JUDGMENT : 1. Heard on I.A. No.1900/2018, which is an application under Order 41 Rule 27 r/w section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same stands allowed with the consent of the parties as the documents relate to the treatment of the petitioner in a Government Hospital. The present First Appeal has been filed against the order dated 29.01.2000 passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Ujjain in Civil Suit No.5-B/90 (New No.1-B/2000). 2. The facts of the case reveal that the present appellant before this Court, who is a housewife, was admitted at Government District Hospital, Ujjain for a family planning operation on 06.12.1989 and while the operation was going on, she was administered saline/glucose. The undisputed facts reveal that after the saline was administered, later on, there was a swelling at the place, where the needle was inserted and on account of heavy swelling, she was shifted to M.Y. Hospital, which is again a Government Hospital at Indore. In spite of the treatment given to her, she developed gangrene and her hand was amputated above the elbow joint. The plaintiff, who is hailing from a poor family, was working as daily wager and was also involved in stitching work, became disabled and filed a civil suit claiming compensation from the Government to the tune of Rs.1,85,000/-. The plaintiff has claimed the amount as compensation on various heads, including loss of earning on account of permanent disability, which was more than 50%, the trauma, which she has suffered and the money spent on her treatment, while she has taken treatment in the Hospital and after she was discharged. 3. A written statement was filed before the trial Court on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as on behalf of other defendant and the issues were framed by the trial Court. The plaintiff was examined before the trial Court and she has categorically stated before the trial Court that on 06.12.1989 saline was administered and on account of improper insertion of needle and on account of infection, she was feeling burning sensation in her hand and later on resulting into swelling in her hand and she was shifted to M.Y. Hospital, Indore, where her hand was amputated. The plaintiff has categorically stated that she has protested in the matter and she has submitted complaint to doctors, however, defendant No.2 -Dr. The plaintiff has categorically stated that she has protested in the matter and she has submitted complaint to doctors, however, defendant No.2 -Dr. R.S. Chauhan did not pay any heed to her protest. In spite of there being evidence on record, the trial Court has held the issues as not proved in respect of the aforesaid averments. The plaintiff as well as the other witnesses have sated before the trial Court that she was having pain in her hand, she became critical and again this issue has been held as not proved even though the plaintiff was shifted from Government District Hospital Ujjain to M.Y. Hospital, Indore. Another issue, which was framed, was in respect of amputation and the trial Court has held that the doctors were not responsible in the matter of amputation. One of the issues i.e. whether condition of the plaintiff became serious in the hospital on account of insertion of needle for administering saline has been held as proved by the trial Court. Dr. R.S. Chauhan (D.W-1) was examined before the trial Court and he has admitted that the plaintiff was admitted on 06.12.1989. In paragraph-4 of his statement, he has admitted that as she was having pain in her hand, she was referred to M.Y. Hospital, Indore. He has admitted that family planning operation took place on 06.12.1989, but he was not the person, who has given injection to the plaintiff. He has again categorically admitted in his cross-examination that he saw the swelling about which the complaint was lodged by the plaintiff. He has also admitted that the hand became slightly bluish and there was probability of gangrene also and later on he has admitted that after obtaining opinion from surgical expert, she was referred to M.Y. Hospital, Indore. The doctor, at the same time, stated that it was the nurse, who has given injection to the patient as well as inserted the saline drip in her hand. In spite of the aforesaid clinching evidence, the trial Court has decided the issues against the plaintiff. The statement of Smt. Zarina (P.W-1) establishes that she was subjected to operation and saline was given to her, which was finally resulted in gangrene and her hand was amputated above the elbow joint. She has also stated about loss of earning and about the disability suffered by her. The statement of Smt. Zarina (P.W-1) establishes that she was subjected to operation and saline was given to her, which was finally resulted in gangrene and her hand was amputated above the elbow joint. She has also stated about loss of earning and about the disability suffered by her. Smt. Mehrat Bee (P.W-2), who is sister-in-law of the plaintiff, has also stated about the operation and about the amputation and has supported the case of the plaintiff. She has given similar statement like the plaintiff. The documents brought on record are the document relating to treatment of the plaintiff right from her admission at M.Y. Hospital, Indore, which is again a Government Hospital and she was