JUDGMENT : SANJIB BANERJEE, J. The extent of the applicability of the dictum in a recent Supreme Court judgment falls for consideration here. The appellants insist that the interpretation rendered in the relevant judgment as to the territorial jurisdiction of a court receiving a matter under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is absolute and not open to question; the respondents assert that the ratio decidendi in the judgment reported at (2017) 7 SCC 678 (Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited v. Datawind Innovations Private Limited) is contrary to the statute and contrary to the very Constitution Bench judgment that it relies on to propound the rule. 2. These appeals arise out of a common judgment and order dated December 15, 2017 rendered by the Arbitration Court, where the dictum in Indus Mobile was found to be inapplicable. 3. The matter involves the interpretation of Section 2(1)(e) of the said Act and how such provision has been seen in Indus Mobile. Section 2(1)(e) of the said Act, prior to the 2015 Amendment, and post-2015 Amendment Section 2(1)(e)(i) are materially similar : “2. Definitions. – (1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, (a)… (b)… (c)… (d)… (e) "Court" means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not-include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;” “2. Definitions. Definitions. –(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, - (a) … (b) … (c) … (d) … (e) “Court” means— (i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes; (ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, and in other cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to that High Court;” 4. Section 2(1)(e)(i) [which is in pari materia with pre-2015 Amendment Section 2(1)(e)] of the said Act indicates the court or courts to which a matter under Part-I of the said Act may be carried in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration. All petitions and applications made to a court under Part-I of the said Act, in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial arbitration, save, for obvious reasons, those under Sections 8 and 11 of the Act, may be carried only to a court answering to that description under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act to receive the same. The essence of Section 2(1)(e)(i) is that if, instead of an arbitral reference, the disputes between the parties had to be carried by way of a plaint as in a civil suit, the court or courts which would be authorised to receive such civil suit would also be the court or courts which would be empowered to receive a petition or application under Part-I of the Act, except for the matters covered by Section 8 and 11 thereof. (Under Section 8 of the Act the application has, per force, to be made to the judicial authority in seisin of the lis which is perceived to be covered by an arbitration agreement; and, under Section 11 of the Act, the request is made to a Chief Justice or his designate.) There is a further qualification which is postulated by Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act in it specifying that the court to which a matter under Part-I of the Act may be carried must not be a civil court of a grade inferior to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district or any Court of Small Causes. In Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act, a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction is included within the folds of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district. 5. Though the definitions provision in Part-I of the Act may also apply to Part-II thereof, the discussion here is confined to Part-I of the Act as all these matters pertain to domestic arbitration. 6. In its use of the expression “having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit”, Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act requires the court or courts to be identified on the basis of where a civil suit involving the same subject-matter could have been carried. Thus, such definition points to the place of suing under Sections 15 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code and to the relevant provisions of the Letters Patent if the court is a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The caveat always remains: no civil court of a grade inferior to the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district or a Court of Small Causes has the authority to receive any matter under the said Act. 7. It is possible that several courts may have the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction to receive a civil suit. Thus, several courts may also have the authority to receive a petition or application under Part-I of the said Act in terms of Section 2(1)(e)(i) thereof pertaining to the same arbitration agreement. However, once a court receives a petition or application under Part-I of the said Act, the jurisdiction of the other possible courts pertaining to the same arbitration agreement stands ousted by virtue of Section 42 of the Act. However, once a court receives a petition or application under Part-I of the said Act, the jurisdiction of the other possible courts pertaining to the same arbitration agreement stands ousted by virtue of Section 42 of the Act. Again, the operation of Section 42 of the Act does not extend, for obvious reasons, to Section 8 or Section 11 of the Act. 8. There are many grounds based on which the jurisdiction of a civil court may be invoked. If a suit pertains to an immovable property such that the suit has to be regarded as a suit for land, as the expression goes in legal parlance, such suit has to be instituted in the court within the local limits of which the property or any part thereof is situate. Where a suit is for compensation pertaining to any movable property, the suit may be carried to a civil court within the local limits of the jurisdiction of which the wrong was done or, at the option of the plaintiff, to the court within whose local limits of jurisdiction the defendant voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain. In respect of other suits to be instituted in a civil court other than a High Court exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the option of instituting the same where the defendant or each of the defendants voluntarily reside or carry on business or personally work for gain at the time of the commencement of the suit; or, with the leave of court or the subsequent acquiescence of the other defendants, in a court within whose jurisdiction any of the defendants voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain at the time of the commencement of the suit; or, where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. 9. In a suit instituted in this court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is the relevant provision. A suit which is regarded as a suit for land may only be instituted in this court if the land or any part thereof is situate within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. 9. In a suit instituted in this court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is the relevant provision. A suit which is regarded as a suit for land may only be instituted in this court if the land or any part thereof is situate within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. This court has also the authority to receive a suit where the defendant or any of them voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within the territorial limits of this court, subject to leave being obtained under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent in respect of those who do not voluntarily reside or carry on business or personally work for gain within the jurisdiction. In addition, a civil suit may be instituted in this court, irrespective of where the defendant or defendants voluntarily reside or carry on business or personally work for gain, if the whole of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of this court. Further, this court may receive a civil suit, irrespective of where the defendants may voluntarily reside or carry on business or personally work for gain, if any part of the cause of action as pleaded in the plaint has arisen within the territorial limits of this court and leave is obtained at the outset. 10. Of course, all of the above considerations pertaining to territorial jurisdiction are subject to the pecuniary value of the suit. However, in an arbitration matter, such consideration is irrelevant since Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act ordains that the matter be carried only to the principal civil court in a district. 11. The consideration as to which court may be entitled to receive a suit is also subject to any previous agreement of the parties in such regard. Such agreement, known as a forum selection clause, is recognised in our jurisprudence and is subject to the solitary condition that only such a court which is otherwise clothed with the jurisdiction to receive a suit may be chosen by the parties as the desired forum. In other words, it is not open to the parties to confer jurisdiction by agreement on a court that would otherwise not possess the jurisdiction to receive the civil action. 12. In other words, it is not open to the parties to confer jurisdiction by agreement on a court that would otherwise not possess the jurisdiction to receive the civil action. 12. The above preliminary discussion is necessary to appreciate the dictum in Indus Mobile and the rival submission as to the efficacy and applicability of such dictum. 13. In four of the six matters involved herein there are identical clauses – or, at any rate, clauses of similar legal import – both as to arbitration and the seat of the arbitral reference. These are APO 26 of 2018, APO 27 of 2018, APO 39 of 2018 and APO 42 of 2018. In the other two matters, APO 37 of 2018 and APO 38 of 2018, there are clauses identifying the desired court and the seat for the arbitral reference. That all the agreements involved in these matters contain an arbitration clause is obvious. The clause evidencing choice of seat for the arbitral reference in the four matters is contained as a part of Article 22 of the relevant agreements : “22. Law, Jurisdiction, Arbitration (a) All disputes, differences and/or claim arising out of this Agreement whether during its subsistence or there after shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the provision of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be referred to the sole Arbitration of an Arbitrator nominated by the Managing Director of the Lender. The award given by such an Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the Borrower to this Agreement. (b) The venue of arbitration proceedings shall be at Chennai. (c) The arbitrator so appointed herein above, shall also be entitled to pass an Award on the hypothecated asset and also on any other securities furnished by or on behalf of the Borrower.” The forum selection (or choice of court) clause and the chosen seat for the arbitral reference appear from the following in clauses 23 and 24 of the other two matters : “23. Arbitration “23.1 All disputes, differences and/or claims arising out of this Loan Agreement or as to the construction, meaning or effect hereof or as to the rights and liabilities of the parties hereunder shall be settled by arbitration to be held in Mumbai in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or any statutory amendments thereof and shall be referred to a person to be appointed by the Lender. In the event of death, refusal, neglect, inability, or incapability of the person so appointed to act as an Arbitrator, the Lender may appoint a new arbitrator. The award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on all parties concerned.” “24. Jurisdiction “24.1 Subject to the provisions of clause 23 above, any suit, petition, reference or other filing permitted or required to be made pursuant to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in respect of the matters arising out of this Agreement including, without limitation, a petition for appointment of an arbitrator or arbitrators under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall be instituted only in competent courts at Mumbai.” 