State Government through the Secretary Department of Higher Education, Bihar, Patna v. Parwati Kumari W/O Ramakant Singh
2018-04-19
RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD, RAJENDRA MENON
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT: RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD, J. These Letters Patent Appeals have come up for consideration by virtue of the order dated 30.01.2018 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No(S). 1310- 1313 of 2018 [arising out of SLP(C) No(S) 13715-13718 of 2016]. 2. It appears on perusal of the record that three Writ Applications being CWJC No. 7237/1999, 13136/2001 and 10437/2002 were preferred by Smt. Parvati Kumari and others who happened to be the Principal of Sanjay Gandhi Smarak Mahila College, Seikhpura. 3. In the Writ Application, the petitioners were at first instance seeking implementation of the judgment dated 09.07.1998 passed by a learned Writ Court in CWJC No. 4733 of 1997 and quashing the government order no. 408 dated 4th March 1997 / 24th May, 1997, as contained in Annexure-3 to the Writ Application, by which the deficit grants of Rs. 10,00,000/- which was being provided to the colleges in question were cancelled. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LITIGATIONS 4. From the records it appears that earlier the Governing Body of Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Women’s College, Sheikhpura and others had moved this Court in CWJC No. 4733/1997 seeking quashing of Memo No. 408 dated 4th March 1997 issued under signature of the Deputy Secretary of the Government, Department of Higher Education, Govt. of Bihar (Respondent no. 3) by which the earlier government order dated 12th February 1988 granting financial recurrent grant of Rs. 5,00,000/- with effect from 1987-88 enhanced to Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten lakhs) to the college in question had been cancelled. The petitioners had also sought for a declaration of the decision contained in Clause 3 of the Cabinet Resolution of the respondent- State dated 19.10.1982 contained in Annexure-1 as unlawful, ultra vires and the college be declared entitled to get the annual recurrent grant which the college was receiving till Financial Year 1996-97. 5. A learned Single Judge of this Court, after hearing the parties, allowed the Writ Application on the ground that the impugned orders were passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the college in question. It was also held that the impugned orders did not provide any reason for withdrawing the benefit of grants which were given to the college in question.
It was also held that the impugned orders did not provide any reason for withdrawing the benefit of grants which were given to the college in question. It was the contention of the State respondents that the State Government had taken a policy decision that after 19.10.1982 affiliation to the colleges will be provided without any financial aid and in terms of the said policy the State Government was not providing any financial aid to the other colleges but by way of exception the three colleges which are mentioned in the letter dated 4th March 1997/24th May, 1997 were being provided financial aid which was against the policy decision of the State Government and had no justification. Without going into the merits of the contention as to whether the petitioners would have any legal right to claim recurrent grant from the government, the learned Single Judge while quashing the orders contained in Annexures 11 & 12 of the said Writ Application left it open to the authorities concerned to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law. 6. It further appears that despite the order passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 4733 of 1997, when the respondent State was not taking a decision the first Writ Application being CWJC No. 7237 of 1999 was filed seeking a direction to implement the judgment of this Court delivered on 09.07.1997 in CWJC No. 4733 of 1997 and for payment of grant of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the college. 7. During pendency of the said Writ Application, the State respondents came out with an order passed by the Secretary, Higher Education on 09.11.2011 which was circulated vide Memo No. 1366 dated 09.11.2001. By the said order the respondent authorities reiterated their stand. It was the stand of the respondents that prior to 19.10.1982 the college in question was affiliated earlier up to Intermediate and it was not under the Higher Education Department of the Government of Bihar. The college in question was granted affiliation up to Graduation standard but under the government policy not to provide any financial aid by the government to such colleges. It was also held that the college in question was granted grants-in-aid as an exception and it was not in terms of the government policy. 8. Memo No. 1366 dated 09.11.2001 has been challenged by the petitioners in CWJC No. 10437 of 2002.
