ORDER : The prayer sought in the writ petition reads thus: “[a] Declare that the words – “However, the Licensee can hold Security Deposit up to Rs.3000/at the credit of any Consumer and refund the excess Security Deposit when it is over and above Rs.3000/” contained in Regulation 6.2 of the KERC (Security Deposit) Regulations, 2007, and “However, the limit of Rs.3000/for refund of the excess Security Deposit as per clause 6.2 shall be adhered to” contained in Regulation 6.2(a)(ii) of the K.E.R.C (Security Deposit) Regulations, 2007, at Annexure-A, are arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional, ultra vires to Section 47 of the Electricity Act, 2003, framed without following the principles of natural justice, suffered from legal malice, null and void and consequentially for striking down the same in so far as the petitioner is concerned; [b] Declare that Regulation 7 of K.E.R.C (Security Deposit) Regulations, 2007, restricting the mode of payment of Security deposit either to cash or Bank Guarantee only is arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional, ultra vires to Section 47 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and consequentially issuance of appropriate writ or direction to the 1st respondent to frame appropriate regulations enabling the consumers of electricity in Karnataka to maintain the required security under Section 47 of the Electricity Act, 2003, in any liquid form other than cash or Bank guarantee also, in so far as the petitioner is concerned.” [Emphasis supplied] 2. The petitioner has confined to the prayer [a] and prayer [b] is not pressed. 3. The petitioner is one of the registered consumers of the second respondent under R.R.No.K.02741 maintained in the 1st Subdivision of Attavar, Mangalore of the second respondent. It is the contention of the petitioner that 3 monthly minimum deposit [3 MMD] was made as deposit with the second respondent as provided under Sections 30.02, 30.03 and 30.05 of the then prevailing KERC [ES & D] Code, 200001. That Regulation 6.2 of the KERC [Security Deposit] Regulations, 2007 [‘Regulations’ for short] deals with the demand notice for Additional Security Deposit which provides that based on the general review, demand for shortfall in Security Deposit or refund of excess Security Deposit shall be made by the licensee. However, the licensee can hold security deposit up to Rs.3000/at the credit of any consumer and refund the excess security deposit when it is over and above Rs.3000/. However, the licensee can hold security deposit up to Rs.3000/at the credit of any consumer and refund the excess security deposit when it is over and above Rs.3000/. In terms of 6.2(a), in the case of existing consumers, from whom 3 MMD had been collected by the Licensee where the monthly billing cycle is in vogue: (i) Additional Security Deposit shall not be collected till deposit held at credit falls short of the average bill amount corresponding to two months [2 MMD] in case of monthly billing and three months [3 MMC] in case of bimonthly billing calculated based on the consumption in the preceding year. (ii) If the deposit held is more than 120% of the average bill amount corresponding to two months (2 MMD) in case of monthly billing and three months (3 MMD) in case of bimonthly billing of the preceding year, the Licensee shall refund excess deposit held over and above 120% of the average bill amount corresponding to two months (2 MMD) in case of monthly billing and three months (3 MMD) in case of bimonthly billing of the preceding year, within 12 months of the notification of these Regulations in the first instance and during the first quarter in the subsequent years, through adjustments in the energy bill of the Consumer. However, the limit of Rs.3000/for refund of the excess Security Deposit as per clause 6.2 shall be adhered to. 4. It is the grievance of the petitioner that the aggregate of previous years electricity bills including tax [for the period April 2007 to March 2009] in respect of his installation No.K02741 was Rs.2,398/and average monthly bill was Rs.200/that means to 120% of 2 MMD to be maintained by the petitioner would be Rs.480/. However, existing 3 MMD security deposit maintained by the petitioner with the second respondent is only Rs.740/, he is not eligible to get refund of the excess security deposit of Rs.260/in view of the minimum limit of Rs.3000/prescribed in the Regulation 6.2 of the Regulations. Hence, this writ petition. 5. Learned counsel Sri.Shridhar Prabhu, appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned condition of Rs.3000/limit fixed for a consumer to be eligible for getting refund of excess security deposit, if otherwise eligible under the Regulation is arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional and ultra vires to Section 47 of the Electricity Act, 2003 [‘Act’ for short]. Hence, this writ petition. 