JUDGMENT : ARINDAM SINHA, J. 1. Petitioners say they are a charitable and educational society which manages Delhi Public School, Ruby Park and Delhi Public School, Durgapur. They have challenged notification dated 28th August, 2006 read with notification dated 10th February, 2011 published in Kolkata Gazette by Labour Department, Government of West Bengal whereby in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (5) in section 1 of Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, State, inter alia, with approval of Central Government extended provisions of the Act to, inter alia, Educational Institutions (including public, private, aided or partially aided) run by individuals, trustees, societies or other organizations, 2. Mr. Majumdar, learned advocate appears on behalf of petitioners and had on earlier occasions submitted, the Act at the first instance is applicable to factories. Under subsection (5) of section 1, State Government may extend the Act or any of its provision to any other establishment or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. State Government has by a legislation being West Bengal Shops & Establishments Act, 1963 defined both 'establishment' and 'commercial establishment'. According to him, his clients are not covered by definition of establishment in the State Act for it to make applicable the Central Act. His further submission is, word 'otherwise' used in sub-section (5) of section 1 in the Central Act cannot include his clients since other establishment has not been defined by State Government. 3. He relied L.N. Gadodia & Sons vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner reported in (2011) 13 SCC 517 , paragraphs 21 and 22 to submit, in considering Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provision Act, 1952, Supreme Court looked to definition of 'establishment' and 'commercial establishment' under Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954 since therein petitioner's units were situate in Delhi. He submitted, his client's institution being situate in this State, for meaning of word 'establishment', on extension of the Insurance Act, reliance can and should be placed on West Bengal Shops & Establishments Act, 1963. He next relied on R & B Falcon(A) PTY Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2008) 12 SCC 466 , to paragraphs 23 to 26 for declaration of law regarding phrase 'or otherwise' as used in law. He next relied on R & B Falcon(A) PTY Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in (2008) 12 SCC 466 , to paragraphs 23 to 26 for declaration of law regarding phrase 'or otherwise' as used in law. Supreme Court said, the phrase when used as a general phrase following an enumeration of particulars, is to be commonly interpreted in a restricted sense, as referring to such other matters as are kindred to the classes before mentioned. 4. He also relied on 11 Judge Bench decision of Supreme Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2002) 8 SCC 481 , to view expressed by the Hon'ble The Chief Justice of India speaking for himself and 5 other learned Judges, to paragraph 25, which is reproduced below :- "25. The establishment and running of an educational institution where a large number of persons are employed as teachers or administrative staff, and an activity is carried on that results in the imparting of knowledge to the students, must necessarily be regarded as an occupation, even if there is no element of profit generation. It is difficult to comprehend that education, per se, will not fall under any of the four expressions in Article 19(1)(g). "Occupation" would be an activity of a person undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission in life. The abovequoted observations in Sodan Singh case correctly interpret the expression "occupation" in Article 19(1)(g)." 5. Hence, according to him petitioners are entitled to reliefs they have prayed for. 6. Mr. Agarwal, learned advocate appears for State and had submitted, West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act, 1963, under definitions section 2(2) provides 'commercial establishment' to mean, inter alia, a society registered under any enactment in force for the time being, charitable or other trust, whether registered or not, which carries on, whether for purposes of gain or not, any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, any business, trade or profession and such other class or classes of concerns or undertakings as the State might declare to be commercial establishments for purposes of the Act. Relying on judgment of Supreme Court in Employees' State Insurance Corporation vs. R.K. Swamy and Others reported in (1994) 1 SCC 445 , paragraph 13 he submits, wider meaning should be given to words 'commercial establishments', to include petitioners' educational institutions, to help achieve object of beneficent purpose of extending provisions of Central Act of 1948 to them. 7. Mr. Mukherjee learned advocate, Additional Government Pleader appeared for learned Advocate General and submitted, under sub-section (5) of section 1 in Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, State, upon having received approval of Central Government in that behalf, can extend provisions of said Act to any other establishment or class of establishments, being, inter alia, commercial. He too relied on R.K. Swamy (supra) to submit, notified description of establishment should be included in giving wider meaning to phrase "any other establishment or class of establishments, inter alia, commercial, agriculture or otherwise". He also relied on judgment of Supreme Court in Bangalore Turf Club Limited vs. ESI Corporation reported in (2014) 9 SCC 657, to paragraphs 14, 16, 18, 19, 22 and 37. 