JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Maya Nand Jha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’) has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the order dated 05.08.2016 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai in Bakhri P.S. Case No.232 of 2014 by which finding a prima facie case to be made out under Section 25(1-B)(a) and 26 of the Arms Act the petitioner has been summoned to face trial. 3. Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that institution of the first information report (for short ‘the FIR’) itself is bad in law as the same amounts to second FIR in respect of same incident for which the FIR was already registered earlier. He submitted that since the entire investigation conducted by the police after institution of the second FIR was bad in law, the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate ought not to have taken cognizance of the offence and summoned the petitioner to face trial. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Maya Nand Jha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State submitted that the allegations made in the first information report are distinct from the FIR instituted earlier. He submitted that it is the bounden duty of the police to investigate a case and on completion of investigation to submit a report before the court. According to him, on completion of investigation, when the police submitted their report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C., the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate finding a prima facie case to be made out against the petitioner rightly took cognizance of the offence and summoned him to face trial. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. The facts of the case, in brief, are that an Assistant Sub Inspector of Police Suresh Yadav lodged a written report on 25.07.2014 addressed to the Police Inspector-cum- S.H.O., Bakhri Police Station stating therein inter alia that he is the investigating officer of Bakhri Police Station Case No.320 of 2013 dated 09.12.2013 lodged for the offences under Sections 143, 341, 323, 504, 506 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’) and 25(1- B)(a) and 26 of the Arms Act which was instituted on the basis of written report submitted by Md. Halim (petitioner) wherein he had alleged that Md. Moazzam and three other named accused persons along with three unknown miscreants surrounded him and while hurling abuses snatched rupees eighty six thousand from his pocket on the point of pistol and on raising alarm they fled away leaving the pistol. The informant in Bakhri P.S. Case No.320 of 2013 had handed over the loaded pistol while lodging the case which was seized and a production-cum-seizure list was prepared. He has further alleged that during investigation and the supervision in Bakhri P.S. Case No.320 of 2013 it transpired that the loaded pistol produced by the petitioner at the police station on the date of occurrence did not belong to the accused rather the same was planted by the informant himself and he had mischievously produced the loaded pistol with motive to make the case more serious. It has further been stated in the written report that the Superintendent of Police, Begusarai vide Memo No.4957/C.R. dated 11.07.2014 directed him to submit final report in Bakhri P.S. Case No.320 of 2013 showing the case untrue and to submit a proposal for prosecution against the informant under Sections 182 and 211 of the IPC and to register a case against the petitioner under Section 25(1-B)(a) and 26 of the Arms Act. 7. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, Bakhri P.S. Case No.232 of 2014 dated 25.07.2014 was registered for the offences punishable under Sections 25(1-B)(a) and 26 of the Arms Act. 8. On completion of investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner vide Charge-sheet No.106 of 2016 dated 09.07.2016 in the Court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai, who vide impugned order dated 05.08.2016 took cognizance of the offence and summoned the petitioner. 8. On completion of investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet against the petitioner vide Charge-sheet No.106 of 2016 dated 09.07.2016 in the Court of Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai, who vide impugned order dated 05.08.2016 took cognizance of the offence and summoned the petitioner. 9. In course of argument, it has been brought to my notice that pursuant to the direction of the Superintendent of Police, Begusarai the police submitted final form showing the case to be untrue vide Final Report No.64 of 2015 dated 31.03.2015. However, after perusal of the police report and the materials collected in course of investigation, learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Begusari differed with the police report and found a prima facie case to be made out against the named accused persons in Bakhri P.S. Case No.320 of 2013 under Sections 143, 341, 323, 504 and 379 of the IPC and sections 25(1-B)(a) and 26 of the Arms Act. 10. Thus, it is seen that two cases have been instituted in respect of recovery of the same loaded pistol. The first case was instituted on 09.12.2013 on the basis of the statement of the petitioner whereas the second case has been instituted on 25.07.2014 on the basis of the statement of the investigating officer of the first case. 11. In order to examine the legal issue raised in this case as to whether the subsequent FIR, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, would be maintainable, it would be appropriate to consider herein the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. 12. Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. deals with information to the police and their powers to investigate. 13. Every information relating to a cognizable offence either given orally or in writing is required to be entered in a book to be kept by the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station. 