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2018 DIGILAW 687 (JK)

Hotel Nedous v. State

2018-09-06

ALOK ARADHE, GITA MITTAL

body2018
ORDER : Gita Mittal, J. 1. The present writ petition brings to the fore the absolutely unacceptable position where public premises of huge dimensions have been permitted to be exploited by the respondents for private commercial gain despite the admitted expiry of the lease as back as in 1985 without payment of a single penny since 1990 for such occupancy. The efforts of the respondents to proceed in accordance with law with action under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988 to evict these unauthorized occupants are sought to be interdicted by the present writ petition. We may first note briefly the essential facts giving rise to the present petition. I. Factual narration 2. The petitioner has placed on record a government order dated 12.07.1963 permitting renewal of the lease of land, building and premises in favour of Col. Harry Nedou alias Ghulam Qadir (for a period of twenty years) with effect from the date of expiry of the existing lease). 3. The petitioner in this case claims under a Government Order dated 12.07.1963 whereby lease rights of two premises i.e., Nedous Hotels in Srinagar and Gulmarg under subsisting leases with M/s. Nedous and Sons expiring on 13.04.1965 and on 01.01.1965 respectively were transferred for unexpired periods to Colonel Harry Nedou alias Ghulam Qadir. Pursuant thereto a lease deed was executed by the Government in his favour. 4. The petitioner has placed on record a sale deed dated 31.10.1963 executed by Mr. W.A. Nedou as vendor in favour of Col. Harry Nedou alias Ghulam Qadir. As per the recitals in this sale deed, it is disclosed that Mr. W.A. Nedou had been granted lease of the premises known as the Nedou Hotel, Srinagar and Nedou Hotel Gulmarg by the Government of J&K which came to an end on 01.01.1965. The vendors stated that he was carrying on hotel business in these premises. This transfer of lease was accepted by the Government and renewal of the lease for a period of twenty years was granted. 5. It is not disputed before us that by this indenture, the lease of 20 years only was granted to the said lessee. It is also an admitted position that the term of the said lease deed expired on 31.12.1985. 6. 5. It is not disputed before us that by this indenture, the lease of 20 years only was granted to the said lessee. It is also an admitted position that the term of the said lease deed expired on 31.12.1985. 6. It is also an admitted position that after expiry of the lease, the same was not handed over to the Government. Instead on 05.08.1994, the petitioner addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary of the J&K Government seeking renewal of the lease of the land "land under and appurtenant to Nedous hotel Gulmar measuring 98 kanals and 11 marlas". This was followed with a reminder dated 18.11.1989. In the writ petition, it is submitted that this request was not considered and no communication was received from the Government. 7. We find admissions of the fact that the lease has expired in the letters dated 05.08.1994 and 18.11.2009 written by the petitioner herein to the respondents seeking renewal of the lease deed. 8. So far as the payment of rent is concerned, it is the petitioner's contention that rent of Rs. 12,272/- stands regularly paid. In this regard, three receipts dated, 13.06.1987, 13.06.1988, 06.06.1989 and 08.07.1986 for a sum of Rs. 12,272/- and fourth receipt dated 08.07.1986 for a sum of Rs. 6000/- issued by the CEO, GDA have been placed on record. 9. So far as the prayer for the renewal is concerned, the respondents i.e., the Estates Officer i.e., Chief Executive Officer, Gulmarg Development Authority, Gulmarg has addressed a letter dated 04.02.2015 to the petitioner informing him that the "application for renewal of lease period for Nedous Hotel Complex (Structure and land) has been taken up with Administrative Department vide this order No. GDA/2014/2556 dated 02.12.2014 and the Administrative Department has recently conveyed that your application for renewal of lease has been rejected." The petitioner was also clearly put to notice that the action against the petitioner would be taken under the J&K Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1988 and the Land Grants Act. 10. Before us, Mr. Anil Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that there is no order of rejection for the renewal of the lease deed by a competent authority. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that no such order has been produced on record. 11. 10. Before us, Mr. Anil Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that there is no order of rejection for the renewal of the lease deed by a competent authority. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that no such order has been produced on record. 11. The record placed before us would show that the respondents initiated proceedings under the J&K Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988 against the petitioner. A notice dated 31.03.2015 under sub-Section(1) of Section 11 has been placed on record calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be made against him. This notice has also been issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Gulmarg Development Authority, Gulmarg, notifying the petitioner that the lease in his favour stands expired; that a request for seeking of extension of lease has been made; that from the date of expiry in the year 1985, the possession of the hotel and the land (Nedous Complex) was being held unauthorisedly; that the Government had rejected the pending request of renewal which was conveyed to the petitioner vide a letter dated 04.02.2015. In this background, the notice to show cause was issued to the petitioner to show cause on or before 6th April 2015 as to why an order of eviction should not be issued. 12. The petitioner responded by a communication served upon the petitioner dated 06.04.2015. This reply was not found satisfactory by the CEO, Gulmarg Development Authority, who was also the Estate Officer under the J&K Public Property Act, 1988, who proceeded to pass an order dated 25.04.2015 under Subsection (1) of Section 5 of the enactment directing the petitioner to vacate the public premises within a period of seven days from the date of issuance of the order. 13. So far as the order dated 25.04.2015 is concerned, the relevant extract thereof reads as follows:- "3. Whereas, the lease period to the above said public premises stands expired in the year 1985 and your pending request seeking extension of the lease stands cancelled by the Government which was conveyed to the undersigned and accordingly for your unauthorized occupation of the supra public premises you have been served to show cause notice in terms of sub-section (1) Section 4 of the Jammu and Kashmir Premises (Eviction of unauthorized occupants) Act 1988 on 30/03/2015. 4. 4. Whereas, you have responded to the notice supra on 06.04.2015, your reply however, was not satisfactory in light of records pertaining to the case and in sequel thereto the undersigned while declaring you as the unauthorized occupant of the public premises issues this order of eviction while exercising the power under Section 5 of the Jammu and Kashmir Premises (Eviction of unauthorized occupants) Act 1988. 