JUDGMENT Hon’ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.—Heard Sri S.K. Verma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Bipin Lal Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rakesh Kumar Mishra, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents. 2. Present petition has been filed for quashing the impugned orders dated 28.5.2012, 21.8.1998 and 15.5.1998 passed by the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Further prayer has been made seeking direction to the respondents to pay all his arrears of salaries and other benefits to the petitioner calculated right from 15.8.1997 till the date of payment of regular salaries. 3. By the impugned order dated 15.5.1998 the petitioner, who was working as Constable in PAC, was dismissed from service on the charge of remaining absent in unauthorized manner from 19.8.1997 till the passing of the order, which was found to be proved. By the same order, for the period of absence from 19.8.1997 till the passing of the order, leave without pay was sanctioned. The departmental appeal filed against the aforesaid order was dismissed vide order dated 21.8.1998 passed by the respondent No. 2 and the revision filed by the petitioner was also rejected vide order dated 28.5.2012 passed by the respondent No. 1. 4. Facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner was working as Constable in 45th Vahini P.A.C., Aligarh. On 15.8.1997 the petitioner was granted leave for 4 days by the Commandant but thereafter he remained absent till the passing of the impugned order. The petitioner was charge-sheeted that after 19.8.1997 he is continuously absent and inspite of the service of notice he did not come back to join his duty which amounts to misconduct and insubordination. He submitted his reply that because of ailment of his wife he could not come. However, he admittedly did not appear in the departmental inquiry. The inquiry proceedings were concluded and he was found guilty of remaining absent in unauthorized manner w.e.f. 19.8.1997. Thereafter, he was given a show-cause notice dated 24.4.1998. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show-cause notice, which was found unsatisfactory and the impugned order of punishment was passed. 5. However, he admittedly did not appear in the departmental inquiry. The inquiry proceedings were concluded and he was found guilty of remaining absent in unauthorized manner w.e.f. 19.8.1997. Thereafter, he was given a show-cause notice dated 24.4.1998. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show-cause notice, which was found unsatisfactory and the impugned order of punishment was passed. 5. It was mainly argued that absence of the petitioner was regularized by the disciplinary authority by granting him leave for the period during which he was absent and as such, since leave was sanctioned to him for the period in question, the order of punishment of dismissal is not sustainable in the eye of law. Elaborating the argument it was submitted that since the petitioner was entitled for grant of his earned leave, medical leave and leave without pay and therefore, there was no dereliction of duty on the part of the petitioner and once the leave without pay was granted, the order of dismissal is illegal. It was next submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the quantum of punishment is highly excessive and the facts and that the circumstances of the case have not been impartially and independently looked into by the disciplinary authority before imposing such harsh punishment. It was next submitted that in any case, the punishment awarded to the petitioner is highly excessive and this Court can look into the same. It was also submitted that the inquiry was conducted by the Assistant Commandant, who was an officer below the rank of Commandant, the appointing authority and as such the inquiry proceedings are vitiated in law. It was submitted that no personal hearing was afforded to the petitioner and as such there was a violation of principles of natural justice. 6. During course of arguments learned Senior Counsel has placed much emphasis on two grounds, firstly, the leave without pay having been sanctioned for the period of absence, the order of dismissal is bad in law and secondly, the quantum of punishment is excessive, harsh and is disproportionate in the present case. 7. Learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh, (1998) 8 SCC 232 (paragraphs 4 and 11). 7. Learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on a judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh, (1998) 8 SCC 232 (paragraphs 4 and 11). He has further placed reliance on judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, JT 1993 (6) SC 1 (paragraph 64), Ex. Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 417 , Vijay Singh v. State of U.P. and others, (2012) 5 SCC 242 (paragraph 17), Jagat Pal Singh v. The Inspector General of Police, U.P. Lucknow and others, 1985 U.P. Criminal Ruling 273, and Dr. Prem Behari Lal Saxena v. State of U.P. and another, AIR 1965 Allahabad 406. 8. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel has submitted that it is not in dispute that after having been granted leave for 4 days on 15.8.1997 the petitioner remain absent since 19.8.1997 and has not submitted any document in his support during the inquiry proceedings. It was pointed out that the inquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with the U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The petitioner was given full opportunity of hearing and in this regard a reference may be made to the inquiry report, which has been annexed with the counter-affidavit. It was submitted that the disciplinary inquiry could have been conducted by any officer other than the appointing authority in view of Rule 12 of the Rules of 1991. He further submitted that the petitioner was admittedly not ill and even as per reply of show-cause notice the wife of the petitioner had recovered by 25.4.1998 but even thereafter he did not appear and reported for duty and did not explain reasons for absence. No medical certificate about his own illness was submitted by the petitioner. It was pointed out that the petitioner had never appeared before the inquiry officer inspite of the notices sent to him and received by him time and again. Submission, therefore, is that no interference is warranted in the present case. 9. I have considered the rival submissions and have perused the record. 