JUDGMENT : The petitioner is a senior citizen, who is now aged 73 years and she is the wife of the 3rd respondent, who is also a senior citizen, now aged 77 years. The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned Ext.P-3 order dated 14.05.2017 issued by the Tribunal under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, whereby her prayer in Ext.P-3 application has been rejected. In Ext.P-3 application dated 14.05.2017, the petitioner had prayed before the said Tribunal that Ext.P-2 settlement deed executed by her in favour of R3 (husband) should be cancelled by virtue of the enabling provisions contained in Sec.23 of the abovesaid Act. 2. The prayers in this Writ Petition (Civil) are as follows : "1. Call for the entire records pertaining to the facts promulgated by the Petitioner in the writ petition. 2. Issue a writ of mandamus, any other writ, order or direction, directing the 1st Respondent to Consider the appeal filed by the Petitioner against Exhibit P4 order and set aside the same. 3. Issue a writ of mandamus, any other writ, order or direction, directing the 6th Respondent not to effect the mutation of the property in the name of 4th Respondent. 4. Issue a writ of mandamus, any other writ, order or direction, directing the 3rd and 4th Respondents to restrain from further alienation of the half share of the 8.30 ares of property in Re Sy No.573/15 of Kadamakkudy Village in Ernakulam District. 5. Such other relief's that this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper to grant, in the interest of justice. 6. Provide cost of the proceedings." 3. Heard Sri. Arun Alex, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Sri. Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Sr. Government Pleader appearing for official respondents 1, 2, 5 & 6 and Sri. K.S. Madhusoodanan, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents 3 & 4. 4. The 4th respondent is the younger son, out of the two sons born in the wedlock between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. The petitioner had executed and got registered Ext.P-2 settlement deed dated 02.01.2012, whereby one half of her rights in 20.83 cents of land was settled in favour of the 3rd respondent (husband). 4. The 4th respondent is the younger son, out of the two sons born in the wedlock between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. The petitioner had executed and got registered Ext.P-2 settlement deed dated 02.01.2012, whereby one half of her rights in 20.83 cents of land was settled in favour of the 3rd respondent (husband). It appears that the family life of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent is very often in doldrums and despite their elderly age, the disputes between these elderly spouses have gone almost unabated. According to the petitioner, the 3rd respondent is behaving in an extremely cruel manner against the petitioner and it is further alleged that in one such incident, the 3rd respondent had tried to kill the petitioner and that an offence under Sec.307 of IPC (attempt to murder), was registered against the 3rd respondent as per Ext.P-1 FIR in Crime No.495/2017 of Varappuzha police station. It is also alleged that due to the constant threats and other pressures exerted by the 3rd respondent, the petitioner was forced to execute Ext.P-2 settlement deed dated 02.01.2012, by which she had settled one half of her rights in her landed property coming to 20.83 cents, in favour of the 3rd respondent. That as the 3rd respondent was not providing even the immediate needs and necessities of the petitioner and as the petitioner was not receiving any maintenance from him, she was constrained to file Ext.P-3 application dated 14.05.2017 before the Tribunal seeking cancellation of Ext.P-2 settlement deed, in terms of Sec.23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The 3rd respondent herein is the sole respondent in Ext.P-3 application filed under Sec.23 of the abovesaid Act. 5. The Maintenance Tribunal constituted as per the abovesaid Act, after hearing the petitioner and the 3rd respondent herein had passed the impugned Ext.P-4 order dated 17.11.2017, whereby Ext.P-3 application was dismissed on the ground that an applicant like the petitioner, who is the spouse of the 3rd respondent herein cannot claim any relief under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and that it is for the petitioner (wife) to seek appropriate remedies against the 3rd respondent (husband), in appropriate proceedings. Aggrieved by Ext.P-4, the petitioner had filed appeal as per Sec.16 of the abovesaid Act before the Appellate Tribunal presided over by the District Collector and Ext.P-6 is the receipt of the said appeal memorandum. It is now pointed out by the petitioner before this Court that during the pendency of this W.P(C), the Appellate Tribunal has dismissed the appeal of the petitioner referred to in Ext.P-6, as per Ext.R3(e) order dated 26.07.2018. According to the petitioner, she was not heard by the Appellate Tribunal before the rendering of Ext.P-3 order, dismissing her appeal. 6. The main issue that calls for determination in this case, is as to whether a person like the petitioner, who is the spouse of the 3rd respondent could maintain an application as in Ext.P-3 for cancellation of the settlement deed as conceived in Sec.23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 as against her spouse. 7. Sec.23 of the abovesaid Act reads as follows : “23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.