5. You are directed to vacate the public premises within a period of 07 days from the date of issuance of this order of Eviction, failing which the necessary recourse to the provisions of the Act will follow accordingly and the undersigned will issue upon you a separate notice under section 10 of the Act seeking the recovery of the rent for your unauthorized occupation of the public premises." (Emphasis by us) 14. The above order is based on an admitted position that the lease in favour of the petitioner has expired and the challenge thereto is completely misconceived. 15. The petitioner assailed the above order by way of a statutory appeal under Section 12 of the J&K Public Premises Act of 1988 before the Court of the Sessions Judge, Baramulla. This appeal was filed on 29.04.2015. The appeal was taken up for consideration on 30.04.2015, when the learned District Judge as the Appellate Authority noted that the order dated 08.04.2013 had been passed in PIL No. 14/2012 titled Mohammad Rafiq Zargar v. State of JK & Ors. by this court directing as follows:- "Para 7. As this Court is seized of this litigation in respect of Gulmarg and Tangmarg all the courts below and the Tribunals are restrained from passing any further orders with regard to the issues pending in this Public Interest Litigation. The Registry is also directed to list the cases concerning the present subject matter before the Public Interest Bench" In the light of the above directions, the learned District Judge, returned the appeal to the appellant with a direction to approach this Court. 16. The Registry is also directed to list the cases concerning the present subject matter before the Public Interest Bench" In the light of the above directions, the learned District Judge, returned the appeal to the appellant with a direction to approach this Court. 16. In view of the above, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition making the following prayers:- "In the premises, it is, therefore, humbly prayed that the impugned orders passed by the respondent No. 3 under the J&K Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988 dated 04.02.2015, 31.03.2015 and 25.04.2015 be quashed and set aside and further this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct the respondents to place the renewal case of the petitioner before the Committee constituted for the purpose." 17. The respondents have filed objections to the writ petition staunchly defending their action under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988. 18. We have heard Mr. Anil Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. B.A. Bar, Sr. AAG for the respondents and given the matter our consideration. We consider the submissions in seriatim hereafter. II. Applicable statutory provisions 19. Before examining the rival contentions we may extract the relevant provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988 hereafter:- "Sec. 2. B.A. Bar, Sr. AAG for the respondents and given the matter our consideration. We consider the submissions in seriatim hereafter. II. Applicable statutory provisions 19. Before examining the rival contentions we may extract the relevant provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988 hereafter:- "Sec. 2. (d) "public premises" means- (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Government; (2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease, or on behalf of,- (i) any company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the Government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first mentioned company; (ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, or a local authority) established by or under a State or Central Act and owned or controlled by the Government; (iii) any University established or incorporated by or under any State Act; (g) "unauthorized occupation in relation to any public premises", means the occupation by any person of the public i premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the of public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant t or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined - for any reason whatsoever. Sec. 4. Issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction (1) If the estate officer is of opinion that any person is in unauthorized occupation of any public premises and that he should be evicted, the estate officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon such concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. (2) The notice shall- (a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; and (b) require all persons concerned, that is to say all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of or claim interest in, the public premises,- (i) to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than seven days from the date of issue thereof, and (ii) to appear before the estate officer on the date specified in the notice along with the evidence which they intend to produce in support of the cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such hearing is desired. (3) The estate officer shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises, and in such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned. (4) Where the estate officer knows or has reasons to believe that any persons are in occupation of the public premises, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3) he shall cause a copy of the notice to be served on every such person by post or by delivering or tendering it to that person or in such other manner as may be prescribed. Sec. 5. Eviction of unauthorized occupants (1) If, after considering cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice under section 4 and any evidence produced by him in support of the same and after personal hearing, if any, given under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 4, the estate officer is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the estate officer shall make an order of eviction, for reason to be recorded therein directing that the public premises shall be vacated, on such date as may be specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises. (2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction on or before the date specified in the said order or within seven days of the date of its publication under sub-section (I), whichever is later, the estate officer or any other officer duly authorized by the estate officer in this behalf may after the date so specified or after the expiry of the period aforesaid, whichever is later, evict that person from and take possession of, the public premises and may, for that purpose, use such force as may be necessary." III. Challenge premised on formulation of a policy for renewal 20. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner cannot be evicted as the respondents are contemplating preparation of a policy framework for renewal of lease cases in the Gulmarg Development Authority with the Chief Secretary in Chair. In this regard, our attention has been drawn to a letter dated 22.12.2012 issued by the Chief Executive Officer, Gulmarg Development Authority, Gulmarg addressed to the Commissioner/Secretary to the Government, Tourism Department, J&K, to address the details of different lease cases including those where the leases in the Gulmarg area have expired. 