10. It was pointed out that the petitioner had never appeared before the inquiry officer inspite of the notices sent to him and received by him time and again. Submission, therefore, is that no interference is warranted in the present case. 9. I have considered the rival submissions and have perused the record. 10. It is not in dispute that the reason for absence, shown by the petitioner, was illness of his wife, who was under treatment and it is also not in dispute that it was not the case of illness of the petitioner himself. 11. On perusal of record I find that the petitioner was granted leave for 4 days on 25.8.1997 and admittedly, the petitioner did not report for duty even till the passing of the order. From perusal of the inquiry report it is very much clear that again and again notices were issued to the petitioner to submit his reply and appear before the inquiry officer for recording his statement and for cross-examination, if any, of the departmental witnesses. In departmental inquiry documentary evidence was placed on record and statement of witnesses were recorded. The petitioner never appeared before the inquiry officer and it is only thereafter he submitted his documents regarding illness of his wife. It is also not in dispute that he himself had not fallen ill and as such finding of fact has been rightly recorded regarding his unauthorized absence by the inquiry officer and rightly upheld by the disciplinary authority. The petitioner was issued a show-cause notice dated 20.4.1998 and was supplied complete inquiry report to which he had given his reply by registered post, which was not found satisfactory. A perusal of the order of dismissal dated 15.5.1998 clearly reflects that the explanation/reply to show-cause notice was given by the petitioner vide registered letter dated 25.4.1998 (received in the office on 6.5.1998), wherein he has stated that now his wife is well but still he did not report in the office on any future date. 12. A perusal of the order of dismissal dated 15.5.1998 clearly reflects that the explanation/reply to show-cause notice was given by the petitioner vide registered letter dated 25.4.1998 (received in the office on 6.5.1998), wherein he has stated that now his wife is well but still he did not report in the office on any future date. 12. Insofar as the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that once the leave without pay was granted to the petitioner his absence stood authorized and his dismissal order is illegal in the light of Bakshish Singh (supra) is concerned, suffice to note that the aforesaid judgment was held to be not an authority for the proposition that order of termination of service is not sustainable in law in case the unauthorized absence is converted into leave without pay for the period of his absence or say, is regularized. The same question was before the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sanaullah Khan v. State of U.P. and others (Service Bench No. 1405 of 2010 decided on 13.4.2017), which was also a case of removal of a Constable enrolled in U.P. Police Force (Civil Police) and the arguments were advanced before the Hon’ble Division Bench on the strength of Bakshish Singh (supra). Relevant paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under : “4. Only argument advanced before this Court is that period of absence was regularized by Competent Authority after granting due leave, hence question of unauthorized absence does not arise since absence was regularized as leave without pay and it cannot be said that there was any unauthorized absence. Reliance is placed on Supreme Court’s decision in State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh, 1998(8) SCC 222 . Therein two Judges Bench confirmed the judgment of Court below wherein a finding was recorded that unauthorized absence from duty having been regularized by treating period of absence as leave without pay, charge of misconduct does not survive. Aforesaid finding was confirmed by Apex Court by observing that period of unauthorized absence from duty was regularized, hence charge did not survive. 5. It is admitted that absence from duty was unauthorized and without seeking any permission or leave before getting absented. Aforesaid finding was confirmed by Apex Court by observing that period of unauthorized absence from duty was regularized, hence charge did not survive. 5. It is admitted that absence from duty was unauthorized and without seeking any permission or leave before getting absented. This question was already considered by Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Hari Har Gopal and others, 1969(3) SLR 274 and it was held that an officer in failing to report on duty and absented without obtaining leave and acted in a manner irresponsibly and unjustifiably, finding of inquiry officer that charge of unauthorized absence is proved, may not be vitiated for grant of leave for the period of absence since purpose of such regularization is for maintaining a correct record of duration of service and adjustment of leave due to delinquent employee and for regularizing his absence from duty. 6. Subsequently noticing a conflict in State of M.P. v. Hari Har Gopal (supra) and State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh (supra), matter was referred to Larger Bench. It was considered by a three Judges Bench in Maan Singh v. Union of India and others, 2003(3) SCC 464 . Court held that in State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh (supra) Court really considered the scope of power of remand and did not consider, whether view expressed by first appellate Court in affirming order of Trial Court was justified or not. Having said so Court said that State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh (supra) is not an authority for the proposition that order terminating employment cannot be sustained inasmuch as once absence is regularized it will vitiate inquiry holding delinquent employee guilty of unauthorized absence and Court reiterated that decision in State of M.P. v. Hari Har Gopal (supra) is correct. 