14. The first information report means an information recorded by a police officer on duty given either by the aggrieved person or any other person to the commission of a cognizable offence. The said section reads as under:- “154. 14. The first information report means an information recorded by a police officer on duty given either by the aggrieved person or any other person to the commission of a cognizable offence. The said section reads as under:- “154. Information in cognizable cases.- (1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. Provided that if the information is given by the woman against whom an offence under sections 326-A, 326-B, 354, 354-A, 354-B, 354-C, 354-D, 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C, 376-D, 376-E or 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded by a woman police officer or any woman officer: Provided further that- (a) in the event that the person against whom an offence under Section 354, Section 354-A, section 354-B, Section 354-C, Section 354-D, Section 376, Section 376-A, Section 376-B, Section 376-C, Section 376-D, Section 376-E or Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, then such information shall be recorded by a police officer, at the residence of the person seeking to report such offence or at a convenient place of such person’s choice, in the presence of an interpreter or a special educator, as the case may be; (b) the recording of such information shall be video-graphed; (c) the police officer shall get the statement of the person recorded by a judicial Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-section (5-A) of section 164 as soon as possible. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under subsection (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under subsection (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in sub-section (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.” 15. It is well settled principle in law that the second first information report about the same occurrence between the same persons and with similarity of scope of investigation cannot be registered, if the same is not in the nature of counter case. 16. There is always a possibility that in respect of the same occurrence between the same persons, more than one piece of information is given to the Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station about a cognizable offence. Under such circumstances, only the earliest or the first information with regard to the commission of a cognizable offence would satisfy the requirement of section 154 Cr.P.C. and all other informations given to the police would be the statements covered under section 162 Cr.P.C. 17. However, on the basis of subsequent information about a cognizable offence the police may validly institute first information report in certain circumstances such as : (a) where the incidents are separate and independent, or (b) where the offences, whether they may be similar or different, are committed in course of single incident, or (c) where the subsequent offence is of such a magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the first information report recorded first. 18. 18. The scheme under the Cr.P.C. is that on coming to know about the commission of a cognizable offence, it is the bounden duty of the police to commence investigation as provided under section 156 or 157 Cr.P.C. On completion of investigation and on the basis of evidence collected, the investigating officer has to form an opinion under section 169 or 170 Cr.P.C. and forward his report to the Magistrate concerned under section 173(2) Cr.P.C. Even after filing of such report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh first information report. He is empowered to make further investigation in terms of section 173(8) Cr.P.C. and submit a supplementary report to the Magistrate notwithstanding that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted earlier. 19. The matter as to whether there exists sufficient and valid ground for further investigation is entirely for consideration of the investigating officer. 20. In Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi Administration) [ (1979) 2 SCC 322 ], in paragraph 20, the Supreme Court held as under :- “20. …The critic ism that a further investigation by the police would trench upon the proceeding before the court is really not of very great substance, since whatever the police may do, the final discretion in regard to further action is with the Magistrate. That the final word is with the Magistrate is sufficient safeguard against any excessive use or abuse of the power of the police to make further investigation. We should not, however, be understood to say that the police should ignore the pendency of a proceeding before a court and investigate every fresh fact that comes to light as if no cognizance had been taken by the court of any offence. We think that in the interests of independence of the magistracy and the judiciary, in the interests of the purity of the administration of criminal justice and in the interests of the comity of the various agencies and institutions entrusted with different stages of such administration, it would ordinarily be desirable that the police should inform the court and seek formal permission to make further investigation when fresh facts come to light”. 21. 21. While acknowledging the power of the police authorities to carry out investigation in terms of section 173 Cr.P.C., in Ram Lal Narang (supra), in paragraph 21, the Supreme Court observed as under :- “21. …In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under section 173 of the 1898 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation.” 