5. Learned counsel Sri.Shridhar Prabhu, appearing for the petitioner submitted that the impugned condition of Rs.3000/limit fixed for a consumer to be eligible for getting refund of excess security deposit, if otherwise eligible under the Regulation is arbitrary, discriminatory, unconstitutional and ultra vires to Section 47 of the Electricity Act, 2003 [‘Act’ for short]. It was argued that the impugned condition in the Regulation was incorporated without following the principles of natural justice and the same is void; the impugned Clauses in the Regulation is a class legislation and makes hostile discrimination against the consumers who maintained 3 MMD of Rs.3000/or less such as the petitioner visàvis the consumers who have maintained more than Rs.3000/as security deposit which is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that the impugned condition was incorporated at the instance of Sri.Y.G.Muralidharan, office of the Consumer Advocacy, KERC, Bengaluru, as per the minutes of the hearing on the draft Regulation held on 08.08.2007. The first respondent ought not to have introduced new concepts which were not included in the draft publication while framing the impugned Regulation. Any modifications to the draft Regulation would adhere to the principles of natural justice. Only reason assigned for putting the limit of Rs.3000/was that the frequent refund/claim of additional security deposit might cause confusion and the consumers might fail to understand the transactions in respect of security deposit. The condition imposed in the Regulation clearly establishes illegal malice on the part of the first respondent in order to unduly favour the second respondent and other distribution licensees. The consultant who proposed the impugned condition in the Regulation is not a stake holder and had no locusstandi to file any suggestion or objection to the draft Regulations proposed by the first respondent. The first respondent accepting the new concept introduced by one of its own department, violated the principles of natural justice in imposing such a condition which discriminates among the class and requires to be struck down in so far as the petitioner is concerned. In support of his contentions, reliance is placed on the following judgments: 1. CELLULAR OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS VS. TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND OTHERS in CIVIL APPEAL No.5017 OF 2016. 2. HARBILAS RAI BANSAL VS. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER, in [1996] 1 SCC 1 3. In support of his contentions, reliance is placed on the following judgments: 1. CELLULAR OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS VS. TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA AND OTHERS in CIVIL APPEAL No.5017 OF 2016. 2. HARBILAS RAI BANSAL VS. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER, in [1996] 1 SCC 1 3. ANDHRA PRADESH DAIRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FEDERATION VS. B.NARASIMHA REDDY AND OTHERS in [2011] 9 SCC 286 4. GLOBAL ENERGY LIMITED AND ANOTHER VS. CENTRAL ELECTRICITY REGULATORY COMMISSION in [2009] 15 SCC 570 5. INDIAN EXPRESS NEWS PAPERS VS. UNION OF INDIA in [1985] 1 SCC 641 6. Learned counsel Sri.S.Sriranga, appearing for the respondent No.2 submitted that basically, the writ petition is filed in individual capacity not as public interest litigation. Section 47(1) read with Section 181(2)(4) of the Act empowers the first respondent to frame Regulations providing reasonable security payable to the distribution licensee like the second respondent, Section 47(2) of the Act empowers the distribution licensee like the second respondent to collect the additional security from the consumers if the existing security is invalid or insufficient. The earlier collection of security deposit was governed by the then prevailing KERC [ES & D] Code, 200001 till its repeal with effect from 17.06.2006, the impugned Regulation was published in the Karnataka Gazette and brought into force with effect from 11.10.2007. 7. It was submitted that Regulation 6.2 of the Regulations prescribing the limit to hold security deposit by the licensee up to Rs.3000/at the credit of the consumer is the policy decision taken by the Commission based on the expert opinion. Experts on analyzing the factual aspects and its practical implementation, noticed that the transaction cost of calculating the excess deposit, arranging refunds etc., may be more than the excess deposit, if the amount is less than Rs.3000/. Hence, a nominal and reasonable amount of Rs.3000/is fixed not to be refunded, keeping in view of the possible increase in annual consumption. Reference is made to Regulation 6.2 (d) of the Regulations to contend that the additional security deposit shall be demanded when the deposit held falls short of the average bill amount corresponding to 2 months [2 MMD] in case of monthly billing and 3 months [3 MMD] in case of bimonthly billing calculated based on the consumption in the preceding year. Balancing act has been done by the Commission by way of providing interest on security deposit in terms of the Regulation 8. There being 2 