7. This has again been reiterated in State of U.P. and others v. Madhav Prasad Sharma, 2011(2) SCC 212 , where, in paras 18 and 19, Court said as under: “18. 7. This has again been reiterated in State of U.P. and others v. Madhav Prasad Sharma, 2011(2) SCC 212 , where, in paras 18 and 19, Court said as under: “18. In State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh, AIR 1999 SC 2626 : (1998) 8 SCC 222 , this Court has dealt with a case wherein the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court and the High Court had taken the view that in case unauthorized absence from duty had been regularized by treating the period of absence as leave without pay, the charge of misconduct did not survive. However, without examining the correctness of the said legal proposition, this Court allowed the appeal on other issues. As the said judgment gave an impression that this Court had laid down the law that once unauthorized absence has been regularized, the misconduct would not survive. The matter was referred to the larger bench in Mann Singh’s case (supra) wherein this Court clarified that the earlier judgment in Bakshish Singh (supra) did not affirm the said legal proposition and after following the judgment of this Court in State of M.P. v. Hari Har Gopal and others (SC) disposed of the case clarifying that this Court in Bakshish Singh (supra) dealt with only on the issue of remand by the High Court as well as by the Ist Appellate Court to the punishing authority for imposing the fresh punishment. 19. This Court held as under: (Maan Singh Case, SCC p. 470, para 6): “6. .... Bakshish Singh’s case is not an authority for the proposition that the order terminating the employment cannot be sustained inasmuch as in the later part of the same order the Disciplinary Authority also regularized unauthorized absence from duty by granting an employee leave without pay.” This Court further held that the law laid down by this Court in Hari Har Gopal (supra) wherein it had been held that in absence of regularization of unauthorized absence it may not be possible for the employer to continue with the disciplinary proceedings as there would be break in service and thus, regularization of such absence even without pay is justified. It is so necessary to continue with the disciplinary proceedings.” 8. It is so necessary to continue with the disciplinary proceedings.” 8. In view of above authorities we have no hesitation in holding that State of Punjab and others v. Bakshish Singh (supra) does not help petitioner and mere fact that period of unauthorized absence was regularized for the purpose of keeping record straight and treating length of service, the misconduct already committed by petitioner would not stand condoned and that is a separate issue.” 13. Therefore, it is very much clear that the argument of learned Senior Counsel on that ground is not sustainable in the eye of law. 14. Insofar as the argument that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate in nature, suffice to note that the petitioner is member of police force and even this aspect is covered by Sanaullah Khan (supra). However, a reference may also be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, 2015 (2) SCC 610 . Relevant paragraphs 20 and 21 are quoted as under: “20. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the Court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is “moral uprightness; honesty”. It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values. 21. The impugned conduct of the respondent working as Deputy Office Superintendent in a sensitive department of Central Excise, according to the disciplinary authority, reflected lack of integrity warranting discontinuance in service. That view has been endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal also. Thereafter, it is not open to the High Court to go into the proportionality of punishment or substitute the same with a lesser or different punishment. That view has been endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal also. Thereafter, it is not open to the High Court to go into the proportionality of punishment or substitute the same with a lesser or different punishment. These aspects have been discussed at quite length by this Court in several decisions including B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, 1995 (6) SCC 749 , Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, 1997 (7) SCC 463 , Om Kumar and others v. Union of India, 2001 (2) SCC 386 , Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank v. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank Employees Association and another, 2007 (4) SCC 669 , Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri and others, 2009 (15) SCC 620 and the recent one in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra).” 15. A reference may also be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 (paragraphs 25, 31, 32 and 33). Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are also quoted as under : “25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows : “Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorized absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence.” 31. It is apt to note here that in the said case the respondent had remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months and admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he neither had any intention nor desire to disobey the order of superior authority or violated any of the rules or regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of proportionality. The facts in the present case are quite different. As has been seen from the analysis made by the High Court, it has given emphasis on past misconduct of absence and first time desertion and thereafter proceeded to apply the doctrine of proportionality. The aforesaid approach is obviously incorrect. It is telltale that the respondent had remained absent for a considerable length of time. He had exhibited adamantine attitude in not responding to the communications from the employer while he was unauthorisedly absent. As it appears, he has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea that he can remain absent for any length of time, apply for grant of leave at any time and also knock at the doors of the Court at his own will. 32. Learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard to impress upon us that he had not been a habitual absentee. We really fail to fathom the said submission when the respondent had remained absent for almost one year and seven months. The plea of absence of “habitual absenteeism” is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are disposed to think that the respondent by remaining unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate. 33. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his official position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline, act with responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve the institution with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organization. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Government of India v. George Philip, (2006) 13 SCC 1: “18. ..... This kind of conduct cannot be countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and ushers in indiscipline in an organization. In this context, we may fruitfully quote a passage from Government of India v. George Philip, (2006) 13 SCC 1: “18. ..... In a case involving overstay of leave and absence from duty, granting six months’ time to join duty amounts to not only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive of the work culture in the organization. Article 51-A(j) of the Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of individual and collective activity so that the nation constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the underlying spirit and objects of Part IV-A of the Constitution have the tendency to negate or destroy the same.” We respectfully reiterate the said feeling and re-state with the hope that employees in any organization should adhere to discipline for not only achieving personal excellence but for collective good of an organization. When we say this, we may not be understood to have stated that the employers should be harsh to impose grave punishment on any misconduct. An amiable atmosphere in an organization develops the work culture and the employer and the employees are expected to remember the same as a precious value for systemic development.” 16. The argument regarding not affording a proper opportunity of hearing was half heartedly advanced. In view of the perusal of inquiry report and the decision noted hereinabove, I do not find any force whatsoever in the abovenoted argument. In view of P. Gunasekaran (supra) no interference is required in such findings of facts. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under : “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second Court of first appeal. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second Court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: “7. ... go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. 14. In one of the earliest decisions in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , many of the above principles have been discussed and it has been concluded thus: “7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 16. These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, 1977 (2) SCC 491 . To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions: “4. .... These principles have been succinctly summed-up by the living legend and centenarian Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, 1977 (2) SCC 491 . To quote the unparalled and inimitable expressions: “4. .... in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. ...” 17. In all the subsequent decisions of this Court upto the latest in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, 2014 (4) SCC 108 , these principles have been consistently followed adding practically nothing more or altering anything.” 17. In reference to argument weakly raised regarding inquiry having been conducted by an officer subordinate to the disciplinary authority, it may be noticed that the Rule 1991 clearly authorizes that the departmental inquiry can be conducted and could have been transferred to any other officer. Such provision is also contained in Rule 7 (i) of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, which provides that disciplinary authority may himself inquire into the charges or appoint an authority subordinate to him as the inquiry officer to inquire into the charges. Thus, the law is clear that the inquiry could have been conducted by any officer so authorized in this respect. In the present case, the petitioner is Constable and the inquiry was conducted by the Assistant Commandant. Thus, this argument also has no force and is hereby rejected. 18. No other point is pressed. 19. Present petition is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.