It was also held that the college in question was granted grants-in-aid as an exception and it was not in terms of the government policy. 8. Memo No. 1366 dated 09.11.2001 has been challenged by the petitioners in CWJC No. 10437 of 2002. The petitioners once again prayed for continuance of the payment of grants which were earlier sanctioned and released to the college. 9. CWJC No. 7237/1999 was filed by the petitioner for identical reliefs where under directions were sought for grant of “deficit grant” status with other aids and grant benefits to be accorded to the college and to provide pay scales to the teachers and non-teaching employees of the college at par with those in the constituent colleges and necessary funds be made available to them to meet the expenditure to be incurred on that count. The Writ Application was later amended to challenge the order of the Secretary, Higher Education dated 09.11.2001. 10. A learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the first three Writ Applications taking them together for hearing and disposal. The petitioners pleaded before the learned Writ Court the entire history as to how the College in question was provided grant which was initially a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- yearly but was increased to Rs. 10,00,000/- vide order no. 192 dated 12.02.1998. It is the case of the petitioners that the college in question was established sometime in June 1980. The College got affiliation for various subjects from Bihar Intermediate Education Council, Patna on 05.03.1982. Some more subjects were allowed and affiliation was granted to the college in 10 more subjects by the Bihar Intermediate Education Council on 23.09.1982. The State Government granted approval to Tilka Manjhi Bhagalpur University and affiliation to the college for various subjects up to graduate level for the Sessions 1982-83 and 1983-84. A copy of the letter issued under Memo No. B/24976-77 dated 20.12.1982 has been brought on record by way of Annexure R/3 & 4 to the Counter Affidavit filed by the respondents. STAND OF THE WRIT-PETITIONERS 11. The petitioners admit that on 09.12.1982 the State declared non-aided education colleges vide letter no. 1065 dated 09.12.1982 which is Annexure-’1’ to the Writ Application being CWJC No. 7237 of 1999 which has been taken as a lead case on the request of the parties for the list of dates and submissions.
STAND OF THE WRIT-PETITIONERS 11. The petitioners admit that on 09.12.1982 the State declared non-aided education colleges vide letter no. 1065 dated 09.12.1982 which is Annexure-’1’ to the Writ Application being CWJC No. 7237 of 1999 which has been taken as a lead case on the request of the parties for the list of dates and submissions. It is after this declaration of the non-aided education policy, the Governor-cum-Chancellor, Bihar is said to have visited the college and vide his letter as contained in Memo No. 258/GD dated 21.04.1983 requested the then Chief Minister to take it over as a constituent college and give it a new shape right at the stage when it is developing. It was noted that the College, i.e., the only Girls College in the city is located in a rural area, thereafter the Governing Body resolved vide Annexure 17 dated 02.07.1984 for taking steps for the college to be a constituent unit of the University or for declaring it at least a ‘deficit-grant-college’. 12. It is stated that on 27.10.1984 the then Chief Minister and Education Minister visited the college and made a public announcement for giving ‘defic it-grant-status’ vide Annexure-5 to the Writ Application, on 13.11.1984 the Registrar of the University wrote the then Chief Minister in that regard for deficit-grant. 13. The State Government was at the relevant time considering for granting deficit-grant-status to 15 Women’s College of the State including this College. The petitioners have relied upon Annexure-3 dated 09.02.1985 in this regard. It is stated that a Viable Committee was constituted by the State Government to enquire into the eligibility of Colleges selected by the State Government which according to the petitioners adopted a pick and choose basis for being considered to be made constituent. This College was not considered even though according to the petitioners 36 other non-aided-colleges were considered even after declaration of non-aided education policy of 1982. Vide Annexure-4 dated 17.10.1986 the State Government issued the order granting inter alia regarding grant-in-aid of Rs. 5,00,000/- to this College. The petitioners alleged that vide Annexure-21 dated 03.07.1987 three additional non-aided affiliated colleges were made constituent even after non-aided education policy of 1982. The State Government enhanced the annual grant of this college from Rs. 5,00,000/- to Rs. 10,00,000/- vide Annexure-7 dated 12.02.1988 and thereafter on 23.12.1988 the college was granted permanent affiliation by the State Government. 14.
