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2018 DIGILAW 671 (GUJ)

DANJIBHAI BHANABHAI @ BHANJIBHAI MARU v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2018-05-01

R.SUBHASH REDDY, VIPUL M.PANCHOLI

body2018
JUDGMENT/ORDER : Vipul M. Pancholi, J. This application is filed for review of the order dated 03.10.2016 passed by this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 906 of 2016 in Special Civil Application No. 9902 of 2015. 2. Heard learned advocate Mr. B.J. Trivedi for the applicant and learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. K.M. Antani for the respondent - State. 3. Learned advocate Mr. Trivedi submits that the applicant preferred Letters Patent Appeal No.906 of 2016 under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against an order dated 13.06.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 9902 of 2015. The learned Single Judge, by the said order, quashed and set aside the Award dated 29.11.2014 passed by the Labour Court in Reference (LCB) No. 48 of 2013. It is pointed out that the Labour Court directed the respondent authorities to reinstate the applicant - workman with continuity of service with 20% back-wages. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Trivedi further submits that by an order dated 03.10.2016, the Division Bench of this Court, dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the applicant mainly on the ground that there was a delay of 14 years in raising the dispute by the applicant - workman and such delay on the part of the workman was fatal. 5. It is contended by learned advocate for the applicant that there is an apparent error on the face of the record while passing the order dated 03.10.2016 by this Court in the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal and therefore the applicant has filed this review application. It is contended that as per the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Ltd. v. Kitab Singh, (2013) AIR(SC) 1172, finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court can be interfered by the writ court only if finding is perverse. In the present case, the findings recorded by the Labour Court were not perverse. In spite of that the learned Single Judge interfered with the Award passed by the Labour Court only on the ground that there was delay of 14 years in raising the dispute. Thus, the aforesaid decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not properly considered by this Court while passing the order dated 03.10.2016. 6. Learned advocate Mr. In spite of that the learned Single Judge interfered with the Award passed by the Labour Court only on the ground that there was delay of 14 years in raising the dispute. Thus, the aforesaid decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is not properly considered by this Court while passing the order dated 03.10.2016. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Trivedi would thereafter submit that in the case of Shahaji v. Executive Engineer, PWD, (2007) 115 FLR 675, when the reference was made after about 16 years from the date of termination of service of the workman and Labour Court did not entertain the reference on the ground of delay, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even if there was delay in making the reference to the Labour Court, if it came to the conclusion that termination was illegal, it could have suitably moulded the relief to be granted to the workman in view of the delay. 7. Learned advocate Mr. Trivedi further placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, (2003) AIR(SC) 3553, and contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the concerned workman initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, the workman should not be non-suited on the ground of delay. 8. Relying upon the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, learned advocate for the applicant has contended that if the respondents were aggrieved by the factum of delay in making the reference, it was essentially for them to challenge the order of making reference by the competent authority when the same was made to the Labour Court. Therefore, it would not be proper on the part of the respondents to raise the contention with regard to delay in filing the reference at the belated stage. It is further submitted that no limitation period is prescribed for raising the dispute and the applicant workman has time and again requested the respondent authorities to employ him. However, no response was given by the respondent authorities and the respondent authorities have not maintained the seniority list and after terminating the services of the applicant workman, his juniors were continued. It is submitted that after termination of services of the applicant, new workers were employed. However, no response was given by the respondent authorities and the respondent authorities have not maintained the seniority list and after terminating the services of the applicant workman, his juniors were continued. It is submitted that after termination of services of the applicant, new workers were employed. Thus, the dispute was existed. 9. Learned advocate Mr. Trivedi, therefore, urged that while passing the order dated 03.10.2016, this Court has not specifically dealt with the aforesaid important aspect and there is an error apparent on the face of the record. He, therefore, requested that the order dated 03.10.2016 be recalled and thereafter the Letters Patent Appeal be allowed by setting aside the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 9902 of 2015. At this stage, learned advocate Mr. Trivedi has fairly submitted that this Court may also mould the relief while allowing the appeal and this Court may even quash and set aside the order of granting 20% back-wages by the Labour Court. However, the applicant be ordered to be reinstated with continuity of service. 