21. It is further submitted by Mr. Anil Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner that by a letter dated 25.08.2009, a Committee was constituted by the Special Secretary to the Government, General Administration Department to propose a policy framework for dealing with the renewal cases in the Gulmarg Development Authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner is, therefore, entitled to consideration of his case for renewal of the lease by such Committee. 22. In our view, this submission, to say the least, is completely misconceived. Admittedly, there is no policy or decision by any competent authority to renew expired leases. The petitioner is claiming occupation and the entitlement to renewal of a claimed lease with regard to 98 kanals of valuable public property in Gulmarg, an extremely popular tourist resort. The lease granted in the year 1963 expired in the year 1985. The petitioner claims that against payment of license fee of merely Rs. 12,272/- for this huge chunk of land over which he is claiming right. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that such fees stands paid till the year 1990. The lease granted in the year 1963 expired in the year 1985. The petitioner claims that against payment of license fee of merely Rs. 12,272/- for this huge chunk of land over which he is claiming right. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that such fees stands paid till the year 1990. Admittedly, therefore, this public property is being continued to be occupied by a person who has no legal right or entitlement thereto since the year 1990 without paying a single penny for the same. 23. No prayer can be premised on the inchoate and nebulous proposition that a policy with regard to renewal of lease has yet to be formulated by the authorities. This is for the reason that no person has a legal right to enforce renewal of a lease deed which has expired. In any case, the petitioner has received the letter dated 04.02.2015 informing it about the rejection of his request. 24. The challenge set up to the rejection on the ground of competency of the person who rejected the same is completely misconceived, as admittedly there is neither any policy for renewal for lease of public property nor any person has or can claim a legal right thereto. 25. In any case, as discussed above, the very initiation of the proceedings under the J&K Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988 would tantamount to a deemed rejection of the request for renewal. 26. The petitioner claims that his case is required to be considered by the Committee. We may note that inasmuch as the case of the petitioner for renewal of the lease stands rejected by the respondents, we are unable to see any merit in the submissions for the reason that the petitioner's request for renewal of the lease has not been considered by the authorities. i. Manner of distribution/allotment of public property 27. Given the challenge and claim by the petitioner, it becomes necessary as to the manner in which public property has to be dealt with by the authorities. 28. The official respondents are public trustees of the public property owned by the State. In this regard we may usefully refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in (2010) 2 SCC 461 , Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah & Anr. at page 483, wherein paragraph No. 47 the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "47. 28. The official respondents are public trustees of the public property owned by the State. In this regard we may usefully refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in (2010) 2 SCC 461 , Mandal Revenue Officer v. Goundla Venkaiah & Anr. at page 483, wherein paragraph No. 47 the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "47. ......... it is well neigh impossible for the State and its instrumentalities including the local authorities to keep every day vigilance/watch over vast tracts of open land owned by them or of which they are the public trustees. ...." 29. In its representation dated 18.11.2009 to the CEO, GDA, the petitioner has stated that over the years, the hotel has catered to the "elitist of the tourism industry". Thus the petitioner has exploited valuable public property for commercial gain without making payment of any amounts for the same. This disentitles the petitioner to exercise of any indulgence in its favour. Public property has to be utilized for the good of the public at large of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in public interest and exercise of discretion with regard thereto cannot be guided by any consideration of private commercial interest. 30. Learned counsel in response to an observation by the Court with regard to the pittance that was the lease amount in the context of the magnitude of the grant claimed by the petitioner, we were told by Mr. Bhan, learned counsel that on account of the difficult circumstances in the State, there was no foot fall in the hotel. This by itself would justify restoration of the property to the Government for appropriate use and allotment. 31. In a case similar on facts to the present case with regard to the allotment by the New Delhi Municipal Council of a Cinema Complex known as Chanakya Cinema Complex situated at Diplomatic Enclave, New Delhi, renewal of the lease/license was sought by the allottee after expiry of the tenure of the allotment. By its judgment reported at (2007) 8 SCC 75 Aggarwal & Modi Enterprises (P) Ltd., v. New Delhi Municipal Council, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge to the judgment of the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition as well as the Division Bench decision upholding the decision of the learned Single Judge. By its judgment reported at (2007) 8 SCC 75 Aggarwal & Modi Enterprises (P) Ltd., v. New Delhi Municipal Council, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge to the judgment of the Single Judge dismissing the writ petition as well as the Division Bench decision upholding the decision of the learned Single Judge. In paragraph No. 22 and 23 of the pronouncement, the Supreme Court also referred Section 141 (2) of the NDMC Act and held as under:- "22. ........... In other words, NDMC is obligated to adopt the procedure by which it can get maximum possible return/consideration for such immovable property. The methodology which can be adopted for receiving maximum consideration in a normal and fair competition would be the public auction which is expected to be fair and transparent. Public auction not only ensures fair price and maximum return it also militates against any allegation of favoritism on the part of the Government authorities while giving grant for disposing of public property. The courts have accepted public auction as a transparent mean of disposal of public property. 