shifted from Government District Hospital, Ujjain to M.Y. Hospital, Indore and the factum of amputation is also not in dispute. There is a disability certificate also and she has suffered 50% disability. In the present case, the evidence produced before the trial Court establishes that on account of insertion of needle and improper post-operative care, she has developed gangrene in her hand and finally amputation has taken place on her hand above the elbow joint. There is certainly a loss of earning. She was working as a daily wager and also doing the stitching work and now she has to work only with one hand for the remaining years of her life. 4. The issue No.1 framed by the trial Court was in respect of the fact whether her problem was looked after properly or not at the relevant point of time by defendant No.2. The statement of defendant No.2 reveals that he was not the doctor, who has inserted needle in her hand and as per his statement it was some sister, who has inserted the needle resulting in amputation of her hand, and therefore, defendant No.2 cannot be made liable for payment of compensation. The other issues relating to amputation on account of the lapses committed by the hospital, are being decided in favour of the plaintiff, as she went inside the hospital as a hail and hearty woman with both the limbs. It was only after she was inserted the needle for administering saline, she developed gangrene resulting into amputation of her hand, and therefore the other issues in respect of payment of compensation are answered in favour of the plaintiff. 5. It was only after she was inserted the needle for administering saline, she developed gangrene resulting into amputation of her hand, and therefore the other issues in respect of payment of compensation are answered in favour of the plaintiff. 5. In the present case, the petitioner has undergone Tubectomy operation under a programme of the State Government in a Government Hospital. The Family Planning Programme has been launched throughout the country with laudable intentions, but it resulted in a disastrous medical misadventure in respect of the petitioner as there was some negligence while treating her, to be more specific, while administering saline to her, which finally resulted in amputation of her hand, above elbow. 6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of A.S. Mittal & Ors., Vs. State of U.P. And others reported in ( AIR 1989 SC 1570 ), in paragraph 16 has held as under : 16. We are afraid in the circumstances of this case, the factual foundations laid before the Court and the limited scope of the proceedings no appeal could be made to the doctrine of State action. Shri Yogeshwar Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh, submitted that the State would approach the matter not with the spirit of a litigant in any adversary action but would look upon the proceedings as a participatory exploration for relief to the victims. He further submitted that the State would indeed, be willing to render help to the victims within the constraints of its resources. Indeed, the factual foundations requisite for establishing the proximate causal-connection for the injury has yet to be established conclusively. These matters would have to be gone into in the criminal and other proceedings that may be pending or in the contemplation of the Government. However, we think that on humanitarian consideration, the victims should be afforded some monitary relief by the State Government. We direct that in addition to the sum of Rs. 5,000/- already paid by war of interim relief, the State Government shall pay a further sum of Rs. 12,500/- to each of the victims. The victims entitled to receive the additional payment shall be the same as those who had the benefit of the interim relief of Rs. 5,000/-. We direct that in addition to the sum of Rs. 5,000/- already paid by war of interim relief, the State Government shall pay a further sum of Rs. 12,500/- to each of the victims. The victims entitled to receive the additional payment shall be the same as those who had the benefit of the interim relief of Rs. 5,000/-. The amount shall be deposited, as was done in the matter of distribution of interim relief, with the District Judge who shall arrange to distribute the same in accordance with the procedure adopted at the time of administration of the interim relief. The deposit shall be made within two months from today and the District Judge shall ensure distribution within the next two months. In the aforesaid case, eye camps were held and the eye operations resulted in irreversible damage and in those circumstances, compensation was awarded. 7. In the case of Achutrao Haribhau Khodwa and others Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in ( AIR 1996 SC 2377 ), a mop was left in the body of a patient which resulted in pus formation eventually leading to her death. The apex Court in the aforesaid case has dealt with vicarious liability of the Government and has also held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur clearly applies and the State Government is liable to pay damages. In the aforesaid case, there was no conclusive proof as to which Doctor or the Member of the Staff acted negligently and in those circumstances damages were granted by the apex Court. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : 18. Even if it be assumed that it is the second operation performed by Dr. Divan which led to the peritonitis, as has been deposed to by Dr. Purandare, the fact still remains that but for the leaving of the mop inside the peritoneal cavity, it would not have been necessary to have the second operation. Assuming even that the second operation was done negligently or that there was lack of adequate care after the operation which led to peritonitis, the fact remains that Dr. Divan was an employee of respondent No. 1 and the State must be held to be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employees working in the said hospital. Assuming even that the second operation was done negligently or that there was lack of adequate care after the operation which led to peritonitis, the fact remains that Dr. Divan was an employee of respondent No. 1 and the State must be held to be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employees working in the said hospital. The claim of the appellants cannot be defeated merely because it may not have been conclusively proved as to which of the doctors employed by the State in the hospital or other staff acted negligently which caused the death of Chandrikabai. Once death by negligence in the hospital is established, as in the case here, the State would be liable to pay the damages. In our opinion, therefore; the High Court clearly fell in error in reversing the judgment of the trial court and in dismissing the appellants' suit. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court of Bombay under appeal is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court is restored. The appellants will also be entitled to costs throughout. 8. In the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Santra (Smt). Reported in (2000) 5 SCC 182 , the apex Court has dealt with negligence on the part of the Doctor in the matter of sterilisation operation at Government Hospital. The plaintiff was granted a sum of Rs.54,000/- along with interest by the trial Court and the decision was affirmed by the High Court and the appeal preferred in the matter was dismissed by the apex Court. Paragraphs 43 to 45 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : 43. The contention as to the vicarious liability of the State for the negligence of its officers in performing the Sterilisation operation cannot be accepted in view of the law settled by this Court in N. Nagendra Rao & Co. v. State of A.P.; Common Cause, A Regd Society v. Union of India and Ors. and Achutrao Haribhau Khodwa and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. The last case, which related to the fallout of a Sterilisation operation, deals, like the two previous cases, with the question of vicarious liability of the State on account of medical negligence of a doctor in a Govt. hospital. The theory of sovereign immunity was rejected. 44. and Achutrao Haribhau Khodwa and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. The last case, which related to the fallout of a Sterilisation operation, deals, like the two previous cases, with the question of vicarious liability of the State on account of medical negligence of a doctor in a Govt. hospital. The theory of sovereign immunity was rejected. 44. Smt. Santra, as already stated above, was a poor lady who already had seven children. She was already under considerable monetary burden. The unwanted child (girl) born to her has created additional burden for her on account of the negligence of the doctor who performed Sterilisation operation upon her and, therefore, she is clearly entitled to claim full damages from the State Govt. to enable her to bring up the child at least till she attains puberty. 45. Having regard to the above facts, we find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed but without any order as to costs. 9. In the case of Jacob Mathew Vs. State of Punjab and another reported in (2005) 6 SCC 1 , the apex Court while dealing with issue of criminal medical negligence and has also dealt with the negligence and actionability in respect of negligence. The apex Court in paragraphs 10, 11 and 48(1) has held as under : 11. The jurisprudential concept of negligence defies any precise definition. Eminent jurists and leading judgments have assigned various meanings to negligence. The concept as has been acceptable to Indian jurisprudential thought is well-stated in the Law of Torts, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (Twenty-fourth Edition 2002, edited by Justice G.P. Singh). It is stated (at p.441-442) -Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Actionable negligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by which neglect the plaintiff has suffered injury to his person or property. ... Actionable negligence consists in the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill towards a person to whom the defendant owes the duty of observing ordinary care and skill, by which neglect the plaintiff has suffered injury to his person or property. ... The definition involves three constituents of negligence: (1) A legal duty to exercise due care on the part of the party complained of towards the party complaining the former's conduct within the scope of the duty; (2) breach of the said duty; and (3) consequential damage. Cause of action for negligence