- (1) Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. (2) Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right. (3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 5” 8. Sec.2(a), Sec.2(d), Sec.2(g) and Sec.2(h) of the abovesaid Act, dealing with various definition clauses read as follows : “2. (3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 5” 8. Sec.2(a), Sec.2(d), Sec.2(g) and Sec.2(h) of the abovesaid Act, dealing with various definition clauses read as follows : “2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) “children” includes son, daughter, grandson and grand-daughter but does not include a minor; (d) “parent” means father or mother whether biological, adoptive or step father or step mother, as the case may be, whether or not the father or the mother is a senior citizen; (g) “relative” means any legal heir of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of or would inherit his property after his death; (h) “senior citizen” means any person being a citizen of India, who has attained the age of sixty years or above.” 9. Sec.4(4) of the abovesaid Act provides as follows : “4. Maintenance of parents and senior citizens.- (1) ….............. (2).................... (3).................... (4) Any person being a relative of a senior citizen and having sufficient means shall maintain such senior citizen provided he is in possession of such senior citizen or he should inherit the property of such senior citizen: Provided that where more than one relatives are entitled to inherit the property of a senior citizen, the maintenance shall be payable by such relative in the proportion in which they would inherit his property.” 10. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (Central Act.56 of 2007), has been framed and enacted by the Parliament and the preamble thereof declares in unambiguous terms, that it is “An Act to provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. 11. The statement of objects and reasons of the Bill which was introduced in the Parliament also declares as follows : “Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. 11. The statement of objects and reasons of the Bill which was introduced in the Parliament also declares as follows : “Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed women are now forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is a need to give more attention to the care and protection for the older persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time-consuming as well as expensive. Hence there is a need to have simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for parents. 2. The Bill proposes to cast an obligation on the persons who inherit the property of their aged relatives to maintain such aged relatives and also proposes to make provisions for setting-up oldage homes for providing maintenance to the indigent older persons. The Bill further proposes to provide better medical facilities to the senior citizens and provisions for protection of their life and property.” 12. So from a mere reading of the preamble as well as the statement of objects and reasons of the Legislation, it can be seen that Parliament has made the intervention to enact the abovesaid law in order to ensure adherence to the traditional norms and values of Indian society for providing care for the elderly and the aged and that in the modern age, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family members and that consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed women, are now forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial support. The Parliament has taken cognizance of the social fact that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is need to give more attention to the care and protection for older persons. The Parliament has taken cognizance of the social fact that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is need to give more attention to the care and protection for older persons. It is also stated therein that though parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the said procedure is both time consuming as well as expensive and there is need to have a simple, inexpensive and speedy provision to claim maintenance of parents and senior citizens. So the law has been made in order to cast an obligation on the persons who inherit the property of their aged relatives to maintain such aged relatives and also proposes to make provisions for setting-up oldage homes for providing maintenance to the indigent older persons and also to provide better medical facilities to the senior citizens and provisions for protection of their life and property, etc. 13. It is in the light of these aspects borne out from the preamble as well as the statement of objects and reasons that the intention of the Parliament in enacting the law and the purpose of the law have to be gathered in interpretative process. Though Sec.23(1) provides that any senior citizen who, after the commencement of the abovesaid Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence etc. 14. While construing the provisions of Sec.23 it is to be borne in mind that in common law, a person could get a justiciable cause of action so as to seek setting aside of a transfer deed like gift deed, settlement deed, etc. only on limited grounds of actual fraud, misrepresentation, coercion and undue influence, incompetency, etc. But with the legislative intervention through the special provision in Sec.23, a senior citizen is enabled to seek setting aside of a transfer deed like settlement deed, gift deed, etc. only on limited grounds of actual fraud, misrepresentation, coercion and undue influence, incompetency, etc. But with the legislative intervention through the special provision in Sec.23, a senior citizen is enabled to seek setting aside of a transfer deed like settlement deed, gift deed, etc. if he has so transferred the property with the explicit or implicit condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and necessities to him and in case of violation of such condition, then a legal fiction is created that due to such violation, it shall be deemed that the transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or misrepresentation. So at the option of the transferor-senior citizen, he could seek the voiding of such transfer by the Tribunal in those contingencies. So it creates an extra-ordinary remedy by such legislative intervention to aid the senior citizen. The creation of such legal fiction of “deemed fraud/coercion/undue influence” by the above enactment is indeed a serious inroad into the common law position of having to plead and prove actual fraud/coercion/undue influence, etc. So the said provision in Sec.23 has to be interpreted and construed not only as a welfare legislation, but also strictly, due to such serious substantial inroads made to the common law scenario. 15. It is not provided in explicit and clear terms in Sec.23 as to whether the transferee against whom the relief under Sec.23 is sought for by the transferor senior citizen should necessarily be confined to transferees who are relatives or children of the senior citizen/parent. Sec.2(g) of the abovesaid Act defines a “relative” to mean any legal heir of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of or would inherit his property after his death. Sec.2(a) thereof defines the term, “children” to include son, daughter, grandson and grand-daughter but does not include a minor. 16. The definitions' clause as per Sec.2 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act clearly insists for a contextual understanding of the various sub clauses therein, as it stipulates that the various definitions are to be so understood, "unless the context otherwise require". 16. The definitions' clause as per Sec.2 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act clearly insists for a contextual understanding of the various sub clauses therein, as it stipulates that the various definitions are to be so understood, "unless the context otherwise require". The relevance and necessity for adherence to contextual interpretation in appropriate cases has been underscored by the Apex Court and various High Courts including this Court in a catena of rulings as in Vanguard Fire & General Insurance v. Fraser & Ross, reported in AIR 1960 SC 971 , National Building Construction Corporation v. Pritam Singh, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1579 paras 12 to 16, Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Company Ltd., reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424 para 33, K.V. Muthu v. Angamuthu Ammal, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 53 , Paul Enterprises v. Rajib Chatterjee & Co., reported in (2009) 3 SCC 709 para 28, National Insurance Company v. Kirpal Singh, reported in (2014) 5 SCC 189 paras 12 to 16, and in Division Bench decisions of this Court in cases as in Thomas v. Sahitya Pravarthaka Co-operative Society Ltd., reported in 2014 (3) KLT 761 paras 7-8, etc. 17. It would also be pertinent to refer to the canons of interpretative construction based on the principle of purposive interpretation or purposive construction. It will be relevant in that regard to refer to the views of Aharon Barak, the eminent jurist and former President of the Supreme Court of Israel, who in his illumating treatise “Purposive Interpretation in Law” has pithly put it as follows : “Purposive interpretation is based on three components: language, purpose, and discretion. Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. Language shapes the range of semantic possibilities within which the interpreter acts as a linguist. Once the interpreter defines the range, he or she chooses the legal meaning of the text from among the (express or implied) semantic possibilities. The semantic component thus sets the limits of interpretation by restricting the interpreter to a legal meaning that the text can bear in its (public or private) language.” As held by the Apex Court in the judgement in Shailesh Dhairyaman v. Mohan Balakrishna Lulla, reported in (2016) 3 SCC 619 p.641 para 31, that the principle of “purposive interpretation” or “purposive construction” is based on the understanding that the court is supposed to attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the “purpose” behind such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to accomplish? And to put it otherwise to interpretative process the court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal test is designed to realise, etc. 18. Therefore, any purposive and contextual interpretation of the provisions in Sec.23 of the abovesaid Act based on the provisions in the preamble and the statement of objects and reasons as well as the other provisions in the Act would clearly imply that ordinarily the right of relief conferred on a senior citizen is against “relatives” and “children” of an aggrieved senior citizen as understood in the abovesaid Act. The rationale for this is that the "transferee" covered by Sec.23 should be a person who is otherwise cast with the obligation to take care of the amenities and necessities of the senior citizen in his old age, as per the provisions of the abovesaid Act. There could be exceptional cases, where the “transferee” within the ambit of Sec.23 could be persons other than “children” or “relatives” of the transferor-senior citizen, as understood in Secs.2(a) & 2(g). But in the facts of this case, it is not necessary to examine in depth any such issues. 