JUDGMENT : R. Devdas, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellants/plaintiffs questioning the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and the first appellate Court. 2. The suit was filed for partition and separate possession in respect of the suit schedule properties. The relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants is admitted. The suit was dismissed on 05.01.2013. An appeal was preferred before the first appellate Court in R.A. No. 82/2013. The appeal was admittedly filed after a delay of 23 days. I.A. No. 1/2013 was filed by the appellants before the first appellate Court seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The 4th appellant filed the affidavit and lead evidence in support of his application seeking condonation of delay and got two documents i.e., certified copy of the judgment and decree marked as Exs. P.1 and P.2. 3. The lower appellate Court finds that on perusal of Ex. P2, the certified copy of the decree, the same was delivered on 13.02.2013 and not on 26.02.2013 as claimed by the appellants. It is on this ground that the learned judge holds that the appellants have not approached the Court with clean hands and have failed to make out reasonable and acceptable grounds to condone the delay of 23 days in preferring the appeal. The learned judge refers to the reported judgments in 2012 (1) CCC page 211 (Andhra Pradesh) and 2012 (2) CCC page 741 (Supreme Court) and holds that there is negligence on the part of the applicant and he is not entitled for condonation of delay. On these grounds, the appeal was dismissed. 4. In the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives And Others Vs. State of Haryana And Others reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127 , it is held at paragraph 16 as under: 16. The principles regarding condonation of delay particularly in land acquisition matters, have been enunciated in Collector (LA) v. Katiji [ (1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1989 SCC (Tax) 172], wherein it is stated in para 3 as under: (SCC p. 108) "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice--that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that: (1) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. (3) 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. (4) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. (5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. (6) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." (emphasis in original) 5. In the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation And Another reported in : (2010) 5 SCC 459 , it is held at paragraphs 14 and 15 as under: 14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. In the case of Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation And Another reported in : (2010) 5 SCC 459 , it is held at paragraphs 14 and 15 as under: 14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate-Collector (L.A.) v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC1353, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy : (1998) 7 SCC 123 : JT (1998) 6 SC 242 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil : (2001) 9 SCC 106 . 6. The law of limitation or the principles of prescription cannot prevail upon the Court's duty to eradicate miscarriage of law and justice wherever and whenever it is discovered or chanced upon. Dismissing the appeal will not advance the interest of justice and it is well settled that the power to condone the delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the Courts to ensure substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits. 7. No doubt the power to condone delay is a discretionary power vested with the Court. It is also true that the applicant has to explain each day's delay while seeking condonation. 7. No doubt the power to condone delay is a discretionary power vested with the Court. It is also true that the applicant has to explain each day's delay while seeking condonation. This Court is of the opinion that while dealing with question of delay, especially in litigations between family members, like the one on hand which is a suit for partition, decisions should be tempered with a degree of kindness. The dispute between family members will not end until logical conclusion is drawn by a competent Court. We have seen orders of condoning delay to the extent of 10 years and 14 years. Each case depends on the individual facts and circumstances of the case. In a matter like this, delay of 23 days is not going to cause hardship to the respondents. On the other hand, so long as the litigation is not settled, the sword of justice keeps hanging on the parties. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that delay should be condoned. Delay is accordingly condoned. The order of the lower appellate Court deserves to be set-aside and the matter is remanded back to the lower appellate Court for decision on merits. The appeal is accordingly allowed. In view of the above order, I.A. No. 1/2013 does not survive for consideration and hence, stands disposed of.