JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Heard finally with consent of learned counsel for the parties. 2. The question that arises for determination in this Writ Petition is whether the Civil Court can in absence of any application for review exercise suo motu power for reviewing its earlier order. This question arises in the following factual backdrop:- The petitioner is the original defendant no.11 in the suit filed by the respondent nos. 1 to 4 for partition and separate possession. In that suit, a declaration has been sought that the plaintiffs had 1/7th share each in the suit property and that the sale-deed dated 16th February, 1987 executed in favour of the defendant no.11 was null and void. In that suit, the defendant no.11 filed an application under Section 8 of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959 for ascertaining the correct valuation of the claim in the suit. The trial Court by order dated 6th January, 2015 allowed that application and directed an enquiry to be held under Section 8 of that Act. The plaintiffs thereafter on 2nd July, 2015 filed an application seeking clarification of the order passed below Exh.87. This clarification, according to the plaintiffs, was necessary to enable the concerned Authority to proceed further in the enquiry as ordered. The defendant no.11 opposed that application on the ground that no clarification was necessary. The trial Court by the impugned order recalled its earlier order passed below Exh.87 and directed the plaint to be returned for presentation to the proper Court after holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Being aggrieved, the defendant no.11 has approached this Court in the present Writ Petition. 3. Shri P.V. Vaidya, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction in recalling its earlier order in the absence of any challenge to the same. Despite observing that there was no application for review of that order, the trial Court could not have exercised suo motu power and recalled its earlier order. He referred to the provisions of Order-XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 [for short “the Code”] in that regard. It was further submitted that the order directing the plaint to be returned was passed without hearing the parties and the impugned order on that count also was not sustainable. He referred to the provisions of Order-XLVII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 [for short “the Code”] in that regard. It was further submitted that the order directing the plaint to be returned was passed without hearing the parties and the impugned order on that count also was not sustainable. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in [1] Murlibai wd/o Satyanarayan Gupta & another Vs. Omprakash Satyanarayan Gupta [1980 Mh.L.J. 86] and [2] Mukesh K. Bajapa Vs. Municipal Corporation of Gr. Bombay [2003 (2) Mh. L.J. 256]. 4. Shri P. P. Kothari, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 4, on the other hand, supported the impugned order. According to him, the trial Court was justified in clarifying its earlier order and applying the provisions of Clause 233 of the Civil Manual. Such power is inherent in the Court and, therefore, rectification of the earlier order was justified. No prejudice was being caused to the defendant no.11 and the plaint was merely returned for its proper presentation. The learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in [1] Shriji Builders Vs. Sibro Construction Company [2004 (2) Goa Law Reporter 31], [2] Ramdulari Matabadalsingh (D) through L.Rs. Vs. Meerabai wd/o Bharatsingh Baghel (D) through L.Rs. [ 2014 (3) Mh.L.J. 323 ], [3] Akola Janata Commercial Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. Prema Satish Purohit & others [2017 (5) Mh. L.J. 402], and [4] Budha Swain & others Vs. Gopinath Deb & others [ (1999) 4 SCC 396 ]. 5. After hearing the respective counsel and after perusing the documents placed on record, I find that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to suo motu recall its earlier order in the absence of any prayer for review. 6. Under Section 114 of the Code, any person considering himself aggrieved can apply for review of an order or judgment. Similarly, under provisions of Order-XLVII, Rule 1 (1) of the Code, “any person considering himself aggrieved” can apply for review of an order or judgment. It is, thus, obvious that the power of review can be invoked only when a person considering himself aggrieved by the order or judgment applies for review. It is well settled that the power of review is not an inherent power and same can be exercised only if conferred by statute. It is, thus, obvious that the power of review can be invoked only when a person considering himself aggrieved by the order or judgment applies for review. It is well settled that the power of review is not an inherent power and same can be exercised only if conferred by statute. The power of review having been conferred under provisions of Section 114 and Order-XLVII, Rule 1 (1) of the Code, it could be exercised only in the manner prescribed and not otherwise. Useful reference in this regard can be made to the judgment of the Division Bench in Damomal Kausomal Raisinghani Vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1967 Bom 355 . In paragraph 9 it has been observed thus:- “9. .........Sec. 114 of the Civil Procedure Code confers a power on a person considering himself aggrieved to apply for a review of the judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the said Court on receiving such an application is empowered to make such order thereon as it thinks fit. It is abundantly clear that the power to review whatever be a person aggrieved in that respect has been made. The Civil Procedure Code does not confer on Courts any general power of reviewing its decision suo motu. …..” 7. In the impugned order, the trial Court itself has observed in paragraph 4 that though the plaintiffs had not applied for review, the application seeking clarification was being considered for exercising the power of review. This exercise on the part of the trial Court was not justified, especially after finding that there was no person aggrieved by the earlier order passed below Exh.87 of which review was undertaken. It is to be noted that while entertaining the application for clarification, the entire order passed below Exh.87 has been recalled and a finding has been recorded that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. At the cost of repetition, when there was no prayer for seeking review of the earlier order, the trial Court acted beyond jurisdiction in recalling the order passed below Exh.87. In that view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is, therefore, set aside. 8. At the cost of repetition, when there was no prayer for seeking review of the earlier order, the trial Court acted beyond jurisdiction in recalling the order passed below Exh.87. In that view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is, therefore, set aside. 8. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Budhia Swain and others [supra] on the power of a Court or Tribunal to recall its order is clearly distinguishable in the light of the observations that the power to recall a judgment would not be exercised if the remedy for re-opening or vacating the judgment in question has not been resorted to. In the present case, the order below Exh.87 has neither been challenged nor has its review been sought. It is also not the case that said order is vitiated on account of fraud. Similarly, the decision in Ramdulari Matabadalsingh [supra] also does not support the stand of the respondent. 9. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed and Rule is made absolute in terms of Prayer Clause [1]. Needless to state that parties aggrieved by adjudication pursuant to the order passed below Exh.87 would be free to challenge the same in according with law. No costs.