19. Sri. There could be exceptional cases, where the “transferee” within the ambit of Sec.23 could be persons other than “children” or “relatives” of the transferor-senior citizen, as understood in Secs.2(a) & 2(g). But in the facts of this case, it is not necessary to examine in depth any such issues. 19. Sri. Arun Alex, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that the 3rd respondent herein, who is the husband of the petitioner is a legal heir of the 3rd respondent to succeed to her property in the case of her intestate death, as he could inherit her property on her intestate death, as per the provisions in the Indian Succession Act which regulates intestate succession of persons like the present parties who belong to Christian religion. So it is argued that a person like the 3rd respondent, who is the husband of the petitioner senior citizen would fulfil the definition of “relative” as understood in Sec.2(g) of the abovesaid Act, even though the 3rd respondent will not fulfil the definition of Sec.2(a) of the abovesaid Act. Per contra, Sri. Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Sr. Government Pleader appearing for the official respondents and Sri. K.S. Madhusoodanan, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents 3 and 4 would submit that the said argument made by the counsel for the petitioner is pedantic and mechanical and has been made without taking a holistic view of the entire provisions of the Act and that even otherwise the question of applicability of the clause in Sec.2(g) (“relative”) would arise only in the case of a childless senior citizen and that in the facts of this case, it is admitted that the petitioner will not come within the ambit of “childless senior citizen”, as she is having two children through her wedlock with the 3rd respondent. 20. 20. Having regard to the structure and scheme of the Act, more particularly as made out from the declaration made by the Parliament in the preamble as well as in the abovesaid statement of objects and reasons thereof, the abovesaid Act is in pith and substance, an enactment to take care of the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens and therefore, special types of disputes, which could occur between spouses who may otherwise be senior citizens, may not have any bearing or impact in the abovesaid Act as Parliament has already framed a separate special law, for regulating matrimonial disputes by the enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1984. So merely because a senior citizen is a spouse and his/ her other spouse may be his/her legal heir, in the case of intestate succession as per the applicable law, by itself will not bring disputed claims which arise out of circumstances mainly out of marital relationship between such persons to be within the scope and ambit of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. So the invocation of the legal fiction of "deemed fraud" without having to prove "actual fraud" legislatively created in Sec.23 could be invoked only in grievances of senior citizens and not in respect of disputes of spouses. This conclusion is warranted due to the necessity of strict construction of the provisions of the extra-ordinary special remedy created by Sec.23. 21. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that the preamble of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (Central Act 66 of 1984), framed by the Parliament makes it clear that it is an enactment to provide for the establishment of family courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and matters connected therewith. Sec.7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 dealing with the jurisdiction of the said court provides as follows : "7. Sec.7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 dealing with the jurisdiction of the said court provides as follows : "7. Jurisdiction.-(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall- (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a District Court or, as the case may be, such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation.-The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:- (a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage; (b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person; (c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them; (d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injuction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship; (e) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the legitimacy of any person; (f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance; (g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor. (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise- (a) the jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and (b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment." 22. Explanation appended to Sec.7(1) of the Family Courts Act categorically makes it clear that the suits and proceedings referred to in sub-sec.1 of Sec.7 could also include the various proceedings mentioned thereunder. Explanation appended to Sec.7(1) of the Family Courts Act categorically makes it clear that the suits and proceedings referred to in sub-sec.1 of Sec.7 could also include the various proceedings mentioned thereunder. Clause (c) of the explanation appended to Sec.7(1) makes it clear that the suit or proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or either of them would come within the jurisdiction of the family court. Further clause (d) thereof further provides an omnibus provision that suit or proceedings for an order or an injunction in circumstances arising out of matrimonial relationship would also come within the jurisdiction of the family court. The broad scope and ambit of clause (d) of the Explanation appended to Sec.7(1) has been explained and interpreted in a series of decisions of the Division Bench of this Court as in Leby Issac v. Leena M. Ninan [ 2005 (3) KLT 665 ], Suprabha v. Sivaraman [ 2006 (1) KLT 712 ], Syamaladevi v. Saraladevi [ 2009 (1) KLT 892 ], Vasumathi v. Valsan [ 2011 (3) KLT 638 ], Anilkumar v. Sheela. N.S. [ 2011 (4) KLT 120 ], Thomas v. Ponnamma Thomas [ 2013 (4) KLT 43 ], Krishna Moorthy v. Soumya Krishna [ 2015 (4) KLT 471 ], Janaki Amma v. Renuka Sadanandant [ 2016 (1) KLT 563 ] etc. The Division Bench of this Court in Leby Issac’s case (supra) [ 2005 (3) KLT 665 ], has held, more particularly in paras. 