The petitioners alleged that vide Annexure-21 dated 03.07.1987 three additional non-aided affiliated colleges were made constituent even after non-aided education policy of 1982. The State Government enhanced the annual grant of this college from Rs. 5,00,000/- to Rs. 10,00,000/- vide Annexure-7 dated 12.02.1988 and thereafter on 23.12.1988 the college was granted permanent affiliation by the State Government. 14. The petitioners have also a contention that the University Grants Commission inspected this College and vide Annexure-9 dated 09.03.1989 found it fit to be eligible to receive financial assistance under Section 3(f) and 12B of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956; however, the College remained getting only the deficit grant of Rs. 10,00,000/-. 15. The State Cabinet is said to have approved the proposal to withdraw non-aided education policy vide Annexure-9 to the Writ Application being CWJC No. 7237 of 1999. A perusal of Annexure-9 would show that as back as on 19.10.1982 there was a cabinet decision not to provide any financial aid or to bear additional expenses of any affiliated college on sanction of new teaching as well as non-teaching posts in a college. Vide Annexure 10 dated 09.01.1990 the State Cabinet decided for giving free women education up to graduation level and it was decided that the State shall bear the cost. The grievance of the petitioners is that all of a sudden vide Annexure-11 dated 04.03.1997 the State Government withdrew annual grant on the ground that the same is in breach of 1982 Non-Aided Education Policy. This decision has been reiterated by the State Government vide order dated 09.11.2001 and the same is under challenge in the Writ Applications. STAND OF THE STATE 16. The State respondents opposed the Writ Applications on the grounds inter alia that there was a policy of the State Government that no financial aid would be provided while granting affiliation to the Private Colleges and such policy decision was notified by the State Government but contrary to the said policy of the Government the College in question was granted recurring grant which was not just and proper. The learned Writ Court was, however, informed by the petitioners that the policy of non-aided college was a mere paper formality. It was never obeyed and there were large number of colleges which were granted deficit-grants.
The learned Writ Court was, however, informed by the petitioners that the policy of non-aided college was a mere paper formality. It was never obeyed and there were large number of colleges which were granted deficit-grants. Examples were provided - (i) Kishanganj Mahila College, Aurangabad which was established in 1980 and was granted affiliation on 04.01.1983 was taken over and made a constituent college w.e.f. 01.12.1986 giving it 100% financial support, (ii) Mahila College, Dalmianagar which was granted affiliation in 1982 and the Viable Committee in its report had found that the College had no land of its own, no building of its own, yet the College was made constituent on 01.12.1986, (iii) Ganga Devi Mahila College, Patna was established in 1971, it got affiliation in 1980, it was running in a rented premises and the Viable Committee clearly reported that it did not fulfill the criteria to be made a constituent college, yet w.e.f. 01.12.1986 it was made a constituent college. 17. The learned Writ Court having considered the pleadings and submissions of the parties asked a specific question as to whether there was any State Policy which provided for grant of deficit grant status to minority institutions exclusively. The learned Writ Court was informed that there was no such policy. For the reasons inter alia recorded in Paragraphs 31, 33 and 39 the learned Writ Court allowed the Writ Application. In Paragraphs 42 and 43 of the judgment the learned Writ Court held as follows:- “42. Thus, on consideration of all the facts noted above, I have no option but to hold that cancelling the recurring grant, depriving the petitioners’ institution of the status of full deficit grant/constituent status cannot be justified. The State’s action, as noted above, has never been consistent with its professed policy. Policy, as shown above, has been obeyed more in breach. No valid distinction for hostile discrimination brought on record by the State. 43.