modes, Initial Security Deposit [ISD] and Additional Security Deposit [ASD], in cases of demand to be made for ASD, the security deposit decided not to be refunded at Rs.3000/is quite reasonable and no discrimination is caused to the petitioner. It was submitted that the consumers whose security deposit of Rs.3000/is withheld or not refunded form a class by themselves and as such there being no discrimination within the said class of the consumers, there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the cause of action for filing this writ petition is enumerated as per Para 2.26 of the writ petition, whereby it is stated that the existing 3 MMD security deposit maintained by the petitioner with the second respondent being Rs.740/, he is deprived of getting the refund of excess security deposit of Rs.260/in view of the limit of minimum of Rs.3000/prescribed in the impugned Regulation. However, in respect of R.R.No.K02741 of the petitioner, now a sum of Rs.1370/is the present deposit and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to any refund. Hence, the challenge to Regulation 6.2 of the Regulations has been rendered academic. In such circumstances, Courts should restrain from deciding the matters of academic interest. Memo is filed by the respondent No.2 seeking dismissal of the writ petition which reads thus: “Respondent No.2 respectfully submits as under: The grievance of the petitioner, as set out in paragraph 2.26 of the writ petition, is that since the existing 3 MMD security deposit maintained by the petitioner with the 2nd respondent is only Rs.740/he is not eligible to get refund of excess security deposit of Rs.260/in view of the limit of minimum Rs.3,000/prescribed in the impugned Regulations. It is respectfully submitted that the present deposit in respect of RR.No.K02741 [i.e., the petitioner] is a sum of Rs.1,370/, and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to any refund. In the circumstances, the challenge to Regulation 6.2 of the Regulations has been rendered academic. It is settled law that Courts will not decide the matters of academic interest. It is respectfully submitted that the present deposit in respect of RR.No.K02741 [i.e., the petitioner] is a sum of Rs.1,370/, and therefore the petitioner is not entitled to any refund. In the circumstances, the challenge to Regulation 6.2 of the Regulations has been rendered academic. It is settled law that Courts will not decide the matters of academic interest. Wherefore it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the present writ petition as the same has been rendered academic, in the interests of justice.” No objections are filed by the petitioner to the said memo. Learned counsel placed reliance on the following judgments: 1. 1987 [SUPP] SCC 93 in the case of DHARTIPAKAR MADAN LAL AGARWAL VS. RAJIV GANDHI; 2. [2001] 7 SCC 657 in the case of ARNIT DAS VS. STATE OF BIHAR. 8. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 supports the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for respondent No.2. 9. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perusing the material on record, it is evident that the petitioner is challenging the regulation 6.2 of the Regulations as far as imposing the limit of Rs.3000/relating to the refund of the security deposit is concerned, on the ground that his entitlement to refund of Rs.260/against the security deposit of Rs.740/maintained by the petitioner is denied/made ineligible owing to the minimum limit of Rs.3,000/prescribed in the clauses of the Regulation. Clause 6.2(d) of the Regulations reads thus: “6.2 Demand notice for Additional Security Deposit Based on such a review, demand for shortfall in Security Deposit or refund of excess Security Deposit shall be made by the Licensee. However, the Licencesee can hold Security Deposit up to Rs.3000/at the credit of any consumer and refund the excess Security Deposit when it is over and above Rs.3000/ (d) Additional security deposit shall be demanded when the deposit held falls short of the average bill amount corresponding to two months (2 MMD) in case of monthly billing and three months (3 MMD) in case of bimonthly billing calculated based on the consumption in the preceding year. However if the shortfall is less than Rs.200/in case of LT categories and Rs.1000/in respect of HT installations, the same need not be demanded.” 10. However if the shortfall is less than Rs.200/in case of LT categories and Rs.1000/in respect of HT installations, the same need not be demanded.” 