14. The only other reference to the statute that needs to be made at the outset is to Section 20 of the Act that provides as follows : “20. Place of arbitration.—(1) The parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. (2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1), the place of arbitration shall be determined by the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties. (3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the arbitral tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods or other property.” 15. It is time to see the judgment in Indus Mobile and record the criticism thereof as made by the respondent finance companies. Since the issue involved here revolves on the dictum in Indus Mobile and there have been several judgments on the aspect since Indus Mobile as cited by the parties, the discussion on such case is in somewhat greater detail than on a precedent cited in the usual course. 16. Since the issue involved here revolves on the dictum in Indus Mobile and there have been several judgments on the aspect since Indus Mobile as cited by the parties, the discussion on such case is in somewhat greater detail than on a precedent cited in the usual course. 16. In Indus Mobile, the first respondent before the Supreme Court, having its registered office at Amritsar, supplied goods to the appellant before the Supreme Court in Chennai from New Delhi. The appellant approached the first respondent and expressed a desire to do business with the first respondent as its retail chain partner. It was in such circumstances that an agreement was executed between the parties in 2014. Such agreement contained an arbitration clause and both the forum of choice and the seat of the arbitral reference were indicated in the matrix contract. As to the seat of the arbitral reference, the agreement specified that “Such arbitration shall be conducted at Mumbai, in English language”. The forum selection clause provided as follows : “All disputes and differences of any kind whatever arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of Mumbai only.” 17. Disputes arose between the parties and the first respondent claimed that a large sum was due and owing from the appellant to the first respondent. The arbitration clause contained in the agreement was invoked by the first respondent and an arbitrator was appointed by the first respondent. The appellant objected to the appointment and called upon the first respondent to withdraw its notice. Two petitions were then filed by the first respondent before the Delhi High Court, one under Section 9 of the said Act and the other under Section 11 thereof. Both the petitions were disposed of by the judgment and order impugned before the Supreme Court. 18. As is recorded at paragraph 5 of the report in Indus Mobile, the Delhi High Court held that since no part of the cause of action had arisen in Mumbai, the forum selection clause was inapplicable as courts in Mumbai had no jurisdiction to entertain any petition under the said Act. 18. As is recorded at paragraph 5 of the report in Indus Mobile, the Delhi High Court held that since no part of the cause of action had arisen in Mumbai, the forum selection clause was inapplicable as courts in Mumbai had no jurisdiction to entertain any petition under the said Act. The Delhi High Court also held that since such court had been first approached and it also had the jurisdiction to receive the petition under Section 9 of the said Act, it could proceed with the petition for interim measures on merits. The request under Section 11 of the Act was disposed of by appointing a retired Supreme Court Judge as the sole arbitrator. The judgment also recorded that the conduct of the arbitration would be in Mumbai. 19. The appellant contended before the Supreme Court that “even if it were to be conceded that no part of the cause of action arose at Mumbai, yet the seat of the arbitration being at Mumbai, courts in Mumbai would have exclusive jurisdiction in all proceedings over the same.” The Supreme Court also noticed the contrary submission on behalf of the first respondent that since no part of the cause of action had arisen in Mumbai, even if the seat of the arbitral reference was at Mumbai, “it makes no difference as one of the tests prescribed by the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to give a court jurisdiction must at least be fulfilled.” However, the court did not express any view in such judgment on such aspect of the matter. 20. The Supreme Court went on, in Indus Mobile, to quote the pre-2015 Amendment Section 2(1)(e) of the Act and Section 20 thereof before observing, at paragraph 9 of the report, that the “concept of juridical seat has been evolved by the courts in England and has now been firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.” In such context, the Supreme Court noticed the Constitution Bench judgment reported at (2012) 9 SCC 552 (Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc) and proceeded to quote paragraphs 96, 98 to 100 and 123 from the Balco judgment. The court then referred to another Constitution Bench judgment reported at (2014) 5 SCC 1 [Enercon (India) Limited v. Enercon GmbH] and quoted paragraph 134 from the relevant report, which was a passage dealing with the law relating to international arbitration. The court then referred to another Constitution Bench judgment reported at (2014) 5 SCC 1 [Enercon (India) Limited v. Enercon GmbH] and quoted paragraph 134 from the relevant report, which was a passage dealing with the law relating to international arbitration. On the basis of the passages quoted from Balco and Enercon, the Supreme Court concluded as follows at paragraph 13 of the report : “13. This Court reiterated that once the seat of arbitration has been fixed, it would be in the nature of an exclusive jurisdiction clause as to the courts which exercise supervisory powers over the arbitration. …” 21. At paragraphs 15 and 16 the judgment in Indus Mobile, two other Supreme Court judgments rendered on matters pertaining to international arbitration were noticed before adverting to a report of the Law Commission that was the precursor to the 2015 Amendment to the Act of 1996 and the reference to the judgment in Balco in such report of the Law Commission. At paragraph 18 of the report, the court noticed that the Amending Act of 2015 did not incorporate the Law Commission’s recommendations as indicated in the report quoted as “it was found unnecessary to expressly incorporate what the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has already done by way of construction of the Act.” The finding rendered on the legal issue appears at paragraphs 19 and 20 of the report in Indus Mobile : “19. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction – that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction – that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties. “20. It is well settled that where more than one court has jurisdiction, it is open for parties to exclude all other courts. For an exhaustive analysis of the case law, see Swastik Gases (P) Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited. This was followed in a recent judgment in B.E. Simoese Von Staraburg Niedenthal v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited. Having regard to the above, it is clear that Mumbai courts alone have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts in the country, as the juridical seat of arbitration is at Mumbai. This being the case, the impugned judgment is set aside. The injunction confirmed by the impugned judgment will continue for a period of four weeks from the date of pronouncement of this judgment, so that the respondents may take necessary steps under Section 9 in the Mumbai Court. Appeals are disposed of accordingly.” 22. According to the appellants, it is evident on a proper reading of Indus Mobile that the ratio decidendi therein is that, once the seat of an arbitral reference is agreed to between the parties, it is only the courts at such place which is designated as the seat, which will have jurisdiction over all matters covered by Part-I of the Act of 1996. The appellants submit that such is the inescapable conclusion from the law as declared by the Supreme Court at paragraph 19 of the report in Indus Mobile; and the issue is neither res integra nor open to question before a High Court. 23. The appellants then proceed to cite the judgments of several High Courts where the dictum in Indus Mobile has been followed. The appellants suggest that since the law as declared in Indus Mobile has been widely applied, such settled position should not be disturbed. 23. The appellants then proceed to cite the judgments of several High Courts where the dictum in Indus Mobile has been followed. The appellants suggest that since the law as declared in Indus Mobile has been widely applied, such settled position should not be disturbed. The appellants emphasise on the principles of judicial propriety, discipline and decorum and even refer to the doctrine of stare decicis. 24. The appellants first refer to a Delhi High Court judgment reported at (2018) SCC Online Del 7009 (N.J. Construction v. Ayursundra Health Care Private Limited). A single bench of the Delhi High Court noticed the varying forum selection and arbitral seat selection clauses in the contract, but read the judgment in Indus Mobile to instruct that (notwithstanding the forum selection clause providing that “only the court in Guwahati shall have jurisdiction ...”) “since the seat of arbitration is at New Delhi, a neutral venue, only such court shall have jurisdiction to decide …”. The request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act was disposed of accordingly. In the next case carried by the appellants, reported at (2018) SCC Online Del 8227 (Rites Limited v. Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi), another single bench of the Delhi High Court noticed that the relevant contract provided for the arbitration to take place in Goa and applied the dictum in Indus Mobile to hold that “where the parties have agreed that arbitration shall be conducted at a neutral venue – that is, where no part of the cause of action has arisen – the courts having jurisdiction in respect of the neutral venue would have ‘exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings’.” The judgment also noticed the judgment and order impugned herein and observed that “this Court is unable to concur with the same view” and added that the judgment and order impugned in the present proceedings was “contrary to the express authoritative ruling of the Supreme Court in Indus Mobile …”. 25. In a judgment reported at (2018) SCC Online Guj 316 (Unique Optical Fibre & Telecom Services Private Limited v. Telecommunications Consultancy Indian Limited), which is next cited by the appellants, requests under Section 11 of the 1996 Act were repelled by the designate of the Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court. 25. In a judgment reported at (2018) SCC Online Guj 316 (Unique Optical Fibre & Telecom Services Private Limited v. Telecommunications Consultancy Indian Limited), which is next cited by the appellants, requests under Section 11 of the 1996 Act were repelled by the designate of the Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court. However, the agreement in such case contained both forum selection and arbitral seat selection clauses which provided for courts in Delhi to have exclusive jurisdiction and the arbitration proceedings to be held in Delhi. 26. In another judgment, reported at (2018) SCC Online Del 9178 (Global Credit Capital limited v. Krrish Realty Nirman Private), carried by the appellants, the seat for the arbitral reference was stipulated in the agreement to be New Delhi, but the forum selection clause provided for the courts at Gurgaon to have jurisdiction “of all the matters concerning this Agreement”. The designate of the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court relied on the decision in Indus Mobile to overrule the objection as to jurisdiction. In a further Delhi case reported at (2017) SCC Online Del 10361 (Dipendra Kumar v. The Strategic Outsourcing Services Private Limited), cited by the appellants, a request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act was dismissed only on the ground that the agreement provided for the arbitral reference to be held in Bengaluru. Again, the decision was guided by understanding of the dictum in Indus Mobile. 