arises only when damage occurs; for, damage is a necessary ingredient of this tort. 2. According to Charles worth & Percy on Negligence (Tenth Edition, 2001), in current forensic speech, negligence has three meanings. They are: (i) a state of mind, in which it is opposed to intention; (ii) careless conduct; and (iii) the breach of duty to take care that is imposed by either common or statute law. All three meanings are applicable in different circumstances but any one of them does not necessarily exclude the other meanings. (Para 1.01) The essential components of negligence, as recognized, are three: "duty", "breach" and "resulting damage", that is to say: 1. the existence of a duty to take care, which is owed by the defendant to the complainant; 2. the failure to attain that standard of care, prescribed by the law, thereby committing a breach of such duty; and 3. damage, which is both causally connected with such breach and recognized by the law, has been suffered by the complainant. If the claimant satisfies the court on the evidence that these three ingredients are made out, the defendant should be held liable in negligence. 49. We sum up our conclusions as under:- (1) Negligence is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The definition of negligence as given in Law of Torts, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (edited by Justice G.P. Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence are three: 'duty', 'breach' and 'resulting damage. The definition of negligence as given in Law of Torts, Ratanlal & Dhirajlal (edited by Justice G.P. Singh), referred to hereinabove, holds good. Negligence becomes actionable on account of injury resulting from the act or omission amounting to negligence attributable to the person sued. The essential components of negligence are three: 'duty', 'breach' and 'resulting damage. In the light of the aforesaid and also keeping in view the evidence available on record, it can safely be gathered that the Staff at the Hospital was negligent and the same has resulted in damage to the plaintiff which has finally resulted in amputation of her hand and, therefore, the plaintiff, as she has proved her case based upon the documents, which have not been disputed by the Government, she is entitled for compensation, as claimed by her. 10. In the case of Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences Vs. Prasanth S. Dhananka and others reported in (2009) 6 SCC 1 , in paragraphs 49 to 51 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : 49. The observations in the aforesaid case were reiterated in State of Punjab vs. Shiv Ram & Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 1 . In this case, a suit had been filed against State of Punjab and a lady doctor, a State Government employee, claiming damages for a failed tubectomy as the woman conceived and gave birth to a child notwithstanding the procedure. The suit was decreed against the State Government. This is what this Court had to say while allowing the appeal: "The plaintiffs have not alleged that the lady surgeon who performed the sterilization operation was not competent to perform the surgery and yet ventured into doing it. It is neither the case of the plaintiffs, nor has any finding been arrived at by any of the courts below that the lady surgeon was negligent in performing the surgery. The present one is not a case where the surgeon who performed the surgery has committed breach of any duty cast on her as a surgeon. The surgery was performed by a technique known and recognized by medical science. It is a pure and simple case of sterilization operation having failed though duly performed. The present one is not a case where the surgeon who performed the surgery has committed breach of any duty cast on her as a surgeon. The surgery was performed by a technique known and recognized by medical science. It is a pure and simple case of sterilization operation having failed though duly performed. The learned Additional Advocate General has also very fairly not disputed the vicarious liability of the State, if only its employee doctor is found to have performed the surgery negligently and if the unwanted pregnancy thereafter is attributable to such negligent act or omission on the part of the employee doctor of the State." 50. The Court further held forth a caution that if doctors were frequently called upon to answer charges having criminal and civil consequences, it would frustrate and render ineffective the functioning of the medical profession as a whole and if the medical profession was "hemmed by threat of action, criminal and civil, the consequence will be a loss to the patients........ and no doctor would take a risk, a justifiable risk in the circumstances of a given case, and try to save his patient from a complicated disease or in the face of an unexpected problem that confronts him during the treatment or the surgery." 