10. On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader submits that there is no error apparent on the face of the record while passing the order dated 03.10.2016 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 906 of 2016 and therefore this application is not maintainable. It is further submitted that applicant wants to re-argue the matter on merits and therefore such type of application may not be entertained by this Court. 11. We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and we have also gone through the material produced on record as well as the decisions upon which the reliance is placed by the learned advocates for the applicant. From the record, it is revealed that the Labour Court passed an Award on 29.11.2014 in Reference (LCB) No. 48 of 2013 by which the Labour Court directed the respondent authorities to reinstate the applicant workman with continuity of service with 20% back-wages. The said award was challenged by the present respondents by filing Special Civil Application No. 9902 of 2015. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated 13.06.2016, allowed the said petition and thereby quashed and set aside the Award passed by the Labour Court, against which, the present applicant preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 906 of 2016. The said award was challenged by the present respondents by filing Special Civil Application No. 9902 of 2015. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated 13.06.2016, allowed the said petition and thereby quashed and set aside the Award passed by the Labour Court, against which, the present applicant preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 906 of 2016. This Court, by an order dated 03.10.2016, dismissed the said Letters Patent Appeal and therefore the applicant has filed the present application for review of the order dated 03.10.2016 passed in the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal. 12. In the order dated 03.10.2016, this Court recorded the submissions canvassed by the learned advocates appearing for the present applicant that the learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the Award passed by the Labour Court mainly on the ground that there was delay of 14 years in filing the Reference which was fatal and the dispute was not existed. This Court also recorded the submission of the learned advocate for the present applicant that if the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 - original petitioners were aggrieved by the factum of delay in making the reference, it was essentially for them to challenge the order of making reference by the competent authority when the same was made to the Labour Court. Therefore, it was contended that it would not be proper on the part of the original petitioners - respondent authorities herein to raise the contention with regard to delay in filing the reference. 13. It is required to be noted that this Court in the order dated 03.10.2016 recorded the finding with regard to the delay caused in filing the reference. However, the submission of the learned advocate for the applicant with regard to not challenging the order of making reference by the competent authority when the same was made to the Labour Court by the present respondents - original petitioners is not dealt with. 14. In view of the above, we are of the view that learned advocate for the applicant is right in submitting that there is an error apparent on the face of the record while passing the order dated 03.10.2016 in the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal. Accordingly, the said order is required to be recalled. 15. 14. In view of the above, we are of the view that learned advocate for the applicant is right in submitting that there is an error apparent on the face of the record while passing the order dated 03.10.2016 in the aforesaid Letters Patent Appeal. Accordingly, the said order is required to be recalled. 15. In the case of Shahaji, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when the reference was made after 16 years from the date of termination of service of the workman and Labour Court did not entertain the reference on the ground of delay, however, if Labour Court comes to the conclusion that termination was illegal, it could have suitably moulded the relief to be granted to the workman in view of the delay. However, the reference cannot be rejected on the ground of delay. 16. In the case of S.M. Nilajkar, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the concerned workman initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act followed by the conciliation proceedings and then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, the workman should not be non-suited on the ground of delay. 17. In the case of Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) AIR(SC) 1351, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 11 and 12 as under : "11. In the instant case, the respondent-management is not shown to have taken any plea regarding delay as is evident from the issues framed by the Labour Court. The only plea raised in defence was that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the reference and the termination of the services of the workman was justified. Had this plea been raised, the workman would have been in a position to show the circumstances preventing him in approaching the Court at an earlier stage or even to satisfy the Court that such a plea was not sustainable after the reference was made by the Government. The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore, were not justified in holding that the workman had not given any explanation as to why the demand notice had been issued after a long period. The findings of facts returned by the High Court in writ proceedings, even without pleadings were therefore, unjustified. The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore, were not justified in holding that the workman had not given any explanation as to why the demand notice had been issued after a long period. The findings of facts returned by the High Court in writ proceedings, even without pleadings were therefore, unjustified. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the Courts were bound to render an even handed justice by keeping balance between the two different parties. Such an approach totally ignores the aims and object and the social object sought to be achieved by the Act. Even after noticing that "it is true that a fight between the workman and the management is not a just between equals, " the Court was not justified to make them equals while returning the findings, which if allowed to prevail, would result in frustration of the purpose of the enactment. The workman appears to be justified in complaining that in the absence of any plea on behalf of the management and any evidence, regarding delay, he could not be deprived of the benefits under the Act merely on technicalities of law. The High Court appears to have substituted its opinion for the opinion of the Labour Court which was not permissible in proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 12. We are, however, of the opinion that on account of the admitted delay, the Labour Court ought to have appropriately moulded the relief by denying the appellant-workman some part of the back wages. In the circumstances, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside by upholding the award of the Labour Court with modification that upon his reinstatement the appellant would be entitled to continuity of service, but back wages to the extent of 60 per cent with effect from 8-12-1981 when he raised the demand for Justice till the date of award of the labour Court i.e. 16-4-1986 and full back wages thereafter till his reinstatement would be payable to him. The appellant is also held entitled to the costs of litigation assessed at Rs.5,000/- to be paid by the respondent-management. Appeal allowed." 18. In the case of M/s. Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Ltd., the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 11 as under : "11. We are satisfied that the learned single Judge throughly analysed all the aspects and arrived at a correct conclusion. Appeal allowed." 18. In the case of M/s. Atlas Cycle (Haryana) Ltd., the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 11 as under : "11. We are satisfied that the learned single Judge throughly analysed all the aspects and arrived at a correct conclusion. It is settled law that when the Labour Court arrived at a finding overlooking the materials on record, it would amount to perversity and the writ Court would be fully justified in interfering with the said conclusion. We are conscious of the fact that the High Court exercising writ of certiorari would not permit to assume the role of the appellant Court, however, the Court is well within its power to interfere if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal/Labour Court had erroneously refused to admit the admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted any inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding, the writ Court would be justified in exercising its remedy. In other words, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari." 19. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions, if the facts of the present case are examined, it transpires that the applicant workman had worked with the respondent authorities during the period between November, 1987 to November, 1999. On 30.11.1999, his services came to be terminated. Thereafter, demand notice was issued by the applicant - workman on 26.02.2013. When the reply was not given, applicant filed a complaint before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Bhavnagar and thereafter dispute was referred to the Labour Court, Bhavnagar. It is not in dispute that the present respondents did not challenge the order of making reference to the Labour Court by filing appropriate proceedings before the appropriate Court. It is true that there was a delay of 14 years in raising the dispute. However, from the record, it is revealed that dispute was existed as after terminating the services of the applicant, his juniors were continued and even thereafter new workers were employed by the respondents. Thus, the dispute was alive. 20. Learned advocate Mr. It is true that there was a delay of 14 years in raising the dispute. However, from the record, it is revealed that dispute was existed as after terminating the services of the applicant, his juniors were continued and even thereafter new workers were employed by the respondents. Thus, the dispute was alive. 20. Learned advocate Mr. Trivedi is right in submitting that if the respondents were aggrieved by the factum of delay in making reference, it was for them to challenge the order of making reference by the competent authority when the same was made to the Labour Court. Thus, when the order of making reference was not challenged by the respondents, said aspect is also required to be considered while deciding the issue involved in the matter. 21. It is true that there was delay of 14 years in making the reference before the Labour Court and therefore while granting the relief in favour of the workman, the said aspect is required to be considered. The Labour Court has awarded 20% back-wages. However, during the course of submissions, learned advocate for the applicant has fairly submitted that this Court may also mould the relief while allowing the present review application. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge has committed an error while allowing the petition filed by the present respondents and thereby quashing and setting aside the Award passed by the Labour Court. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the applicant is not entitled for the back-wages. Hence, the Award passed by the Labour Court as well as the order passed by the learned Single Judge are required to be modified. 23. In view of the above, Misc. Civil Application for review is allowed. Order dated 03.10.2016 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 906 of 2016 is recalled. Letters Patent Appeal is partly allowed. Respondents are directed to reinstate the applicant with continuity of service but without any back-wages.