The State’s action, as noted above, has never been consistent with its professed policy. Policy, as shown above, has been obeyed more in breach. No valid distinction for hostile discrimination brought on record by the State. 43. Thus, on the facts above, it would not be out of place to direct that if so many other colleges, who are similarly or worse situated than the petitioners, have been granted the benefit of deficit grant/constituent then petitioners’ college deserves the same treatment from the State otherwise actions of the State would be grossly arbitrary and would be highly discriminatory without any lawful reason or rational.” It is this judgment of the learned Writ Court which has been brought in intra-court appeals before us. 18. During pendency of the aforesaid three Writ Applications the Ad hoc Committee of Sanjay Gandhi Smarak Mahila Mahavidyalaya filed a fourth Writ Application giving rise to CWJC No. 2082 of 2015, again challenging the Memo No. 1366 dated 09.11.2001 issued under signature of the Under Secretary to the Higher Education Department, Govt. of Bihar and for a direction to grant annual recurring government grant to the College amounting to the tune of Rs. 10,00,000/-. 19. Mr. Pushkar Narain Shahi, learned A.A.G. VI representing the State of Bihar has drawn the attention of this Court towards the various dimensions of the impugned judgment of the learned Writ Court and has submitted that despite having found that the deficit grants were being provided to this College against the existing government’s non-aided education policy, the learned Writ Court seems to have gone by the grounds taken by the writ petitioners that several institutions, some of whom have been cited here-in-above, were granted 100% financial aid even contrary to the government’s non-aided policy, this according to the learned A.A.G. VI is not a proper consideration of the submissions advanced on behalf of the State and the learned Writ Court could not appreciate that there cannot be a direction to provide deficit grants against the government’s policy. Learned A.A.G. VI would submit that in the matters having financial implication on the State the learned Writ Court was required to restrain itself from issuing a direction against the policy decision of the Government.
Learned A.A.G. VI would submit that in the matters having financial implication on the State the learned Writ Court was required to restrain itself from issuing a direction against the policy decision of the Government. It is further submitted that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not confer negative equality but what has been done by the learned Writ Court in the present case is that the case of the petitioners has been allowed taking into consideration that other institutions were also being granted deficit grants in breach of the government’s policy. It has been pointed out that the learned Writ Court in Paragraph 31 of the impugned judgment has taken note of the fact that the right to receive aid or right to be made a constituent or the right to be granted deficit grant status is neither a statutory right nor prima facie a right which is defined and controlled by statutory parameters. 20. It is further submitted that the learned Writ Court even though held that it is the discretion of the State, could not appreciate in the latter part of the judgment that the State had already come out with a policy of not providing any financial aid to the private college seeking affiliation and, therefore, in case the learned Writ Court found that some institutions were conferred benefits of financial aid contrary to the policy of the government that would not confer a right upon the writ petitioners to claim the deficit grants or grants-in-aid which are apparently contrary to the policy decision of the government. 21. Learned A.A.G. VI has argued pointing out from the observations of the learned Writ Court in Paragraphs 32 and 39 of the impugned judgment wherein the learned Writ Court has taken note of the submissions of the State that the recurring grant provided to the petitioners and continued for over a decade was not pursuant to any policy decision rather it was on the direction of the then Chief Minister and, therefore, there being a policy not to grant financial aid, the decision of the government to cancel recurring grant cannot be questioned. It is submitted that despite having taken note of the submissions the learned Writ Court has not considered that aspect of the matter and, therefore, the impugned judgment of the learned Writ Court is fit to be set aside.