27. An unreported judgment of a single bench of the Delhi High Court rendered in OMP (Misc) 8/2017 on January 30, 2018 (Raheja Developers Limited v. Proto Developers & Technologies Limited) is next referred to by the appellants. Clause 19 of the relevant agreement between the parties stipulated that the seat of the arbitration would be Delhi and it also provided that “jurisdiction will be of the courts in Delhi.” An objection was taken by the respondents in that case on the ground of Section 42 of the 1996 Act since the arbitral tribunal had been constituted by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on a request under Section 11 of the Act. At paragraph 9 of the Delhi judgment, the single bench overruled such objection by referring to the judgment in Indus Mobile and the fact that the agreement between the parties provided for the arbitration proceedings to be conducted in Delhi. 28. At paragraph 9 of the Delhi judgment, the single bench overruled such objection by referring to the judgment in Indus Mobile and the fact that the agreement between the parties provided for the arbitration proceedings to be conducted in Delhi. 28. The next case brought by the appellants is an unreported judgment of a single bench of the Bombay High Court delivered on July 5, 2017 in AP No. 372 of 2016 (Municipal Corporation for the City of Kalyan & Dombivli v. Rudranee Infrastructure Limited). The two petitions challenging the arbitral award were sought to be contested on the ground that the district court at Thane, which had concurrent jurisdiction with the Bombay High Court, was the court of exclusive jurisdiction. The petitioners contended that since an arbitrator was appointed by the designate of the Chief justice of the Bombay High Court under Section 11 of the 1996 Act and “the very fact that the meetings in the arbitration reference were held, and the award was made, in Mumbai, fixes the seat of arbitration in Mumbai.” The judgment in Indus Mobile was pressed into service for such purpose. The court, however, disagreed with the petitioners since no seat of arbitration was stipulated in the agreement and held that the district court at Thane had curial jurisdiction over the award in view of Section 42 read with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. 29. An Allahabad decision has been placed next by the appellants. In the judgment reported at (2017) 125 ALR 582 (Suristh Tiwary v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey), a request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act was dealt with by a single bench. A clause in the relevant agreement stipulated that the arbitration proceedings would be conducted in New Delhi. On the strength of such clause and by applying the dictum in Indus Mobile, the request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act was repelled with the observation that “The seat of an arbitration is analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause” and “Any claim for remedy under Section 11, can be made only in the Courts of the place designated as the seat of arbitration.” A judgment of a single bench of Chhattisgarh High Court, reported at (2017) 4 CGLJ 570 (Vijay Kumar Agrawal v. Tata Motors Finance Limited), has been placed by the appellants. Both the forum selection clause and the arbitral seat clause in the relevant agreement identified Mumbai as the place of choice. The relevant clauses are identical to the clauses in the present case in APO 37 of 2018 and APO 38 of 2018, possibly since it is the same finance company that was involved in the Chhattisgarh case. On the strength of the judgment in Indus Mobile, the court held that only an appropriate court in Mumbai could have entertained the challenge to the arbitral award that was the subject-matter of the case. 30. Another unreported judgment of a single bench of the Delhi High Court has been cited by the appellants. In such judgment rendered on September 27, 2017 in OMP (I) (COMM) 373/2017 (Devyani International Limited v. Siddhivinayak Builders & Developers), a petition under Section 9 of the Act was decided on merits on the strength of the arbitral seat clause, which provided for the arbitration to be held in Delhi, though there was a forum selection clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the courts in Mumbai to entertain a case or suit arising out of the agreement. The principle enunciated in Indus Mobile was applied to hold that once the seat of arbitration was identified to be Delhi, courts in Delhi would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain matters pertaining to the arbitration agreement. A judgment of the single bench of the Uttarakhand High Court reported online at MANU/UC/0138/2017 (Nagar Palika Parishad v. Ramesth Construction Private Limited) has been carried next by the appellants to demonstrate how the legal position decided in Indus Mobile was applied on the basis of the agreement between the parties providing for Dehradun to ordinarily be the place of arbitration. The issue in that case was whether the jurisdiction of court of district judge, Pauri Garhwal stood excluded by the clause in the agreement that provided for Dehradun to ordinarily be the place of arbitration. It was held that such clause implied that the court of the district judge, Dehradun alone had the jurisdiction under the 1996 Act in respect of all matters which were to be carried to a court in connection with the relevant agreement. 31. A single bench judgment of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court reported at (2001) 4 MhLJ 211 (Arvind Kanhaiyalal Pashine v. Tata Finance Limited) is referred to by the appellants. 31. A single bench judgment of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court reported at (2001) 4 MhLJ 211 (Arvind Kanhaiyalal Pashine v. Tata Finance Limited) is referred to by the appellants. Both the forum selection and the arbitral seat clauses in that case identified Mumbai as the place of choice. Though the case was under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the appellants say that in the matter of assessment of the appropriate court qua the agreed seat of the arbitration, the view expressed in Indus Mobile was also a possible view under the 1940 Act. 32. On the wide acceptance of the principle recognised in Indus Mobile, the appellants place a Division Bench judgment of this court reported online at MANU/WB/0987/2017 (Mechon Services v. Predominant Engineers & Construction Private Limited). The issue in that case was as to which court would be competent to execute an arbitral award passed under the 1996 Act. The court noticed the judgment in Indus Mobile and held that since the parties had agreed to have their disputes resolved through arbitration by the West Bengal State Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council having its seat within the jurisdiction of this court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, “we have no hesitation to hold that the Original Side of this High Court is the Court where such award can be enforced with reference to the seat of the arbitral tribunal which is within the jurisdiction of the Original Side of this Court”. 33. The appellants have also relied on two recent judgments, one from Delhi reported at (2018) SCC Online Del 9566 (Katyayini Paper Mills Private Limited v. Directorate General of Supplies & Disposal) and the other from Kerala reported at (2018) SCC Online Ker 2538 (K. Sasidharan v. Sundaram Finance Limited), which accepted and applied the dictum in Indus Mobile. 34. The appellants next place a Full Bench judgment of this court reported at AIR 2015 Cal 112 (Prabhat Pan v. The State of West Bengal) for the proposition that judicial discipline is more important than jurisprudential correctness. It was held in such judgment, inter alia, that “Judge-made law relating to binding precedents is founded on the larger public policy of predictability and certainty regarding the law. It was held in such judgment, inter alia, that “Judge-made law relating to binding precedents is founded on the larger public policy of predictability and certainty regarding the law. It is a rule of judicial discipline which is the sine qua non for sustaining the system.” Elsewhere in the judgment it was observed as follows : “Since certainty and consistency are the bedrock of a mature judicial system, a legal pronouncement of a superior forum, in the hierarchical judicial structure in this country, when cited before an inferior forum is binding on the inferior forum, subject to the caveat that the authority of the superior forum is not per incuriam.” The judgment in Prabhat Pan also instructed on how to discern the ratio decidendi in a judgment and what is the law which is declared by the Supreme Court in a judgment for the purpose of Article 141 of the Constitution : “41. A judgment is an authority for the legal position that it expressly decides and not anything else which is deemed to have been considered or decided. The dictum in Mithilesh Garg is binding on this court and has to be regarded as the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution; but what is binding is only the ratio decidendi of that judgment. The ratio decidendi of a judgment has to be discerned upon the reading of the whole of the judgment and has to be found out from what is set out in the judgment itself. As to what is set out in the judgment, it has to be read in the context of the matter and not in isolation. A judgment is not to be read as a statute and its ratio is its reasoning on how the law was applied to the facts to arrive at the conclusion. The statements of the Supreme Court contained in its judgments, other than the law, have no binding force.” 35. The appellants exhort that consistency is the hall-mark of a mature judicial system and refer to the following quotation from an article entitled Mr. Justice Frankfurter: A Heritage for All Who Love the Law by Tom C. Clerk published in 1965 (51 A.B.A.J. 330) as quoted in a judgment reported at (2017) 13 SCC 115 (Dental Council of India v. Dr. Justice Frankfurter: A Heritage for All Who Love the Law by Tom C. Clerk published in 1965 (51 A.B.A.J. 330) as quoted in a judgment reported at (2017) 13 SCC 115 (Dental Council of India v. Dr. Hedgewar Smruti Rugna Seva Mandal, Hingoli) : “For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private views to the law of which we are all guardians – those impersonal convictions that make a society a civilised community, and not the victims of personal rule.” 36. The appellants next refer to a passage from an English judgment reported at (1914) 3 KB 458 (Velazquez, Limited v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue) : “But there is one rule by which, of course, we are bound to abide – that when there has been a decision of this Court upon a question of principle it is not right for this Court, whatever its own views may be, to depart from that decision. There would otherwise be no finality in the law. If it is contended that the decision is wrong, then the proper course is to go to the ultimate tribunal, the House of Lords, who have power to settle the law and hold that the decision which is binding upon us is not good law.” 37. On similar lines, the appellants refer to the following oft-quoted passage from the House of Lords judgment reported at (1901) AC 495 (Quinn v. Leathem) : “ … there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” 38. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” 38. The appellants finally refer to a yet unreported judgment of the Supreme Court rendered on May 1, 2018 in Civil Appeal No.4628 of 2018 (Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc.). The appellants submit that the issue regarding the seat of an arbitral reference may not have been finally pronounced upon by the Supreme Court in view of the reference to a larger bench in such judgment in Hardy as evident from paragraph 23 thereof : “23. In our opinion, though, the question regarding the “seat” and “venue” for holding arbitration proceedings by the arbitrators arising under the Arbitration Agreement/International Commercial Arbitration Agreement is primarily required to be decided keeping in view the terms of the arbitration agreement itself, but having regard to the law laid down by this Court in several decisions by the Benches of variable strength as detailed above, and further taking into consideration the aforementioned submissions urged by the learned counsel for the parties and also keeping in view the issues involved in the appeal, which frequently arise in International Commercial Arbitration matters, we are of the considered view that this is a fit case to exercise our power under Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and refer this case (appeal ) to be dealt with by the larger Bench of this Court for its hearing.” 39. The respondents are scathing in their criticism of the judgment in Indus Mobile, but not for one moment in an irreverential way. They submit that the dictum in Indus Mobile is per incuriam as it is a contrary to the express finding in such regard at paragraph 96 of the judgment in Balco. The respondents are scathing in their criticism of the judgment in Indus Mobile, but not for one moment in an irreverential way. They submit that the dictum in Indus Mobile is per incuriam as it is a contrary to the express finding in such regard at paragraph 96 of the judgment in Balco. The respondents submit that though Indus Mobile refers to Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act, it does not discuss such provision in arriving at the conclusion; that Indus Mobile refers to Section 20 of the Act of 1996, which is completely irrelevant in the context of discovering which court would be appropriate to receive a petition or application under Part-I of the Act of 1996 in relation to an arbitration agreement; and, most importantly, that the dictum in Indus Mobile is based on judgments rendered in the context of international commercial arbitrations where the seat of arbitration was invariably outside India. In addition, the respondents submit that the dictum in Indus Mobile does not resolve a possible conflict if there is a forum selection clause that provides for a designated court to receive all petitions under Part-I of the Act of 1996 and also another clause that provides for a seat of the arbitral reference at some other place. 40. The respondents assert that there is nothing in the law that prevents the parties to a contract to provide for a particular court or any court of a particular city to be the designated court to receive all applications under Part-I of the Act of 1996 in respect of the arbitration agreement between the parties and a completely different city being designated as the seat for the arbitral reference. The respondents maintain that in such a situation, the perceived dictum in Indus Mobile cannot hold good since the parties have chosen separate places for the two purposes and there is no law that requires the choice of one to be influenced by the choice of the other. Thus, the respondents submit, that the two parties to an agreement governed by an arbitration clause may stipulate that the appropriate courts in Calcutta would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain petitions and applications pertaining to the arbitration agreement and, in the same breath, also agree that the seat of the arbitration would be Mumbai. Thus, the respondents submit, that the two parties to an agreement governed by an arbitration clause may stipulate that the appropriate courts in Calcutta would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain petitions and applications pertaining to the arbitration agreement and, in the same breath, also agree that the seat of the arbitration would be Mumbai. As to the forum selection clause in the choice of the court, the respondents continue, the appropriate court in Calcutta in the given example would have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain all petitions and applications pertaining to the arbitration agreement as long as such court is otherwise empowered by Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act of 1996 to receive any petition or application pertaining to the arbitration agreement. It is the further contention of the respondents that Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act of 1996 is no different from Sections 16 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code or, in this court, to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Such submission amounts to this: that if a court other than this High Court were to be designated by the agreement of the parties to be the forum of choice, such court ought to have authority under any of the rules recognised under Sections 16 to 20 of the Code; or, if such court were to be this court, this court ought to be authorised under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent to receive the matter. 41. The respondents submit that the perceived dictum in Indus Mobile is flawed since such aspect of the matter was not taken into consideration and passed sub silentio. It is here that paragraph 96 of the judgment in Balco, despite it being in the context of a foreign arbitral award, may be referred to for whatever it is worth : “96. … We are of the opinion, the term “subject-matter of the arbitration” cannot be confused with “subject-matter of the suit”. The term “subject-matter” in Section 2(1)(e) is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to the Courts of Delhi being the courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal. This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were to be performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the courts would have jurisdiction, i.e. the court within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution, i.e. arbitration is located.” 42. In such circumstances, both the courts would have jurisdiction, i.e. the court within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution, i.e. arbitration is located.” 42. The aforesaid passage from Balco is quoted in Indus Mobile, but, according to the respondents, the judgment in Indus Mobile failed to notice the dictum in the Constitution Bench in Balco that both sets of courts – those otherwise competent to receive the action if it were a suit and the court within whose jurisdiction the chosen seat of arbitral reference is situate – are clothed with the jurisdiction to entertain petitions and applications under Part-I of the Act of 1996 and not only the court within whose jurisdiction the chosen seat of the arbitral reference is located. 43. The respondents maintain that a fundamental mistake was committed in Indus Mobile applying the law relating to international commercial arbitration where the chosen seat was outside India to a matter exclusively governed under Part-I of the Act as it was a case of domestic arbitration. The respondents add that Section 20 of the Act of 1996 has nothing to do with a court empowered to receive a petition or application under Part-I of the Act. Section 20 of the Act merely leaves the parties to an arbitration agreement free to agree on the place of arbitration and also provides that failing any agreement as to the place of arbitration, such place would be determined by the arbitral tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties. Section 20 of the Act of 1996 also makes a distinction between the chosen seat of arbitration and the venue for a particular meeting of the arbitral tribunal. Again, the choice of such venue is left to the arbitral tribunal and the considerations for such choice are the appropriateness of the venue for consultation among the members of the arbitral tribunal, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods or other property. 44. The respondents raise a further question as to the court which would be appropriate to receive a petition or application under Part-I of the Act of 1996 if there were no agreed seat of arbitration, but there was a venue that was chosen by the arbitral tribunal. 44. The respondents raise a further question as to the court which would be appropriate to receive a petition or application under Part-I of the Act of 1996 if there were no agreed seat of arbitration, but there was a venue that was chosen by the arbitral tribunal. According to the respondents, the choice of the seat of the arbitration, or the lack of it, would have no bearing on the choice of court to which a petition or application has to be filed under Part-I of the Act of 1996. 45. The respondents next place several judgments on the principle of ratio decidendi, obiter dictum, sub silentio and per incuriam. The respondents first rely on the minority view in a judgment reported at (1979) 3 SCC 745 (Dalbir Singh v. State of Punjab). Paragraph 22 of the judgment is placed for the enunciation therein as to what can be regarded as the law declared by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. The following passage is of relevance in the context : “22. … A decision on a question of sentence depending upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case, can never be regarded as a binding precedent, much less “law declared” within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution so as to bind all courts within the territory of India. According to the well-settled theory of precedents every decision contains three basic ingredients : “(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of (i) and (ii) above.” For the purposes of the parties themselves and their privies, ingredient (iii) is the material element in the decision for it determines finally their rights and liabilities in relation to the subject-matter of the action. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This indeed is the ratio decidendi. It is not everything said by a Judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. It is the judgment that estops the parties from reopening the dispute. However, for the purpose of the doctrine of precedents, ingredient (ii) is the vital element in the decision. This indeed is the ratio decidendi. It is not everything said by a Judge when giving judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. In the leading case of Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd. v. Haynes [LR 1959 AC 743 ], it was laid down that the ratio decidendi may be defined as a statement of law applied to the legal problems raised by the facts as found, upon which the decision is based. The other two elements in the decision are not precedents. The judgment is not binding (except directly on the parties themselves), nor are the findings of facts. …” 46. The next judgment cited by the respondents is reported at (1989) 1 SCC 101 (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur). Paragraph 11 of the report deals with the concepts of per incuriam and sub silentio : “11. Pronouncements of law, which are not part of the ratio decidendi are classed as obiter dicta and are not authoritative. With all respect to the learned Judge who passed the order in Jamna Das case and to the learned Judge who agreed with him, we cannot concede that this Court is bound to follow it. It was delivered without argument, without reference to the relevant provisions of the Act conferring express power on the Municipal Corporation to direct removal of encroachments from any public place like pavements or public streets, and without any citation of authority. Accordingly, we do not propose to uphold the decision of the High Court because, it seems to us that it is wrong in principle and cannot be justified by the terms of the relevant provisions. A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. A decision should be treated as given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute. So far as the order shows, no argument was addressed to the court on the question whether or not any direction could properly be made compelling the Municipal Corporation to construct a stall at the pitching site of a pavement squatter. Professor P.J. Fitzgerald, editor of the Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn. explains the concept of sub silentio at p. 153 in these words : A decision passes sub silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind. The Court may consciously decide in favour of one party because of point A, which it considers and pronounces upon. It may be shown, however, that logically the court should not have decided in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point B in his favour; but point B was not argued or considered by the court. In such circumstances, although point B was logically involved in the facts and although the case had a specific outcome, the decision is not an authority on point B. Point B is said to pass sub silentio.” 