51. The evidence in the present case has to be evaluated in the background of the above observations. It is clear that a mere misjudgment or error in medical treatment by itself would not be decisive of negligence towards the patient and the knowledge of medical practice and procedure available at the time of the operation and not at the date of trial, is relevant. It is also evident that a doctor rendering treatment to a patient is expected to have reasonable competence in his field. In the aforesaid backdrop, in a case involving medical negligence, once initial burden has been discharged by the patient by making out a case of negligence on the part of the Hospital or the Doctor concerned, the onus then shifts on the Hospital or the attending Doctors and it is for the Hospital to satisfy the Court that there was no lack of care of diligence. In the present case, the plaintiff has successfully discharged the burden of establishing negligence and lack of care on the part of the Hospital which has resulted in amputation of her limb and, therefore, she is certainly entitled for compensation. 11. In the case of Kusum Sharma and others Vs. Batra Hospital and Medical Research Centre and others reported in (2010) 3 SCC 480 in paragraph 63 has held as under : 66. Lord Atkin in his speech in Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1937) A.C. 576 stated, "Simple lack of care --such as will constitute civil liability is not enough; for purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence; and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established." Thus, a clear distinction exists between "simple lack of care" incurring civil liability and "very high degree of negligence" which is required in criminal cases. Lord Porter said in his speech in the same case --"A higher degree of negligence has always been demanded in order to establish a criminal offence than is sufficient to create civil liability. (Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (10th Edn., 2001) Para 1.13). In the present case, the lack of care has been established by the plaintiff, she did lodge a protest when saline was inserted, there was a swelling and irritation in the hand and she responded with quite promptitude and the Doctor who has examined the appellant has affirmed the same before the trial Court and, therefore, as there was a lack of care which resulted in amputation of limb and, therefore, in the light of the aforesaid judgment, the plaintiff is entitled for compensation, as prayed for. 12. In the case of V. Kishan Rao Vs. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital and another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 513 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has again granted compensation, in similar circumstances, paragraph 50 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : 50. In a case where negligence is evident, the principle of res ipsa loquitur operates and the complainant does not have to prove anything as the thing (res) proves itself. In such a case it is for the respondent to prove that he has taken care and done his duty to repel the charge of negligence. In the light of the aforesaid, it is the State which is required to pay compensation. In such a case it is for the respondent to prove that he has taken care and done his duty to repel the charge of negligence. In the light of the aforesaid, it is the State which is required to pay compensation. 13. In the case of Balram Prasad Vs. Kunal Saha and others reported in (2014) 1 SCC 384 , in paragraphs 136, 139 and 187, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : 136. The liability of compensation to be apportioned by this Court on the appellant-AMRI Hospital is mentioned in paragraph 165 of the Malay Kumar Ganguly’s case which reads as under: “165. As regards, individual liability of Respondents 4, 5 and 6 is concerned, we may notice the same hereunder. As regards AMRI, it may be noticed: (i) Vital parameters of Anuradha were not examined between 11-5-1998 to 16-5-1998 (body temperature, respiration rate, pulse, BP and urine input and output). (ii) IV fluid not administered. (IV fluid administration is absolutely necessary in the first 48 hours of treating TEN.)” 139. Therefore, in the light of the rival legal contentions raised by the parties and the legal principles laid down by this Court in plethora of cases referred to supra, particularly, Savita Garg’s case, we have to infer that the appellant-AMRI Hospital is vicariously liable for its doctors. It is clearly mentioned in Savita Garg’s case that a Hospital is responsible for the conduct of its doctors both on the panel and the visiting doctors. We, therefore, direct the appellant-AMRI Hospital to pay the total amount of compensation with interest awarded in the appeal of the claimant which remains due after deducting the total amount of Rs.25 lakhs payable by the appellants-doctors as per the Order passed by this Court while answering the point no. 7. 187. The Civil Appeal No. 692/2012 filed by the appellant-AMRI Hospital is dismissed and it is liable to pay compensation as awarded in this judgment in favour of the claimant after deducting the amount fastened upon the doctors in this judgment with interest @ 6% per annum. It was held by the apex Court that a Hospital is vicariously liable for its Doctors keeping in view the judgment delivered in the case of Savita Garg Vs. National Heart Institute reported in (2004) 8 SCC 56 and the liability was fixed upon the Hospital. 14. It was held by the apex Court that a Hospital is vicariously liable for its Doctors keeping in view the judgment delivered in the case of Savita Garg Vs. National Heart Institute reported in (2004) 8 SCC 56 and the liability was fixed upon the Hospital. 