It is submitted that despite having taken note of the submissions the learned Writ Court has not considered that aspect of the matter and, therefore, the impugned judgment of the learned Writ Court is fit to be set aside. RESPONSE OF THE WRIT-PETITIONERS 22. On the contrary, defending the judgment of the learned Writ Court Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate assisted by learned Advocates Mr. Navin Prasad Singh and Narayan Singh and Mr. P.K. Shahi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by learned Advocate Mr. Abhinav Shrivastava representing the writ petitioners in LPA No. 430/2014, 470/2014 and 312/2014 and also the appellants in LPA no. 533/2015 submitted that the learned Writ Court has rightly allowed the Writ Applications on finding that it is a hostile discrimination. 23. Learned Senior Counsel jointly submit that the State respondents had failed to bring any distinction for treating the writ petitioners differently with discrimination. It has also been submitted at the Bar that this College is the only Women’s College in the entire district and is situated in a rural area, therefore, considering the fact that the State Government has decided to give free education to women up to Post Graduate level and now that the education policy of the State Government has also changed, the case of the petitioners is fit to be considered for grant of deficit grant and to make it a constituent College. The reasons and rationale provided by the learned Writ Court have been the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel. CONSIDERATION 24. Having heard learned A.A.G. VI for the State as also learned Senior Counsel representing the writ petitioners – respondents in the first three Letters Patent Appeals arising out of impugned judgments of learned Writ Court in CWJC No. 7237/1999, 13136/2001 & 10437/2002 and the appellants in LPA No. 533 of 2015 arising out of CWJC No. 2082 of 2015 we are of the considered opinion that there was no statutory provision or policy of the State Government providing for deficit grant to a private affiliated college or to convert such college into a constituent college of a University, contrary to the then existing policy of the Government, the College in question was granted grants-in-aid in the year 1986. 25.
25. In absence of a legal right or a policy decision of the Government providing for financial aid the petitioners cannot seek a relief in the nature of a writ of certiorari and a writ of mandamus calling upon the respondents to release grant-in-aid in favour of the writ petitioners. It is the specific case of the State which has not been denied that the Government had come out with a policy decision on 09.12.1982 itself vide Annexure-1 which is known as ‘Non-Aided Education Policy’. It is not in dispute that the Non-Aided Education Policy was in existence on 17.10.1986 when Annexure-4 granting Rs. 5,00,000/- annual recurring grant was issued in favour of the College in question. It was apparently in violation of the Government policy of Non-Aided Education notified on 09.12.1982. Further enhancement of the annual grant from Rs. 5,00,000/- to Rs. 10,00,000/- vide Annexure 7 dated 12.02.1988 was nothing but an extension and continuation of the benefit which was granted earlier in violation of the government policy. 26. No doubt, during the given period the executives who were conferred with the responsibility to implement the government policy were acting arbitrarily and contrary to the government’s policy approved by Cabinet and thereby they granted financial benefits up to 100% to several private colleges but the question would be whether such illegal or arbitrary decision taken by the executives vested with the power to implement the government’s policy would confer any benefit upon the college in question so as to seek a writ of mandamus from this Court to allow them the same benefits. 27. In other words the question which has fallen for consideration before us is as to whether even if finding that the grants-in-aid were allowed to this college as well as other colleges during the periods in question contrary to the then notified education policy of the Government, should we exercise our power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to perpetuate an illegality. It is to be kept in mind that a Writ Court is guided by a self regulated code to restrain itself in the matters where the writ petitioners approach this Court with a prayer to issue directions against a policy decision of the Government. 28.
It is to be kept in mind that a Writ Court is guided by a self regulated code to restrain itself in the matters where the writ petitioners approach this Court with a prayer to issue directions against a policy decision of the Government. 28. The learned Writ court has taken it as a case of hostile discrimination but in our considered opinion to prove that it is a case of hostile discrimination the petitioners are first obliged to prove that there was a legal right vested in them either by a statute or that there was a policy decision of the government under which they were entitled to get grants-in-aid. It should be shown that while their case was not considered others were granted the benefits under the policy of the government. Unfortunately that is not the case of the petitioners. In this case it is an admitted position that there was a policy of the government not to provide grant-in-aid to a private affiliated college but in violation of that some of the colleges were granted financial aid upto 100%. It is own contention of the petitioners that the Viable Committee was acting on pick and choose basis in selecting colleges for recommendations to make them constituent and in some cases college was made constituent by ignoring the adverse remarks made against them by the Viable Committee. We are afraid, on their own contention the petitioners are showing that all that happened during that period were against the Government Policy. The petitioners, therefore, cannot make such action as a ground to claim a writ from this Court. 29. In this connection we may rely upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gadde Venkateswara Rao Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 1966 SC 828 (V 53 C 154), the Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that ordinarily the petitioner, who seeks to file an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, must allege breach of his fundamental or legal right. Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose.
Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamental right can also approach the Court but it is implicit in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief asked for must be one to enforce a legal right. 30. In the case of Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Ajit Kumar Kar & Ors., reported in AIR 2009 SC 34 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the claim of the respondents-retirees claiming a vested right to draw DR as per existing pay scales which was much higher, the Hon’ble Apex Court held “It is well-settled that DR is a matter of grace to the Government Servants and not a vested right and hence a claim against the Government for the grant of such allowance at particular rate is not justiciable. The grant of DR at such rates and subject to such conditions is the prerogative of the Central Government in terms of Rule 55-A of the CCA (Pension) Rules, 1972. Rule 44 of FR to the grant of DA imposed no duty on the State to grant it and it merely confers a power on the State to grant compassionate allowance at its own discretion and no mandamus or any other writ or direction, therefore, should be issued to compel the exercise of such a power as there is no right in the employee which is capable of being protected or enforced.” 31. In the case of Fuljit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors., reported in AIR 2010 SC 1937 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the plea of negative equality based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Having considered a large number of judgments on the subject, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Paragraph 13 of the judgment held as under:- “3. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia (supra) in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage for negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept.
The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia (supra) in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution of India does not envisage for negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial Forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise Art.14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it would make function of the administration impossible. [vide Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1772 ; Panchi Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 589 ; and Shanti Sports Club & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2009) 15 SCC 705 ] : ( AIR 2010 SC 433 : 2009 AIR SCW 6953).” 32. In the case of Chief Commercial Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad & Ors. Vs. G. Ratnam & Ors., reported in (2007) 8 SCC 212 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering a case where the respondent employee of the railway was punished with a penalty of reduction to lower grade post of TTE and the punishment was confirmed by the Appellate Authority but on a challenge made by him to the order of punishment before the Central Administrative Tribunal, on a technical ground the Tribunal held that the departmental traps were not laid by the Vigilance Officers of the Railways in accordance with the Indian Railways Vigilance Manual, 1996 and as a result of the defective investigations, the orders of imposition of penalty upon the respondents by the Disciplinary Authority and the consequential orders of the Revisional Authority as well as the Appellate Authority were bad under law. The challenge made to the said order of the Tribunal before the High Court failed, therefore, the matter went to the Hon’ble Apex Court.
The challenge made to the said order of the Tribunal before the High Court failed, therefore, the matter went to the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court considered the submissions of the parties and came to a conclusion that the administrative instructions are issued by the Central Government or the State Government to its servants as to how to act in certain circumstances; but that will not make such instructions statutory rules which are justiciable in certain circumstances. In order to see that such executive instructions have the force of statutory rules, it must be shown that they have been issued either under the authority conferred on the Central Government or the State Government by some statute or under some provision of the Constitution providing therefore. The Hon’ble Apex Court thus held as under:- “Therefore, even if there has been any breach of such executive instructions that does not confer any right on any member of the public to ask for a writ against the Government by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 33. In our considered opinion breach of policy decision of the Government by the executives would not confer any right on the petitioners of this case to ask for a writ to perpetuate the said breach. 34. In the case of South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Prem Kumar Sharma & Ors., reported in 2006 AIR SCW 3762, it was found that the entitlement to employment of a person whose land had been acquired was being governed by the guidelines dated 22.12.1984 which supported that the land losers should have lost at least three acres of non-irrigated land or 2 acres of irrigated land. The total land acquired in the case of respondent no. 1 was 72 decimal which the respondent no. 1 originally owned along with 10 others. The Railway was of the view that he cannot get the employment in terms of the guidelines but it was the contention of the respondent that the norms fixed by the Railway had not been uniformally followed and in several cases acquisitions were for lesser extents of land and they have been given employment. Several instances have been highlighted before the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court found that the guidelines were undisputedly applicable.