47. A recent judgment reported at (2018) 4 SCC 743 (Jayant Verma v. Union of India) is cited by the respondents for the proposition that when a cryptic view is expressed without analysing the law, there may not be any ratio decidendi discernible from such judgment. 48. Finally, a judgment of the Delhi High Court reported at (2018) SCC Online Del 9338 (Antrix Corporation Limited v. Devas Multimedia Private Limited) has been placed for the discussion therein, inter alia, on the dictum in Indus Mobile. In that case the appellant before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court applied under Section 11 of the 1996 Act before the Chief Justice of India, seeking the constitution of an arbitral tribunal. Such appellant then applied under Section 9 of the Act before the Bangalore City Civil Court seeking an order restraining the respondent from proceeding with the arbitral reference before the International Chamber of Commerce since it was contrary to the agreement between the parties. Such appellant then applied under Section 9 of the Act before the Bangalore City Civil Court seeking an order restraining the respondent from proceeding with the arbitral reference before the International Chamber of Commerce since it was contrary to the agreement between the parties. The respondent appeared before the Bangalore court and sought time to file objections. In the meantime, the ICC proceedings were stayed by the designate of the Chief Justice of India in proceedings under Section 11 of the Act filed by the appellant before the Delhi High Court, but finally the request under Section 11 was dismissed since the arbitral tribunal had already been constituted under the ICC rules. While dismissing the request under Section 11 of the Act, it was observed that the appellant before the Delhi High Court would have the right to air its objections in appropriate proceedings. 49. The ICC’s arbitral tribunal rendered an award in favour of respondent in the Delhi High Court proceedings. Such respondent then applied under Section 9 of the Act before the Delhi High Court at the post-award stage. However, the appellant before the Delhi High Court applied before the Bangalore City Civil Court under Section 34 of the Act to challenge the award. A single bench of the Delhi High Court held that the original petition under Section 9 filed by Antrix in the Bangalore court was not maintainable and the subsequent petition under Section 9 at the post-award stage filed by Devas in Delhi was maintainable. As a consequence, it was also held that Antrix’s petition under Section 34 of the Act before the Bangalore Court was incompetent. The appeal before the Division Bench arose in such circumstances. The primary question before the Division Bench was whether the Bangalore court had any jurisdiction since the parties had chosen New Delhi as the seat of arbitration and, by virtue of such designation, exclusive jurisdiction was conferred on the courts at New Delhi. At paragraph 53 of the report, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court noticed that Balco had unmistakably held that courts at the seat do not have exclusive jurisdiction; but two courts have concurrent jurisdiction – the seat court and the court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises. At paragraph 53 of the report, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court noticed that Balco had unmistakably held that courts at the seat do not have exclusive jurisdiction; but two courts have concurrent jurisdiction – the seat court and the court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises. In such light, the appeal was allowed with the observation that the Delhi High Court did not possess the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with or adjudicate applications arising out of the arbitration agreement and that Section 42 of the Act precluded the Delhi High Court from hearing or deciding the application preferred by Devas. 50. In the light of the rival contentions and the various judgments brought to bear on the legal issue, it is necessary first to discover the exact ratio decidendi in the judgment in Indus Mobile. This is important because, whether or not the ratio decidendi in Indus Mobile is appropriate or such ratio decidendi is founded on relevant legal considerations, the binding impact of such ratio cannot be brushed aside or wished away. 51. In Indus Mobile, the agreement between the parties contained a clause selecting the seat of arbitration and the agreement also contained a forum selection clause. As it happened, both such clauses identified Mumbai and the courts at Mumbai as the seat of arbitration and the forum of choice, respectively. The apparent dictum in Indus Mobile is that in case of a domestic arbitration, where the choice of the seat of arbitration and the forum selection clause indicate the same place, only courts at such place will have jurisdiction to entertain any application under Part-I of the 1996 Act (except, for obvious reasons, requests under Section 11 of the Act and applications under Section 8 thereof). 52. The apparent dictum in Indus Mobile does not cover a situation where the seat of the arbitral reference in a domestic arbitration is ‘X’ and the forum selection clause identifies courts at ‘Y’ to be exclusively entitled to entertain petitions and applications pertaining to the arbitration agreement. Indeed, in this day and age of party autonomy, it is for the parties to choose where they would want their arbitral reference to be held and which court they would identify for the petitions and applications pertaining to the arbitration agreement to be carried to. Indeed, in this day and age of party autonomy, it is for the parties to choose where they would want their arbitral reference to be held and which court they would identify for the petitions and applications pertaining to the arbitration agreement to be carried to. There is no legal requirement that the two must be the same and it is possible that the parties agree that the seat of the arbitral reference would be Delhi but courts at Calcutta would have the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain all matters pertaining to the arbitration agreement. 53. However, the extent of party autonomy is subject to the rules of public policy as recognised in Sections 15 to 20 of the Code, in case of a court governed by the Code; and by Clause 12 of the Letters Patent in case of a chartered High Court as this court. What such rule of public policy reflects is that the parties to an agreement can confer exclusive jurisdiction only on such a court which possesses the authority in law to entertain an action; parties by their agreement cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which does not otherwise possess the authority to entertain the action. That is the rule enunciated in the judgment reported at (1971) 1 SCC 286 (Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Limited). Paragraph 4 of the report in Hakam Singh is quite clear on the legal issue and such rule as recognised in Hakam Singh has not been disturbed till date : “4. The Code of Civil Procedure in its entirety applies to proceedings under the Arbitration Act. The jurisdiction of the courts under the Arbitration Act to entertain a proceeding for filing an award is accordingly governed by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. By clause 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the City of Bombay. In any event the respondents have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the courts at Bombay. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.” (Emphasis supplied.) 54. Section 2(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which was relevant for the consideration in the judgment in Hakam Singh, defined “Court” to mean “a Civil Court having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the reference if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not, except for the purpose of arbitration proceedings under Section 21, include a Small Cause Court”. While on the 1940 Act, it may also be relevant to notice Section 31(4) of such predecessor statute of the 1996 Act : “31. Jurisdiction. – (1). … (2). … (3). … (4). Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any law for the time being in force, where in any reference any application under this Act has been made in a Court competent to entertain it, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings, and all subsequent applications arising, out of that reference, and the arbitration proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.” 55. The corresponding provision is found in Section 42 of the 1996 Act : “42. Jurisdiction. – Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.” 56. On the other hand, Section 20 of the 1996 Act has no bearing on where any petition or application under Part-I of the Act may be filed. On the other hand, Section 20 of the 1996 Act has no bearing on where any petition or application under Part-I of the Act may be filed. Indeed, the choice of the seat or place of arbitration has no nexus with the choice of the court where any petition or application under Part-I of the 1996 Act may be carried to. The choice of the court is governed by Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the 1996 Act read with Section 42 thereof and, subject to the parameters under such provisions being adhered to, it is governed by any agreement between the parties. In other words, if corporate entities, ‘A’ and ‘B’, both having their only places of business in Pune, enter into a contract the performance whereof is only in Pune, and such agreement contains an arbitration clause, then all petitions and applications pertaining to such arbitration agreement (except under Sections 8 and 11 of the 1996 Act), have per force to be carried to the appropriate court in Pune and nowhere else. Further, once a particular court in Pune is approached and such court is found to have jurisdiction to entertain the matter or the jurisdiction of such court is not objected to, it is only such court which will be authorised to entertain all future petitions and applications under Part-I of the 1996 Act pertaining to the arbitration agreement. The significance of this rule cannot be understated, particularly since an arbitration agreement is capable of generating several references and, once a particular court is approached in connection with a matter under Part-I of the 1996 Act pertaining to an arbitration agreement and the jurisdiction of such court is established or not doubted, that court is the exclusive forum to receive all subsequent matters and applications in respect of the arbitration agreement. 