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2018 DIGILAW 670 (BOM)

Soham Realtors Pole Star v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Nagpur-II

2018-03-07

ARUN D.UPADHYE, B.P.DHARMADHIKARI

body2018
JUDGMENT : B.P. Dharmadhikari, J. 1. In this appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act appellant-assessee questioned the order dated 23.01.2017 on application No.ST/COD/93463/16-MUMBAI refusing to condone delay of about 624 days in filing an appeal against the order in original. We have heard it finally with consent. 2. Contention of Advocate Chauhan is that provisions of Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 prescribe the stages through which service on other side must be attempted and pasting on notice board of the authority issuing the order is last resort. He contends that in present matter after initiating steps under Section 37C (1)(a), directly step under Section 37C (1)(c) have been resorted to and thus there was no recourse to procedure prescribed under Section 37C (1)(b). 3. Advocate Bhattad submits that perusal of order impugned in this appeal clearly shows proper application of mind and due consideration of facts therefore, no substantial question of law arises in the matter. 4. After hearing respective counsel, we find that questions whether service can be said to be valid or not and relevance of answer to this question, insofar as prayer for condonation of delay is concerned, arise for adjudication in this appeal as substantial questions of law. 5. Normally the prayer for condonation of delay may be required to be considered independent of the question of the date on which copy of order impugned in delayed proceeding was received or served upon the applicant-appellant. Thus, merely because proper steps were taken to complete service in terms of Section 37C, that by itself will not be sufficient to reject the prayer for condonation of delay. It will have impact only on length of delay. 6. If facts show that grievance is about not effecting service and hence delay in that event fact of service of impugned order as per law may have some bearing. 7. In matter before us the affidavit tendered by appellant to appellate authority in support of prayer for condonation of delay shows an assertion that the knowledge of impugned order was acquired in November 2015 through Chartered Accountant. Thereafter an application for certified copy of that order was moved and that certified copy has been received on 27.04.2016. After receipt thereof the subject appeal along with prayer for condonation of delay has been filed. Thereafter an application for certified copy of that order was moved and that certified copy has been received on 27.04.2016. After receipt thereof the subject appeal along with prayer for condonation of delay has been filed. The impugned order does not record any finding on its correctness or otherwise or then its relevance. In paragraph 4, the impugned order only takes note of steps taken by the lower authority i.e. department to complete service in terms of Section 37C upon appellant-assessee and with satisfaction that proper steps have been taken, the prayer for condonation of delay has been refused. As already noted supra, in the proper case though there may be due service of impugned order, there may be independent reasons which disabled the appellant from approaching the appellate authority. Thus, mere service of impugned order in terms of Section 37C cannot be decisive in present matter. Moreover said finding does not seem to be legally correct. 8. This court on 04.08.2017 after taking note of the fact that service tax demand was of Rs.71.58 lakhs with penalty, the aggregate amount worked out to Rs.1.43 crores expected the petitioner to deposit amount of Rs.1 crores to show his bona fide. It is not in dispute that accordingly that amount has been deposited. Because of said deposit on 22.11.2017 this court has directed respondent not to take any coercive steps against the appellant for securing recovery of balance amount. 9. The perusal of findings recorded in paragraph 4 by appellate authority show that after making efforts to complete service through post on last known address and after the envelope containing impugned order was received back, direct recourse has been taken to publication of notice in terms of Section 37C (1)(c). Thus, there is no recourse to procedure prescribed by Section 37C (1)(b). Though Advocate Chauhan is relying upon few judgments to point out effect of this violation, as vital aspects are not considered by the appellate authority, we are not inclined to look in those judgments. Language in sub-clause (1)(c) itself shows that when there is failure to complete service in manner provided in clauses (1)(a) and (1)(b), recourse to said sub-clause (1)(c) is open. The impugned order does not even mention this aspect. 10. In this situation, we find that the questions of law formulated above squarely fall for consideration in present matter. Language in sub-clause (1)(c) itself shows that when there is failure to complete service in manner provided in clauses (1)(a) and (1)(b), recourse to said sub-clause (1)(c) is open. The impugned order does not even mention this aspect. 10. In this situation, we find that the questions of law formulated above squarely fall for consideration in present matter. The authority passing impugned order has not looked into relevant aspects having material bearing on answer to these questions. Thus, there is non-application of mind. Hence, we quash and set aside the order dated 23.01.2017 and restore application ST/COD/93463/16MUMBAI on the file of the appellate authority for its fresh consideration preferably within period of six months from today. 11. As the matter is being remanded back an amount of Rs.1 crore is already paid by petitioner, we continue interim order granted by this court on 22.11.2017 during the pendency of said proceedings. 12. The appeal is thus allowed and disposed of.