22. In K. Chandrasekhar Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. [ (1998) 5 SCC 223 ] the Supreme Court took into consideration the scope and ambit of section 173(2) and 173(8) of the Code and observed, inter alia, in paragraph 24 as under :- “24. …The dictionary meaning of “further” (when used as an adjective) is “additional; more; supplemental”. “Further” investigation therefore is the continuation of the earlier investigation and not a fresh investigation or reinvestigation to be started ab initio wiping out the earlier investigation altogether. In drawing this conclusion we have also drawn inspiration from the fact that sub section (8) clearly envisages that on completion of further investigation the investigating agency has to forward to the Magistrate a “further” report or reports – and not fresh report or reports – regarding the “further” evidence obtained during such investigation.” 23. In Mithabhai Pashabhai Patel and Others Vs. State of Gujarat [ (2009) 6 SCC 332 ], in paragraph 13, the Supreme Court has observed as under :- “13. It is, however, beyond any cavil that “further investigation” and “reinvestigation” stand on different footing. It may be that in a given situation a superior court in exercise of its constitutional power, namely, under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution of India could direct a “State” to get an offence investigated and/or further investigated by a different agency. Direction of a reinvestigation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior court would ordinarily issue such a direction.” 24. In Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr. [ (2013) 6 SCC 384 ], in paragraphs 41 and 42, the Supreme Court held as under:- “41. Direction of a reinvestigation, however, being forbidden in law, no superior court would ordinarily issue such a direction.” 24. In Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr. [ (2013) 6 SCC 384 ], in paragraphs 41 and 42, the Supreme Court held as under:- “41. It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. Such things are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, commonality of purpose or design. Where two incidents are of different times with involvement of different persons, there is no commonality and the purpose thereof different and they emerge from different circumstances, it will not be possible for the Court to take a view that they form part of the same transaction and therefore, there could be a common FIR or subsequent FIR could not be permitted to be registered or there could be common trial. 42. Similarly, for several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences "committed in the course of the same transaction".” 25. It is, thus, obvious from the law laid down by the Supreme Court that in order to examine the impact of one or more first information reports the court has to rationalize the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of “sameness” to find out whether both first information reports relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence or are in regard to incident which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two different occurrences. There cannot be a second first information report in respect of the same offence because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first report registered by the police. There cannot be a second first information report in respect of the same offence because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first report registered by the police. However, the Supreme Court has clearly held that it is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal application for the purpose of determining whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. Such things are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given case. 26. Recently, the Supreme Court considered the permissibility of institution of second first information report in great detail in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah Vs. CBI [ (2013) 6 SCC 348 ]. While deciding the case of Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah, the Supreme Court after considering its earlier decisions in (2013) 6 SCC 384 : Anju Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P., (2013)5 SCC 148 : Surender Kaushik Vs. State of U.P., (2011) 5 SCC 79 : Narmada Bai Vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 14 SCC 444 : Chirra Shivraj Vs. State of A.P., (2010) 12 SCC 254 : Babubhai Vs. State of Gujarat, (2010) 9 SCC 567 : C. Muniappan Vs. State of T.N., (2010) 2 SCC 200 : Rubabbuddin Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat, WP(Crl.) No.6 of 2007, order dated 12.08.2010 (SC) Rubabbuddin Sheikh Vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 1 SCC 441 : Nirmal Singh Kahlon Vs. State of Punjab, (2004) 13 SCC 292 : Upkar Singh Vs. Ved Prakash, (2002) 1 SCC 714 : Kari Choudhary Vs. Sita Devi, (2001) 6 SCC 181 : T.T.Antony Vs. State of Kerala, (1979) 2 SCC 322 : Ram Lal Narang Vs. State (Delhi), AIR 1963 SC 1850 : State of A.P. Vs. Cheemalapati, AIR 1961 SC 1241 : State of A.P. Vs. Kandimalla, and AIR 1957 SC 340 : Swamirathnam Vs. State of Madras summarized its conclusions in paragraphs 58 to 60 as under :- “58. As against this, Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the CBI is not faced with any prejudice which is to be caused to it, if the relief as prayed for by the petitioner is granted. Admittedly, the petitioner is not praying for quashing of the charge sheet dated 04.09.2012. As against this, Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the CBI is not faced with any prejudice which is to be caused to it, if the relief as prayed for by the petitioner is granted. Admittedly, the petitioner is not praying for quashing of the charge sheet dated 04.09.2012. During the course of argument, when this Court specifically put a question to learned ASG appearing for the CBI as to what prejudice would be caused to the CBI if instead of treating the charge sheet dated 04.09.2012 to be fresh and independent charge sheet, the same will be treated as a supplementary charge sheet in the first charge sheet, there was no definite answer as to what prejudice would be caused to the CBI. For the sake of repetition, it is relevant to mention that in our order dated 08.04.2011 in Narmada Bai (supra), while disposing of the said writ petition, this Court directed the CBI to take up the investigation as prayed accepting their contention that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is a part of the same series of acts in which Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi were killed and, therefore, Tulsiram Prajapati encounter should also be investigated by the CBI. Accepting the above assertion of the CBI, this Court directed to complete the investigation within six months. Summary: 58.1. This Court accepting the plea of the CBI in Narmada Bai (supra) that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR directed the CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief prayed for i.e., registration of a fresh FIR. Accordingly, filing of a fresh FIR by the CBI is contrary to various decisions of this Court. 