14. In the present case, it is a State run Hospital and the State of Madhya Pradesh is liable to pay compensation keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. The claim before the apex Court in the case of Savita Garg (supra) was running in crores and, in the present case, only a meager amount of Rs.1,85,000/- has been claimed by the lady and this Court is of the opinion that she is certainly entitled for compensation, as prayed for. In the case of Raman Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd and others reported in (2014) 15 SCC 1 , the issue regarding compensation / damages to a victim who was electrocuted and finally the same resulted in amputation of his both the arms and left leg upto knee, was taken into account and the Electricity Board was held liable to pay compensation keeping in view the Electricity Act, 2003. 15. In almost similar case, decided by the Hon'ble Supreme court reported in (2015) 11 SCC 423 Alfred Benedict and another Vs. Manipal Hospital, Bangalore and others, a child was administered I.V. Fluid in Hospital in artery instead of vein and finally amputation of right hand for gangrene took place, the child was awarded Rs.20.00 lacs compensation with interest @ 9% p.a., Paragraphs 10 to 14 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under : 10. We have heard Learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the finding recorded by the State Commission as also the National Commission. We do not find any reason to differ with the finding that it was only because of the negligence on the part of the Hospital the two years' child developed gangrene resulting into amputation of her right arm. 11. However, taking into consideration the sufferings of the girl child, who is now 13 years of age, in our opinion the compensation awarded by the Commission is in a lower side. Learned Counsel appearing for the complainant submitted that every year she has to incur battery charges for the artificial limb, which costs Rs. 80,000/- annually. 11. However, taking into consideration the sufferings of the girl child, who is now 13 years of age, in our opinion the compensation awarded by the Commission is in a lower side. Learned Counsel appearing for the complainant submitted that every year she has to incur battery charges for the artificial limb, which costs Rs. 80,000/- annually. There cannot be any dispute that the girl will have to suffer throughout her life and has to live with artificial limb, Not only she would have to face difficulty in her education but would have also to face problem in getting herself married. Although the sufferings, agony and pain, which the girl child will carry cannot be compensated in terms of money, but, in our view, a compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs only) will be just and reasonable in order to meet the problems being faced by her and also to meet future troubles that will arise in her life. 12. With the aforesaid reason, we allow the appeal filed by the complainants being Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 35632 of 2013 by enhancing the compensation to Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs only), which shall carry simple interest of 9 per cent per annum from the date of this order. It may be made clear that out of the total compensation, a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs shall be deposited in a long term fixed deposit in a nationalized bank so that this amount along with interest, that may accrue, shall take care of her future needs. The balance Rs. 10 lakhs shall be utilized by investing Rs. 5 lakhs in a short term fixed deposit in a nationalized bank so that this amount along with accrued interest will take care of her needs in near future. The rest Rs. 5 lakhs may be spent for her further medical treatment. 13. The aforesaid compensation amount shall be paid by owner of the Hospital within six weeks from today. It is needless to say that the amount, which has already been paid, shall be adjusted out of the amount awarded by this Court. 14. In the light of aforesaid order, the civil appeal filed by the Hospital, being appeal arising out of SLP(C). CC No. 12025 of 2014, is dismissed. 16. In the case of V. Krishnakumar Vs. It is needless to say that the amount, which has already been paid, shall be adjusted out of the amount awarded by this Court. 14. In the light of aforesaid order, the civil appeal filed by the Hospital, being appeal arising out of SLP(C). CC No. 12025 of 2014, is dismissed. 16. In the case of V. Krishnakumar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in (2015) 9 SCC 388 , Hon'ble Justice Shri S. A. Bobde, while dealing with grant of compensation on account of negligent act, in paragraphs 16, 17, 18 and 19 has held as under : 16. The next question that falls for consideration is the compensation which the Respondents are liable to pay for their negligence and deficiency in service. The child called Sharanya has been rendered blind for life. The darkness in her life can never be really compensated for in money terms. Blindness can have terrible consequences. Though, Sharanya may have parents now, there is no doubt that she will not have that protection and care forever. The family belongs to the middle class and it is necessary for the father to attend to his work. Undoubtedly, the mother would not be able to take Sharanya out everywhere and is bound to leave the child alone for reasonable spells of time. During this time, it is obvious that she would require help and maybe later on in life she would have to totally rely on such help. It is therefore difficult to imagine unhindered marriage prospects or even a regular career which she may have otherwise pursued with ease. She may also face great difficulties in getting education. The parents have already incurred heavy expenditure on the treatment of Sharanya to no avail. It is, thus, obvious that there should be adequate compensation for the expenses already incurred, the pain and suffering, lost wages and the future care that would be necessary while accounting for inflationary trends. 