23. Disposal of public property partakes the character of trust and there is distinct demarcated approach for disposal of public property in contradiction to the disposal of private property i.e. it should be for public purpose and in public interest. Invitation for participation in public auction ensures transparency and it would be free from bias or discrimination and beyond reproach." (Emphasis supplied) 32. In this judgment, having regard to the long period of occupation by the petitioner, which the Court held was without legal sanctioned, the Supreme Court by its judgment decided on 31.08.2007, granted time till 31.12.2007 to the petitioner to handover possession to the NDMC. Clearly allotment of public land cannot be other than by an open, transparent and public process. It is therefore well settled that State and public authorities are public trustees of land owned by them. 33. What is significant to note is the declaration by the Supreme Court that disposal of public property partakes the character of a trust. 34. In (2011) 5 SCC 29 Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of M.P., the Supreme Court had occasion to examine legality of action taken by the Government of M.P to allot 20 acres of land to an institution established in the name of Khushabhav Thakre on the basis of merely an application made by the Trust. 34. In (2011) 5 SCC 29 Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of M.P., the Supreme Court had occasion to examine legality of action taken by the Government of M.P to allot 20 acres of land to an institution established in the name of Khushabhav Thakre on the basis of merely an application made by the Trust. One of the grounds on which the appellant challenged the allotment of land was that the State Government had not adopted any rational method for the allotment which was consistent with the doctrine of equality. The High Court negated the appellant's challenge. Before the Supreme Court, counsel for the State had placing reliance on several judicial precedents, argued that the Court cannot exercise the power of judicial review to nullify relied on a policy framed a state policy by the State Government to allot Nazul land without advertisement. The Supreme Court placed reliance on its prior judgments in the cases of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 , Kasturilal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J & K, (1980) 4 SCC 1 , Common Cause v. Union of India, Shrilekha Vidyarthy v. State of U.P., (1991) 1 SCC 212 , LIC v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, (1995) 5 SCC 482 , New India Public School v. HUDA and rejected the submissions. In paragraph No. 65, the Supreme Court held as follows:- "65. What needs to be emphasized is that the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities cannot give largesse to any person according to the sweet will and whims of the political entities and/or officers of the State. Every action/decision of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to give largesse or confer benefit must be founded on a sound, transparent, discernible and well defined policy, which shall be made known to the public by publication in the Official Gazette and other recognized modes of publicity and such policy must be implemented/executed by adopting a non- discriminatory and non-arbitrary method irrespective of the class or category of persons proposed to be benefited by the policy. The distribution of largesse like allotment of land, grant of quota, permit licence etc. The distribution of largesse like allotment of land, grant of quota, permit licence etc. by the State and its agencies/instrumentalities should always be done in a fair and equitable manner and the element of favoritism or nepotism shall not influence the exercise of discretion, if any, conferred upon the particular functionary or officer of the State." (Emphasis supplied) 35. On this issue, we may usefully also refer to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in 1987 (2) SCC 295 , Sachidanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal, wherein, again placing reliance on prior judicial precedents, the Supreme Court laid down the following propositions:- "40. .......... State owned or public-owned property is not to be dealt with at the absolute discretion of the executive. Certain precepts and principles have to be observed. Public interest is the paramount consideration. One of the methods of securing the public interest, when it is considered necessary to dispose of a property, is to sell the property by public auction or by inviting tenders. Though that is the ordinary rule. it is not an invariable rule. There may be situations where there are compelling reasons necessitating departure from the rule, but then the reasons for the departure must be rational and should not be suggestive of discrimination. Appearance of public justice is as important as doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an appearance of bias, jobbery or nepotism." (emphasis by us) 36. It is, therefore, well settled that public owned property cannot be dealt with in any manner other than ensuring public interest and has to be done in a fair and equitable manner. 37. The Supreme Court had occasion also to comment on a claim of renewal of a lease of public property in the pronouncement reported as (2017) 5 SCC 86 Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Mesco Kalinga Steel Limited & Ors. With regard to the High Court direction to execute the lease deed, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:- "22. ........In the light of aforesaid decision, when we consider the overall conduct of Mesco in the instant case, we are fully satisfied that the High Court has adventured into an avoidable illegality while directing execution of lease deed. It is a settled law that equity follows the rule of common law in respect of such contracts. ........In the light of aforesaid decision, when we consider the overall conduct of Mesco in the instant case, we are fully satisfied that the High Court has adventured into an avoidable illegality while directing execution of lease deed. It is a settled law that equity follows the rule of common law in respect of such contracts. Renewal of lease is a privilege and if a tenant wishes to claim the privilege, he must do so strictly within the time limited for the purpose.......". 38. It is therefore well settled that not only grant of lease or license of public property is dispensation of state largesse, but renewal thereof is a privilege. Grant of the lease as well as its renewal has to be effected by an open and transparent process. ii. Lease period expired-whether there could be automatic renewal 39. This issue is also not res-integra. In (2016) 11 SCC 406 , Delhi Development Authority v. Anant Raj Agencies Private Limited, the Supreme Court noted that the power to grant a lease included a power to grant renewal thereof. However, renewal after expiry of the lease period cannot be automatic. It was further specifically held that mere acceptance of the rent by the lessor after expiry of the lease period would not tantamount to renewal of the lease. Paragraph Nos. 30 to 34 of the said judgment wherein this issue stands discussed deserves to be considered in extenso & read as follows:- "30. Thus, it is abundantly clear from the aforesaid legal statutory provisions of the DD Act and terms and conditions of the lease deed and the case law referred supra that there is no automatic renewal of lease of the property in question in favour of the original lessee. Therefore, the concurrent findings of the courts below on the contentious issue in the impugned judgment are not only erroneous but also error in law and hence, the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law and liable to be set aside. 