58.2. The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section 156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the First Information Report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of evidence collected, Investigating Officer has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the concerned Magistrate under Section 173(2) of the Code. 58.3. On completion of investigation and on the basis of evidence collected, Investigating Officer has to form an opinion under Section 169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the concerned Magistrate under Section 173(2) of the Code. 58.3. Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation normally with the leave of the Court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. 58.4. Further, on receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or offences and on entering FIR in the Station House Diary, the officer-in-charge of the police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 of the Code. Subsection (8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report (s) to the Magistrate. Subsection (8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report (s) to the Magistrate. A case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, is liable to be interfered with by the High Court by exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 58.5. First Information Report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR. 58.6. In the case on hand, as explained in the earlier paras, in our opinion, the second FIR was nothing but a consequence of the event which had taken place on 25/26.11.2005. We have already concluded that this Court having reposed faith in the CBI accepted their contention that Tulsiram Prajapati encounter is a part of the same chain of events in which Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi were killed and directed the CBI to “take up” the investigation. 58.7. For vivid understanding, let us consider a situation in which Mr. “A” having killed “B” with the aid of “C”, informs the police that unknown persons killed “B”. During investigation, it revealed that “A” was the real culprit and “D” abetted “A” to commit the murder. As a result, the police officer files the charge sheet under Section 173(2) of the Code with the Magistrate. Although, in due course, it was discovered through further investigation that the person who abetted Mr. “A” was “C” and not “D” as mentioned in the charge sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code. In such a scenario, uncovering of the later fact that “C” is the real abettor will not demand a second FIR rather a supplementary charge sheet under section 173(8) of the Code will serve the purpose. 58.8. “A” was “C” and not “D” as mentioned in the charge sheet filed under Section 173 of the Code. In such a scenario, uncovering of the later fact that “C” is the real abettor will not demand a second FIR rather a supplementary charge sheet under section 173(8) of the Code will serve the purpose. 58.8. Likewise, in the case on hand, initially the CBI took a stand that the third person accompanying Sohrabbuddin and Kausarbi was Kalimuddin. However, with the aid of further investigation, it unveiled that the third person was Tulsiram Prajapati. Therefore, only as a result of further investigation, the CBI has gathered the information that the third person was Tulsiram Prajapati. Thus a second FIR in the given facts and circumstances is unwarranted; instead filing of a supplementary charge sheet in this regard will suffice the issue. 58.9. Administering criminal justice is a two end process, where guarding the ensured rights of the accused under Constitution is as imperative as ensuring justice to the victim. It is definitely a daunting task but equally a compelling responsibility vested on the court of law to protect and shield the rights of both. Thus, a just balance between the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed under the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. Accordingly, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. As a consequence, in our view this is a fit case for quashing the second F.I.R to meet the ends of justice. 58.10. The investigating officers are the kingpins in the criminal justice system. Their reliable investigation is the leading step towards affirming complete justice to the victims of the case. Hence they are bestowed with dual duties i.e. to investigate the matter exhaustively and subsequently collect reliable evidences to establish the same. Conclusion: 59. In the light of the specific stand taken by the CBI before this Court in the earlier proceedings by way of assertion in the form of counter affidavit, status reports, etc. Hence they are bestowed with dual duties i.e. to investigate the matter exhaustively and subsequently collect reliable evidences to establish the same. Conclusion: 59. In the light of the specific stand taken by the CBI before this Court in the earlier proceedings by way of assertion in the form of counter affidavit, status reports, etc. we are of the view that filing of the second FIR and fresh charge sheet is violative of fundamental rights under Article 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution since the same relate to alleged offence in respect of which an FIR had already been filed and the court has taken cognizance. This Court categorically accepted the CBI’s plea that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is a part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR and in spite of the fact that this Court directed the CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief as prayed, namely, registration of fresh FIR, the present action of CBI filing fresh FIR is contrary to various judicial pronouncements which is demonstrated in the earlier part of our judgment. 