17. There is no doubt that in the future Sharanya would require further medical attention and would have to incur costs on medicines and possible surgery. It can be reasonably said that the blindness has put Sharanya at a great disadvantage in her pursuit for making a good living to care for herself. 18. 17. There is no doubt that in the future Sharanya would require further medical attention and would have to incur costs on medicines and possible surgery. It can be reasonably said that the blindness has put Sharanya at a great disadvantage in her pursuit for making a good living to care for herself. 18. At the outset, it may be noted that in such cases, this Court has ruled out the computation of compensation according to the multiplier method. (See Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha and Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prashant S. Dhananka and Ors. The court rightly warned against the straightjacket approach of using the multiplier method for calculating damages in medical negligence cases. Quantification of Compensation 19. The principle of awarding compensation that can be safely relied on is restitutio in integrum. This principle has been recognized and relied on in Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Sukumar Mukherjee and in Balram Prasad's case (supra), in the following passage from the latter: 170. Indisputably, grant of compensation involving an accident is within the realm of law of torts. It is based on the principle of restitutio in integrum. The said principle provides that a person entitled to damages should, as nearly as possible, get that sum of money which would put him in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong. (See Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co.). An application of this principle is that the aggrieved person should get that sum of money, which would put him in the same position if he had not sustained the wrong. It must necessarily result in compensating the aggrieved person for the financial loss suffered due to the event, the pain and suffering undergone and the liability that he/she would have to incur due to the disability caused by the event. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken into account the principle of restitutio in integrum and has held that based upon the aforesaid principle, the aggrieved person should get that sum of money which would put him in the same position if he had not sustained the wrong. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken into account the principle of restitutio in integrum and has held that based upon the aforesaid principle, the aggrieved person should get that sum of money which would put him in the same position if he had not sustained the wrong. 17. In the present case, the plaintiff who is a lady was earning her livelihood by working as a Labourer, she was involved in the job of stitching and now one entire limb has gone above the elbow and, therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the compensation claimed was too meager and the trial Court as there was sufficient evidence on record, has certainly erred in law and facts in dismissing her plaint. 18. The apex Court again on account of amputation of both the limbs while taking into account law of tort, has awarded Rs.90.00 lacs with interest to a child who lost both the arms on account of electrocution, in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh and others Vs. Naval Kumar alias Rohit Kumar reported in (2017) 3 SCC 115 . In the light of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the plaintiff has certainly made out a case. The issues framed in the matter are duly proved. 19. Resultantly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the plaintiff has been able to make out a case for grant of compensation, as prayed for, and the same is accordingly granted to her by allowing the prayer made in the plaint. Keeping in view the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, specially in light of the percentage of the disability (amputation of one limb above elbow joint) and in the considered opinion of this Court, the plaintiff has prayed for a very meager amount of compensation to the tune of Rs.1,85,000/-, and therefore, the prayer made by the plaintiff is hereby allowed. The plaintiff shall be entitled for compensation to the tune of Rs.1,85,000/- along with interest @ 9% per annum right from the date on which the suit was filed. With the aforesaid, the present First Appeal stands allowed with costs. A decree be drawn accordingly.