section 138 of the Evidence Act, prescribed the order of examination of a witness in the Court. Order of re-examination is also prescribed calling for such a witness so desired for such re-examination. Section 138 of the Evidence Act, prescribed the order of examination of a witness in the Court. Order of re-examination is also prescribed calling for such a witness so desired for such re-examination. Therefore, a reading of Section 311, Cr.P.C. and Section 138 Evidence Act, insofar as it comes to the question of a criminal trial, the order of re-examination at the desire of any person under Section 138, will have to necessarily be in consonance with the prescription contained in Section 311, Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, imperative that the invocation of Section 311, Cr.P.C. and its application in a particular case can be ordered by the Court, only by bearing in mind the object and purport of the said provision, namely, for achieving a just decision of the case as noted by us earlier. The power vested under the said provision is made available to any Court at any stage in any inquiry or trial or other proceeding initiated under the Code for the purpose of summoning any person as a witness or for examining any person in attendance, even though not summoned as witness or to recall or re-examine any person already examined. Insofar as recalling and re-examination of any person already examined, the Court must necessarily consider and ensure that such recall and re-examination of any person, appears in the view of the Court to be essential for the just decision of the case. Therefore, the paramount requirement is just decision and for that purpose the essentiality of a person to be recalled and re-examined has to be ascertained. To put it differently, while such a widest power is invested with the Court, it is needless to state that exercise of such power should be made judicially and also with extreme care and caution. 15. In this context, we also wish to make a reference to certain decisions rendered by this Court on the interpretation of Section 311, Cr.P.C. where, this Court highlighted as to the basic principles which are to be borne in mind, while dealing with an application under Section 311, Cr.P.C. In the decision reported in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) AIR SC 178, this Court held as under in paragraph 14: "14. It would appear that in our criminal jurisdiction, statutory law confers a power in absolute terms to be exercised at any stage of the trial to summon a witness or examine one present in court or to recall a witness already examined, and makes this the duty and obligation of the Court provided the just decision of the case demands it. In other words, where the court exercises the power under the second part, the inquiry cannot be whether the accused has brought anything suddenly or unexpectedly but whether the court is right in thinking that the new evidence is needed by it for a just decision of the case. If the court has acted without the requirements of a just decision, the action is open to criticism but if the court's action is supportable as being in aid of a just decision the action cannot be regarded as exceeding the jurisdiction." 16. In the decision reported in Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India and another, (1991) Supp1 SCC 271 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1346 ), this Court again highlighted the importance of the power to be exercised under Section 311, Cr.P.C. as under in paragraph 10:- "10. In order to enable the court to find out the truth and render a just decision, the salutary provisions of Section 540 of the Code (Section 311 of the new Code) are enacted where under any court by exercising its discretionary authority at any stage of enquiry, trial or other proceeding can summon any person as a witness or examine any person in attendance though not summoned as a witness or recall or re-examine any person in attendance though not summoned as a witness or recall and re-examine any person already examined who are expected to be able to throw light upon the matter in dispute; because if judgments happen to be rendered on inchoate, inconclusive and speculative presentation of facts, the ends of justice would be defeated." 17. In the decision in Raj Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 604 : ( AIR 1999 SC 3524 : 1999 AIR SCW 3522), the proposition has been reiterated as under in paragraph 9: "9. We may observe that the power of the court as envisaged in Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been curtailed by this Court. We may observe that the power of the court as envisaged in Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been curtailed by this Court. Neither in the decision of the five-Judge Bench in A.R. Antulay case, (1992) AIR SC 1701: 1992 AIR SCW 1872 nor in Kartar Singh case, (1994) CriLJ 3139 such power has been restricted for achieving speedy trial. In other words, even if the prosecution evidence is closed in compliance with the directions contained in the main judgment it is still open to the prosecution to invoke the powers of the court under Section 311 of the Code. We make it clear that if evidence of any witness appears to the court to be essential to the just decision of the case it is the duty of the court to summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person." 18. In U.T. of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Anr. v. Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan, (2006) 7 SCC 529 : (2006 AIR SCW 4840), the decision has been further elucidated as under in paragraph 15 (of SCC) : (para 12 of AIR SCW): "15. A conspectus of authorities referred to above would show that the principle is well settled that the exercise of power under Section 311, Cr.P.C. should be resorted to only with the object of finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof of such facts which lead to a just and correct decision of the case, this being the primary duty of a criminal court. Calling a witness or re-examining a witness already examined for the purpose of finding out the truth in order to enable the court to arrive at a just decision of the case cannot be dubbed as "filling in a lacuna in the prosecution case" unless the facts and circumstances of the case make it apparent that the exercise of power by the court would result in causing serious prejudice to the accused resulting in miscarriage of justice." 19. In Iddar and Ors. v. Aabida and Anr., (2007) AIR SC 3029: (2007 AIR SCW 5490), the object underlying under Section 311 of the Code has been stated as under in paragraph 11:- "11. In Iddar and Ors. v. Aabida and Anr., (2007) AIR SC 3029: (2007 AIR SCW 5490), the object underlying under Section 311 of the Code has been stated as under in paragraph 11:- "11. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the powers of the court to summon a witness under the section merely because the evidence supports the case for the prosecution and not that of the accused. The section is a general section which applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code and empowers Magistrate to issue summons to any witness at any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the significant expression that occurs is "at any stage of inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code" .It is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the section confers a very wide power on the court on summoning witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power the greater is the necessity for application of judicial mind." 20. In P. Sanjeeva Rao v. State of A.P., (2012) AIR SC 2242: (2013 AIR SCW 492), the scope of Section 311 of the Code has been highlighted by making reference to an earlier decision of this Court and also with particular reference to the case, which was dealt with in that decision in paragraphs 13 and 16, which are as under:- "13. Grant of fairest opportunity to the accused to prove his innocence was the object of every fair trial, observed this Court in Hoffman Andreas v. Inspector of Customs, Amritsar, (2000) 10 SCC 430 . The following passage is in this regard apposite: "In such circumstances, if the new counsel thought to have the material witnesses further examined, the Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. The following passage is in this regard apposite: "In such circumstances, if the new counsel thought to have the material witnesses further examined, the Court could adopt latitude and a liberal view in the interest of justice, particularly when the court has unbridled powers in the matter as enshrined in Section 311 of the Code. After all the trial is basically for the prisoners and courts should afford the opportunity to them in the fairest manner possible." 16. We are conscious of the fact that recall of the witnesses is being directed nearly four years after they were examined-in-chief about an incident that is nearly seven years old. Delay takes a heavy toll on the human memory apart from breeding cynicism about the efficacy of the judicial system to decide cases within a reasonably foreseeable time period. To that extent the apprehension expressed by Mr. Rawal, that the prosecution may suffer prejudice on account of a belated recall, may not be wholly without any basis. Having said that, we are of the opinion that on a parity of reasoning and looking to the consequences of denial of opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, we would prefer to err in favour of the appellant getting an opportunity rather than protecting the prosecution against a possible prejudice at his cost. Fairness of the trial is a virtue that is sacrosanct in our judicial system and no price is too heavy to protect that virtue. A possible prejudice to prosecution is not even a price, leave alone one that would justify denial of a fair opportunity to the accused to defend himself." 22. Again in an unreported decision rendered by this Court dated 08.05.2013 in reported in Natasha Singh v. CBI (State), (2013) AIRSCW 3554 - Criminal Appeal No.709 of 2013, where one of us was a party, various other decisions of this Court were referred to and the position has been stated as under in paragraphs 14 and 15: "14. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the Court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the case. Power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results. Power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results. An application under Section 311, Cr.P.C. must not be allowed only to fill up a lacuna in the case of the prosecution, or of the defence, or to the disadvantage of the accused, or to cause serious prejudice to the defence of the accused, or to give an unfair advantage to the opposite party. Further the additional evidence must not be received as a disguise for retrial, or to change the nature of the case against either of the parties. Such a power must be exercised, provided that the evidence that is likely to be tendered by a witness, is germane to the issue involved. An opportunity of rebuttal, however, must be given to the other party. The power conferred under Section 311, Cr.P.C. must, therefore, be invoked by the Court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be exercised with great caution and circumspection. The very use of words such as "any Court" , "at any stage" , or "or any enquiry" , "trial or other proceedings" , "any person" and "any such person" clearly spells out that the provisions of this section have been expressed in the widest possible terms, and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any way. There is thus no escape if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case. The determinative factor should, therefore, be whether the summoning/recalling of the said witness is in fact, essential to the just decision of the case. 15. Fair trial is the main object of criminal procedure, and it is the duty of the court to ensure that such fairness is not hampered or threatened in any manner. Fair trial entails the interests of the accused, the victim and of the society, and therefore, fair trial includes the grant of fair and proper opportunities to the person concerned, and the same must be ensured as this is a constitutional, as well as a human right. Thus, under no circumstances can a person's right to fair trial be jeopardized. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of such right would amount to the denial of a fair trial. Thus, under no circumstances can a person's right to fair trial be jeopardized. Adducing evidence in support of the defence is a valuable right. Denial of such right would amount to the denial of a fair trial. Thus, it is essential that the rules of procedure that have been designed to ensure justice are scrupulously followed, and the court must be zealous in ensuring that there is no breach of the same. (vide Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar and Anr., (1958) AIR SC 376; Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2004) AIR SC 3114 : (2004 AIR SCW 2325); Zahira Habibullah Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors., (2006) AIR SC 1367 : (2006 AIR SCW 1340); Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) v. M.S. Sampoornam (Mrs.), (2007) 2 SCC 258 ; Vijay Kumar v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2011) 8 SCC 136 : (2011 AIR SCW 6236) and Sudevanand v. State through C.B.I., (2012) 3 SCC 387 : (AIR 2012 SC (Cri) 458 : 2012 AIR SCW 953).)" 21. It goes without saying that the trial court can exercise its discretion for summoning and examining additional witnesses or recall and re-examine any person already examined, either suo motu or on the application of either side. The only requirement is that the trial court should record its satisfaction that the evidence of the witnesses is essential to the just decision of the case. 22. I am of the view that if the learned Special Judge has found the examination of the persons referred to in the impugned order as necessary in the circumstances of the case, then very strong and substantial ground needs to be made out for setting aside the said discretion exercised by the trial court. The only safeguard that can be placed in such a case is that the defence could make a prayer for seeking time to cross-examine the witnesses after the chief examination of such a witness is recorded on the basis of summoning under Section 311 of the Code. In that event, there would not be any prejudice to the accused persons in any way. 23. I appreciate the concern expressed by the learned trial Judge. It is heartening to note that the Presiding Officer is actively participating in the trial and is trying to find out the truth. In that event, there would not be any prejudice to the accused persons in any way. 23. I appreciate the concern expressed by the learned trial Judge. It is heartening to note that the Presiding Officer is actively participating in the trial and is trying to find out the truth. The Presiding Officer is alive to the fact that the witnesses, more particularly, the eye-witnesses have turned hostile and thereby the prosecution has not been able to lead substantial direct evidence. The attempt on the part of the trial court is to look into circumstantial evidence and that is the reason to exercise suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code. In fact, the whole idea in extracting the impugned order passed by the trial court is to highlight that the trial court is seeking very important clarifications from the witnesses who are sought to be re-examined. The entire focus of the trial Judge is on the tower location of mobile and the CDR. This, perhaps, may go a long way in going to the root of the matter, or rather, shall be helpful to the trial court to appreciate the circumstantial evidence on record. 24. In Iddar and Others v. Aabida and another, (2007) AIR SC 3029, the Apex Court held that the determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit of the accused and it would not be an improper exercise of the powers of the court to summon a witness under the section merely because the evidence supports the case for the prosecution and not that of the accused. 25. For the foregoing reasons, I see no good reason to disturb the impugned order in exercise of my supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 26. I am of the view that the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in this very matter between the same parties, referred to above, should not be construed or understood as restricting or restraining the trial Judge in the course of retrial from exercising his suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code to re-examine few witnesses for the just decision of the case though the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed to re-examine only particular 26 witnesses in the course of the retrial. In the course of retrial, if the Presiding Officer has thought fit, in the interest of justice and for the just decision of the case, to exercise his suo motu power under Section 311 of the Code, then it cannot be said that the trial Judge has travelled beyond the scope of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. On the contrary, ends of justice would not be served or would rather frustrate if I disturb the impugned order and do not permit the trial Judge to act in accordance with his impugned order. 27. In the result, this application fails and is hereby rejected.