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2018 DIGILAW 686 (RAJ)

FARUKH KHAN v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

2018-03-06

P.K.LOHRA

body2018
ORDER : P.K. Lohra, J. Petitioner-juvenile has preferred this revision petition under section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (for short, 'Act of 2015') to challenge order dated 19th of December, 2017, passed by Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Nagaur (for short, 'learned appellate Court') rejecting his appeal and affirming order dated 13th of December, 2017, passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Nagaur (for short, 'Board'). The learned Board at the threshold by its order dated 13th of December, 2017, rejected bail application of the petitioner under Section 12 of the Act of 2015 arising out of FIR No. 122/2017 of Police Station Deedwana, District Nagaur wherein he is charged for offence under Sections 354D, 363 & 376 IPC and Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act. 2. Being aggrieved by the order of learned Board, petitioner approached learned appellate Court and the learned appellate Court upon consideration of the matter and alleged criminal delinquencies of the petitioner declined to interfere in the matter. 3. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that in case of grant of bail to a juvenile gravity and magnitude of offence cannot be seen and strictly speaking embargo for grant of bail envisaged under Cr.P.C. cannot be pressed into service. It is also argued by learned counsel that the primary consideration is welfare of the juvenile and in the matter of grant of bail report of Probation Officer is to be given due credence. 4. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor has submitted that both the Courts below have examined the matter and have concurrently recorded their findings for rejection of bail which is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. It is argued by learned Public Prosecutor that though petitioner is a juvenile but he has been charged for offence under the POCSO Act and offence of mental depravity, therefore, it would not be appropriate to enlarge him on bail. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant has strenuously urged that release of petitioner in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case would defeat the ends of justice, and therefore, no interference with the impugned order is warranted. 6. I have bestowed my consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar by learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 7. 6. I have bestowed my consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar by learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 7. While it is true that Section 12 of the Act of 2015 envisages provision for grant of bail to a child in conflict with law notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force but then in appropriate cases bail can be refused if that Court feels that releasing him on bail is likely to bring juvenile in association with any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger, or that release of such a person would defeat the ends of justice. In the instant case, petitioner-juvenile is charged for offence under Sections 354D, 363 & 366 IPC and Section 3/4 of the POCSO Act with two other accomplices out of which one is juvenile. The third accused Saiyad Taskin is charged for offence under Section 120B IPC and Section 16/17 of the POCSO Act, therefore, the petitioner and another juvenile have committed an offence with the conspiracy of third accused. This sort of situation has made this Court to believe that petitioner and another juvenile have committed serious offences due to their association with accused Saiyad Taskin, therefore, involvement of third accused Saiyad Taskin has furnished reasonable belief that release of petitioner is likely to expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger. True it is that in case of a juvenile seriousness of delinquency cannot be given undue credence but at the same time Court cannot overlook a significant fact that the release of juvenile would defeat the ends of justice. The prosecutrix in the matter is 14 years' old and the petitioner and one more juvenile have committed offence in association with one more adult accused has prima facie created a situation wherein risk of juvenile committing such offences in future is also a likelihood. The report of Probation Officer also reveals that affirmative changes in his conduct and behaviour are forthcoming, therefore, viewed from any angle, I feel disinclined to interfere with the impugned orders. 8. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed. 9. However, before parting, it is made clear that petitioner juvenile be kept in a profound atmosphere at a place of safety in Child Care Institution, Nagaur.