31. Therefore, the concurrent findings of the courts below on the contentious issue in the impugned judgment are not only erroneous but also error in law and hence, the same cannot be allowed to sustain in law and liable to be set aside. 31. From the above discussion, it is clear that in the absence of renewal of lease, the status of the original lessee, in relation to the property in question, is that of an unauthorized occupant as he had continued in occupation of the property in question as an 'unauthorized person' in terms of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, which reads as under: "2(g) "unauthorized occupation", in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever." 32. In the absence of renewal of lease after 10.8.1968, the pleadings of the original lessee that the DDA is estopped from taking the plea that there is no renewal of lease after having accepted the rent after 10.8.1968, in respect of property in question and after accepting certain sums in respect of the same, subsequently, for change of the property in question from leasehold to freehold are all irrelevant aspects for the reason that the same are contrary to the aforesaid provisions of the DD Act, the Nazul Land Rules applicable to the fact situation and the terms and conditions of the lease deed. Further, it is clear from the contents of the termination notice dated 01.09.1972 served upon the original lessee by the DDA that it has not only refused to renew the lease of the property but also asked the original lessee to hand over the possession of the property in question within 30 days, which is absolutely in consonance with Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. 33. 33. Without examining the case in the proper perspective that the property in question being a Public Premises in terms of Section 2(e) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 and that after expiry of lease period the original lessee has become unauthorized occupant in terms of Section 2(g) of the said Act in the light of relevant statutory provisions and rules referred to supra and law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the Case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. & Anr. the concurrent findings of the courts below on the contentious issue is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law and therefore, liable to be set aside. 34. The grant of perpetual injunction by the Trial Court in favour of original lessee, restraining the DDA from taking any action under the said termination notice dated 01.09.1972, on the ground that the termination notice dated 01.09.1972 being illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction and the affirmation of the same by both the first appellate court, i.e., by the learned ADJ and further by the High Court by its impugned judgment and order are not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law." (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, on expiry of the period of the lease, there can be no automatic renewal and the lessee becomes an "unauthorized occupant" thereupon. 40. On the issue of contours of renewal of a lease or license, reference may usefully be also made to a Division Bench pronouncement of the High Court of Delhi dated 27.10.2016 in RFA (OS) 67/2016, the Indian Hotel Company Limited v. New Delhi Municipal Council, with regard to the matter relating to the well-known Hotel the Taj Man Singh Hotel. In paragraph No. 40 of the pronouncement, the court observed that the right to renewal is an important and integral right of the grant, noted the submissions of the counsel for the petitioners and then further went on in paragraph No. 44 to observe that the same was not a vested right. In paragraph No. 46, it was noted that even the renewal clause in the lease deed did not create any vested right in the lessee. 41. It was observed in paragraph No. 52 in the said judgement that "renewal of a grant amounts to a fresh grant". In paragraph No. 46, it was noted that even the renewal clause in the lease deed did not create any vested right in the lessee. 41. It was observed in paragraph No. 52 in the said judgement that "renewal of a grant amounts to a fresh grant". So far as the request from the IHCL to renew the license was concerned, the Court observed that "the NDMC would be bound to secure the price which would be fetched at a fair petition and the fair competition would be the one as contemplated by the Supreme Court in the Centre for Public Interest Litigation case i.e., an auction. It was noted that as per the judgment, it was settled law that unless there is a social or a welfare purpose or any other public interest which is served, an asset held for the benefit of the public, if commercially exploited should be by way of an auction or an open competitive bidding because it would then fetch the maximum revenue." 42. It is trite that renewal of a lease of public property, especially where the public property is being exploited for a commercial purpose, has to be in public interest by open, transparent process. 43. In the present case, we are concerned with not any simple allotment of land for personal use, say as a residence or otherwise by a person, but of valuable commercial property in the nature of a hotel. Clearly the well settled proposition regarding dispensation of state largesse by way of renewal of a lease of valuable commercial property has to abide by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. 44. It is trite that so far as rights claimed under a specific contract and grant are concerned, the parties have to strictly abide by the terms thereof. In the present case, it is an admitted fact that the lease of the petitioner stands expired. So far as the rights of the petitioner are concerned, the same have to abide strictly by the terms of said lease. 45. In the objections, the respondents have pointed out that by virtue of A Government Order No. 89-TSM of 2006 dated 04.04.2006, the Government constituted a Committee for preliminary screening of lease cases in Gulmarg and that the case of the petitioner was also discussed. 45. In the objections, the respondents have pointed out that by virtue of A Government Order No. 89-TSM of 2006 dated 04.04.2006, the Government constituted a Committee for preliminary screening of lease cases in Gulmarg and that the case of the petitioner was also discussed. It was held that since the petitioner has encroached adjacent State land measuring 91 Kanals, therefore, it was recommended that the lease of the petitioner shall be cancelled. 