JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. SARANGI, J. - Petitioner no.1-Union of India, and its functionaries-petitioners no.2 and 3 have filed this application challenging the order dated 05.03.1999 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cutack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No.464 of 1992 by which the Tribunal quashed the order dated 30.06.1992 passed by petitioner no.2 directing for recovery of a sum of Rs.15,000/- from the opposite party for the loss sustained by the department because of his negligence and misconduct, while he was working as Deputy Postmaster, Jajpur Head Post Office. 2. The factual matrix of the case in hand is that the opposite party, while he was in-charge of Deputy Postmaster, Jajpur Head Post Office during the period 1986-1987, was supervising the Savings Bank Account work. During the said period, he did not account for the Savings Bank deposits and/or withdrawals entered in the Pass Books No.34552 and 345233 on different dates. Consequentially, an amount of Rs.15,000/- was to be recovered from the opposite party and rest amount was to be recovered from other erring officials. As such lapses were detected, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the opposite party and ultimately vide order dated 30.06.1992, petitioner no.2 ordered for recovery of a sum of Rs.15,000/- in 30 monthly equal instalments from the opposite party which was challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No.464 of 1992. Learned Tribunal, by order dated 05.03.1999, quashed the order dated 30.06.1992 passed by petitioner no.2 on the ground that adequate opportunity was given to the opposite party. Hence this writ petition. 3. Learned Central Government Counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously contended that the opposite party, having failed to discharge his duty causing loss to the Government, is responsible for dereliction in duty. As such, the consequential direction for recovery of a sum of Rs.15,000/-, which was given by following a disciplinary proceeding, cannot be said to be illegal or irregular. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, states that the opposite party is not liable to pay any amount demanded by the authority pursuant to order dated 30.06.1992 and such amount has been determined without affording opportunity of hearing, thereby there is gross violation of principles of natural justice.
4. Learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand, states that the opposite party is not liable to pay any amount demanded by the authority pursuant to order dated 30.06.1992 and such amount has been determined without affording opportunity of hearing, thereby there is gross violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the Tribunal is well justified in passing the impugned order quashing the order dated 30.06.1992 passed by petitioner no.2 directing for recovery of the amount from the opposite party, as he is no way concerned with such amount. It is further contended that challenging the order passed by the learned Tribunal even when the petitioners filed this writ petition, no interim order was passed by this Court. In the meantime, on attaining the age of superannuation, the opposite party has already superannuated from service. Therefore, the opposite party seeks for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. Admittedly, the opposite party, while working as Deputy Postmaster in Jajpur Head Post Office during the period 1986-87, did not account for the Savings Bank deposits and withdrawals resulting pecuniary loss to the department. Consequentially, a disciplinary proceeding was initiated and he was served with a charge-sheet allowing him to submit his written statement of defence. But, in order to submit written statement of defence, the petitioner requested for inspection of certain documents and to take the extracts of the same. The same was rejected by the disciplinary authority. Again the petitioner moved the disciplinary authority to make available the documents and to give personal hearing. But, without giving him opportunity of hearing, the order for recovery of a sum of Rs.15,000/- was passed, thereby there is a denial of opportunity of hearing to explain his defence. Consequentially, there was gross violation of the principles of natural justice, for which the proceeding so initiated was vitiated. 7. On perusal of records, it also appears that the statement of imputation was recorded on 20.03.1992, which relates to certain transaction of the year 1987 reflected in the relevant register pertaining to deposits and withdrawal of certain Pass Book accounts.
Consequentially, there was gross violation of the principles of natural justice, for which the proceeding so initiated was vitiated. 7. On perusal of records, it also appears that the statement of imputation was recorded on 20.03.1992, which relates to certain transaction of the year 1987 reflected in the relevant register pertaining to deposits and withdrawal of certain Pass Book accounts. It is not possible on the part of an employee to remember or call those entries/transactions in the year 1992. In order to make out an efffective defence, the opposite party would certainly seek assistance of those particulars. When he represented for giving him an opportunity to inspect and, if necessary, to take extract of those documents, such request of the opposite party was by the disciplinary authority without application of mind. The reasons assigned in the counter affidavit are that during the fact finding enquiry conducted by A.S.P.O. in January, 1991, the opposite party had occasion to peruse the documents, therefore, the opposite party could not have made request to peruse the documents and extract thereof. As such, rejection of the request of the opposite party by the disciplinary authority cannot be said to be not in compliance of the principles of natural justice. 8. It is well settled principle of law laid down by the apex Court that the Tribunal or the Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the findings of disciplinary authority. The duty of the Tribunal or Court is not to re-appreciate the evidence on record, but to review whether the decision making process has been correctly made. If there are procedural lapses affecting the principles of natural justice in finalization of a departmental proceeding, then the Tribunal or Court would be justified in interfering with the order of the disciplinary authority. 9. Applying the said principle to the present context, it appears that the disciplinary authority has not given opportunity of hearing to the opposite party to make out his written statement of defence by going through the relevant papers and documents, thereby there is gross violation of principles of natural justice. 10. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satrughan Lal, AIR 1998 SCW 2898, the apex Court held that opportunity of hearing based on principles of natural justice has to be an effective opportunity of hearing and not mere pretence. 11.
10. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satrughan Lal, AIR 1998 SCW 2898, the apex Court held that opportunity of hearing based on principles of natural justice has to be an effective opportunity of hearing and not mere pretence. 11. In view of such position, learned Central Administrative Tribunal has not committed any illegality or irregularity in passing the impugned order dated 05.03.1999 in Annexure-1 so as to warrant interference of this Court at this stage. More particularly, the incident is of the year 1987 and the Tribunal has passed the judgment on 05.03.1999. The petitioners have approached this Court in the year 1999 and in the meantime more than 19 years have elapsed. This being a year old case and as such opportunity of hearing having not been granted to the opposite party, we do not find any illegality or irregularity in the impugned order dated 05.03.1999 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack to warrant our interference. 12. Accordingly, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed and the same is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost. Petition dismissed.