8. Mr. Mukherjee then relied on judgment dated 9th April, 2012 by a learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court in, inter alia, WP 31457 of 2011 (Management of Independent CBSE Schools Association Karnataka vs. Union of India), to paragraphs 40 to 44 as are set out below:- "40. Question no.3: Whether the employees of educational institutions can be brought within the purview of the ESI Act? 41. To answer this question, it is necessary to read section 1(5) of the E.S.I. Act. It reads as follows: "1(5). The appropriate Government may, in consultation with the corporation and where the appropriate Government is a State Government, with the approval of the Central Government after giving one month's notice of its intention of so doing by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this Act or any of them, to any other establishment or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise." 42. The last word 'otherwise' used in section 1(5) of the ESI Act has wide amplitude. The legislature, in exercise of its wisdom, has empowered the Government to bring in not merely the industrial, commercial or agricultural establishments, but also other establishments including the educational establishments. The last word 'otherwise' used in section 1(5) of the ESI Act has wide amplitude. The legislature, in exercise of its wisdom, has empowered the Government to bring in not merely the industrial, commercial or agricultural establishments, but also other establishments including the educational establishments. When the provisions of the ESI Act can be made applicable to educational establishments or the institutions, then the word 'employee' would accordingly apply to the employees working therein. 43. The word 'otherwise' used in section 1(5) of the ESI Act cannot be given restrictive meaning by applying the principle of ejusdem generis. The legislature has closed all the escape routes by consciously using the word 'otherwise'. 44. The question is therefore answered in the affirmative." 9. Mr. Majumdar in reply relies on Bangalore Turf Club Limited (supra), paragraphs 34 and 35. He submits, Supreme Court while considering dictionary meanings of word 'establishment', in paragraph 35 gave wider meaning to it. Paragraph 35 is reproduced below:- "Therefore, it can be simply stated that an "establishment" is a term which can have wide meaning. It would be any place where business is conducted, or in other words, it would be any place of business. Now the question arises whether a "race club" is in the nature of a place where business is conducted. To answer the same, the activities that are undertaken by the appellant Turf Club require to be noticed." 10. The notifications extend application of the Central Act as pursuant to exercise of power by State to, inter alia, educational institutions such as those of petitioner society running it and employing ten or more persons. State's contention that institutions of petitioners are commercial establishments under definitions section 2(2) in West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act, 1963 as carrying on business, trade or profession or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to, any business, trade or profession, cannot be accepted. Supreme Court in R.K.Swamy (supra) was dealing with contention of advertising agencies claiming to not be shops for purposes of application to them, by respective States in which they were situate, the Act of 1948. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, Supreme Court said that which was relied upon both on behalf of State and learned Advocate General. "14. There is no doubt at all that the said Act is beneficent legislation. In paragraph 14 of the judgment, Supreme Court said that which was relied upon both on behalf of State and learned Advocate General. "14. There is no doubt at all that the said Act is beneficent legislation. If, therefore, it is reasonably possible so to construe the word "shop" as to include the activity of an advertising agency within it, that construction must be preferred." 11. They contended, it is reasonably possible to construe the words 'commercial establishments' to include the activity of educational institutions and such construction should be preferred. However, Supreme Court in Bangalore Turf Club (supra) said as it did in paragraph 35 which is reproduced above. To give a wide meaning to establishment as a term, it would mean any place where business is conducted. It is here that petitioners had relied on T.M.A. Pie Foundation (supra) to passages in the judgment quoted above. 12. In Managements of Independent CBSE Schools Association Karnataka (supra) learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court answered question framed in the judgment as, the word 'otherwise' used in sub-section (5) of section 1 of the Central Act cannot be given restrictive meaning by applying principle of ejusdem generis. In R & B Falcon(A) PTY Ltd. (supra) Supreme Court declared regarding phrase 'or otherwise' as used in law, to say, when used as a general phrase following an enumeration of particulars, to be commonly interpreted in a restricted sense, as referring to such other matters as are kindred to the classes before mentioned. This judgment was not brought to notice of learned Single Judge and hence said judgment is per incuriam. 13. For reasons aforesaid, this Court is convinced petitioners are entitled to relief sought. There shall be an order in terms of prayer (b) of the writ petition. In order dated 24th January, 2017, made by a co-ordinate Bench, submission made on behalf of ESI Corporation was recorded as under:- "Mr. Banerjee learned Advocate for the E.S.I. Corporation has assured the Court that in case the writ petition succeeds the Corporation shall refund all the amount that may have been deposited pursuant to the notification of the petitioners within six weeks after this order is passed." 14. There will also be a direction upon the Corporation to act on its assurance as made. 15. The writ petition is disposed of.