JUDGMENT Hon’ble B. Amit Sthalekar, J.—Heard Shri B.P. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned standing counsel for the respondents no 1 and 2 and Shri Anil Bhushan, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Bal Mukund Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner is the Committee of Management and is seeking quashing of the order of the District Magistrate dated 7.12.2017 whereby the District Inspector of Schools (DIOS) disapproved the order dated 19.9.2017 whereby the respondent No. 3 was placed under suspension. 3. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charges against the respondent No. 3 were of serious nature relating to financial irregularities of charging Rs. 200/- extra fees from each of the students and despite several letters being sent to him on 24.9.2016, 31.12.2016 and 10.3.2017 he did not submit any reply, therefore, he was placed under suspension. 4. Shri Anil Bhushan, learned senior counsel on the other hand sought to rebut the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that order of suspension was passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management and there was no resolution of the Committee of Management to place approving the suspension to place the petitioner under suspension as required under sub-section (5) of Section 16 G of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921. The second submission is that the order of suspension does not mention that it was passed in contemplation of issuance of a charge-sheet to the petitioner or during the pendency of the departmental proceedings and, therefore, the order of suspension was passed by way of punishment. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to submit that in the impugned order itself there is a reference to a resolution of the Committee of Management, Agenda No. 2 dated 19.10.2017 to place the petitioner under suspension and, therefore, it cannot be said that there was no resolution of the committee of management to place the petitioner under suspension. Learned counsel has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Tej Narain Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2008(7) ADJ 108 (DB). This judgement on the facts does not help the petitioner at all. 6. Learned counsel has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Tej Narain Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2008(7) ADJ 108 (DB). This judgement on the facts does not help the petitioner at all. 6. The second judgement relied upon is also a Division Bench judgement in Hari Singh Rajput v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2015(3) ADJ 686 (DB), wherein the Court set aside the order of the DIOS on the ground that the same did not indicate any reason for suspension of the teachers but the Court at the same time held that because there were serious allegations of financial irregularities, therefore prayer for reinstatement of the teachers cannot be acceded to. It is this part of the judgement on which stress has been laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. The other judgement relied upon is the case of Committee of Management, Krishak Inter College, Bhauri v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2015(8) ADJ 686 (DB), wherein also the approval was granted by the DIOS to the order of suspension and in the meantime the charge-sheet had also been issued The learned single judge however held that the order of the DIOS granting approval to the order of suspension was not in accordance with Section 16-G(7) of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act. In that case the other point was that after the suspension of the petitioner the order of termination was also passed. The Divisional Bench held that merely because the petitioner’s services had been terminated it cannot be said that the writ petition could not entertained against an order granting approval to the order of suspension. 8. What is noticed in the present case is that the order of suspension does not mention that it has been passed in contemplation of any departmental proceedings. Another aspect is that it has been passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management and does not refer to any resolution of the Committee of Management in this regard. 8. What is noticed in the present case is that the order of suspension does not mention that it has been passed in contemplation of any departmental proceedings. Another aspect is that it has been passed by the Manager of the Committee of Management and does not refer to any resolution of the Committee of Management in this regard. The resolution of the committee of management referred to in the order of the DIOS is dated 19.10.2017 which is subsequent to the date of the order of suspension and what is equally noticeable is that even in the order of suspension was forwarded to the DIOS for approval, the appropriate resolution of the committee of management with regard to the respondent No. 3 being placed under suspension was not mentioned as one of the documents being forwarded which itself shows that even when as late as 26.9.2017 when the documents were sent to the DIOS for approval there was no resolution of the committee of management to place the respondent No. 3 under suspension. Therefore, on the facts of the case I find that the order of suspension was itself passed by an authority not competent to pass such order unless there was a resolution of the committee of management to place the respondent No. 3 under suspension. It is also noticed that the suspension order does not mention that it was passed in contemplation of departmental proceedings or that it was passed during the pendency of departmental proceedings. The order of the DIOS cannot be said to be without any reason. 9. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that the services of the respondent No. 3 has subsequently been terminated but so far as the impugned order of DIOS is concerned, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the same. 10. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.