10. A reading of these regulations makes it clear that the additional security deposit shall be demanded when the initial security deposit held falls short of bill amount corresponding to two months (2 MMD) in case of monthly billing and as such, the minimum limit of Rs.3,000/for refund of the excess security deposit may be enhanced in terms of clause 6.2(d) demanding the additional security deposit depending on the average bill amount corresponding to two months (2 MMD) in case of monthly billing. Clause 8 of the Regulations provides for the payment of interest by the licensee on security deposit (ISD, ASD and Meter Security Deposit) of the consumer as specified under K.E.R.C. (Interest on Security Deposit) Regulations, 2005. It is evident that the prayer in the writ petition is to quash the condition imposing the limit of Rs.3000/prescribed under the Regulation 6.2 so far as the petitioner is concerned. The cause of action as enumerated in paragraph 2.26 of the writ petition now being not alive owing to the changed circumstances as reflected in the memo filed by the respondent No.1, not disputed by the petitioner, claiming of any refund by the petitioner would not arise. 11. In the circumstances, it is beneficial to refer to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dhartipakar Madan Lal’s case (supra), whereby the Hon’ble Apex Court in the factual context of the challenge to the election relating to Lok Sabha which was dissolved in 1984 held that even if the election petition is ultimately allowed on trial as the respondent is a continuing member of the Loksabha, not on the basis of the impugned election held in 1981 but on the basis of his subsequent election in 1984 and the appeal is allowed and the case is remitted to the High court, the respondent’s election cannot be setaside after trial of the election petition as the relief for setting aside the election has been rendered infructuous by lapse of time. In this view, grounds raised in the petition for setting aside the election of the respondent have been rendered academic. Thus, it is observed that court should not undertake to decide an issue unless it is a living issue between the parties. In this view, grounds raised in the petition for setting aside the election of the respondent have been rendered academic. Thus, it is observed that court should not undertake to decide an issue unless it is a living issue between the parties. If the issue is purely academic, its decision one way or the other would have no impact on the position of the parties, it would be waste of public time to engage itself in deciding it. Reliance is placed on the Lord Viscount Simon speech in the House of Lords in Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada Vs. Fervis (1944 SC 111), wherein it is observed thus: “I do not think that it would be a proper exercise of the authority which this House possesses to hear appeals if it occupies time in this case in deciding an academic question, the answer to which cannot affect the respondent in any way. It is an essential quality of an appeal fit to be disposed of by his House that there should exist between the parties to a matter in actual controversy which the House undertakes to decide as a living issue.” 12. Similarly in the case of Arnit Das (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that it is settled practice that the court does not decide matters which are only of academic interest on the facts of a particular case. 13. In the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd and others and other connected petitions reported in (2004) 10 SCC 201 , the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court observed thus: “32. The abovestated are general principles. Legislations in the field of taxation and economic activities need special consideration and are to be viewed with larger flexibility in approach. Observations of the Constitution Bench in R.K. Garg v. Union of India and Ors., (1981) 4 SCC 676, are apposite, wherein this Court has emphasized a greater latitude like play in the joints being allowed to the Legislature because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or straitjacket formula. In this field the Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment. In this field the Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment. Their Lordships quoted with approval the following statement of Frankfurter, J. in Morey v. Doud, (1957) 354 US 457: "In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial selfrestraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after ail has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events, selflimitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability". 14. In the light of these Judgments, the factual matrix of the case is analyzed. It is apparent that the petitioner is not eligible to claim any refund in terms of Regulation 6.2 of the Regulations, owing to the changed circumstances i.e., the security deposit in respect of R.R.No.K02741 of the petitioner being changed to Rs.1,370/, the essential quality of existence of an actual controversy of a living issue being absent, deciding the issue involved herein would become purely academic. Any decision one way or the other would have no impact on the position of the petitioner due to the subsequent changed circumstances. Hence, addressing the issue on merit being academic, the writ petition does not survive for consideration and deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, writ petition stands dismissed.