57. The corollary to such rule as applicable in the Pune example is that in such a given situation the parties could not have chosen any court in Patna or Panaji or anywhere else to have been the forum of choice. Even if the parties had chosen a court at Patna or Panaji or the like, such court would not have had any authority to receive the action and the agreement between the parties would have been to no avail and void in view of the dictum in Hakam Singh. Even if the parties had chosen a court at Patna or Panaji or the like, such court would not have had any authority to receive the action and the agreement between the parties would have been to no avail and void in view of the dictum in Hakam Singh. Thus, the extent of party autonomy in the choice of court is limited. The extent of party autonomy, however, in the choice of seat for the arbitral reference is unrestricted. Continuing with the Pune example, the parties could have agreed the seat of arbitration to be in Patna or Panaji or even Puducherry and such choice would be binding on them; but an agreement as to the seat of the arbitral reference would not have any bearing on the court which could receive any action under Part-I of the Act. 58. Pre-2015 Amendment Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act and post-2015 Amendment Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the 1996 Act do not take the seat of the arbitral reference, whether agreed or accidental, as a relevant consideration to identify the court to which a matter under Part-I of the 1996 Act may be carried. There is good reason for ignoring the seat of the arbitral reference. Conceptually, the seat of an arbitral reference cannot be equated with the place of performance of a contract for any cause of action based on the situs thereof to be founded as a ground to invoke the jurisdiction of a court. More importantly, when the parties can agree to a seat of arbitral reference, they can, at any stage, alter their choice by further agreement. Since the choice of court becomes relevant even before the commencement of arbitral proceedings, if a court were to be approached at such stage, the future seat, agreed or accidental, of the arbitral reference can have no manner of relevance at such stage. 59. Since the choice of court becomes relevant even before the commencement of arbitral proceedings, if a court were to be approached at such stage, the future seat, agreed or accidental, of the arbitral reference can have no manner of relevance at such stage. 59. With respect, this aspect of the matter did not get any or adequate consideration in Indus Mobile and, to the extent the ratio decidendi in Indus Mobile may be perceived to imply that the parties to an agreement may be free to agree on a common place as the seat of the arbitral reference and the choice of forum for the court at such chosen place to be exclusively entitled to receive all matters pertaining to the arbitration agreement, irrespective of the fact that such court of choice may not possess due authority under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act, such dictum has to be tempered by the long-standing rule enunciated in Hakam Singh. 60. It is, thus, that the ratio in Indus Mobile has to be read down in the light of the dictum in Hakam Singh to provide that, in case of a domestic arbitration when parties to an arbitration agreement choose a seat for the arbitral reference and also choose the courts or a particular court at the same place as the seat of the arbitral reference as the exclusive court to which petitions and applications under Part-I of the 1996 Act can be carried, such court would have exclusive jurisdiction in such regard as long as such court is otherwise clothed with the authority under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Act read with Sections 15 to 20 of the Code where applicable; or Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the 1996 Act read with Clause 12 of the Letters Patent as in this court. That is the net effect, if the dictum in Indus Mobile has to be read in consonance with the rule as declared in Hakam Singh. Since Hakam Singh was not referred to in Indus Mobile and the law as declared in Hakam Singh, also by a two-member Bench as in Indus Mobile, could not have been overruled by a Bench of coordinate strength and authority, the law does not change and the law remains exactly as it was prior to Indus Mobile. 61. Since Hakam Singh was not referred to in Indus Mobile and the law as declared in Hakam Singh, also by a two-member Bench as in Indus Mobile, could not have been overruled by a Bench of coordinate strength and authority, the law does not change and the law remains exactly as it was prior to Indus Mobile. 61. In a sense, the confusion was created, if it may be said with all humility, with a contextually inappropriate example at paragraph 96 of the judgment in Balco. To begin with, the legal issue in Balco was whether an arbitral award rendered in a foreign land could be assailed in any court in India under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The larger issue involved in Balco was the applicability of Part-I of the 1996 Act to international arbitrations and foreign arbitral awards. In the context of the legal issues that arose in Balco, Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act was irrelevant as the matter in Balco pertained to international law where the choice of the seat of the arbitral reference determines the choice of the curial law or the law applicable to the conduct of the arbitral reference and the outcome thereof, unless the parties agree otherwise. As is recognised in a judgment of this court rendered several months before the Balco judgment was pronounced, reported at AIR 2012 Cal 92 (Coal India Limited v. Canadian Commercial Corporation), when parties to an arbitration agreement choose Switzerland as the seat of arbitration, they do not do so because of the picturesque background of the Alps, but they embrace the Swiss law to apply to the conduct of the arbitral reference and the outcome thereof, unless they expressly agree otherwise. 62. The example at paragraph 96 of the judgment in Balco ran thus : “For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to the courts of Delhi being the courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal.” 63. With respect, the example would have been apposite if instead of Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata the three places had been chosen to be Geneva, London and Kolkata or Toronto, Mumbai and Sydney or even Singapore, New York and Delhi; for, the example would have been apposite then in the context of international law as the applicable arbitration laws would have been different at the three places, being the countries of the parties and the country chosen as the seat for the arbitral reference. Again, with respect, the example was misplaced in the context of the discussion in Balco since the arbitration law was and is the same in Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata. 64. Such aspect of the matter is clear from the passage from the judgment reported at Enercon (India) Limited noticed at paragraph 12 of the report in Indus Mobile. The opening sentence of paragraph 134 of the judgment in Enercon (India) Limited clinches the issue : “134. It is accepted by most of the experts in the law relating to international arbitration that in almost all the national laws, arbitrations are anchored to the seat/place/situs of arbitration. Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2009), in Para 3.54 concludes that ‘the seat of the arbitration is thus intended to be its centre of gravity.’ …” 65. What is true in the law relating to international arbitration may not be applicable to domestic arbitration and, with respect, Indus Mobile may have failed to see the distinction between the two. 66. It is further evident from the judgment reported at (2014) 7 SCC 603 (Reliance Industries Limited v. Union of India) and the judgment reported at (2015) 9 SCC 172 (Harmony Innovation Shipping Limited v. Gupta Coal India Limited) that the rule on which the dictum in Indus Mobile was sought to be founded is a rule of international law. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment in Indus Mobile, particularly the quotation from Redfern and Hunter as extracted in the judgment reported at (2016) 11 SCC 508 (Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Ashapura Minechem Limited), are clear in their recognition of the principle being applicable in international law - that the parties choose a particular place of arbitration because its lex arbitri is one which they find attractive. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment in Indus Mobile are quoted : “14. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment in Indus Mobile are quoted : “14. In Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, this statement of the law was echoed in several paragraphs. This judgment makes it clear that “juridical seat” is nothing but the “legal place” of arbitration. It was held that since the juridical seat or legal place of arbitration was London, English courts alone would have jurisdiction over the arbitration thus excluding Part I of the Indian Act. (See paras 36, 41, 45 to 60 and 76.1 and 76.2.) This judgment was relied upon and followed by Harmony Innovation Shipping Limited v. Gupta Coal India Limited, (See paras 45 and 48). In Union of India v. Reliance Industries Limited, this Court referred to all the earlier judgments and held that in cases where the seat of arbitration is London, by necessary implication Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is excluded as the supervisory jurisdiction of courts over the arbitration goes along with “seat”. “15. In a recent judgment in Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Ashapura Minechem Limited, all the aforesaid authorities were referred to and followed. Para 34 of the said judgment reads as follows : “34. As a matter of fact the mere choosing of the juridical seat of arbitration attracts the law applicable to such location. In other words, it would not be necessary to specify which law would apply to the arbitration proceedings, since the law of the particular country would apply ipso jure. The following passage from Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration contains the following explication of the issue : “It is also sometimes said that parties have selected the procedural law that will govern their arbitration, by providing for arbitration in a particular country. This is too elliptical and, as an English court itself held more recently in Breas of Doune Wind Farm it does not always hold true. What the parties have done is to choose a place of arbitration in a particular country. That choice brings with it submission to the laws of that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration. What the parties have done is to choose a place of arbitration in a particular country. That choice brings with it submission to the laws of that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration. To say that the parties have “chosen” that particular law to govern the arbitration is rather like saying that an English woman who takes her car to France has “chosen” French traffic law, which will oblige her to drive on the right-hand side of the road, to give priority to vehicles approaching from the right, and generally to obey traffic laws to which she may not be accustomed. But it would be an odd use of language to say this notional motorist had opted for “French traffic law”. What she has done is to choose to go to France. The applicability of French law then follows automatically. It is not a matter of choice. Parties may well choose a particular place of arbitration precisely because its lex arbitri is one which they find attractive. Nevertheless, once a place of arbitration has been chosen, it brings with it its own law. If that law contains provisions that are mandatory so far as arbitration are concerned, those provisions must be obeyed. It is not a matter of choice any more than the notional motorist is free to choose which local traffic laws to obey and which to disregard.” 67. When two Indian parties enter into an arbitration agreement where the seat of the arbitral reference is in India, the choice of such seat has no impact on the lex arbitri since the arbitration law is uniform all over the country. Thus, if a party in London enters into an agreement with a party in Kolkata and the arbitration agreement between them provides for the seat of the arbitral reference to be Geneva, unless the agreement also specifies something to the contrary, it follows from such agreement that the conduct of the arbitral reference and the outcome thereof would be governed by Swiss law. The same thing cannot be said, for obvious reasons, if a party in Mumbai were to enter into an arbitration agreement with another party in Kolkata and provide for the seat of the arbitral reference to be Delhi. The same thing cannot be said, for obvious reasons, if a party in Mumbai were to enter into an arbitration agreement with another party in Kolkata and provide for the seat of the arbitral reference to be Delhi. The concept of juridical seat of arbitration is irrelevant in any domestic arbitration since the arbitration law does not change from one place to another within this country. 