60. In view of the above discussion and conclusion, the second FIR dated 29.04.2011 being RC No. 3(S)/2011/Mumbai filed by the CBI is contrary to the directions issued in judgment and order dated 08.04.2011 by this Court in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 115 of 2009 and accordingly the same is quashed. As a consequence, the charge sheet filed on 04.09.2012, in pursuance of the second FIR, be treated as a supplementary charge sheet in the first FIR. It is made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim of both the parties and it is for the trial Court to decide the same in accordance with law. Consequently, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 149 of 2012 is allowed. Since the said relief is applicable to all the persons arrayed as accused in the second FIR, no further direction is required in Writ Petition(Criminal) No. 5 of 2013.” 27. Consequently, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 149 of 2012 is allowed. Since the said relief is applicable to all the persons arrayed as accused in the second FIR, no further direction is required in Writ Petition(Criminal) No. 5 of 2013.” 27. Considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decisions noted above, when I look to the facts of the present case I find that recovery of loaded pistol was reported to the police firstly on 09.12.2013 on the basis of the statement of the petitioner in which four persons were named and three unknown persons were also made accused. The police investigated the said case and came to a finding that the loaded pistol was planted by the petitioner in the said case and a false case of recovery of loaded pistol had been instituted. The investigating agency had also come to a conclusion that the illegal loaded pistol produced by the petitioner belonged to him. Since the police had already investigated and came to the conclusion that the accused persons of Bakhri P.S. Case No. 320 of 2013 had been falsely booked for possession of illegal loaded pistol, there was no occasion for the police to register a fresh first information report and start a de novo investigation. Such kind of investigation is beyond the jurisdiction of the police. Even if it is presumed that there was need for further investigation of the case the police could have resorted to the powers conferred under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. and investigated the case further instead of instituting a fresh case. As noted above, further investigation is in continuation of earlier investigation and, as such, permissible in law, but fresh investigation or re-investigation is not permissible. If law prohibits re-investigation or de novo investigation by the investigating agency on its own, in my considered opinion, the same cannot be permitted merely by instituting a second first information report with regard to the same occurrence. If the police came to a conclusion after investigation and supervision that the story was false and the loaded pistol belonged to the petitioner charge-sheet ought to have been submitted against him exonerating original accused in Bakhri P.S. Case No. 320 of 2013 instead of instituting a fresh case vide Bakhri P.S. Case No. 232 of 2014. 28. If the police came to a conclusion after investigation and supervision that the story was false and the loaded pistol belonged to the petitioner charge-sheet ought to have been submitted against him exonerating original accused in Bakhri P.S. Case No. 320 of 2013 instead of instituting a fresh case vide Bakhri P.S. Case No. 232 of 2014. 28. In view of the above discussions and conclusion, the second first information report bearing Bakhri P.S. Case No.232 of 2014 dated 27.07.2014 filed on the statement of Assistant Sub Inspector of Police Suresh Yadav was not permissible in law. The same is hit by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C. 29. It is true that in the said case investigation is over and the charge-sheet has already been filed, in my opinion, the same would make no difference to the fate of the case. If the first information report itself was not permissible, the petitioner cannot be put on trial in Bakhri P.S. Case No. 232 of 2014. 30. In that view of the matter, the impugned order dated 05.08.2016 passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai in Bakhri P.S. Case No.232 of 2014 is set aside. However, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra), the charge-sheet No.106 of 2016 filed in Bakhri P.S. Case No.232 of 2014 shall be treated as further report in Bakhri P.S. Case No.320 of 2013 and the investigation carried out in that case would also be treated as the further investigation of Bakhari P.S. Case No.320 of 2013. The entire record of Bakhri P.S. Case No.232 of 2014 will form part of the record of Bakhri P.S. Case No.320 of 2013. The learned Magistrate before whom Bakhri P.S. Case No.320 of 2013 is pending shall consider the charge-sheet submitted in Bakhri P.S. Case No.232 of 2014 as further report in Bakhri P.S. Case No.320 of 2013 in terms of Sub Section (8) of Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. and pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. 31. It is made clear that while passing the order, the learned Magistrate shall not be prejudiced in any manner by any observation made by this Court in the present case or the order passed by the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate in Bakhri P.S. Case No.232 of 2014. 32. The application is allowed to the extent indicated above.