46. The respondents have also submitted that in terms of SRO 580 of 1977, no lease can be renewed for a period beyond 40 years. The facts of the case would show that the petitioner is occupying the land for well over fifty years which is way beyond the maximum permissible period of extensions. IV. Deposit of rent/license fee voluntarily after expiry of lease & its acceptance by the allotting authority/lessor after expiry of the grant - impact thereof 47. In the present case, it has been argued by Mr. Anil Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had paid rent which has been accepted by the authorities. It is trite that after the expiry of the period of lease, the lessee of Government property thereupon becomes an unauthorized occupant of public land. Merely because he deposits rent voluntarily with the lessee, it cannot be deemed that there was renewal of lease or that the occupation becomes authorized. 48. In this regard, reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in (2006) 8 SCC 286 Gram Panchayat, Village Haripura v. Commissioner, Firozpur Division & Anr. wherein the Court held as follows:- "11. Therefore, the Full Bench took the view that because some rent had been paid that would not make a tenant ipso facto a lessee. A particular method has been prescribed that how lease to be executed as per Rule 6. Therefore, in this view of the matter, we are of opinion that unless proper lease is granted in the manner provided in rule 6 of the Rules till that time simply because someone has paid rent that would not entitle him to claim as a tenant. In the absence of statutory provisions and rules thereunder, it is difficult to accept that since the rent had been deposited with the Gram Panchayat that would make them tenants. In the absence of statutory provisions and rules thereunder, it is difficult to accept that since the rent had been deposited with the Gram Panchayat that would make them tenants. Thus, the conclusion drawn by the Commissioner, Firozpur Division and affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be sustained. We are unable to understand the reasoning of the Division Bench to ignore the Full Bench judgment on the ground that in the aforesaid case the lease was granted year to year basis. The question is not the grant of lease on year to year basis. The question is whether the Gram Panchayat has recognized the contesting respondent as a tenant or not. Simply someone has paid or deposited the rent with the Gram Panchayat voluntarily after unauthorisedly occupying the Gram Panchayat land, he would not be deemed to be a tenant. This would be mockery of law. A lawful tenant is one who has been admitted as tenant after following due procedure of law. It is not one man show of the Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat that he can surreptitiously take someone as a tenant without following the procedure under the rules, in case the Sarpanch or any Panch inducts someone as a tenant without following the procedure prescribed under the Rules then such induction of the person will not be authorised or lawful and the Gram Panchayat will not be bound by that. In fact for lease of Shamilat deh land proper procedure has been prescribed that the land has to be auctioned and proper document has to be executed and it has to be authenticated. In the absence of the proper formalities being undertaken the voluntary deposit of the rent or even accepting the rent by the Gram Panchayat will not make that person a lawful tenant under the Gram Panchayat." (Emphasis by us) 49. The deposit of the amounts by the petitioner after 31.12.1985 therefore creates no legal right, little or interest in favour of the petitioner to continue with the occupation of the public property. V. Individuos discrimination 50. A further submission that the respondents have discriminated against the petitioner and that other persons whose leases have expired are continuing to occupy the demised premises without objection or eviction at the hands of the respondents. 51. V. Individuos discrimination 50. A further submission that the respondents have discriminated against the petitioner and that other persons whose leases have expired are continuing to occupy the demised premises without objection or eviction at the hands of the respondents. 51. It is well settled that no person can urge a plea of discrimination premised on an illegality. It also needs no further elaboration that after completion of the period of the lease, a lessee becomes an unauthorized occupant and has no right at all to continue in occupation of the demised premises. Therefore, merely because the respondents have not proceeded against similarly placed unauthorized occupancies, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that he would have a legal right to be treated in a like manner. 52. In (2012) 12 SCC 419 Usha Mehta v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. the lease deed of public land purportedly executed by the Estate Officer was found to be a forged document. The Government denied regularization of the said lease deed on the ground that the lease relied upon by the appellant was unauthorized and the entire transaction was a result of fraud and collusion. It appears that a similar agreement was executed by the same Estate Officer to regularize on payment of market value. The petitioner pressed entitlement to similar treatment on the basis of the forged document. The Supreme Court held that no right was created on the strength of the forged document, also noting that there was no evidence to support the petitioner's contention that the other cases were of an identical nature and held that the High Court was not right in entertaining the appellant's bald plea of discrimination. We may extract paragraph No. 14.2 of the above said judgment, wherein the Court observed as follows:- "14.2. The plea of discrimination raised by the appellant was wholly misconceived and the High Court rightly declined to entertain the same. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that: "14. Equality before law. -The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." The concept of equality enshrined in that article is a positive concept. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that: "14. Equality before law. -The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." The concept of equality enshrined in that article is a positive concept. The Court can command the State to give equal treatment to similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong order has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality be committed in their favour by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities." 53. In the present case as well, other than a bald plea that the respondents have permitted other persons to continue with that illegal occupation, no details thereof have been furnished. 54. In Chandigarh Administration v. Jagjit Singh ( AIR 1995 SC 705 ) the Supreme Court held as under: "Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over and over again. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over and over again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is similar to the other persons' case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course -- barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises.)" (Emphasis by us) 55. So far as the plea of the petitioner that it has been singled out by individuos discrimination and that the respondents are not proceeding against other lessees whose leases have expired, it is trite that a person cannot claim negative equality. Neither the petitioner nor the other persons whose leases have expired, have any legal right to continue to occupy the leased properties. In such eventuality, the respondents would require to be directed to ensure that strict action is taken by them for recovery of all public properties which are illegally and unauthorizedly occupied, unless there are binding orders of any court interdicting such action by the respondents. We would therefore hereby direct the respondents to ensure strict adherence to this well settled requirement of law. 56. In fact, given the plea of individuos discrimination set up by the petitioner, we have grave doubts that the failure to discharge the public trust reposed in the authorities/respondents, the failure of the respondents to take action may be deliberate or collusive with the lessee who continue to occupy and exploit public property for commercial gains. Such omissions are detrimental to public interest and would have led to deprivation of public property and revenue to the State of J&K and tremendous loss to public interest. VI. Dispute as to extent of land leased to the erstwhile lessee and that occupied by the petitioner 57. Mr. Such omissions are detrimental to public interest and would have led to deprivation of public property and revenue to the State of J&K and tremendous loss to public interest. VI. Dispute as to extent of land leased to the erstwhile lessee and that occupied by the petitioner 57. Mr. B.A. Dar, learned Senior AAG for the respondents submits that the respondents vehemently dispute that the petitioner is in possession of the land over which he is claiming possession and occupation and further that the rental of Rs. 12,272/- which was only with regard to 2.13 kanals of land which has been leased to Begum Saleema Nedou. 58. Learned counsel for the respondents has also drawn our attention to a letter dated 17.12.1990, whereby an amount of Rs. 12,272/- then sought to be deposited, was returned to Begum Saleema Nedou clearly informing her that "the lease of the Nedous Hotel at Gulmarg has already expired in the year 1985 and the Government has not renewed it due to the fact that the building is conflicting with the Master Plan and has to be dismantled for other development purposes." 59. In their objections, the respondents have further stated that " in the year 1981, the mother of the petitioner namely Saleema Nedous succeeded in obtaining the lease of land measuring 02 kanals 13 marlas appurtenant to the aforesaid Nedous Hotel from the Government for a period of 90 years by virtue of Government Order No. 135-UD of 1981 dated 26-02-1981. However, in view of this fact, that the grantee failed to utilize the land for a purpose it was allotted to her, the lease was determined and the allotment order was rescinded by the Government. Copy of the lease order dated 26-02-1981 and order of determination of lease dated 12-03-1982 are also appended herewith as Annexure C & D respectively. Significant to mention here, that under the garb of grant of lease of land measuring 02 kanals and 13 marlas, the petitioner has encroached upon the vast chunk of land measuring 98 kanals 11 marlas and has fenced it from all the sides, which fencing was demolished pursuant to the order of this Hon'ble Court. The petitioner has deliberately kept aback and concealed the documents in order to put his claim on huge chunk of land. The petitioner has deliberately kept aback and concealed the documents in order to put his claim on huge chunk of land. The petitioner be directed to disclose and furnish all the documents pertaining to the quantum of lease. However, it is stated that all records which were lying with the answering respondent No. 3 got gutted in hazardous fire in 1984, though the answering respondent No. 3 tried its utmost to reconstruct the same from available sources." 60. There can be no manner of doubt that the petitioner is in unauthorized occupation of huge amount of public property. VII. Objections to the proceedings and order under The Jammu and Kashmir Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988. 61. The petitioner has submitted that by the Government Order dated 12.07.1963, rights have been transferred in favour of the petitioner and therefore the provisions of the J&K Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1988 are not attracted. To say the least, this submission is merely to be noted for the sake of rejection. The petitioner has admitted his status as a lessee under a grant by the Government and claims to have paid the charges for the same as well. The Government remains the owner of the property and the premises are clearly public premises. 62. A bald plea is taken that the impugned notices and orders issued are without jurisdiction and are discriminatory for the reason that the Government has not taken any decision with regard to the renewal of the lease nor the renewal case of the petitioner been placed before the Committee. We have also set out hereinabove the manner in which dispensation of the state largesse which includes the grant of renewal of public property has to be undertaken. In the light of the above discussion, the petitioner has no legal right to renewal of the lease over the public property which the Government holds in as the public trust. 63. The above narration thus establishes that there is no dispute at all by the petitioner that the property in question is a public premise. It is also an admitted position that the lease in question expired on or about 31.12.1985 and that there is no subsisting grant thereafter at all in favour of the erstwhile lessee. 64. 63. The above narration thus establishes that there is no dispute at all by the petitioner that the property in question is a public premise. It is also an admitted position that the lease in question expired on or about 31.12.1985 and that there is no subsisting grant thereafter at all in favour of the erstwhile lessee. 64. There can be no cavil at all that in the present case the premises are covered under the definition of Public Premises within the meaning of the expression in Section 2 (g) of the J&K Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1988 and that the Estate Officer had full jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 65. Sub-section g of Section 2 defines "Unauthorized occupation in relation to any public premises" as "occupation by any person of public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever." 66. The lease in favour of the petitioner admittedly had expired in the year 1985 and the lessee was covered under the definition of the unauthorized occupants as defined under Section 2(g) of the enactment. 67. The petitioner has admittedly received the notice dated 31.03.2015 issued by the Estate Officer under Section 4(1) of the J&K Act, 1988. The petitioner's reply dated 06.04.2015 thereto was found unsatisfactory resulting in the passing of the eviction order on 25.04.2015. 