JUDGMENT S.R. Brahmbhatt, J. Heard learned advocates for the parties. 2. The petitioner, one of the opponents in Election Petition No. 2 of 2017 in the Court of Principal Civil Judge at Kapadwanj and appellant in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 46 of 2017 in the Court of 3rd Additional District Judge at Nadiad, has approached this Court by way of this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with following prayers : "(a) be pleased to allow/admit this petition; (b) be pleased to quash and set aside the order passed by the Principle Civil Judge, At Kapadvanj under Exhibit-5 in the Election Petition 02/2017 dated 12/06/2017 as well as Order passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Nadiad dated 08-02-2018 in the Civil Procedure Appeal No. 46/2017 At Annexure - A; (c) Be pleased to stay the execution, operation and implementation of the Order passed by the Principle Civil Judge, At Kapadvanj under Exhibit-5 in the Election Petition 02/2017 dated 12/06/2017 as well as Order passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Nadiad dated 08-02-2018 in the Civil Procedure Appeal No. 46/2017 At Annexure - A; (d) To grant any other appropriate and just relief/s;" 3. The facts in brief, as could be gathered from the memo of petition as well as order impugned deserve to be set out hereinbelow, in order to appreciate the controversy in question. 4. The petitioner herein contested the election of Nirmali Group Gram Panchayat for the post of Sarpanch. The voting was conducted on 27.12.2016 and results were declared on 29.12.2016. The petitioner polled 814 votes as against 791 votes polled by respondent no.1. The respondent no.1 being aggrieved and dissatisfied on account of methodology of counting of votes and on allegations of corrupt practice adopted by the officer concerned, moved Election Petition No 2 of 2017 under Section 31 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short). In said application, the respondent no.1 made an application Exh. 5 inter-alia praying for calling and keeping the election material and votes in the safe custody of the Court on the allegation of rendering them safe and protected from any vulnerable of tempering etc. The said application was resisted by present petitioner as well as others. In said application, the respondent no.1 made an application Exh. 5 inter-alia praying for calling and keeping the election material and votes in the safe custody of the Court on the allegation of rendering them safe and protected from any vulnerable of tempering etc. The said application was resisted by present petitioner as well as others. However, the learned Judge before whom the said Election Petition was pending, allowed the same by calling the votes and material casted in the election to be delivered to the Court in the safe custody of the Court during pendency of the Election Petition No. 2 of 2017. This order was passed on 12.6.2917. The said order was viewed as an order passed by the concerned Court and hence Civil Misc. Appeal was preferred before the concerned District Court wherein, it was registered as Civil Misc. Appeal No. 46 of 2017 and said Court after recording its lack of jurisdiction to entertain the same, declined to interfere with the order solely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The petitioner, thus, approached this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order passed by learned Judge in Election Petition No. 2 of 2017 below Exh. 5 application on the ground that the learned Judge did not have jurisdiction and competence to pass such an order and therefore same is prayed to be quashed and set aside. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner invited Court's attention to the provisions of Section 31 and laid greater emphasis upon Section 31(7)(a) and (b) to support his contention that plain and simple reading of the application along with Election Petition would clearly indicate that the contention of original petitioner - respondent no. 1 hereinabove cannot be said to be a simplicitor falling under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that allegations made in the Election Petition unequivocally point to its corrupt practice and therefore, there being no prima-facie recording, there ought to have been any order, which is passed by the learned Judge in the Election Petition. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that learned Judge has in fact treated the application below Exh. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that learned Judge has in fact treated the application below Exh. 5 to one filed under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the CPC and as such the interim injunction application is dealt with, which has been contrary to the law laid down by this Court in case of Manjulaben Prakashkumar Chaudhari Vs. State of Gujarat rendered in the proceedings of Special Civil Application No. 723 of 2017 and Special Civil Application No. 1507 of 2017. The counsel for the petitioner laid greater emphasis upon the observation of this Court in paras 11, 12, and 14 to support his contention that the Election Petition cannot be treated as an ordinary civil suit governed by those provisions so as to cloth the learned Judge with the powers of granting interim injunction as envisaged under Order 31 Rule 1 and 2. The plain and simple reading of application as well as order passed thereon, which is impugned in this petition, would clearly indicate that unfortunately the learned Judge has treated the application to be one under Order 31 Rule 1 and 2 and hence on touch stone of law laid down by this Court in case of Manjulaben, the order becomes invalid and is not sustainable and deserve to be quashed and set aside. 8. Learned advocate for the petitioner invited Court's attention to page-27, para-8 of the impugned order to indicate that how and in what manner the law laid down by this Court is completely ignored. 