Several instances have been highlighted before the Hon’ble Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court found that the guidelines were undisputedly applicable. In the aforementioned background rejecting the plea of hostile discrimination, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Paragraphs 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment held as under:- “9. The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the 'Constitution') is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals other cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. In this regard this Court in Gursharan Singh & Ors. v. NDMC & Ors. [ 1996 (2) SCC 459 ] held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court. The Court observed: "Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination." 10. In Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and Ors.
Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination." 10. In Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain and Ors. ( 1997 (1) SCC 35 ), this Court considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality holding: "Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised. In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to Perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court was clearly in error in directing the appellants to allot the land to the respondents." 11. In State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ram Kumar Mann [ 1997 (3) SCC 321 ] this Court observed: “The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had been given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing misappropriation of money, is dismissed from service and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a similarly Circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14 for Reinstatement? The answer is obviously "No". 12. In a converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality.
As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle him to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs can never make a right". [See: State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Another [ (2000) 9 SCC 94 ].” 35. Following the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate and Mr. P.K. Shahi, learned Senior Advocate that the withdrawal of the grant-in-aid by the impugned order is a case of ‘hostile discrimination’. In our considered opinion, the grant-in-aid which was earlier allowed to the College in question was contrary to the policy decision of the government which was already notified and known as ‘Non-Aided Education Policy’. The grants provided at the instance of the then Chief Minister would not partake character of a statutory rule or change of policy decision which was approved by Cabinet and duly notified and, therefore, such benefits contrary to the policy conferred upon the College in question are neither in accordance with any statutory rule nor in terms of a policy decision of the government, therefore, we cannot exercise powers conferred upon us under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to set aside the impugned order and thereby perpetuate the illegality. 36. The fact that other Colleges were granted grants-inaid/financial aids up to 100% would also not come to the rescue of the College in question because it is their own contention of the petitioners that such grants-in-aid were contrary to the policy decision of the government and on pick and choose basis. The learned Writ Court seems to have been impressed by the contention that despite there being a Non-Aided Education Policy the Government executives were providing such grants-in-aid to several institutions and, therefore, this College cannot be singly deprived of the benefit. We are afraid such contention of the College in question cannot be accepted as it would be against the spirit of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not a case where writ-petitioners are seeking positive-equality. 37. In result, the impugned judgment of the learned Writ Court is set aside and the Letters Patent Appeals bearing no. 430/2014, 474/2014 and 312/2014 are hereby allowed. 38.
It is not a case where writ-petitioners are seeking positive-equality. 37. In result, the impugned judgment of the learned Writ Court is set aside and the Letters Patent Appeals bearing no. 430/2014, 474/2014 and 312/2014 are hereby allowed. 38. Letters Patent Appeal No. 533 of 2015 has been preferred by Ad hoc Committee of the College in question challenging the judgment dated 04.02.2015 passed by the learned Writ Court. The learned Writ Court was pleased to dismiss the Writ Application on the ground that an order of the year 2001 passed by the Department of Education, Government of Bihar was being challenged after a decade. In fact the issues raised in LPA No. 533 of 2015 are identical and the impugned order of the year 2001 is the same which was under challenge in other Writ Applications. As we have already discussed here-in-above the entire issue and have already set aside the impugned order of the learned Writ Court in the aforementioned Letters Patent Appeals, this L.P.A. No. 533 of 2015 will result in its dismissal. 39. Before we part with this it is made clear that we have not thought it just and proper to go into the question of entitlement of the College in question under the present policy of the government as the same is not an issue decided by learned Writ Court in the impugned judgment. 40. All the Letters Patent Appeals are disposed of accordingly.