68. In the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported at (2012) SCC 12 573 Cantonment Board & Ors. v. Church of North India, the respondent was running a Mission hospital in the State of Rajasthan in a premises given on a lease dated 01.04.1982 which expired on 31.03.1984. Proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 were initiated, the respondents inter alia objected to the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer and also that action should be taken under the Transfer of the Property Act. The High Court of Rajasthan accepted the contentions of the respondent. Upon considering the challenge thereto by the authorities, the Supreme Court held as follows:- "17. This being the position, there is no substance in the objection raised by and on behalf of the respondent. The High Court of Rajasthan accepted the contentions of the respondent. Upon considering the challenge thereto by the authorities, the Supreme Court held as follows:- "17. This being the position, there is no substance in the objection raised by and on behalf of the respondent. The Estate Officer did have jurisdiction to take action against the respondent under the Public Premises Act. The period of authorization of the respondent to occupy the premises was over on 31.3.1984. Therefore, the respondent was in an unauthorized occupation thereafter under Section 2(g)of the Act. Notice as required, under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act was given. The respondent had no acceptable defence. The premises were no longer being used properly. That being so, the order of eviction was fully justified as also the order passed by the District Judge dismissing the appeal. 18. The Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court, therefore, clearly erred in holding that a notice of 15 days ought to have been given in the present case to terminate the authority of the respondent on the concerned premises. The provisions of Sections 106 and 107 of Transfer of Property Act could not be applied to the present case on that count since the premises were covered under a special act which will prevail as against a general enactment. The Division Bench also having accepted that the respondent was in an unauthorized occupation, erred in insisting that a 15 days' notice was necessary." (Emphasis by us) 69. According to Mr. Anil Bhan, learned counsel for the petitioner the grant was against a sum of Rs. 12,272/- per month. The writ petitioner has claimed that it has paid rent regularly and in support thereof has annexed only four receipts, three dated 13.06.1987; 06.06.1989 and 13.06.1989 each for a sum of Rs. 12,272/- respectively. A fourth receipt dated 08.07.1986 placed on record is inexplicably for a sum of Rs. 6000/-. No amount has been tendered or paid thereafter. Admittedly, not a penny has been paid to the Government for the occupancy of this huge property for a period of over 28 years. 70. The record of this case also establishes that the lessee has expired. We are not informed about the date of the death, whether it was during the currency of the lease or after its expiry on 31.12.1985. The writ petition has been filed through Mr. 70. The record of this case also establishes that the lessee has expired. We are not informed about the date of the death, whether it was during the currency of the lease or after its expiry on 31.12.1985. The writ petition has been filed through Mr. Umer Khaleel described in the affidavit as son of late "Col. Nadia Nedou" the erstwhile lessee, who clearly have no right at all to continue on occupation. 71. So far as the proceedings under the J&K Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988 are concerned, no challenge at all is laid in the writ petition that the same are not in accordance with law. There is no objection at all that the Estate Officer has not followed the prescribed procedure. 72. The challenge in the writ petition is primarily premised on the simple objection that a request for renewal of lease stands made and is pending with the authorities. The petitioner cannot challenge rejection of its request for renewal as illegal or colourable. 73. With regard to the petitioner's contention that the eviction proceedings be deferred because of its request for renewal, a reference may be made to pronouncement of Supreme Court in a case also relating to an order under the J&K Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1988 wherein deference of the proceedings were sought because of an issue pending before the Revenue Secretary. In the judgment reported at (2002) 10 SCC 406 K.K. Verma v. State of JK & Ors. a stay of execution of order of eviction which had attained finality had been granted by this Court. A further direction was made for reconsideration of a fresh allotment which stood made in favour of another party. This order was set-aside by the Supreme Court holding that the High Court had erred in passing this order holding as under:- "3. We have heard learned Counsel. On perusal of the record, we find that the proceedings initiated against respondent No. 4 under the Public Premises Act, has attained finality after the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench. The status of respondent No. 4 being of an unauthorized occupant was not entitled to continue in possession over the land. We have heard learned Counsel. On perusal of the record, we find that the proceedings initiated against respondent No. 4 under the Public Premises Act, has attained finality after the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench. The status of respondent No. 4 being of an unauthorized occupant was not entitled to continue in possession over the land. The High Court fell in error in issuing direction that the order of eviction shall not be executed till the matter is decided by the Revenue Secretary despite he was held to be an unauthorized occupant. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the part of the order of the High Court whereby respondent No. 4 was allowed to continue in possession over the land till the decision by the Revenue Secretary." (Emphasis supplied) 74. Clearly, even if the petitioner's request for renewal could be considered to be pending, the proceedings and orders under the JK Act of 1988 cannot be interdicted in order to consider the basic claim of entitlement to renewal of lease for public property, first and foremost what has to be examined is to the manner in which public property has to be dealt with and how it can be allotted. The next issue which would arise for consideration is as to whether a person has a legal right to renewal of a grant or dispensation by the Government of immovable property allotted to it? We consider these important aspects of the matter hereafter. 75. We find that in the instant case, the Estate Officer has followed the requirements of the statute in issuing the notice and in passing the impugned order. No legally tenable ground to challenge the notices and the eviction order under the J&K Act, 1988 have been laid in the writ petition. VIII. Result 76. For all the reasons, we find no merit in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed. 77. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary of the State of J&K to ensure strict compliance. The Chief Secretary shall also look into the State Government Order No. 1150-GAD of 2009 dated 25.08.2009 relied upon by the petitioner noted by us hereinabove. Strict action in securing all public properties shall be taken by the authorities in the light of the above observations.