9. Learned advocate appearing for the petitioner invited Court's attention to the observation made by this Court in case of Rameshbhai Sumatbbai Humbal Vs. Laxmanbhai Tejabhai Khatariya rendered in the proceeding of Special Civil Application No. 919 of 2018 decided by this Court on 24.4.2018 and laid greater emphasis on para nos. 12 and 13 to support his contention that allegations in the application would not confine the to the respondent no.1 and hence there was no scope for learned Judge to pass an order impugned in this petition as if same was passed under Order 39 provision and hence same deserve to be quashed and set aside. 10. 12 and 13 to support his contention that allegations in the application would not confine the to the respondent no.1 and hence there was no scope for learned Judge to pass an order impugned in this petition as if same was passed under Order 39 provision and hence same deserve to be quashed and set aside. 10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that in light of the law laid down by this Court in case of Manjulaben and when it has been absolutely clear that the scope of inquiry and proceedings under Section 31(7)(a) being greater and larger than the scope of inquiry under Section 31 (7)(b) and when the Court has held that even while examining the petition under Section 31(7)(a), if the powers under Order 39 are not found to be there, then, in case, if the petition is falling under Section 31(7)(b), the scope of inquiry under Order 39 is obviously obliviate. 11. The Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner in extenso and has also perused the papers and documents annexed to this petition. 12. At the outset, we must observe that this petition is required to be treated as essentially one filed under Article 227 only, though the advocate of the petitioner has styled the same under Article 226 also. The Court, therefore, needs to bear in mind the scope and purview of examining the challenge under Article 227 only. 13. The impugned order, if is read in light of the averments made in the application below Exh.5 as well as in Election Petition, then, would indicate that the same was based on pleadings made in the application as the allegations were in respect of those who were entrusted the duty of counting the votes/polls in the election. The respondent no. 1 - original petitioner in the Election Petition has made elaborate allegations on the concerned officer that the counting was vitiated on account of corrupt practice adopted by him in discharging duties, which were otherwise required to be considered as valid votes and thus has helped the victorious candidate i.e. petitioner. 14. Against said backdrop of allegation, when the application Exh. 14. Against said backdrop of allegation, when the application Exh. 5 is made for seeking direction to keep votes in safe custody, then, question arises, same be called to be so graver irregularities or order lacking jurisdiction requiring any interference of the Court under Article 227, even for that matter, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the answer would be in emphatic "NO". 15. The decision of this Court in case of Manjulaben rendered by this Court in light of the facts available on record. The facts of those petitions and orders impugned therein, therefore, required to be reproduced hereinbelow to appreciate the ratio of judgment as the ratio of the judgment is required to be culled out from the reading of entire judgment and not by truncated reading of few observations of the Court here and there. The facts in case of Manjulaben, as could be seen from paras 2, 3 and 5, would deserve to be reproduced here below : "2. In Special Civil Application No.723 of 2017, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 13.01.2017 passed below Exh.1, by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mansa, in Election Petition No.1 of 2017, whereby the interim prayer for staying the implementation and operation of the result dated 29.12.2016 declared in favour of respondent No.3 by the Election Commission is rejected. 3. In Special Civil Application No.1507 of 2017, the petitioners have challenged the Order dated 23.01.2017 passed below application Exh.5 in Election Petition No.1 of 2017 whereby the elected representatives have been restrained from discharging their administrative powers and recounting is also ordered. 5. Relevant facts from each of the petition are incorporated as under IN SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO.723 OF 2017 i. The election of Babupura Gram Panchayat was held on 27.12.2016 and counting thereof was held on 29.12.2016. The elections were concluded on 03.01.2017. It is the case of the petitioner that 71 votes were deliberately misplaced in order to favour respondent No.3. ii. Eventually, after recounting of the votes, the petitioner was declared as unsuccessful candidate by a margin of 35 votes as compared to respondent No.3. The petitioner immediately on 29.12.2016, filed a complaint with the Election Officer regarding the lost/misplaced ballots so that the Election Officer reports the same to the Commissioner and take appropriate action under rule 49 of the Gujarat Panchayats Election Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred as the Rules). iii. The petitioner immediately on 29.12.2016, filed a complaint with the Election Officer regarding the lost/misplaced ballots so that the Election Officer reports the same to the Commissioner and take appropriate action under rule 49 of the Gujarat Panchayats Election Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred as the Rules). iii. As the Election Officer remained indolent, the petitioner filed Special Civil Application No.22002 of 2016 before this Court, which came to be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Election Petition No.1 of 2017 wherein, vide order dated 13.01.2017 passed below Exh.1, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mansa, rejected the interim prayer of staying implementation and operation of the result dated 29.12.2016 by observing that section 31 of the Act of 1993 does not confer such power on him. IN SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 1507/2017 i. The State Election Commission declared election programme