68. The discussion in Balco on such aspect, particularly in its reference to Section 2(1)(e) of the Act was not germane to the context of the issues involved in the matter and the conclusion at the end of paragraph 96 of the judgment in Balco cannot be regarded as the ratio decidendi of such judgment or being the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. 69. As noticed earlier in this judgment, a three-member bench of the Supreme Court in Gurnam Kaur emphasised that “Quotability as ‘law’ applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi” and that “Statements which are not part of the ratio decidendi are distinguished as obiter dicta and are not authoritative.” In such light, the example at paragraph 96 of the judgment in Balco and the conclusions drawn on such aspect in some of the subsequent paragraphs, which are not a part of the ratio decidendi in such judgment, cannot be regarded as authoritative or of binding value. A passage from Salmond on Jurisprudence (12 Ed) was quoted with approval in the judgment in Gurnam Kaur. The quotation has been extracted earlier in this judgment where, in describing when a decision passes sub silentio, it was observed though a court may consciously decide in favour of one party because of point A, it may be shown that the court should not have decided in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point B in its favour; “but point B was not argued or considered by the court.” In such a situation, the judgment in Gurnam Kaur went on to observe, that “although point B was logically involved in the facts, … the decision is not an authority on point B. Point B is said to pass sub silentio.” And so it may have been in the case of Indus Mobile on the aspect of whether the designated court otherwise had authority in law to receive the action. It is evident that not only did the judgment and order impugned in Indus Mobile hold that no part of the cause of action had arisen in Mumbai, but such argument was also repeated before the Supreme Court. However, in deciding the matter, the judgment in Indus Mobile does not appear to have addressed such issue. Indeed, in the opening sentence of paragraph 20 of the judgment in Indus Mobile, the appropriate legal principle was noticed and stated to the effect that where more than one court has jurisdiction it is open for the parties to choose one court and exclude all others. However, the judgment does not address the issue as to whether any court in Mumbai had jurisdiction at all. 70. The rule in Hakam Singh has been reiterated by the Supreme Court over and over again in course of the nearly four decades since it was first formulated. Such rule has also been found to hold good for arbitration matters in the backdrop of both the 1940 Act and the 1996 Act since the material part of Section 2(c) of the 1940 Act for the purpose of the legal issue involved herein was identical to Section 2(1)(e) of the 1996 Act prior to the 2015 Amendment and Section 2(1)(e)(i) in post-2015 Amendment 1996 Act does not alter the position. Though not in the context of the 1996 Act, the rule in Hakam Singh was endorsed and applied in the judgment reported at (2004) 4 SCC 671 (Hanil Era Textiles Ltd v. Puromatic Filters (P) Ltd) at paragraph 7 of the report : “7. … In Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. it was held that it is not open to the parties to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or a proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy. It was also held that such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.” 71. In a judgment pertaining to a matter under the 1940 Act, reported at (2009) 3 SCC 107 (Rajasthan SEB v. Universal Petrol Chemicals Ltd), it was observed as follows : “31. It was also held that such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.” 71. In a judgment pertaining to a matter under the 1940 Act, reported at (2009) 3 SCC 107 (Rajasthan SEB v. Universal Petrol Chemicals Ltd), it was observed as follows : “31. Section 20 of the Code will apply in respect of deciding the issue with regard to territorial jurisdiction of a court in respect of a matter relating to arbitration also, for in Hakam Singh, it was held that the jurisdiction of the court under the Act to entertain the proceeding for filing an award was governed by the provisions of the Code.” 72. A three-member Bench of the Supreme Court in a judgment reported at (2015) 12 SCC 225 (B. E. Simoes Von Staraburg Niedenthal v. Chhattisgarh Investment Limited) quoted a passage from another judgment to emphasise that for a forum selection clause to be valid and enforceable, it had to meet both tests : there must be an identified place and a court at such place must possess the authority to receive the action. The following passage is apposite : “10. In Swastik Gases (P) Ltd. (2013) 9 SCC 32 , in the lead judgment, one of us (R.M. Lodha, J., as he then was) referred to the earlier decisions of this Court in Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd; Globe Transport Corpn. v. Triveni Engg. Works (1983) 4 SCC 707 ; Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. (1995) 4 SCC 153 ; New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 4 SCC 677 ; Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics (P) Ltd. v. Chand Mal Baradia (2005) 10 SCC 704 ; Rajasthan SEB v. Universal Petrol Chemicals Ltd; Balaji Coke Industry (P) Ltd. v. Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat (P) Ltd. (2009) 9 SCC 403 ; A.V.M. Sales Corpn. v. Anuradha Chemicals (P) Ltd. (2012) 2 SCC 315 and culled out the legal position in para 32 of the Report as under : “32. … It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ or ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. … It is a fact that whilst providing for jurisdiction clause in the agreement the words like ‘alone’, ‘only’, ‘exclusive’ or ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ have not been used but this, in our view, is not decisive and does not make any material difference. The intention of the parties—by having Clause 18 in the agreement—is clear and unambiguous that the courts at Kolkata shall have jurisdiction which means that the courts at Kolkata alone shall have jurisdiction. It is so because for construction of jurisdiction clause, like Clause 18 in the agreement, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius comes into play as there is nothing to indicate to the contrary. This legal maxim means that expression of one is the exclusion of another. By making a provision that the agreement is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of other courts. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the courts at a particular place and such courts have jurisdiction to deal with the matter, we think that an inference may be drawn that parties intended to exclude all other courts. A clause like this is not hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act at all. Such clause is neither forbidden by law nor is it against the public policy. It does not offend Section 28 of the Contract Act in any manner.” (Emphasis supplied) 73. The legal position and the importance of the judgment in Hakam Singh have been lucidly explained in a judgment reported at (2005) 7 SCC 791 (Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd) : “21. A plain reading of Section 20 of the Code leaves no room for doubt that it is a residuary provision and covers those cases not falling within the limitations of Sections 15 to 19. The opening words of the section, “subject to the limitations aforesaid” are significant and make it abundantly clear that the section takes within its sweep all personal actions. A suit falling under Section 20 thus may be instituted in a court within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain or cause of action wholly or partly arises. “22. It is, no doubt true, as submitted by Ms. A suit falling under Section 20 thus may be instituted in a court within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain or cause of action wholly or partly arises. “22. It is, no doubt true, as submitted by Ms. Malhotra that where two or more courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit, parties may by agreement submit to the jurisdiction of one court to the exclusion of the other court or courts. Such agreement is not hit by Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872, nor can such a contract be said to be against public policy. It is legal, valid and enforceable. “23. Earlier, more than thirty years ago, such a question came up for consideration before this Court in Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. It was the first leading decision of this Court on the point. There, a contract was entered into by the parties for construction of work. An agreement provided that notwithstanding where the work was to be executed, the contract “shall be deemed to have been entered into at Bombay” and the Bombay Court “alone shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate” the dispute between the parties. The question before this Court was whether the court at Bombay alone had jurisdiction to resolve such dispute. “24. Upholding the contention and considering the provisions of the Code as also of the Contract Act, this Court stated : “By clause 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay. In any event the respondents have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the courts at Bombay. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.” (emphasis supplied) “25. But where two courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.” (emphasis supplied) “25. Hakam Singh was followed and principle laid down therein reiterated in several cases thereafter. [See Globe Transport Corpn. v. Triveni Engg. Works, A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies (1989) 2 SCR 1 , Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co. (1991) 4 SCC 270 , R.S.D.V. Finance Co. (P) Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 130 , Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., Shriram City Union Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Rama Mishra (2002) 9 SCC 613 and New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.]” 74. In the same vein, the Supreme Court reiterated in the judgment reported at (2004) 4 SCC 677 (New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Company Ltd) that the whole of the rule as to a forum selection clause is not only that parties are bound by their choice of forum, but also that they are so bound only if the forum of their choice possesses the jurisdiction under the law to receive any action pertaining to the parties’ agreement. That is clear from the following paragraphs of the report : “14. By a long series of decisions it has been held that where two courts or more have jurisdiction under CPC to try a suit or proceeding, an agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in any one of such courts is not contrary to public policy and in no way contravenes Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Therefore, if on the facts of a given case more than one court has jurisdiction, parties by their consent may limit the jurisdiction to one of the two courts. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter. [See Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. and Shriram City Union Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Rama Mishra.] “15. In the aforesaid factual background, the facts of the case at hand have to be looked into. “16. But by an agreement parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which otherwise does not have jurisdiction to deal with a matter. [See Hakam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd. and Shriram City Union Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Rama Mishra.] “15. In the aforesaid factual background, the facts of the case at hand have to be looked into. “16. Had it only been indicated in the consignment note that the court at head office city had jurisdiction then in the absence of a precise indication of the place what would have been the consequence, we are not presently concerned, more particularly, when the consignment note itself had indicated that the court at Udaipur alone had jurisdiction. “17. As was observed by this Court in Shriram case referring to Hakam Singh case an agreement affecting jurisdiction of courts is not invalid. It is open to the parties to choose any one of the two competent courts to decide the disputes. Once the parties bind themselves as such it is not open for them to choose a different jurisdiction. “18. Above being the factual and legal position, the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in upsetting the order of the first appellate court. It is not a case where the chosen court did not have jurisdiction. The only question, therefore, related to exclusion of the other courts.” 75. Though there may not be any need to suspect that the rule in Hakam Singh may not apply to situation governed by the 1996 Act, since Section 2(1)(e)(i) (the legal position was no different in pre-2015 Amendment Section 2(1)(e)) thereof unmistakably points to the relevant provisions of the Code (or, in case of a High Court, to the relevant provision in its Letters Patent), the following passage from a judgment reported at (2009) 9 SCC 403 (Balaji Coke Industry (P) Ltd v. Maa Bhagwati Coke Gujarat (P) Ltd) may be seen : “24. The only question which falls for our consideration is whether, notwithstanding the mutual agreement to make the high-seas sale agreement subject to Kolkata jurisdiction, it would be open to the respondent Company to contend that since a part of the cause of action purportedly arose within the jurisdiction of the Bhavnagar Court, the application filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, before the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhavnagar (Gujarat), would still be maintainable. “25. The aforesaid question has often troubled the courts with one view being that since the parties to the agreement had agreed to a particular forum, they could no longer resile from the said position and claim that other courts, where a part of the cause of action may have arisen, would also have jurisdiction to entertain a suit or other proceeding. The other view has been that, if by the said agreement the rightful jurisdiction of a court was sought to be ousted and a court was vested with the jurisdiction to entertain a suit, which it did not have, the same would be contrary to the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872, being contrary to public policy. One of the earlier judgments on this dichotomy of views is that of this Court in Hakam Singh. “26. Faced with the question as to whether an agreement arrived at between two parties that one of the two courts having jurisdiction, would decide all the disputes relating to such agreement, was hit by the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872, this Court in Hakam Singh case held that where two courts or more have the jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, an agreement between the parties that one of such courts would have the jurisdiction to decide the disputes arising between the parties from such agreement would not be contrary to public policy and would not, therefore, be contrary to the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act, 1872. “27. The said question once again arose in A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd., wherein following the decision in Hakam Singh, but relying on the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio, this Court held that by an agreement which absolutely ousted the jurisdiction of a court having the jurisdiction to decide the matter, would be unlawful and void, being contrary to public policy under Section 28 of the Contract Act. But so long as the parties to a contract do not oust the jurisdiction of all the courts, which would otherwise have the jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law, it could not be said that the parties had by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the court.” 76. But so long as the parties to a contract do not oust the jurisdiction of all the courts, which would otherwise have the jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law, it could not be said that the parties had by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the court.” 76. It must be recorded in this context that the several decisions cited here where the rule in Hakam Singh has been followed by the Supreme Court were not placed by the parties. However, the notice of the parties, particularly of the appellants, was drawn to such authorities being referred to a day before pronouncing this judgment with an offer to the appellants to deal with the authorities if they so desired. The appellants have no grievance in such authorities being cited and have chosen not to cite any other judgment. 77. The exercise that is now left is to apply the dictum in Indus Mobile as tempered by the rule in Hakam Singh to the several matters here. 78. The grievance of the appellants in the several matters is that the petitions under Section 9 of the Act were not thrown out by the arbitration court despite the objections raised in each case. 79. As indicated above, the facts relevant for the present purpose pertaining to APO 26 of 2018, APO 27 of 2018, APO 39 of 2018 and APO 42 of 2018 are similar and the facts pertaining to APO 37 of 2018 and APO 38 of 2018 are different from the others, but similar as between themselves. Essentially, the first four matters contain clauses indicating the choice of the seat of the arbitral reference, but do not contain any forum selection clause. In the two other matters the choice of seat for the arbitral reference is indicated to be Mumbai and the forum selection clause also provides for courts at Mumbai to receive matters arising out of the agreements. Thus, if the entirety of the dictum in Indus Mobile were to be applied to these six matters, without such dictum being tempered by the long-standing rule in Hakam Singh, the principle enunciated in Indus Mobile would not apply to APO 26 of 2018, APO 27 of 2018, APO 39 of 2018 and APO 42 of 2018 but would apply with full vigour to APO 37 of 2018 and APO 38 of 2018. 80. 80. It must now be noticed that in none of the cases did the appellant hirer take out an application for revocation of the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The objection as to the jurisdiction of this court was canvassed in the affidavits-in-opposition filed by the appellants. Usually, the statements contained in a plaint in a civil suit are assumed to be correct if an objection as to the jurisdiction of the court is taken. This is because an objection as to territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction is capable of being waived by virtue of the principle recognised in Section 21 of the Code and the lack of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction does not amount to the inherent lack of jurisdiction. Ordinarily, when the territorial jurisdiction of the court is challenged upon a suit being filed, such challenge is by way of a petition for the rejection of the plaint or akin to such a petition. The test there is that, if on a meaningful reading of the plaint, the jurisdiction of the court is found to be wanting, only then would the plaint be rejected and such a decision would not affect the merits of the disputes between the parties. 81. However, the assessment of the authority of a court in receipt of a petition under Section 9 of the 1996 Act is somewhat different since, unlike a plaint in the suit, the petition under Section 9 of the 1996 Act is only an interlocutory application. Again, if every petition under Section 9 of the Act where the jurisdiction of the court is questioned were to be tried on evidence, the already delayed process of adjudication would be burdened further. Thus, the court takes a general view of the grounds asserted to approach such court while assessing a challenge to the court’s jurisdiction to receive a petition under Section 9 of the Act. 82. In the petitions under Section 9 of the 1996 Act in the first four matters, it has been pleaded that the matrix contract between the parties was executed or the execution of such agreement was completed at the office of the finance company within the jurisdiction of this court. 82. In the petitions under Section 9 of the 1996 Act in the first four matters, it has been pleaded that the matrix contract between the parties was executed or the execution of such agreement was completed at the office of the finance company within the jurisdiction of this court. Though the appellants seek to detract from such assertion by demonstrating that the stamp-paper was purchased outside the State of West Bengal and the address of the finance company is also shown to be outside the State of West Bengal, it cannot be said on a plain reading of the petitions pertaining to the first four matters that the court should not have granted leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Indeed, the objection as to jurisdiction, it was plain to see, was taken by hirers who had failed to meet the payment obligations under the relevant agreements. 83. As to the two other matters, APO 37 of 2018 and APO 38 of 2018, the parties have disclosed at the end of the hearing that the disputes in APO 38 of 2018 have been resolved. The consideration is thus confined to APO 37 of 2018 where the agreement contains a forum selection clause and also a choice of seat for the arbitral reference. 84. It is possible that despite there being a forum selection clause governing an agreement and impacting the choice of the forum by a party thereto, a party may, nonetheless, approach a court not designated by the agreement. Such action of the relevant party may come off only in two situations: when the other parties to the contract do not object to the jurisdiction of the court; or, when the forum selection clause is incapable of being enforced since the court of choice may not otherwise be clothed with the jurisdiction to entertain an action in terms of Section 2(1)(e)(i) of 1996 Act read with Sections 16 to 20 of the Code or the relevant provision of the Letters Patent, as the case may be. However, if a party to an agreement which is governed by a forum selection clause is of the opinion that the forum selection clause is inoperative or incapable of being enforced because the designated court is not authorised under the law to receive the action, the petition or the plaint must clearly say so and indicate the reasons why the designated court would be incompetent under the law to entertain any action arising out the agreement. 85. In the petition under Section 9 of the 1996 Act giving rise to APO 37 of 2018, no attempt was made by the petitioning-finance company to point out the forum selection clause or assert its inefficacy. In such a situation, particularly when it is evident that a suit based on the subject-matter of the dispute between the parties could have been carried to the designated court, the court in receipt of an action in breach of the forum selection clause would refrain from proceeding with the action and return the petition for it to be filed in the designated court, provided an objection in such regard is taken. 86. For the reasons aforesaid, the orders impugned in APO 26 of 2018, APO 27 of 2018, APO 39 of 2018 and APO 42 of 2018 are not interfered with, though on completely different grounds than indicated in the judgment in support thereof. The order impugned in APO 37 of 2018 is set aside and the connected petition under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, AP 535 of 2017, is rejected by revoking the leave granted under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, with liberty to the finance company to carry it to the appropriate court. Accordingly, APO 26 of 2018, APO 27 of 2018, APO 39 of 2018 and APO 42 of 2018 are dismissed and APO 37 of 2018 is allowed as above with no order being passed on APO 38 of 2018 since the disputes pertaining to such matter have been resolved. 87. There will be no order as to costs. 88. Urgent certified website copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.