10, 13 and 14 thereof that the expression 'in circumstances arising out of marital relationship' occurring in clause (c) of the Explanation to Sec.7(1) will be those particulars which closely precedes, surrounds, accompanies, follows a marital relationship and it means primarily those can be the marriage itself and the surrounding occurrences in connection with the marriage and that the main requirement is that such “circumstances” must have a direct bearing on the marriage, since the marriage precedes the existence or origin of a “marital relationship”. “Circumstances" arising out of marital relationship are therefore, occurrence or things which stood around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify or follow, which surround or accompany, which depend upon, which support or qualify the principal event of a marriage or matrimonial relationship. “Circumstances" arising out of marital relationship are therefore, occurrence or things which stood around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify or follow, which surround or accompany, which depend upon, which support or qualify the principal event of a marriage or matrimonial relationship. That the expression "in circumstances arising out of matrimonial relationship” thus means not only those occurrences which transpired during marital life, but those also include circumstances which led to the marriage, which developed thereafter, which took place during the marital life, which resulted in breaking down of marriage and also those which “closely" followed as a consequence of all these. If the intention of the legislature were to take in only those occurrences which take place during a "marital relationship", there was no necessity to use the word "circumstances" in Explanation (d) to Sec.7(1) of the Act and the same purpose could have been achieved if explanation (d) is worded without the term "circumstances" also. So, thus it is held that the inclusion of the word "circumstances", in the relevant provision is quite significant and it must have been done to include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship, i.e. The principal event of marriage and the eventualities surrounding the same etc. It will profitable to refer to paras 10, 13 and 14 of the abovesaid judgment of the Division Bench in Leby Issac’s case (supra) [ 2005 (3) KLT 665 ], which reads as follows : "10. Therefore, it follows that if court finds that a 'petition' is filed before a Family Court for an 'order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship', such petition will be maintainable before a Family Court. The Court has to firstly confirm from pleadings and other materials available in a case that a marital relationship is involved in the case. Secondly, court has to consider whether the petitioner discloses existence of any circumstances arising out of marital relationship based on which relief in the petition is moulded. It has then to confirm whether relief sought for in the petition is either 'injunction' or other 'order'. Secondly, court has to consider whether the petitioner discloses existence of any circumstances arising out of marital relationship based on which relief in the petition is moulded. It has then to confirm whether relief sought for in the petition is either 'injunction' or other 'order'. On consideration of the above facts, if the court is satisfied that the case instituted before the court is a petition or "proceeding is for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship", the court can exercise jurisdiction to entertain such petition. 13. So, 'circumstances' in relation to a marital relationship will be those particulars which closely precedes, surrounds, accompanies and follows a marital relationship. That means, primarily those can be the marriage itself and the surrounding occurrences in connection with marriage. The main requirement is that such 'circumstances' must have a direct bearing on marriage, since the marriage precedes, the existence or origin of a 'marital relationship'. 'Circumstances' arising out of a marital relationship are therefore, 'occurrences or things which stand around or about, which attend upon, which closely precede or follow, which surround and accompany, which depend upon, or which support or qualify the principal event' of a marriage or marital relationship. 