for holding election of Sarpanch and members of Gram Panchayat of Village Nyara, Taluka Padadhari, District Rajkot, on 27.11.2016 by issuing a notification. The date of polling was fixed on 27.12.2016 and the date of counting was fixed on 29.12.2016. There were eight wards in Nyara Gram Panchayat divided in eight constituencies. ii. Petitioners No.1 and 2 contested for the post of Sarpanch. From the panel of the petitioners which comprised of seven candidates, three candidates were elected, whereas from the panel of respondent No.2, four candidates were elected. In the election of Sarpanch, petitioner No.1 was declared elected by four votes. Respondent No.2 presented Election Petition No.1 of 2017 on 13.01.2017 before the Principal Civil Judge at Padadhari. Along with the election petition, Exh.5 application for stay came to be moved. Election Petition No.1 of 2017 was fixed on 18.01.2017, thereafter, it was adjourned to 20.01.2017. On behalf of respondent No.1, time was sought and the matter was kept on 21.01.2017. On 21.01.2017 the petitioners sought time to file reply. The petitioners were directed to file reply till 2:30 p.m. on 23.01.2017. iii. It is the case of the petitioners that on 23.01.2017 they could not file reply because the documents were not available with them. On the same day the Civil Judge heard the application Exh.5 and granted stay as prayed for in the said application i.e. restraining the elected representatives from exercising their administrative powers till the result in recounting is declared. On the same day the Civil Judge heard the application Exh.5 and granted stay as prayed for in the said application i.e. restraining the elected representatives from exercising their administrative powers till the result in recounting is declared. The Civil Judge further directed for the appointment of a Court Commissioner for the purpose of recounting." 16. In light of said facts, the Court made observation qua the injunction power under Order 39 and there cannot be any dispute qua the said proposition of law. However, the said proposition of law in our view cannot be stretched to come to absolute proposition of law to show that there exists no power whatsoever forever issuing interim orders, which are required to be issued in light of the facts and pleadings of a given case and which would not amount to an injunction as envisaged under Order 39 upon the authority their functioning in question. 17. The Court is unable to accept the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Judge has in fact referred the application to be an injunction application and treated the order passed to be order of injunction. In our view the language employed should be subservient to the essence and purport of the order and no orders can be judged merely on the basis of language which is employed else it would render it vulnerable for no reason. 18. This Court is also of the view that this Court need not go into the fine distinction, which was sought to be made out in respect of provisions of Section 31(7)(a) and Section 31(7)(b) of the Act at this stage of this petition in view of the given facts, else it can well be said that the Court's power to call for literature and material of proceedings in light of the election as made, cannot be said to be non-existed on the plain and simple reading of provision and submission made in the application and petition. 19. It would not be out of place to refer here the provision of Subsections (3) and (6) of Section 31 of the Act to indicate the scope of inquiry and applicability of Code of Civil Procedure bearing specifically mentioning provision of compromising, withdrawing and amendment of pleadings. Therefore, it can well be said that the legislature has in its wisdom ousted the applicability of other provisions. Therefore, it can well be said that the legislature has in its wisdom ousted the applicability of other provisions. The order that may help and facilitate the adjudication of the controversy in question can always be said permissible. We hasten to add here that we therefore do not want to dwelve any further elaborate the matter. Suffice it to say that the decision rendered by this Court in case of Manjulaben is in respect of facts pleaded thereunder and interim orders or injunction, which amounted to duty performed by the concerned and therefore, this fact and observation cannot thereafter be stretched further to deny a Judge's jurisdiction to pass appropriate order in furtherance of his process of adjudication. The process of adjudication is discussed by this Court in judgment in case of Rameshbhai and therefor, we are of the view that impugned order which is not capable of being classified as an injunction simplicitor, interfering with the duties of the officer or election process cannot be said to be impermissible as sought to be canvassed, based upon the observation of this Court in case of Manjulaben . 20. It needs hardly any discussion that inherent powers in a Court under Section 151, when it has not been specifically ousted like compromise, withdrawal and amendment, as it is seen in provisions of Section 31(6), the same can well be said to be available for passing appropriate order, which could be said to be in furtherance and for facilitating the inquiry/adjudication and examining of the controversy arising out of the Election petition. 21. It is also required to be mentioned here that the petitioner unfortunately has not taken up any such grounds before the learned Judge when he was hearing Exh. 5 application nor has same been pleaded in the Appeal and therefore, if one strictly goes by the avowed principles of pleadings then, perhaps this petition would have been rejected even on that ground also. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, when the order impugned is in our view passed in light of the averments and apprehension qua tempering with the votes polled, we find no infirmity therein so as to call for any interference and as a result thereof, the petition being merit-less, deserves dismissal and accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.