14. The expression 'in circumstances arising out of marital relationship' thus means not only those occurrences which transpired during marital life, but those also include such circumstances which led to the marriage, which developed thereafter, which took place during marital life, which resulted in breaking down of marriage and also those which 'closely' followed as a consequence of all these. If the intention of legislature was to take in only those occurrences which take place during a 'marital relationship', there was no necessity to use the word 'circumstances' in explanation (d) to S.7(1) of the Act. The same purpose could have been achieved if explanation (d) is worded without the term 'circumstances' also. So, the inclusion of word 'circumstances' in the relevant provision is quite significant and it must have been done to include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship i.e., the principal event of marriage and the eventualities surrounding the same." 23. So, the inclusion of word 'circumstances' in the relevant provision is quite significant and it must have been done to include all such circumstances surrounding, preceding and closely following a marital relationship i.e., the principal event of marriage and the eventualities surrounding the same." 23. Further, the Division Bench of this Court in Janaki Amma v. Renuka [ 2016 (1) KLT 563 ] has held, more particularly in para.16 thereof that the most crucial aspect to be considered while deciding the question relating to the applicability of clause (d) of Explanation to Sec.7(1) is as to whether the suit or proceedings instituted seeking for an order or injunction in the circumstances arising out the marital relationship, is the cause of the lis itself and not merely the parties to the lis. Prime consideration should be as to whether the cause of the lis has got any bearing with the marital relationship. An objective assessment should be made as to whether the cause has got any stem from the circumstances arising out of the marital relationship and in other words, whether the cause should have been existed but for the marital relationship, shall be the basis of the assessment. If the cause of action is emerging out of any circumstances related to the matrimonial relationship and the same could not have existed independently, then the suit or proceedings can be maintained before the Family Court and will fall under the broad provision in clause (d) of Explanation appended to Sec.7(1) Family Courts Act, 1984 etc. 24. Therefore in the light of the specific remedies made available to regulate litigations arising out of matrimonial relationships between parties through the framing of special law in the nature of Family Courts Act, 1984, it is only to be held that disputes as in the present one, which in pith and substance are between spouses will be in the realm of "circumstances arising out of marital relationship", which will be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the family court and hence beyond the scope and ambit of the provisions contained in the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007. The argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the application in the present case is maintainable merely because the respondent-spouse is the legal heir of the applicant-spouse on the intestate death of the latter, as per the applicable law relating to succession and that therefore, the dispute is amenable of being adjudicated under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, as the respondent-spouse is a "relative" of the applicant-spouse, in view of Sec.2(g) of the Senior Citizens' Act etc., is rather mechanical and is one based on a "tunnel visioned" view of the matter. This contention is not made by taking into account a holistic view of the Senior Citizens' Act. This Court is all the more justified in so holding, as the Parliament has framed separate law through the enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1984, to regulate the adjudication of disputes between spouses in circumstances arising out of marital relationship between them. By virtue of the provisions contained in Sec.8 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the matters covered by the Family Courts Act have been excluded. 25. It is brought to the notice of this Court that this Court has already rendered judgment dated 16.01.2018 in W.P.(C) No.12841/2015 in the case in Kanakamma v. Revenue Divisional Officer reported in 2018 (2) KLT 79 that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to adjudicate on the inter se dispute between husband and wife. 26. For the aforesaid reasons dealt with herein above, this Court is in concurrence with the view enunciated in the abovesaid decision in Kanakamma v. Revenue Divisional Officer reported in 2018 (2) KLT 79 . Consequently, it is only to be held that the impugned views rendered by the Tribunal in Ext.P-4 order as confirmed in Ext.R-3(e) appellate order rendered by the Appellate Tribunal, is legal and right. In the light of these aspects, this Court is constrained to reject the prayers in this Writ Petition. 27. Sri. Consequently, it is only to be held that the impugned views rendered by the Tribunal in Ext.P-4 order as confirmed in Ext.R-3(e) appellate order rendered by the Appellate Tribunal, is legal and right. In the light of these aspects, this Court is constrained to reject the prayers in this Writ Petition. 27. Sri. Arun Alex, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that liberty may be granted to the petitioner to initiate appropriate proceedings before the Family Court, including appropriate proceedings for partition of the property, if so advised and that this Court may make it clear that the period of pendency of proceedings in Ext.P-3 application dated 14.05.2017 upto the disposal of this writ petition, may be excluded as envisaged in Sec.14 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of computing limitation in initiating proceedings before the Family Court etc. It is made clear that it is open to the petitioner to take up the plea for time exclusion before the competent Forum on the ground that the petitioner was bonafide prosecuting the abovesaid impugned proceedings before the Maintenance Tribunal etc. Having regard to the old age of the petitioner, it is ordered that on institution of such proceedings, the Family Court may endeavour for its early disposal within 6 months or so. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Petition (Civil) will stand finally dismissed.